On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party

The existence of various non-proletarian ideas in the Communist Party organization in the Fourth Army of the Red Army greatly impedes the implementation of the Party's correct line. Unless these are thoroughly corrected, the Fourth Army will surely be unable to shoulder the tasks assigned to it by China's great revolutionary struggle. The source of all such incorrect ideas in the Party organization in the Fourth Army lies, of course, in the fact that the basic sections of its rank and file are composed mainly of peasants and other elements of petty-bourgeois origin, but the failure of the Party's leading bodies to wage a concerted and resolute struggle against these incorrect ideas and to educate the members in the Party's correct line is also an important cause of their existence and growth. Acting on the spirit of the September letter from the Central Committee, the congress points out the manifestations, the sources, and the methods of correction of all non-proletarian ideas in the Party organization in the Fourth Army, and calls upon all comrades to rise up and thoroughly eliminate them.

On the Purely Military Viewpoint

The purely military viewpoint is highly developed among a number of comrades in the Red Army. It manifests itself as follows:

1. Some hold that the military and the political are opposed to each other and refuse to recognize that the military is only one of the means for accomplishing political tasks. Some even go so far as to say, "If the military is good, naturally the political will be good; if the military is bad, the political can't be good either"—a step further in attributing the leading role to military affairs.

2. Some think that the task of the Red Army, like that of the White army, is merely to fight. They fail to understand that the Chinese Red Army is an armed body for carrying out the political tasks of the revolution. Especially at present, the Red Army should certainly not confine itself to fighting; besides fighting to destroy the enemy's military strength, it must also shoulder such important tasks as spreading propaganda among the masses, organizing the masses, arming them, and helping them to establish revolutionary political power and even to set up Party organizations. The Red Army does not fight merely for the sake of fighting but in order to conduct propaganda among the masses, organize them, arm them, and help them to establish revolutionary political power; without these objectives—spreading propaganda, organizing and arming the masses, and helping them to establish revolutionary political power—fighting loses all meaning, and the Red Army loses the reason for its existence.

3. Hence, organizationally, the purely military viewpoint leads to subordinating the Red Army's political work organs to its military work organs and to putting forward the slogan, "Let Army Headquarters handle outside matters." Carried to its logical conclusion, this idea would mean the danger of alienating the masses, using the army to control the political power, and departing from proletarian leadership—the road of warlordism, as taken by the Kuomintang army.

4. At the same time, this viewpoint leads to neglect of the importance of propaganda teams in propaganda work and to neglect of the organization of the soldiers' committees in the army and of the local workers and peasants in mass organization. As a result, both propaganda and organizational work have come to be virtually abandoned.

5. It leads to pride in victory and dejection in defeat.

6. It leads to departmentalism—everything is considered only from the standpoint of the Fourth Army, and it is not realized that arming the local masses is one of the important tasks of the Red Army. This is a magnified form of narrow group egoism.

7. A few comrades, confined within the narrow environment of the Fourth Army, think that aside from it there are no other revolutionary forces. Hence the deeply rooted idea of conserving strength and avoiding struggle. This is a remnant of opportunism.

8. Some comrades, regardless of subjective and objective conditions, suffer from the revolutionary impatience of an acute disease, unwilling to engage painstakingly in the small-scale, meticulous mass work but full of illusions and wanting only to do great things. This is a remnant of putschism.

The sources of the purely military viewpoint are:

1. A low political level. Hence the failure to recognize the role of political leadership in the army and to recognize that the Red Army and the White army are fundamentally different.

2. The mentality of mercenaries. The many prisoners of war captured in successive battles who have joined the Red Army have brought with them a strong mercenary mentality, thereby forming a lower stratum that provides a base for the purely military viewpoint.

3. Confidence, arising from the two previous causes, in military strength alone and lack of confidence in the strength of the masses.

4. Lack of active attention to and discussion of military work by the Party, which is also a reason why such a viewpoint exists among a section of the comrades.

The methods of correction are as follows:

1. Raise the political level within the Party through education, eradicate the theoretical roots of the purely military viewpoint, and make clear the fundamental distinction between the Red Army and the White army. At the same time, uproot all remnants of opportunism and putschism and break down the departmentalism of the Fourth Army.

2. Intensify the political training of both officers and men, and especially the education of ex-prisoners. At the same time, so far as possible, have local organs of political power select experienced workers and peasants who have been in struggle and send them into the Red Army, so as to weaken and eventually eliminate the organizational source of the purely military viewpoint.

3. Encourage local Party organizations and mass organs of political power to criticize the Red Army Party and the Red Army itself, so as to influence the Party and the officers and men of the Red Army.

4. The Party must give active attention to and discussion of military work. All work must be discussed and decided upon by the Party before being executed through the masses.

5. Draw up Red Army rules and regulations clearly defining its tasks, the relationship between the military and the political work systems, the relationship between the Red Army and the masses of the people, and the functions and powers of the soldiers' committees and their relationship with the military and political organs.

On Ultra-Democracy

Since the Fourth Army of the Red Army accepted the directives of the Central Committee, the phenomena of ultra-democracy have been greatly reduced. For example, Party decisions are now more readily carried out, and no one any longer puts forward the erroneous demands, such as that the Red Army should apply "a system of democratic centralism from below," or that "lower levels should discuss first and higher levels make decisions afterward." In actual fact, however, this reduction is only a temporary and superficial phenomenon and does not mean that ultra-democratic ideas have already been eliminated. That is to say, the roots of ultra-democracy are still deeply embedded in the thinking of many comrades. The evidence for this is the various expressions of reluctance in carrying out Party decisions.

The methods of correction are:

1. Eradicate all roots of ultra-democracy theoretically. First, it should be pointed out that the danger of ultra-democracy lies in the damage it does, down to the total destruction, of the Party organization, and the weakening and undermining, down to the complete ruin, of the Party's fighting capacity, thus rendering the Party unable to shoulder its fighting tasks and causing the defeat of the revolution. Next, it should be pointed out that the source of ultra-democracy consists in the loose, undisciplined nature of the petty bourgeoisie. When this loose, undisciplined nature is brought into the Party, it develops into ultra-democratic ideas both politically and organizationally. These ideas are utterly incompatible with the fighting tasks of the proletariat.

2. Organizationally, ensure democratic life under centralized guidance. The line to be followed is:
   a. The Party's leading organs must follow a correct line of guidance and produce effective methods when problems arise, so as to establish themselves as centers of leadership.
   b. The higher organs must have a good knowledge of the conditions in the lower organs and of the life of the masses, thus providing an objective basis for correct guidance.
   c. No Party organization at any level should make casual decisions. Once a decision is reached, it must be firmly carried out.
   d. All decisions of the higher Party organs that are of an important nature must be promptly transmitted to the lower Party organs and the Party members among the masses. The method to be used is to convene meetings of activists or general Party membership meetings of Party branches or even of the columns (depending on what circumstances permit), sending out people to attend and make reports.
   e. The lower Party organs and the Party members among the masses must thoroughly discuss the directives from higher organs, in order to understand their meaning thoroughly and decide on the methods of carrying them out.

On the Non-Organizational Viewpoint

The non-organizational viewpoint existing in the Party organization in the Fourth Army manifests itself as follows:

A. The minority does not submit to the majority. For example, when a proposal put forward by a minority is voted down, they fail to sincerely carry out the Party decision.

Methods of correction:

1. At meetings, all participants should be encouraged to voice their opinions as fully as possible. On disputed questions, the rights and wrongs should be clarified, and no compromises or glossing over should be tolerated. If a question cannot be settled in one session, discussion should be continued at a second session (provided this does not interfere with work), in order to reach an unequivocal conclusion.
2. One of the points of Party discipline is that the minority must submit to the majority. The minority, if their views have been voted down, must support the resolution passed by the majority. Except to bring the matter up for discussion again at the next meeting if necessary, they must not show any opposition in their actions.

B. Non-organizational criticism:

1. Criticism within the Party is a weapon for strengthening the Party organization and increasing its fighting capacity. In the Red Army Party, however, criticism does not always take this form, and sometimes turns into purely personal attack. As a result, it harms both the individual and the Party organization. This is a manifestation of petty-bourgeois individualism. The method of correction consists in helping Party members understand that the purpose of criticism is to increase the Party's fighting capacity so as to achieve victory in the class struggle, and that they should not use criticism as a means of personal attack.
2. Many Party members make criticisms not inside the Party but outside. This is because, generally speaking, they have not yet grasped the importance of the Party organization (its meetings, etc.) and see no difference between criticism inside and outside the organization. The method of correction is to educate Party members so that they understand the importance of the Party organization, and make criticisms of Party committee members or other comrades at Party meetings.

