Letter to Lin Biao
(June 14, 1929)
Comrade Lin Biao:
1. I am greatly moved by your letter, and my courage is strengthened because you are bravely moving forward. I will work with you and all the comrades who are for the unity of the Party and the advancement of the revolution
against all harmful views, habits, and systems. The question under dispute at
present is not a question which concerns one individual or a particular moment.
It is a question concerning the entire Party of the Fourth Army and the struggle
which has been going on for a year. Previously, it was, however, concealed for
various reasons, and it has been exposed only recently. In fact, the past concealment was wrong, and the current exposure is the only proper course. When
controversy arises over questions within the Party, this represents progress for the Party, not retrogression. It is retrogression only if one compromises, muddles
through, and erases the line between the two sides, thereby reducing important
matters to insignificance in a vulgar way. I think this time it will not lead to
fearful and evil consequences. Only a few days after the Baisha conference, the
question has already been hotly debated among the masses in the Party. I think
our comrades will definitely demand a thorough clarification of this question and
will definitely refuse to compromise, sit on the fence, and be blind to the distinction between right and wrong. They will certainly be able to choose and support
a view that promotes the unity of the Party and the advancement of the revolution. There is absolutely no doubt that through this the work of transforming the
Fourth Army can be completed, and as a result the Party of the Fourth Army can
make extremely great progress.

2. One cannot understand the origins of the current debate without knowing
the history of the struggle in the Fourth Army. Without an understanding of this
origin, one cannot understand the nature of the entire problem in the struggle
between two different systems of thought since the initiation of the Fourth Army.
Among the key points of this problem are the following: (1) individual leadership and Party leadership; (2) the military point of view and the political point of
view; (3) cliquism and anti-cliquism; (4) the roving rebel mentality and the anti-roving-rebel mentality; (5) the question of political power in the middle section of the
Luoxiao Mountain Range; (6) the question of local armed forces; (7) urban policy
and the question of Red Army discipline; (8) the assessment of the current situation;
(9) the defeat in southern Hunan; (10) the question of a scientific approach, and of
regularization; (11) the question of military skills in the Fourth Army; (12) formalism and utilitarianism; (13) the separation of powers and the concentration of power;
(14) other decadent ideas. Let me speak about them below.

3. The main question for the Party of the Fourth Army is that of individual
leadership and Party leadership. To discuss this question, we must first of all
remember that the greater part of the Fourth Army was born out of the old army.
Moreover, it was brought forth in an environment of defeat. If we remember
these two points, we can then understand why all the ideas, habits, and systems
are so difficult to change and why Party leadership and individual leadership are
always in opposition, and have long been in a state of conflict. Since the Red
Army emerged from the transformation of the old army, it brought with it a
conflict between supporters of all the old ideas, old habits, and old systems and
some who fight against these ideas, habits, and systems. This is the first reason
why up to now it has not yet been possible to establish absolute Party leadership in the Fourth Army. Moreover, the greater part of the Fourth Army emerged in
an environment of defeat (this was in 1927), and the Party organization that put it
together was the one from before the defeat, which was extremely weak in the
first place and lost the leadership completely in the course of the defeat. It can be
said that survival at the time depended nine times out of ten solely on the
leadership of the individual. It is this which created the enormous power of the
individual leader. That is the second reason why it has not been possible to
establish absolute Party leadership in the Fourth Army. Having understood these
two causes, if we then look again at the history of the Fourth Army since it was
organized, we can understand the central factor in the ebb and flow of the
struggle between the individual and the Party. Since the Fourth Army was established, the Party has established a basis everywhere at the company level and
above. Now that the policy of the higher leading bodies (the Special Committee
of the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Area and the Fourth Army's Army Committee and
Front Committee) is correct, and with the establishment of local Party branches
in the various xian of the border region, and the development of the mass struggle, the role of the individual has been gradually reduced, and the leadership of
the Party has been strengthened. In general, this can be divided into three periods. The first period is from the creation of the Fourth Army to September of last
year, when we returned to the border area. It includes the victories in a series of
battles in the border area and the defeat in southern Hunan. In this period, the
Party was unable to wield the absolute power of command. Cliquism existed
widely and was on the rise. The Party dared not attempt to allocate and transfer
the guns. There were clashes between the principle of giving attention to all
aspects of the rear area of the Red Army and the selfish departmentalism of a
minority of Red Army comrades. It was not possible to establish a system of military
supplies or regulations regarding the organization of the army. Individual control
over politics and weapons was common. From the company to the corps, the Party
as it existed at that time was in reality in a subordinate position, and regarding certain
issues, it was absolutely obliged to accept the orders of an individual.