On Absolute Equalitarianism

At one time, absolute egalitarianism ran very high in the Red Army. Examples: It was opposed to giving allowances to wounded soldiers on the basis of the severity of their wounds and insisted on equal distribution to all. When officers rode on horseback, this was viewed not as something necessary for work but as a sign of inequality. Equal distribution of supplies was demanded in the most extreme fashion, with unwillingness to allow any special groups to have slightly more. In carrying rice, it was demanded that everyone, regardless of age or physical strength, carry the same load. In housing, billets were expected to be equally distributed, and cursing would break out if the headquarters occupied a slightly larger room. In assigning fatigue duties, absolute equality was demanded, and anyone would refuse to perform a share that was a little heavier. Even when two wounded soldiers were assigned to one stretcher, they would rather see both stay behind than have one carried away. All this shows that absolute equalitarianism is still very serious among the officers and men of the Red Army.

Like ultra-democracy in the political sphere, absolute equalitarianism is a product of a handicraft and small-peasant economy, the only difference being that one appears in the sphere of material life while the other appears in the sphere of political life.

The method of correction: It must be pointed out that absolute equalitarianism is nothing but the illusion of a peasants' and small proprietors' outlook; even before the abolition of capitalism, it is no more than a peasant and petty-bourgeois fantasy. Even under socialism, the distribution of material things can never be absolutely equal, but must follow the principle of "from each according to his ability, to each according to his work" and the needs of the work. The material distribution in the Red Army must be roughly equal, as, for instance, in the case of equal pay for officers and men, because this is required by the circumstances of the present struggle. But absolute equalitarianism beyond reason must be opposed, because it is not required by the struggle; on the contrary, it hinders the struggle.

On Subjectivism

Subjectivism exists to a considerable degree among certain Party members, and this is highly detrimental to the analysis of the political situation and the guidance of work. The inevitable result of subjectivist analysis of the political situation and subjectivist guidance of work is either opportunism or putschism. As for subjectivist criticism within the Party, loose, groundless talk, or mutual suspicion, these often give rise to unprincipled disputes within the Party and undermine the Party organization.

With regard to criticism within the Party, there is one more point that should be mentioned: some comrades ignore the major issues in their criticism and confine themselves to minor points. They do not understand that the main task of criticism is to point out political and organizational mistakes. As for personal shortcomings, unless they are linked with political and organizational mistakes, there is no need to be overly severe and cause comrades to become too timid to act. Moreover, once such criticism develops, the spirit of the Party becomes entirely concentrated on minor shortcomings, everyone becomes a scrupulous, overcautious "gentleman," and the Party's political tasks are forgotten. This is a very great danger.

The method of correction is mainly to educate Party members so that their thinking and the inner-Party life become both political and scientific. To achieve this, it is necessary to: (1) educate Party members to apply the Marxist-Leninist method to analyzing the political situation and assessing class forces, in place of making subjectivist analyses and assessments;

2) Make Party members pay attention to social and economic investigation and research, so as to determine the tactics of struggle and methods of work, and help comrades understand that without investigating the actual situation, they will fall into the deep pit of fantasy and blind action.


3) Inner-Party criticism should guard against subjectivism, dogmatism, and the vulgarization of criticism; statements should be evidence-based, and criticism should pay attention to politics.


**On Individualism**

The individualistic tendencies within the Party in the Red Army manifest as follows:

1. Vengefulness. When criticized by a soldier comrade within the Party, a person may seek an opportunity outside the Party to retaliate against him; beating and scolding are forms of such retaliation. Revenge is also sought within the Party: if you criticize me at this meeting, I will find fault with you at the next meeting to retaliate. This vengefulness arises entirely from an individualistic viewpoint, disregarding both class interests and the interests of the Party as a whole. Its target is not the hostile class, but rather other individuals within one’s own ranks. This acts as a corrosive agent that weakens the organization and diminishes its fighting capacity.

2. Cliquism. Concern only for the interests of one’s own small group, with no regard for the overall interests. While superficially not for the individual, it actually embodies an extremely narrow individualism and has an equally significant corrosive and centrifugal effect. The atmosphere of cliquism has long been prevalent in the Red Army, and though it has improved somewhat following criticism, its remnants still persist and must be diligently overcome.

3. Mercenary mentality. Failure to recognize that both the Party and the Red Army are instruments for carrying out revolutionary tasks, and that one is a member of them. Failure to recognize that one is the subject of the revolution, thinking that one bears responsibility only to the individual superior officer, not to the revolution. This passive, mercenary attitude toward the revolution is also a manifestation of individualism. This mercenary revolutionary mentality is the reason why unconditionally hardworking active elements are not very numerous. If the mercenary mentality is not eliminated, the number of active elements cannot increase, and the heavy burden of the revolution will always rest on the shoulders of a few, to the great detriment of the struggle.

4. Hedonism. Individualism manifested in the pursuit of pleasure is also found among quite a few in the Red Army. They always hope that the troops will march into the big cities. Their aim in going to the big cities is not to work, but to seek pleasure. They are most unwilling to work in the Red areas where life is hard.

5. Passivity and slackening in work. A slight dissatisfaction makes them become passive and stop working. The main reason for this is lack of education, but there are also cases where leaders handle problems, assign tasks, or enforce discipline improperly.

6. Desire to leave the ranks. The number of people working in the Red Army who demand to leave the forces and be transferred to local work is increasing daily. The reasons for this are not entirely personal; they also include: first, the excessively poor material conditions of the Red Army; second, fatigue from prolonged struggle; and third, inappropriate handling of problems, assignment of work, or enforcement of discipline by leaders.

Methods of correction: The main approach is to strengthen education to ideologically rectify individualism. Furthermore, problems should be handled, work assigned, and discipline enforced appropriately. Efforts must also be made to improve the material conditions of the Red Army, utilizing every possible opportunity for rest and reorganization to enhance material conditions. The social origin of individualism is the reflection of petty-bourgeois and bourgeois ideas within the Party, and this point must be made clear when carrying out education.


**On Roving-Rebel Mentality**

Owing to the large proportion of déclassé elements in the Red Army and the existence of vast numbers of roving people throughout the country, especially in the southern provinces, the political ideology of roving-rebel mentality has arisen within the Red Army. This mentality manifests in: first, an unwillingness to do hard work to establish base areas and set up the political power of the masses, and from there to extend political influence, preferring instead to use the method of fluid guerrilla actions merely to extend political influence. Second, in expanding the Red Army, not following the path of expanding from local Red Guards[5] and local Red Army units to expanding the main Red Army forces, but opting for the method of "recruiting soldiers and buying horses" and "soliciting defectors and recruiting mutineers." Third, impatience with waging arduous struggle together with the masses, merely hoping to dash into the big cities to eat, drink, and make merry. All these manifestations of the roving-rebel mentality greatly hinder the Red Army in carrying out its correct tasks; therefore, eliminating this mentality is truly an important objective in the inner-Party ideological struggle of the Red Army. It must be understood that the roving-rebel mentality of the type seen historically with Huang Chao and Li Chuang[6] is no longer permitted by today’s environment.

Methods of correction: (1) Intensify education, criticize incorrect ideas, and eradicate roving-rebel mentality. (2) Step up education against hooligan consciousness among the basic ranks of the existing Red Army and newly arrived prisoners of war. (3) Win over activist elements of workers and peasants who have experience in struggle to join the ranks of the Red Army, thereby changing the composition of the Red Army. (4) Create new Red Army units from among the struggling worker and peasant masses.


**On Remnants of Putschism**

The struggle against putschism has already been conducted within the Red Army Party, yet it remains insufficient. Consequently, remnants of putschist ideology still exist in the Red Army. Its manifestations include: first, reckless action irrespective of subjective and objective conditions. Second, incomplete and irresolute implementation of urban policy. Third, lax military discipline, especially during defeats. Fourth, the practice within some units of burning houses. Fifth, the system of executing deserters and the practice of corporal punishment also carry a putschist character. The social origin of putschism is a synthesis of lumpen-proletarian ideology and petty-bourgeois ideology.

Methods of correction: (1) Ideologically eradicate putschism. (2) Rectify putschist actions institutionally and through policy.


**On the Organizational Problems of the Party**

The organizational problems of the Red Army Party have now reached an extremely critical stage. In particular, the poor quality of Party members and the laxity of organization have greatly affected the leadership of the Red Army and the implementation of policies. The congress has therefore made a detailed analysis and decision regarding this issue. Comrades should strive, in the spirit of the congress, to transform the Party organization, ensuring that it can indeed shoulder the Party's political tasks; only thus can success be achieved.