The second period was from last September, when we returned to the border
area, to March 14 [1929], when we took Tingzhou. During this period, the Party
was first able to criticize cliquism theoretically (even though it still could not
really do it). A system of military supplies was set up. The system of seventyfive long-barreled guns per company was set up. But it did not yet extend to
short-barreled guns. It was not so difficult as in the first period to transfer guns
to the localities. In this period, a minority of comrades tried hard to bow their
heads, and the Party was really in a commanding position. This was so in general from the Party branch to the Front Committee. There were several obvious
characteristics during this period: First, in the situation created by the Hunan
defeat and the flight of most of the remaining forces, the individual did not
manifest much effective leadership. At the same time, unlike the first period,
when there was a series of military victories, now there was the possibility of
collapse if we did not rely on Party leadership. This is the first reason why Party
leadership gained ground. Second, during this period, as compared to the first
period, there was indeed some progress in Party organization, as well as in the
political consciousness and experience of struggle among the comrades. It was
more difficult for the incorrect words and actions of a minority of comrades to
gain support from the rank and file. As a result, these people had to restrain
themselves somewhat. This is the second reason why Party leadership gained
ground. Third, in this period, we encountered two fresh friendly forces: the Fifth
Army9 and the Second and Fourth Regiments.10 The Fifth Army could not influence the Fourth Army much, but it did provide some stimulus to the Fourth
Army in smashing cliquism. Particularly at the Bolu Meeting,11 in discussing the
merging of the Fourth and Fifth Armies, Comrade Peng Dehuai's indignant
remarks dealt quite a blow to the minority of comrades. As for the Second and
Fourth Regiments, the comrades of the Fourth Army were truly ashamed to see
them. Their political instructors exercised authority over the officers. In the first
five registers,12 the names of the officers were placed after those of the political
instructors. They cannot allocate one bullet without asking the Party. They have
absolute Party leadership. This can also be identified as a factor which helped to
strengthen the leadership of the Party in the Fourth Army.

The third period is from Tingzhou to the present. During this period, the Party
and the Red Army have truly progressed in all areas as compared to the previous
situation. Because of the establishment of the First, Second, and Third Columns,
cliquism really began to weaken. The column committees were somewhat more
effective than the Front Committee. Party branches at all levels could discuss
various issues without misgivings. The number of short-barreled guns could also
be regulated. The establishment of the Political Department also limited the
authority of the Headquarters. These are the organizational aspects. As far as the
political line is concerned, an effort could be made in their work to carry out the political tasks delineated at the Sixth Congress.13 Urban policy was somewhat
better applied. Progress was made in propaganda. They learned the tactics of
large-scale guerrilla warfare. As a result of the development of the situation, the
organization of the Red Army was also expanded. But because the will of the
Party was very greatly extended, the will of the individual underwent unprecedented suffering. Then there were several military victories in a row, and a
formalistic theory arrived from afar. These three factors combined to bring about
the outbreak of the current dispute. The focal point of the controversy is whether
we still need the Party branch in the present-day army. Because a minority of
comrades firmly insisted on having an army committee, they had to attack the
Front Committee. This in turn impinged on the question of the Party organization
itself. The slogans of their attack were "the Party runs too many things" and
"power is too much concentrated in the Front Committee." When, in the course
of the controversies, the discussion touched on the work of the Party branch,
some said that the branch should be concerned only with the education of the
comrades. This also arose from the question of the sphere of the Party's authority. Because they advocated that the sphere of the Party's interference should be
restricted, they had to demand limits on the work of the Party branch as well.
With the expansion of the will of the Party, and the restriction of the will of the
individual, all questions had to be the subject of resolutions by Party meetings at
various levels. Only then could the Party members as individuals carry out their
work according to those resolutions. Thus the individual did not enjoy the freedom of the hero.14 As a result, their demand for considerable freedom found
expression in such slogans as "Do we have to ask the Party even about one gun?"
and "Should the Party take care of the groom when he runs out of things to eat?"
deriding the work of the Party bureaus regarding minute details. Such are the
views they expressed at the Hulei meeting of the Front Committee.15 Although
the questions under discussion were divided into three (the scope of the Party's
power, the work of the Party branch, and the lack of freedom for the individual),
the spirit was the same throughout. This is the concrete manifestation of the
struggle for supremacy between Party leadership and the leadership of the individual. Since the recent controversies emerged, some comrades have felt that the
Party in the Fourth Army has arrived at a crisis. If the individualist leadership
exercised by a minority of comrades is victorious, the result, as you said in your
letter, will inevitably be that the close unity of the Party will be disrupted and the
future prospects of the revolution will be harmed. But I am confident it will not come to this, because the Party of the Fourth Army at present has made obvious
progress since the first and second periods. The foundations of the various columns
can no longer be shaken. Decisions based on the selfish desires of the individual will
be rejected by the masses. We need only look at the fact that at a meeting attended
by forty-one people,16 the Army Committee which a minority of comrades obstinately insisted on establishing was abolished by a vote of thirty-six to five in order to
see that the majority will definitely not support their demand, which is "harmful to
solidarity and harmful to the revolution." The struggle between individualism and
anti-individualism, that is to say, between individual leadership and Party leadership,
is the main thread that runs through the history of the Fourth Army. Generally
speaking, on the following questions (each one of them), there are none on which
there are not diametrically opposed viewpoints. Let us simply try to list them.

4. Some comrades in the Fourth Army have always been partial to the military viewpoint and are at odds with those who adopt a political viewpoint, that is
to say, a mass viewpoint. This is a serious problem concerning the political line.
Thanks to long-term experience of struggle, and the influence of the workerpeasant masses, the brains entertaining this simplistic viewpoint have been gradually washed clean to some extent. The simplistic mentality of "fighting big
battles" and "taking dozens of zhou and xian" has become less common, but has
not been completely eliminated. It raises its head at every opportunity. Particularly at times of military defeat, [such people hold that] everything else can be
eliminated, and it is all right as long as you keep the guns. At meetings, what these
comrades hate most is the discussion of questions of propaganda and organization.
In guerrilla work, they try to develop military influence alone, not political influence.
The cliquism left over from the warlord armies is one of the problems that does the
most harm to the Red Army. And yet a minority of comrades are not only unwilling
to strive vigorously to eliminate cliquism but even have a tendency to encourage it.
If we do not eliminate cliquism, it will be impossible to have completely collective
leadership by the Party as they do in the Second and Fourth Regiments, and then the
Red Army will be nothing but a fine-sounding name!

The mentality of roving rebel bands has always been very powerful in the Red
Army. Its source is to be found in the component of vagrants in the Fourth Army.
The Party has already waged many struggles against this mentality, but a remnant of it still exists today, and even now those who formerly represented this
mentality cannot be said to have abandoned it. The most striking political manifestation of this mentality of roving rebel bands lies in the dissident views on the
problem of political power in the middle section of the Luoxiao Mountain
Range. We must not forget that the unanimity within the Party in the Fourth
Army regarding the question of the independent régime in the Hunan-Jiangxi
Border Area is merely superficial. In their hearts, some of the comrades are
constantly prepared to abandon the struggle in the border area. Whenever there is a crisis, these comrades immediately. . . . 17 All those who have participated in
the struggle in the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Area understand this. The question of
establishing a military force in the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Area has always ended
in a struggle because it involves transferring guns from the Red Army. This is a
manifestation of opposing views coming out of two different political lines that
of the military viewpoint and that of the mass viewpoint. The component of
vagrants in the Red Army produced the mentality of roving rebel bands. At the
same time, it has affected urban policy and the discipline of the Red Army. It is
also evident that responsible comrades have put forward different views. According to one view, it does not matter much if military discipline is disrupted to
some extent, or a city is smashed up a bit. The other view is just the opposite. As
regards the matter of disrupting military discipline, some comrades feel that it
would be better not to have this recent victory than to have our discipline broken.
Other comrades do not feel so concerned and merely dismiss the matter with a
sigh of regret. This is only the most recent example. In the past, there were many
such instances. The question of military discipline is a big political question for
the Red Army, but because one group of people advocates rigor while another
group advocates laxity, the result is rather negative. As regards the psychology
of the masses, the effect is rather harmful, because the majority behave [badly],
and only a minority behave well.