**I. The Party’s Organizational Line**

1. The line for expanding Party membership should make combat soldiers the primary target. At the same time, non-combat personnel such as porters, orderlies, etc., should not be neglected. 2. Building a Party branch in every company and a Party cell in every squad—this is one of the important principles of Party organization in the Red Army. In units where the number of Party members is too small to realistically establish a cell in each squad, the cell should temporarily be organized by platoon, and the cell members systematically assigned to each squad, but it must be understood that this is a transitional measure. 3. The previous method in the Red Army of organizing cells by mixing cadre members with ordinary members, and intellectual elements with laboring elements, is entirely correct. However, there is still a lack of planned, proper mixing of elements from different backgrounds and with different abilities; this point requires greater attention in the future. As for simply organizing cadre members into separate cells, that is inadmissible.

**II. On the Problem of Lax Organization in the Party**

1. The current state of the Party organization in the Fourth Army:

a. Admission to the Party is too casual; many who are unqualified for Party membership are pulled in, especially officers who are indiscriminately admitted without any conditions. As a result, the quality of the Party has become very poor.

b. Party departments at all levels manage to solve problems in their work but have completely forgotten the task of educating comrades. Training-type meetings, such as congresses of activists, joint meetings of secretaries, publicity committee members, and organization committee members, joint meetings of committee members and organization committee members, branch congresses, and general membership meetings of columns or detachments,[7] are held very infrequently.

c. Generally, discipline is lax. Especially in cases where a person holds an important post with no one to replace him, his errors are often glossed over without enforcing discipline. When this is done for one person, it has to be done for others too, resulting in a general relaxation of discipline.

d. Since all officers have become Party members, the result is that the staff of all military and political organs pay little attention to their work as part of their social profession, regarding social-professional work as Party work and inseparable from it. For instance, military work conferences and political work conferences at various levels are almost entirely absent; once the Party decides something, it is considered settled, and the matter of Party members playing a core role in their social professions is simply never discussed.

e. Relations between higher and lower levels are not close. Reports from lower levels seldom receive written replies or instructions from above. Higher levels seldom dispatch representatives to attend lower-level meetings. While this is admittedly due to the imperfect organization of higher-level organs, the lack of an active working attitude on the part of higher-level organs also contributes to the lack of guidance, or lack of detailed guidance, for lower-level organs. This is particularly true regarding guidance for practical work—for example, guiding the work of a unit departing for guerrilla operations—where there is a general lack of detail; there are even a few units that receive almost no guidance at all, not even in a rough outline.

f. Many branch congresses and cell meetings are not held on schedule.

2. Lines of correction:

a. Resolutely purge the old membership base: Those with erroneous political concepts, opium users, those who seek to make illicit fortunes, gamblers, and the like, who refuse to mend their ways despite repeated admonitions—whether cadres or non-cadres—shall all be expelled from the Party.

b. Conditions for new members joining the Party in the future: (1) No errors in political concepts (including class consciousness); (2) Loyalty; (3) A spirit of self-sacrifice, capable of active work; (4) No concept of seeking illicit fortunes; (5) Does not consume opium, does not gamble. Only those who fully meet these five conditions may be introduced into the Party. The introducer must first verify whether the person to be introduced genuinely fulfills the above conditions and complete the necessary procedures for introduction. After joining the Party, the new member must be told in detail about branch life (including secret work) and the key points that a Party member must observe. The introducer bears corresponding responsibility for the person introduced. The branch committee shall appoint someone to talk with the person about to join the Party to check whether he meets the entry requirements.

c. Party departments at all levels are not merely for solving problems and guiding practical work; they also have the significant task of educating comrades. Various meetings for training comrades, and other training methods such as training classes and discussion meetings, must all be conducted in a planned manner.

d. Strictly enforce discipline; put an end to the perfunctory handling of disciplinary matters.

e. Distinguish clearly between the nature of a Party member's social profession and his Party work. Every Party member (other than those who hold important or specialized tasks within the Party and are revolutionary professionals) must assume a social profession, and simultaneously, within that social profession, bear the work given to him by the Party.

f. The working attitude of Party departments at all levels must become more active than before. Lower levels must make detailed reports to higher levels; higher levels must hold detailed discussions of these reports and provide replies, and whenever possible, send representatives to attend lower-level meetings. The excuses of understaffing, weak work capacity, or insufficient working time must not be used to gloss over inactivity and lead to neglecting this work.

g. Branch committees, and all Party departments at or above the branch committee level, should systematically stipulate the materials for discussion at branch congresses and cell meetings each month, set the dates for the meetings, and rigorously supervise their convening.

**III. How to Make Party Members Interested in Attending Meetings**

1. Reasons for Party members' lack of interest in attending meetings:

a. Not understanding the significance of meetings. The important significance of branch meetings lies, first, in solving problems. All issues concerning the struggle, as well as internal issues, must be intensively discussed at meetings in order to be resolved. If a person does not attend meetings or does not actively voice opinions at them, it means he does not understand the political significance of the meetings, meaning he has no interest in the struggle. Anyone who is active in the struggle is certainly keen to attend meetings and eager to speak. Second, it lies in educating comrades. Meetings not only solve problems, but in the process of doing so, they examine the context of the issues and refer to the instructions from higher levels. This galvanizes the mental faculties and energies of the comrades; through the meetings becoming political and practical in character, the mind of every comrade likewise becomes political and practical. When every comrade is thus political and practical, the fighting strength of the Party grows immensely powerful. This is the educational significance of meetings. Because Party members in the Red Army do not understand this significance, it becomes the first reason for their reluctance to attend meetings or their lack of interest in doing so.

b. Resolutions that are made but not implemented, or long delays in receiving replies to requests submitted to higher levels, thereby reducing interest in discussion.

3. Responsible persons do not prepare well in advance.

They do not prepare agendas; they are unclear about the content and circumstances of issues, nor do they prepare any opinions on how to resolve problems.

4. The chairman readily cuts off Party members’ speeches. If a speech slightly digresses from the topic, it is immediately forbidden, and the speaker becomes discouraged and silent.

If there are mistakes in a speech, besides stopping it, the speaker is also ridiculed.

5. The meeting order is feudal in style—rigid, lifeless, and attending a meeting is like sitting in prison.

(2) Methods of Correction: First, meetings must be politicalized and made practical.
Second, the great significance of meetings must be constantly reminded to comrades, especially new Party members and those who are not active in work.
Third, resolutions should not be made lightly; once a resolution is made, it must be firmly implemented.
Fourth, higher-level organs must promptly answer questions raised by lower-level organs, without delaying so long that momentum is lost.
Fifth, responsible persons must prepare agendas in advance, and the agendas must be concrete; they must first investigate and clarify the content and circumstances of issues, and also think in advance about how to resolve them.
Sixth, the chairman must employ good techniques in guiding meetings, leading the mass discussion to flow toward a certain issue; however, if an important digression beyond the topic arises, not only should it not be brusquely stopped in a way that spoils the atmosphere, but its key points should be valued, seized upon, introduced to everyone, and made into a new topic for discussion.
Only in this way will meetings be lively and interesting, problems truly solved, and meetings truly fulfill their educational significance.
Seventh, abolish the feudal meeting order.
The meeting order of the Communist Party should reflect the active, lively, and straightforward spirit of the proletariat, and these should be made the order.

IV. Youth Organizations within the Red Army Party and Their Work
(1) In the army, the interests of youth and adults cannot be divided, and the Youth League has no special work targets. Furthermore, Party cells organized by squad are advantageous for the struggle. Therefore, there is no need to set up Youth League cells within Party branches.
(2) Because the youth among Party members have different moods compared to adults, besides generally receiving Party training, they also need to receive a special kind of youth education. Moreover, since winning over the masses of young workers and peasants is one of the Party’s important tasks, a specialized organization is necessary to undertake this work. Therefore, Party members under twenty years of age (except in special circumstances such as holding important Party positions) should be separated out within the branch to form a youth work conference. Such conferences, in addition to being regularly convened on a planned basis with the brigade [8] as the unit, should also have meetings convened at appropriate times at the detachment and column levels.
(3) In order to plan the education of youth Party members, plan methods for winning over the masses of young workers and peasants, and guide the youth work conferences, a youth work committee of five persons shall be established within each of the Front Committee and the Column Committees [9]. Brigade committees and branch committees shall each appoint one youth committee member to carry out work under the guidance of Party organs at their respective levels.

V. The Relationship between Political Commissars and Inner-Party Work
The general principle for the Party secretaries at the brigade and detachment levels is not to concurrently serve as political commissars. However, in units lacking personnel, they may still temporarily serve concurrently. For political commissars who do not hold the responsibility of Party secretary, the higher-level Party organ may, depending on the situation and when conditions permit, appoint them as special Party representatives, with the task of guiding the work of that level’s Party organ.

VI. The Issue of the Highest Party Organ for Directly Subordinate Units
For the directly subordinate units of the army and each column, a Directly Subordinate Unit Committee shall be organized as the highest Party organ, with five to seven committee members.

VII. The Issue of Soldiers’ Committee Party Fractions [10]
Brigade-level Soldiers’ Committees shall not set up Party fractions; their work shall be guided by the brigade Party committee [11]. Column-level Soldiers’ Committees shall set up Party fractions, which shall be guided by the column Party committee.

Inner-Party Education Issues
I. Significance
The most urgent issue within the Red Army Party is the matter of education. For the health and expansion of the Red Army, and to be able to shoulder the tasks of struggle, we must start from inner-Party education. Without raising the political level within the Party and eradicating various deviations within the Party, it is absolutely impossible to make the Red Army healthy and expand it, much less to shoulder significant struggle tasks. Therefore, carrying out inner-Party education in a planned way and correcting the past unplanned, laissez-faire state of affairs is one of the Party’s important tasks. The congress stipulates that the following materials and methods be used to educate Party members, and the Party’s leading organs shall have more detailed discussions to carry out this task.

II. Materials
(1) Political analysis; (2) Discussion of notices from higher guiding organs; (3) Common knowledge on organization; (4) Correction of the eight erroneous ideologies within the Red Army Party [12]; (5) Discussion on the issues of anti-opportunism and the Trotskyist opposition [13]; (6) Strategies and techniques of mass work; (7) Investigation and study of the social economy in guerrilla areas; (8) Study of Marxism-Leninism; (9) Study of social and economic sciences; (10) The current stage of the revolution and its future prospects.
Of the ten items above, except for a portion (such as the study of social and economic sciences) which is, in practice, limited in applicability to cadres, the rest are all applicable to ordinary Party members.

III. Methods
(1) Party newspapers; (2) Political bulletins; (3) Compilation of various educational pamphlets for comrades; (4) Training classes; (5) Organized distribution of reading materials; (6) Reading newspapers to illiterate Party members; (7) Individual talks; (8) Criticism; (9) Cell meetings; (10) Branch general meetings; (11) Joint meetings of branch committees and cell leaders; (12) Meetings of activists from group leader level and above with the column as the unit; (13) Army-wide general meetings of activists at the branch secretary level and above; (14) General Party member meetings with the column as the unit; (15) Joint meetings of secretaries, propaganda officers, and organization officers at all levels with the column as the unit; (16) Army-wide joint meetings of secretaries, propaganda officers, and organization officers at the detachment level and above; (17) Political discussion meetings; (18) Appropriate assignment of Party members to participate in practical work.

Red Army Propaganda Work Issues
I. The Significance of Red Army Propaganda Work
The task of Red Army propaganda work is to expand political influence and win over the broad masses. Only through the realization of this propaganda task can the Red Army’s overall tasks—organizing the masses, arming the masses, establishing political power, eliminating reactionary forces, and promoting a revolutionary high tide—be achieved. Therefore, the propaganda work of the Red Army is its primary major task. Neglecting this work is tantamount to abandoning the Red Army’s main task and, in practice, amounts to helping the ruling class weaken the strength of the Red Army.

II. The Current State of Red Army Propaganda Work
(1) Deficiencies in Propaganda Content:
1. No specific political program has been issued (previously issued political programs, such as four-character proclamations, were not specific);
2. Neglect of propaganda and agitation for the masses’ daily struggles;
3. Neglect of winning over the urban poor;
4. Neglect of propaganda directed at the female masses;
5. Insufficient propaganda directed at the youth masses;
6. Insufficient propaganda directed at the lumpenproletariat;
7. Very little propaganda aimed at destroying the armed organizations of the landlord class (militia, Peace Preservation Corps [14], etc.);
8. Propaganda lacks timeliness and local relevance.

(2) Deficiencies in Propaganda Techniques:
1. The propaganda teams are unsound.
(1) The number of propagandists has been reduced from five per large brigade to three; some have only one or two, some have only one, and a few units have none at all.
(2) The composition of propagandists is very poor; they include captured soldiers, cooks and grooms, opium smokers, those who had suspicions of desertion and were disarmed and shoved into the propaganda team, those who failed as clerks [15] and were sent to the propaganda team, and those who were disabled and unwanted by other work departments and pushed into the propaganda team. The current propaganda teams have simply become dumping grounds, utterly incapable of carrying out their tasks.
(3) Almost all officers and soldiers unanimously ostracize the propaganda teams (also because the propagandists’ poor quality and meager work results cause general dissatisfaction). "Idlers," "sellers of fake plasters"—these are the titles commonly given to propagandists.
(4) The propaganda teams lack sufficient propaganda funds.
(5) There is no plan for training propagandists, and supervision of their work is also poor. Consequently, the work of the propaganda teams is extremely haphazard; whether a little is done or none at all, no one cares.
2. Leaflets, proclamations, declarations, etc., are stale and not fresh, and their distribution and mailing are ineffective.
3. Very few wall newspapers are produced; the political bulletins are too brief in content and appear too infrequently, and the print is too small to read clearly.
4. Revolutionary songs and ballads are virtually nonexistent.
5. Only a few pictorials have been produced.
6. Dramatic propaganda (street theater) is completely absent.
7. Clubs, which serve the dual purpose of entertaining soldiers and approaching the worker-peasant masses, have not been set up.
8. Oral propaganda is both sparse and poorly done.
9. Red Army discipline is a form of practical propaganda to the masses; the current discipline is laxer than before, thus giving a bad impression to the masses.
10. Putting back door boards, bundling up straw, sweeping floors, speaking kindly, buying and selling fairly, returning borrowed items, and compensating for losses—these are all forms of Red Army propaganda, and currently they are inadequately performed.
11. Mass meetings are rarely held, and when they are, they are poorly conducted.
12. Propaganda methods targeting White Army soldiers are ineffective.

III. Lines of Correction
(1) Regarding Propaganda Content:
1. Issue a specific political program, to be called the Red Army Political Program.
2. Propaganda must fit the masses’ mood for struggle. Besides generally issuing slogans for insurrection, there must also be slogans suited to the daily lives of places where the masses’ mood for struggle is still low, in order to ignite daily struggles and link them to the insurrectionary slogans.
3. The urban poor (small and medium merchants and students) constitute a significant force in the process of the democratic revolution. Neglecting to win over this force is tantamount to handing them over to the gentry and bourgeoisie. From now on, in-depth propaganda work must be conducted to win over small and medium urban merchants and student masses.
4. Women make up half the population. The economic position of working women and their particularly oppressed condition not only prove women’s urgent need for revolution but also show they are a force that determines the success or failure of revolution. From now on, there must be practical slogans and widespread propaganda directed at women.
5. The toiling youth masses account for over 30 percent of the population, and in struggles they are the bravest and most resolute. Therefore, propaganda aimed at winning over the youth masses is an important task within the overall propaganda task.
6. If the vast masses of the lumpenproletariat in China stand on the side of the revolutionary class, they become a tool of revolution; if they stand on the side of the reactionary class, they become a tool of counterrevolution. Therefore, winning over the lumpenproletarian masses from under the influence of the reactionary class is one of the Party’s propaganda tasks. When carrying out propaganda work, attention must be paid to the differences in life and character among various segments of the lumpenproletariat, and propaganda must be targeted at them accordingly.
7. The destruction of the landlord class’s armed organizations and the winning over of their members are among the conditions for the victory of the agrarian revolution in the countryside. From now on, special attention must be paid to propaganda work targeting the rank-and-file masses of the militia, Peace Preservation Corps, etc.
8. When arriving at a locality, there must be propaganda and agitation slogans suited to that locality, and at different times (such as autumn harvest and the New Year period, the period of the Chiang-Gui War [16] and the period of the Wang-Chiang War [17]), different propaganda and agitation slogans must be devised.

(2) Regarding Propaganda Techniques:
1. The Propaganda Team Issue
(1) Significance
The Red Army’s propaganda teams are crucial instruments of Red Army propaganda work. If the propaganda teams are not properly managed, a large part of the Red Army’s propaganda task will be abandoned. Therefore, the issue of reorganizing and training the propaganda teams is currently one of the tasks on which the Party must intensify its efforts. The first step in this work is to theoretically correct the widespread contemptuous views among officers and soldiers toward propaganda work and the propaganda teams. Strange terms such as "idlers" and "sellers of fake plasters" should henceforth be abolished.
(2) Organization
a. With the detachment as the unit, the directly subordinate units of the army and each column shall each form one unit. Each unit shall organize a company, with one company commander and one deputy commander, sixteen propagandists, one porter (to carry propaganda materials), and two orderlies. The propagandists of each company shall be divided into several squads (the number of squads to be determined based on the number of large brigades or other troops and organs), each squad having one squad leader and three propagandists.
b. The propaganda teams of each detachment shall be under the command of the detachment political commissar. When large brigades operate separately as guerrillas, each large brigade shall be assigned one propaganda squad to work alongside it, under the command of the large brigade political commissar. The propaganda teams of directly subordinate units shall be under the command of the propaganda section chief of the political department. All propaganda teams within a column shall be under the command of the propaganda section of the column political department. All army propaganda teams shall be under the command of the propaganda section of the army political department.