On the assessment of the current situation, too, there have always been divergent views. As a result, views regarding the actions of the Red Army also differ.
This was particularly striking when we were in the border area. Most comrades
do recognize that it was a mistake for the greater part of the forces of the Fourth
Army to go to southern Hunan in July of last year. The meeting of delegates at
Shatian also recognized this. Who could have predicted that a bizarre view
would arise recently among a minority of comrades saying that it was right to go
to southern Hunan and that it was, in contrast, wrong to stay in the border area?
This is another example of diametrically opposing views.

A Communist really must be a bit more scientific in his thinking and actions.
Yet some comrades place themselves in direct opposition to the scientific
attitude, so that we can find many contradictions in a single speech or a single
action. When they speak, they are wholly unconcerned about the effect of what
they say. They just shoot off their mouths at random, paying no attention to right
and wrong. "Say whatever you like. They only understand so much." What an
unscientific attitude! An army that wants to progress even a little must regulate
itself. We can only regard a "messy rotten" situation such as that which formerly
prevailed in the Red Army as a phenomenon characteristic of primitive ranks of
vagrants. We must struggle against it with the utmost force. Yet it is clear that
some of the comrades, intentionally or unintentionally, support such a phenomenon, or at least they do not have the resolve to fight against it. This has hitherto made it impossible for the Red Army to establish a pattern. It lags far behind the
bourgeois armies, and that is truly a sad phenomenon.
"Rotten cowhide is not rotten cowhide. Spoiled bean curd is not spoiled bean
curd." These are the angry words Comrade Zhu Yunqing18 used to describe the
grossly deficient military skills of the Fourth Army. Of all those who have sojourned
in the Fourth Army, there is probably no one who does not recognize that the
military skills in the Fourth Army are highly deficient. But some comrades do not
want to pay attention to their own main task of officer training, but engage in some
political agitation every day, uttering strange words like "What is there to do if we
cannot attack the despotic gentry?" If this situation does not change, there is no way
the problem of poor military skills in the Fourth Army can be solved.

5. In recent days, the most obvious manifestation of the two opposing views
has been the controversy regarding the Army Committee. A minority of comrades insist on having an Army Committee. What they really want is to have a
leading Party organ in their hands, in order to provide scope for the manifestation of their long-suppressed ambitions (which represent yet another guiding
line, different from that of the past). Yet they give grave and ceremonious
reasons, which unfortunately are merely formalistic. They say "if the name is the
Fourth Army, there should be an Army Committee." "To complete the organizational system requires an Army Committee." Is this not an utterly formalistic
mode of expression? At present, we have only a small army of somewhat more
than four thousand. We do not have many "armies," as the Central Committee
has many provinces under it. Moreover, the guerrilla period, in which the army is
often on the march, is quite unlike the period of the border area, when the army
was often garrisoned, and demands swift and centralized army command. A
minority of comrades do not consider these practical reasons at all. They are just
obstinately resolved to insert formalistically an Army Committee between the
Front Committee above and the Column Committee below. Everyone knows we
don't really need it, when the people are the same and the work is the same. Yet
a minority of comrades have exerted their utmost efforts,19 insisting that it must
absolutely be set up. What actually is the reason for all this? If you want to
search out a reason, I can only say that this is the synthesis of all the wrong lines
practiced by a minority of comrades in the past and the final struggle between
two guiding lines. We can easily understand the true meaning of this debate if we
have a clear understanding of the history of the Fourth Army.

To set up a new leading organization, the Army Committee, they had to dig
out the old reasons to attack the old leading organizations, the Front Committee
and the Party branches. The most specific arguments put forward in their attack are: (1) that the Party has replaced the mass organizations; (2) that there is a
patriarchal system within the Party in the Fourth Army. But these attacks, too,
lapse completely into formalism. From the very beginning of the Party in the
Fourth Army, it has been strictly forbidden to replace the mass organizations
with those of the Party. As regards the worker and peasant organizations under
the leadership of the Front Committee, there has never been an instance in which
a Party branch has replaced a workers' or peasants' association. As for the
soldiers' organizations, there has never been an instance in which the Party
branch of any company replaced the soldiers' committee of that company. Everyone in the Fourth Army who has eyes has seen all this. As for a Party bureau
or organ replacing a mass organ or an administrative organ, for example, the
replacement of the Column Soldiers' Committee, the Column Headquarters, or
the Column Political Department by the Column Committee, or the replacement
of the Army Soldiers' Committee, the Army Headquarters, or the Army Political
Department by the Front Committee, these things have never happened, either.
But here also the formalism of a minority of comrades has manifested itself.
They say that even though the organs of the Party bureau have not replaced the
mass organs or the administrative organs, the Column Headquarters, in fact,
rarely report to the Army Headquarters and that the Army Headquarters is now
treated lightly. This minority of comrades does not understand that this represents the difference between formalism and utilitarianism. The leadership of the
Column Committee and the Front Committee having been strengthened, all
questions (whichever ones they want to raise) can be raised at the meetings,
discussed, and resolved. Afterward, the responsible comrades in the administrative organs will be notified and will carry out these resolutions. Otherwise, it can
be called acting on one's own (as in the arbitrary allocation of financial resources, guns and ammunition, and so on). This sort of thing is an example of the
strengthening of Party leadership. We have to admit that this represents progress.
At every meeting, the responsible comrades from the administrative organs are
always present and voice their opinions. Moreover, many questions can be discussed
only if they are raised by these responsible comrades (for example, battle plans,
training plans for officers and soldiers, etc.). Everybody has participated in the
discussion and voting on these questions, and afterward the decisions are carried out.
As a result, it is felt that the administrative organs have become somewhat simpler
and freer. In reality, what is so bad about that? The army commander is not so busy,
but the Party representative (who is quite distinct from the secretary of the Party
committee) has even less to do, because the Party representatives at the lower levels
do not send reports to him. The Column Headquarters sends few reports to the Army
Headquarters, but the Political Department of the column sends even fewer reports
to the Political Department of the army. Not taking into account the comparison
between the recent situation and the arbitrary allocation which prevailed earlier in
the administration; not considering whether the present system leads to more results
in the work and is more convenient for struggle than in the earlier period of frenzied activity-the first stage of the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Area when there were many
more reports; judging not on the basis of practical needs, but on the basis of mere
outward forms-what kind of Communist attitude is this? Let me just ask, if it
does not work in practice, no matter how much better it looks in terms of form,
what use is it? As for the accusations against the Action Committee of the
Hunan-Jiangxi Border Area, they do not consider how many results the system
of the Action Committee achieved in the border area, they merely opine in
formal terms that the Party organization replaced the administrative organ and
that this was a bad thing. This is another formalistic error. If this formalism
continues to develop, in all matters the results will not be considered, but only
the form, and this will be unspeakably dangerous. Everyone who has eyes to see
understands that the Action Committee system achieved very great results in the
struggle in the border area. Moreover, the Action Committee functions, on the one
hand, as an internal Party bureau and, on the other hand, as an open administrative
office. Why would this in any way hamper the system of administrative organs?

As for the attack on the patriarchal system within the Party in the Fourth
Army, this is also a formalistic observation. Here we must first ask what a
patriarchal system is. Only then can we know if there is such a system in the
Fourth Army. Otherwise, casual and thoughtless comments will assuredly not
correspond to the facts. The definition of a patriarchal system is that there are
only orders from individuals, no collective discussion; there are only appointments from above, not elections by the masses. If everyone agrees with this
definition, let us see if there exists within the Party of the Fourth Army what this
definition describes. We will then know whether there is a patriarchal system or
not. Collective discussion in the Party of the Fourth Army, from the Party branch
to the Front Committee, has always existed. At Party meetings at every level,
particularly the two levels of the Front Committee and the Column Committee,
whether it is a general meeting or a meeting of the members of the standing
committee, on virtually every occasion there are present, besides the committee
members who are required to be there, comrades in responsible positions who
are not committee members. If some comrades of the minority are forgetful, they
can check the minutes of the meetings of all the columns (the Third Column has
a complete set of minutes since May of last year; not a single one is missing) and
of the Front Committee (the minutes are available starting with this year, and none
are missing). On the important questions, such as the discussion about leaving the
Jinggangshan, the separation of our forces in Donggu, or the current debate and the
separation of forces, we have always sought the opinions of the masses. There are
simply no grounds for saying that within the Party of the Fourth Army there are only
orders by individuals and no collective discussion. As for the process by which the
various leading organs were created, from the detachment20 committees to the column committees and the Front Committee, they were appointed by the Central
Committee. But this is no proof that a patriarchal system exists within the Party
of the Fourth Army. In fact, one cannot find a patriarchal system within the Party
of the Fourth Army. Why do the comrades of the minority use this excuse? What
is the objective origin of this kind of talk? It is true that in the Fourth Army there
is the system which allows the Party secretary to serve concurrently as the Red
Army Party representative. Some comrades do not distinguish clearly that the
Party representative and the secretary are two different things as regards their
functions. Because the spheres of competence of the Party representatives and of
the military commanders have never been fully clarified, the problem of a
struggle for power frequently arises. This has led some muddle-headed people to regard the Party representative working in a certain place as the Party
secretary working there. This is why comrades in several companies of the
Third Column called the Party secretary of their company "boss." This mistake can be eliminated only by separating the Party representative from the
Party secretary. This can be done by searching for people from within, on the
one hand, and by looking at the same time for more people from the outside,
on the other. (The concurrent posts in the past were the result of the fact that
we had very few qualified people. Everyone knows this.) The source of
formalism lies in idealism. Idealism comes from individualism that originates
in the categories of the vagrants, the peasantry, and the petty bourgeoisie.
This is based on the same line as cliquism, the roving rebel mentality, the
purely military viewpoint, and so on. All these are one and the same thing.
Another aspect of the development of this kind of thinking will assuredly
lead to the doctrine of the separation of powers another way of thinking
which represents the vagrants, the peasantry, and the petty bourgeoisie. This
is completely incompatible with the fighting organizations of the proletariat,
whether it be the class organization trade unions or the vanguard organization of the class the Communist Party or its military organization-the
Red Army. This is why the form of separation of powers should not be
allowed to exist in the Army Committee and the Front Committee.