C. The operating expenses of the propaganda teams shall be issued by the Political Department and must be sufficient for their needs.


D. As for methods to improve the composition of propaganda personnel: in addition to requesting local governments to select progressive elements to join the Red Army’s propaganda teams, outstanding individuals shall be chosen from among the soldiers of various units (where possible, squad leaders should not be transferred) to serve as propagandists.


The Political Department should regularly formulate plans for training propaganda teams, specifying the training materials, methods, duration, and instructors, so as to actively enhance the quality of the propagandists.


2. Existing propaganda documents such as leaflets, notices, and manifestos should be reviewed, and new ones should be drafted as quickly as possible.


The appropriate and effective distribution of propaganda materials should be an important item in the technical work of the propaganda teams.


Political work organs should pay attention to and excel at mailing propaganda materials, inserting propaganda materials into mail items, or printing propaganda and agitational slogans on mail items.


3. Wall newspapers are one of the important methods of propaganda directed at the masses.


Each army and each column shall operate one wall newspaper as a unit. They shall be the responsibility of the Propaganda Section of the Political Department, and all shall be named *Current Events Bulletin*.


The content shall include: (1) international and domestic political news; (2) the situation of mass struggles in the guerrilla areas; (3) the work situation of the Red Army.


At least one issue shall be produced every week, all written on large sheets of paper, not mimeographed.


Each time, as many sheets as possible shall be written.


The compilation and publication of the political bulletin should pay attention to the following items: (1) it must be quick; (2) the content should be somewhat rich; (3) the characters should be slightly larger and clearer.


4. Each Political Department is responsible for collecting and compiling revolutionary songs and ballads expressing various popular sentiments. The Compilation Committee of the Army Political Department bears the responsibility for supervision and investigation.


5. The Art Unit of the Propaganda Section of the Army Political Department should be strengthened, and it should publish lithographed or mimeographed pictorials.


In order to strengthen the Army Art Unit, all personnel with artistic talent throughout the army should be concentrated for work.


6. Disguised propaganda (street performances) is one of the most concrete and most effective propaganda methods. The propaganda teams of all detachments and directly subordinate units should establish disguised propaganda units to organize and direct disguised propaganda activities aimed at the masses.


7. Clubs shall be established within Soldiers' Committees with the regiment/battalion as the unit.


8. Propaganda teams shall establish oral propaganda units and written propaganda units to study and direct oral and written propaganda techniques.


9. Strictly enforce the Three Rules of Discipline [18].


10. Actions such as putting back door-boards and bundling up straw are good methods, carried out in the course of operations, to expand the Red Army's influence and increase the masses' faith in the Red Army; they should be implemented well.


11. The Political Department and propaganda teams shall, in a planned and organized manner, convene various mass meetings, stipulating in advance the meeting agenda, speakers, speech topics, and time allocation.


12. Propaganda directed at White Army soldiers and lower-ranking officers is extremely important. The following methods should be emphasized in the future:

(1) Propaganda texts must be brief, so they can be read completely in an instant; they must be incisive and striking, to make an immediate impression.

(2) In addition to systematically writing more slogans tailored to specific enemy units along the roads they travel, leaflets should also be stored with Party branches and mass organizations along the route, to be skillfully delivered to the enemy troops as they pass.

(3) Investigate the names of enemy officers and soldiers and their unit designations through captives and mail inspection, then mail propaganda materials to them or write letters to them.

(4) Treating enemy captives well is a highly effective method of propaganda directed at enemy troops.

The methods for treating captives well: First, do not search the money or any belongings they carry; the past behavior of Red Army soldiers searching the belongings of captives must be resolutely abolished.

Second, welcome captives with great warmth, making them feel spiritual joy; oppose any verbal or behavioral insult toward captives.

Third, give captives material treatment equal to that of veteran Red soldiers.

Fourth, for those unwilling to stay, after conducting propaganda, provide travel expenses and release them to return, so that they may spread the Red Army's influence within the White Army; oppose keeping unwilling individuals forcibly just for the sake of having more soldiers.

All the above items apply fully to captured officers, except under special circumstances.

(5) Treating wounded enemy soldiers is also a highly effective method of propaganda directed at enemy troops.

The medical treatment and money given to wounded enemy soldiers must be completely identical to that given to wounded Red Army soldiers. Moreover, every possible condition should be utilized to send wounded soldiers, whose wounds have been dressed and who have been given money, back to the enemy forces.

The same applies to the treatment of wounded enemy officers.

Issues Concerning the Political Training of Soldiers
I. Issues of Materials
The following items should be artistically compiled into textbooks to serve as training materials for soldiers:

(1) Analysis of the current political situation and the Red Army's tasks and plans;

(2) Various aspects of the agrarian revolution;

(3) Armed organization and its tactics;

(4) The rationale for establishing the Three Rules of Discipline;

(5) Slogans for morning and evening roll calls;

(6) The literacy movement;

(7) How to do mass work;

(8) Explanation of Red Army slogans one by one;

(9) Correction of various deviations;

(10) The Soviet Russian Red Army;

(11) The current stage of the revolution and its future;

(12) A comparison between the Red Army and the White Army;

(13) A comparison between the Communist Party and the Kuomintang;

(14) Revolutionary stories;

(15) Stories about social evolution;

(16) Hygiene;

(17) General knowledge of the geography, politics, and economy of the guerrilla areas;

(18) Revolutionary songs;

(19) Pictorials and newspapers.


II. Methods
(1) Conducting political classes:
1. Divide into three types of classes: ordinary, special, and cadre.
For ordinary classes, there are two forms: when a detachment is together, classes are organized by detachment, with the Detachment Political Commissar as the chief instructor and the regiment/battalion Political Commissars sharing the teaching of various lessons. Besides combat soldiers, orderlies, service personnel, long-term laborers, grooms, and cooks must all attend classes.
The aim of the ordinary class is to provide ordinary soldiers with basic political common sense.

2. Special classes are organized by detachment. Fifty individuals who are slightly literate or have some political common sense are selected through examination from the soldiers of various regiments/battalions to form the class. The Detachment Political Commissar serves as the chief instructor, and the regiment/battalion Political Commissars share the teaching of various lessons.
The aim of the special class is to cultivate personnel with political common sense one level higher than the ordinary class, preparing them for future promotion to lower-level cadre positions.

3. Cadre classes are organized by column, with the army directly subordinate units forming a separate unit. The class is composed of regiment/battalion commanders, deputy commanders, company commanders, deputy commanders, various levels of military officers [19], and other designated personnel.
The aim is to raise the political level of current lower-ranking cadres, enabling them to lead the masses, and preparing them to serve as middle-ranking cadres in the future.
The Column Political Commissar, the Head of the Column Political Department, the Column Commander, and other suitably capable individuals shall serve as instructors.

4. Organize Political Training Committees by detachment. These committees are composed of the various Detachment Political Commissars and military officers capable of conducting political training. The Detachment Political Commissar serves as the committee head. Their task is to discuss various issues concerning the implementation of soldiers' political training within the detachment.

5. The political training of the army and column directly subordinate units shall be organized and carried out by Political Training Committees established under the Propaganda Sections of the respective Political Departments.

6. Teaching methods:
(1) Heuristic method (abolish the rote-memorization/cramming method);
(2) Proceed from the near to the far;
(3) Proceed from the shallow to the deep;
(4) Speak colloquially (new terms must be explained in common language);
(5) Speak clearly;
(6) Speak interestingly;
(7) Use gestures/posture to aid speech;
(8) Review the concepts from the previous session in the subsequent one;
(9) Use outlines;
(10) Cadre classes should use the discussion method.

(2) Talks during morning and evening roll calls:
1. The speaking time each time must not exceed half an hour.
2. Content: (1) Report political news; (2) Criticize daily life; (3) Explain the weekly political slogan.

(3) Assembly addresses:
1. The detachment holds them once a week, the column once every half month, and the whole army irregularly.
2. For each address, the political work organ (at the detachment level, the Political Commissar) must consult with the military work organ to stipulate the content of the speech, designate the speaker, and allocate the speaking time.
3. Attendance is mandatory for every address, except for those on duty.
4. The content of each address and its impact on the masses must be reported by the lower-level political organs to the higher-level political organs.

(4) Individual conversations:
1. Individual conversations must be conducted with the following types of persons:
(1) Those with deviations;
(2) Those who have received punishment;
(3) Wounded soldiers;
(4) Sick soldiers;
(5) New recruits;
(6) Captured soldiers;
(7) Those uneasy about their work;
(8) Those with wavering thoughts.
2. Before the conversation, the psychology and circumstances of the person to be spoken with must be investigated.
3. During the conversation, one must adopt the stance of a comrade and speak with a sincere attitude.
4. After the conversation, the main points and their impact must be recorded.

(5) Recreational activities:
1. Strengthen the work of the entertainment departments of the Soldiers' Committees, with the regiment/battalion as the unit, by conducting the following types of activities:
(1) Games like hide-and-seek;
(2) Playing soccer;
(3) Music;
(4) Martial arts;
(5) Flower-drum opera tunes;
(6) Traditional opera.
2. Disguised propaganda troupes shall be established under each propaganda team.
3. Expenses for recreational equipment shall be provided from public funds (with approval from the Column Political Department for regiment/battalion level).

(6) Improving treatment:
1. Resolutely abolish corporal punishment;
2. Abolish verbal abuse and insults;
3. Provide good treatment for wounded and sick soldiers;
4. Restore the system of issuing four silver dimes monthly for straw sandal money.

(7) How to conduct special education for new recruits and captured soldiers:
1. Explain to new recruits and captives the living habits of the Red Army, such as:
(1) Equality between officers and soldiers (there is only a division of duties between officers and soldiers, not a class division; officers are not an exploiting class, and soldiers are not an exploited class);
(2) The Three Major Rules of Discipline and their rationale;
(3) The meaning and role of the Soldiers' Committee;
(4) The economic system in the Red Army (sources of funds, organizations managing the economy, the principle of financial openness, and the soldiers' audit system);
(5) The Economic Committee manages the regiment/battalion's food and distributes the surplus food money;
(6) Abolition of corporal punishment and insults;
(7) Matters concerning the good treatment of captives.
2. Narrate a brief history of the Red Army's struggles.
3. The Red Army's mission:
(1) How the Red Army differs from the White Army; this point must be explained in detail to captives;
(2) How the Red Army differs from bandits;
(3) The three major tasks of the Red Army.
4. Explain the organizational system of the Red Army.
5. Common political knowledge, such as:
(1) The Kuomintang and the Communist Party;
(2) The three major imperialist powers—Britain, Japan, and the United States—invading China;
(3) Warlord cliques under the direction of imperialism fighting chaotic wars everywhere;
(4) Land distribution;
(5) Soviets;
(6) Red Guards, etc.

(8) Special education for young soldiers:
1. Each Column Political Department is responsible for compiling literacy textbooks for young soldiers (using primary school textbooks from the Commercial Press, the *Common People's Thousand Character Classic*, textbooks from the Longyan Cultural Society, etc., as references).
2. Establish one Young Soldiers' School within each column, divided into three to four classes: one class per detachment, and one class for the directly subordinate unit, with no more than twenty-five students per class.
The Head of the Political Department shall serve as the school principal, and the Head of the Propaganda Section shall serve as the Dean of Academic Affairs.
Appoint one lead teacher per class, with one semester defined as completing ninety teaching hours per class.
3. Paper, brushes, ink, and other stationery shall be purchased with public funds and distributed to the students.

The Issue of Abolishing Corporal Punishment
I. The effects of using corporal punishment within the Red Army
In every unit, the more severe the beatings administered by someone, the greater the resentment among soldiers and the more desertions there were.
The most conspicuous examples: In a certain unit of the 8th Detachment of the 3rd Column, an officer was fond of beating people. As a result, not only did almost all the orderlies and cooks run away, but even the supply officer, the sergeant, and the adjutant ran away.
In the 25th Regiment/Battalion of the 9th Detachment, there was once a period when an extremely beating-prone commander arrived. The masses nicknamed him "the Blacksmith." As a result, the soldiers felt there was no way out, and the atmosphere was filled with resentment and anger. Only when this commander was transferred were the soldiers liberated.
As a result of beatings in the 3rd Regiment/Battalion of the Special Service Detachment, four cooks, one special service platoon leader, and two squad leaders who had struggled for a long time ran away. One of them, named Xiao Wencheng, left a letter behind when he left, declaring he was not a counter-revolutionary, but was fleeing because he could not bear the oppression.
When the 4th Column was first established, the officers transferred there from the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Columns blindly and brutally beat the soldiers. As a result, soldiers ran away one after another. Finally, these officers could not maintain their footing there either and all had to leave the 4th Column.
The 2nd Column had more deserters than any other column. Although there was more than one reason, the extremely severe habit of beatings prevalent among most of the 2nd Column's lower-ranking officers was one of the most important causes.
Three incidents of suicide were discovered in the 2nd Column (one platoon leader, two soldiers). This is the Red Army's greatest stain, and its significance is extremely serious. This, too, must be said to be a result of the especially pervasive culture of beatings in the 2nd Column.
Currently, a common cry among the rank-and-file soldiers in the Red Army is: "If an officer doesn't beat soldiers, he'll beat them to death!" This expression of the masses' discontent and resentment truly deserves our serious attention.

2. The Origin of Corporal Punishment and the Reasons for Its Abolition
To sustain feudal exploitation, the feudal class was compelled to use the harshest punishments as tools to suppress the resistance and rebellion of the exploited. This is why corporal punishment was a product of the feudal era.

As economic development advanced to the capitalist system, it became necessary to advocate liberalism in order to develop the individuality of the masses of workers, peasants, and soldiers, enhance their capacity for labor and combat, and create the conditions for capitalist development.

For this reason, bourgeois states generally abolished corporal punishment, and the strange practice of beating people had long since disappeared even in their armies.

When economic development reaches the birth of socialism and class struggle intensifies, the worker and peasant classes, seeking to overthrow the ruling class’s power and the exploitation dependent on that power, must mobilize the strength of the broad masses of their own class to achieve victory in the struggle.

Soviet political power is the political power of the most progressive class. Under it, no remnants of the feudal system should exist. Thus, in the Soviet Union, not only had corporal punishment long been absent from the Red Army, but its use was also strictly prohibited in general law.

The Fourth Army of the Red Army was born in a China where the feudal system of exploitation had not yet been eliminated. Its main components, moreover, had largely been transformed from the armies of feudal warlords, and thus feudal institutions, ideologies, and habits remained deeply entrenched among both officers and soldiers. As a result, the habit of beating and the belief that one would not be feared without it were still the same as those in feudal warlord armies.

Although a slogan that officers must not beat soldiers had long been put forward, and soldiers were granted the right to appeal their grievances, these measures proved largely ineffective. The result was a widening gap between officers and soldiers, a decline in the morale of both soldiers and officers, an increasing number of desertions, an atmosphere filled with resentment throughout the army, and even instances of suicide—phenomena entirely at odds with the Red Army’s tasks of struggle. If not quickly corrected, the dangers would be beyond measure.

3. Methods of Correction
(1) Resolutely abolish corporal punishment.
(2) Launch a campaign to abolish corporal punishment.
This campaign must work on both officers and soldiers, so that the significance of the principle—“abolishing corporal punishment alone will benefit the struggle”—is widely understood among the masses of officers and soldiers.
Only in this way can officers, far from feeling that they cannot manage the soldiers after the abolition of corporal punishment, come to understand that its abolition will actually be more conducive to management and training. On the soldiers’ side, far from becoming more unruly after the abolition of corporal punishment, they will, through its abolition, develop a heightened spirit of struggle, see the barrier between officers and soldiers removed, and consciously accept management, training, and general discipline.
(3) After the abolition of corporal punishment, some temporary adverse phenomena may arise due to historical habits. This should strengthen our sense of responsibility and spur us to earnestly promote a spirit of persuasion and a conscious observance of discipline, so as to overcome this most pernicious feudal system that runs counter to the tasks of struggle.
Under no circumstances should such adverse phenomena be used as a pretext to shield the feudal habit of beating. The objective consequence of any action that uses temporary adverse phenomena as a pretext to oppose the abolition of corporal punishment or to slacken efforts in abolishing it is to hinder the development of the revolutionary struggle and, in effect, to aid the ruling class.
(4) The legal procedures for the Fourth Army’s abolition of corporal punishment: 1. Revise the Red Army’s punishment regulations; 2. The highest military and political authorities shall jointly issue a general order abolishing corporal punishment and simultaneously promulgate the new Red Army punishment regulations; 3. After the general order is issued, on the one hand, the military and political authorities shall convene meetings of officers to explain in detail the reasons for abolishing corporal punishment, so that all officers will support this important reform embodied in the general order and diligently work to implement it in the troops; on the other hand, soldiers’ committees shall convene meetings of soldiers’ representatives. In addition to supporting this reform so that discipline will be consciously observed thereafter, they shall also enforce strict mass disciplinary sanctions to achieve good results after the abolition of corporal punishment.

The Problem of Caring for the Sick and Wounded
1. The Distressing Conditions of Sick and Wounded Soldiers and Their Effects
(1) The health organizations of all units throughout the army are inadequate: there are too few medical officers, insufficient medicine, wholly insufficient stretcher equipment, and too few and unqualified administrative personnel. As a result, many sick and wounded soldiers not only fail to receive adequate treatment but sometimes do not even receive basic initial treatment.
(2) The military and political organs of the entire army pay insufficient attention to sick and wounded soldiers. For example: 1. Not only have they failed to exert their utmost effort to improve the health organizations, but they have also practically neglected them entirely. Medical and health issues are rarely discussed at meetings of any kind.
2. Officers do not do everything possible to comfort the sick and wounded at all times. Customs such as officers bringing tea and water to sick and wounded soldiers, covering them with blankets, and regularly visiting them to offer solace are virtually non-existent in the Red Army. Officers adopt an attitude of indifference toward the sick and wounded, sometimes even displaying disgust toward them.
3. During marches, officers and even soldiers show not a shred of sympathy for injured soldiers who fall behind along the route. Instead of devising ways to help them, they simply curse them angrily or callously drive them away.
(3) Seriously wounded and seriously ill soldiers receive insufficient provisions and allowances. Wounded soldiers often have no change of clothes for seven or eight days after being wounded. Convalescence allowances are given to sick officers but not to sick soldiers.
(4) Shortcomings of the Jiaoyang Hospital: 1. A state of disorganization; 2. Too few medical officers and too little medicine; 3. Medical officers sell medicines privately; 4. Unsanitary conditions; 5. Insufficient clothing and blankets for keeping warm; 6. Too few orderlies; 7. Poor food and drink; 8. Cramped quarters; 9. Poor relations with the local populace. These problems cause sick and wounded soldiers to view the hospital as a prison and become unwilling to stay in the rear.
The poor treatment of sick and wounded soldiers described above produces the following effects: 1. It causes soldiers to become discontented with the Red Army. “The Red Army is good, all right, except you’d better not get wounded or sick”—this kind of sentiment is virtually universal among all soldiers and even among lower-ranking officers. 2. Soldiers’ dissatisfaction with officers further widens the gap between them. 3. Both soldiers and lower-ranking officers become afraid of being wounded, thereby reducing the Red Army’s combat effectiveness. 4. The number of deserters increases. 5. It adversely affects the masses of workers and peasants, reducing their courage to join the Red Army.

2. Methods of Resolution
(1) Military and political organs must no longer neglect medical and health issues as they have in the past. Henceforth, such issues should be fully discussed at all meetings.
(2) The organization of medical and health agencies should be especially strengthened. Competent personnel must be sought for administrative work; individuals who are of no use elsewhere should not be foisted onto the medical corps. Additional administrative personnel must be added to achieve the goal of complete care.
The problems of too few doctors and insufficient medicine must be resolved by every possible means. Doctors should be supervised and urged to conduct examinations with greater care, not in a perfunctory manner.
(3) Officers, especially company-level officers who are in close contact with the soldiers, should regularly visit sick and wounded soldiers, bring them tea and water, cover them with blankets at night, and devise ways to help them when they feel cold, such as by borrowing extra clothing for them.
These methods of attending to sick and wounded soldiers should be established as a system and practiced by everyone, for this is one of the most effective ways to win over the masses.
(4) Regarding sick and wounded soldiers who fall behind along the route during marches: 1. It must be prohibited for anyone to curse or ridicule them; 2. When a sick or wounded soldier needs to make way, he must be spoken to politely and not simply pushed aside; 3. Whichever unit or organ encounters someone left behind due to illness or injury—whether a combatant or non-combatant—must immediately dispatch a person to attend to him. If the case involves a serious wound or illness, every effort must be made to hire a porter to carry him; 4. During every march, the rear guard must patiently take along sick and wounded stragglers and, when necessary, even carry their rifles and ammunition for them.
(5) In issuing pocket money to sick and wounded soldiers, the severity of the illness or wound should be considered. The seriously wounded and seriously ill should receive somewhat more than the lightly wounded and mildly ill. For convalescence allowances, special consideration should be given to those who are especially seriously wounded or ill; these should be issued as appropriate, without distinction between officers, soldiers, and laborers.
(6) To address the problem of clothing and blankets for sick and wounded soldiers, in addition to the authorities doing their utmost to provide them, donations should be solicited among the officers and soldiers of all units. Furthermore, fundraising should also be initiated among the officers and soldiers of all units. This will not only increase the pocket money for the sick and wounded but will also serve as a good method to awaken a spirit of mutual aid and shared hardship throughout the army.
(7) A plan should be made to correct the many deficiencies of the Jiaoyang rear hospital. Additionally, fundraising campaigns (for clothing, blankets, cash, and grain) should be initiated among the worker and peasant masses in western Fujian, so as to closely link the worker and peasant masses with the Red Army.

The Problem of the Relationship Between the Red Army’s Military System and Political System
1. Until the establishment of higher-level local government organs, the Red Army’s military organs and political organs shall carry out their work in parallel under the guidance of the front committee.
2. Relations Between the Red Army and the Masses:
(1) Matters bearing significance for the entire army, such as the issuance of political programs, shall be issued jointly by the military and political organs.
(2) The direction and supervision of mass work—such as propagating among the masses, organizing the masses, establishing political power, as well as matters concerning confiscation, trials, punishment, fundraising, money collection, and relief—shall all fall within the purview of the political department until local government organs are established.
(3) In places where no government organ has yet been established, the Red Army’s political department shall act in place of the local government organ until such time as a local government organ is established. In places where local government organs have already been established, the principle shall be to allow those local organs to handle all matters independently, so as to consolidate their prestige among the masses. Only when local government organs are not yet sound or in matters involving relations between the Red Army and the locality may matters be handled jointly by the local government organ and the Red Army’s political department.
(4) Assisting in the establishment and development of local armed forces is the responsibility of the political department. Assisting in the routine military training of local armed forces and in their operational command during wartime is the responsibility of the headquarters. However, in both cases, these tasks must, as far as possible, be carried out through the channels of the local government organs, and direct handling must be strenuously avoided.
3. Within the Red Army, the military and political systems each have independent lines for personnel and administrative matters. When there are mutual dealings, such as the transfer of personnel or the transmission of information, parallel notifications shall be made via official correspondence.
4. In carrying out matters of etiquette and military discipline, the principle of class-based obedience shall be applied between the military and political systems. No one may use a difference in systems as a pretext for slacking off or refusing to obey commands.
5. In all matters concerning provisions, medical care, march, combat, and billeting, the political system shall accept the command of the military system. In all matters concerning political training and mass work, the military system shall accept the command of the political system. However, the form of this command may only reach directly to the subordinate organs within the other party’s structure (such as the general affairs section or the adjutant’s office).
6. The direction of the Red Army’s fundraising, as well as the decision and disbursement of funds for political work, all belong to the political department. The military organ shall not interfere (for withdrawal procedures, the political department deals directly with the quartermaster’s office). Party department funds are to be disbursed by the political department.
7. All orders issued by military organs require no signature from the director of the political department, although they must be countersigned by the political commissar. All orders issued by political organs are to be exercised solely by the political department and do not require countersignature by the political commissar.

The first part of this text is printed according to the Selected Works of Mao Zedong (Second Edition) published by the People’s Publishing House in 1991; the other parts are printed according to the letterpress edition of April 6, 1930, preserved in the Central Archives.

Notes
[1] This is a resolution written by Mao Zedong for the Ninth Congress of the Fourth Army of the Red Army of the Communist Party of China. The congress was held in December 1929 in Gutian Village, Shanghang County, Fujian Province; therefore, this resolution is also known as the “Gutian Congress Resolution.” The resolution consists of eight parts. The first part, revised and approved by Mao Zedong, was included in the first volume of the Selected Works of Mao Zedong published in 1951 under the title “On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party.”
The September Letter refers to the letter of instruction to the Front Committee of the Fourth Army drafted by Chen Yi and approved by Zhou Enlai, in accordance with the spirit of the Political Bureau meeting of the CPC Central Committee and Zhou Enlai’s repeated conversations, on September 28, 1929.
[3] Soldiers’ committees refer to the soldiers’ representative meetings and soldiers’ committees in the Red Army, a system established to promote democracy within the army. This system was later abolished. After the start of the New Type of Ideological Education Movement in the Army in 1947, a system of soldiers’ committees led by cadres was established once again in the companies of the People’s Liberation Army, drawing on experience from the Red Army period and the New Type of Ideological Education Movement.
[4] After the failure of the Great Revolution in 1927, a “Left” putschist tendency emerged within the Communist Party of China. It held that the character of the Chinese revolution was one of “uninterrupted revolution” and that the revolutionary situation in China was one of “constantly rising tide.” Consequently, it refused to organize an orderly retreat and mistakenly used commandist methods, attempting to rely on a small number of Party members and a minority of the masses to organize numerous local uprisings nationwide that had no hope of success.

Such adventurist actions were prevalent at the end of 1927 but gradually subsided by early 1928, though sentiments of adventurism still lingered among some Party members.


〔5〕The Red Guards were mass armed organizations in the revolutionary base areas that did not detach from production.


〔6〕Huang Chao (?-884), a native of Yuanju in Caozhou (present-day Heze, Shandong), was a leader of a peasant uprising in the late Tang Dynasty. The peasant war he led lasted for ten years and is one of the most famous peasant wars in Chinese history. Because Huang Chao's insurgent army simply engaged in mobile warfare and did not establish relatively stable base areas, it was referred to as "roving bandits" by feudal rulers. Li Chuang, referring to Li Zicheng (1606-1645), was a native of Mizhi, Shaanxi, and a leader of a peasant uprising in the late Ming Dynasty. The insurgent army he led also failed to establish relatively stable base areas and always engaged in mobile operations. In 1644, they captured Beijing but soon suffered defeat under the joint attack by Qing troops colluded with Ming general Wu Sangui.


〔7〕At that time, a column was roughly equivalent to a regiment, and a detachment was roughly equivalent to a battalion.


〔8〕A large squadron was roughly equivalent to a company at that time.


〔9〕Referring to the Front Enemy Committee of the Fourth Army of the Chinese Red Army and the committees of each column.


〔10〕Party fractions: According to the Party Constitution adopted at the Sixth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, "In non-Party organizations (such as labor unions, peasant associations, social organizations, cultural organizations, etc.), at various congresses, conferences, and institutions, where there are three or more Party members, a Party fraction shall be formed. Its tasks are to strengthen the Party's influence, implement the Party's policies, and supervise the work of Party members in non-Party organizations." The Party Constitution adopted at the Seventh National Congress of the Communist Party of China changed the term "Party fraction" to "Party leading group."


〔11〕Branch committee members, see Note 〔20〕 on page 77 of this volume.


〔12〕Referring to the eight erroneous ideologies pointed out in the first part of this text, "On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party," including the purely military viewpoint and others.


〔13〕Trotsky (1879-1940) once served as a member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (Bolshevik) and Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council. After Lenin's death, he opposed Lenin's theory and line on building socialism in the Soviet Union, organized an opposition faction within the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik), and engaged in factional activities. He was expelled from the Party in November 1927. After the failure of the Great Revolution in China in 1927, a small number of Trotskyites also emerged in China. They aligned themselves with Chen Duxiu and others, holding that the Chinese bourgeois-democratic revolution had been completed and that the Chinese proletariat could only wait until the future to carry out a socialist revolution. They thus advocated the cancellation of the revolutionary movement and were called the "Trotsky-Chen Cancellators." Chen Duxiu was expelled from the Party in 1929.


〔14〕Militia and Peace Preservation Corps, both were reactionary local armed forces.


〔21〕The September Letter refers to the directive letter drafted by Chen Yi for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, based on the spirit of the Political Bureau meetings of the Central Committee and multiple conversations with Zhou Enlai, and finalized after Zhou Enlai's review. It was addressed to the Front Committee of the Fourth Army of the Red Army (September 28, 1929).

〔3〕Soldiers' councils refer to the soldiers' representative conferences and soldiers' committees established in the Red Army. This was a system created to promote internal democracy in the army. This system was later abolished. After the new-type ideological education movement in the army began in 1947, based on the experience from the Red Army period and the new-type ideological education movement, a system of soldiers' councils and soldiers' committees led by cadres was re-established in companies of the People's Liberation Army.

〔4〕After the failure of the Great Revolution in 1927, a "Left" adventurist tendency once emerged within the Communist Party of China. It held that the nature of the Chinese revolution was one of "perpetual revolution" and that the revolutionary situation in China was "constantly on the rise." Consequently, it refused to organize an orderly retreat, erroneously employed commandist methods, and attempted to rely on a minority of Party members and masses to organize numerous local uprisings across the country that had no hope of victory. Such adventurist actions were prevalent at the end of 1927 but gradually subsided by early 1928, though some Party members still harbored adventurist sentiments.

〔5〕The Red Guards were mass armed organizations in the revolutionary base areas that did not detach from production.

〔6〕Huang Chao (?-884), a native of Yuanju in Caozhou (present-day Heze, Shandong), was a leader of a peasant uprising in the late Tang Dynasty. The peasant war he led lasted for ten years and is one of the most famous peasant wars in Chinese history. Because Huang Chao's insurgent army simply engaged in mobile warfare and did not establish relatively stable base areas, it was referred to as "roving bandits" by feudal rulers. Li Chuang, referring to Li Zicheng (1606-1645), was a native of Mizhi, Shaanxi, and a leader of a peasant uprising in the late Ming Dynasty. The insurgent army he led also failed to establish relatively stable base areas and always engaged in mobile operations. In 1644, they captured Beijing but soon suffered defeat under the joint attack by Qing troops colluded with Ming general Wu Sangui.

〔7〕At that time, a column was roughly equivalent to a regiment, and a detachment was roughly equivalent to a battalion.

〔8〕A large squadron was roughly equivalent to a company at that time.

〔9〕Referring to the Front Enemy Committee of the Fourth Army of the Chinese Red Army and the committees of each column.

〔10〕Party fractions: According to the Party Constitution adopted at the Sixth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, "In non-Party organizations (such as labor unions, peasant associations, social organizations, cultural organizations, etc.), at various congresses, conferences, and institutions, where there are three or more Party members, a Party fraction shall be formed. Its tasks are to strengthen the Party's influence, implement the Party's policies, and supervise the work of Party members in non-Party organizations." The Party Constitution adopted at the Seventh National Congress of the Communist Party of China changed the term "Party fraction" to "Party leading group."

〔11〕Branch committee members, see Note 〔20〕 on page 77 of this volume.

〔12〕Referring to the eight erroneous ideologies pointed out in the first part of this text, "On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party," including the purely military viewpoint and others.

〔13〕Trotsky (1879-1940) once served as a member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (Bolshevik) and Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council. After Lenin's death, he opposed Lenin's theory and line on building socialism in the Soviet Union, organized an opposition faction within the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik), and engaged in factional activities. He was expelled from the Party in November 1927. After the failure of the Great Revolution in China in 1927, a small number of Trotskyites also emerged in China. They aligned themselves with Chen Duxiu and others, holding that the Chinese bourgeois-democratic revolution had been completed and that the Chinese proletariat could only wait until the future to carry out a socialist revolution. They thus advocated the cancellation of the revolutionary movement and were called the "Trotsky-Chen Cancellators." Chen Duxiu was expelled from the Party in 1929.

〔14〕Militia and Peace Preservation Corps, both were reactionary local armed forces.

〔15〕Clerks, referring to personnel responsible for writing and clerical work in company units.

〔16〕The Jiang-Gui War refers to the war between Chiang Kai-shek and the Guangxi warlords Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi from March to April 1929.

〔17〕Refers to the war between the new Kuomintang warlords He Yingqin and Li Zongren on one side and Tang Shengzhi on the other during the Nanjing-Wuhan confrontation in October 1927.

〔18〕At that time, the Three Major Rules of Discipline for the Red Army were: (1) Do not take anything from workers, peasants, or small merchants; (2) Confiscate property from local tyrants and turn it over to the public; (3) Obey commands in all actions.

〔19〕Junzuo was a general term in the old army for auxiliary personnel assisting commanding officers in managing administrative affairs, such as quartermasters and medical officers. Here, Mao Zedong used this term from the old army.

〔20〕The "classes" here refer to the hierarchical ranks of officers in the army.

--- Notes

〔15〕Clerks, referring to personnel responsible for writing and clerical work in company units.


〔16〕The Jiang-Gui War refers to the war between Chiang Kai-shek and the Guangxi warlords Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi from March to April 1929.


〔17〕Refers to the war between the new Kuomintang warlords He Yingqin and Li Zongren on one side and Tang Shengzhi on the other during the Nanjing-Wuhan confrontation in October 1927.


〔18〕At that time, the Three Major Rules of Discipline for the Red Army were: (1) Do not take anything from workers, peasants, or small merchants; (2) Confiscate property from local tyrants and turn it over to the public; (3) Obey commands in all actions.


〔19〕Junzuo was a general term in the old army for auxiliary personnel assisting commanding officers in managing administrative affairs, such as quartermasters and medical officers. Here, Mao Zedong used this term from the old army.


〔20〕The "classes" here refer to the hierarchical ranks of officers in the army.