Vaingloriousness, boasting, the ideology of the hero, and other decadent ways
of thinking all have their origin in individualism.

6. We are historical materialists. To get at the truth regarding any matter
whatsoever, we have to investigate it both from the perspective of history and
from the perspective of the circumstances. I have now raised the various aspects
of the historical questions since the Fourth Army came into being to prove that
the current question (the question of the Army Committee, but it is a question of
principle) is merely a historical theme, the last struggle of a wrong ideological
line in history. We should never forget the origins and composition of the Red
Army. According to the statistics for May, of the 1,324 Party members in the
Army, there are 311 workers, 626 peasants, 100 small businessmen, 192 students, and 95 others. The ratio of workers to nonworkers is 23 percent to 77 percent. When we discuss the thinking of an individual, we should not forget his
class origin, his educational background, and his work history. This is the
attitude toward research of a Communist. Manifestly, there exists in the Party
of the Fourth Army an incorrect ideology based on the peasants, the vagrants,
and the petty bourgeoisie. This ideology is harmful to the solidarity of the
Party and the future of the revolution. It runs the risk of deviating from the
proletarian revolutionary standpoint. We must fight against this ideology (it
is mainly a question of thought, the rest is a small matter)21 and overcome
this ideology in order to pursue the thoroughgoing transformation of the Red
Army. We should oppose without hesitation everything that hampers the
elimination of old, decadent thinking and the transformation of the Red
Army. This is the goal for which our comrades will struggle now and in the
future.

As for my request to leave the Front Committee, 22 this does not mean I am
passive and will not participate in this struggle. There are the following
reasons:
1) I have done everything within my ability in the last two years to fight
against the incorrect ideas within the Party. Now, after I have recounted the
content of this question yet again, the majority of the comrades will be
impelled to struggle ceaselessly. Only this will make it possible to achieve
final victory.
2) I have stayed for too long in the Fourth Army. The effect produced by a
certain historical position can be most unfavorable. This is the main reason I
want to point out.
3) I myself am too weak physically and too poor in my wisdom and knowledge, so I hope that the Central Committee can send me to Moscow to study and
rest for a while. Before receiving the permission of the Central Committee, the
Front Committee can send me to do some work in the localities, so that I can
improve myself with the change of environment.
4) The Party of the Fourth Army already has a relatively solid foundation.
My departure will certainly not have any negative effect. Now that the split and
the struggle in the ideology of the Party have begun, my departure can on no account prevent the goal of victory from being attained. So the worry expressed
in the last section of your letter is excessive. Naturally, I can only express my
views regarding my work. The decision will be made by the Party Bureau. Every
day that I remain here will be a day on which I will fight with all of you in the
ideological struggle!
C. salutations!23 Mao Zedong
June 14, at Xinquan

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Notes

We have translated this letter from Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 1, pp. 64-75, where the source
is given as a mimeographed copy in the Party archives. It does not appear to have been
published previously.
1. Lin Biao (1907–1971), original name Yuyong, was a native of Hubei. After graduating from middle school in 1925, he joined the Communist Youth League in Shanghai and
thus gained admission to the fourth class at the Whampoa Military Academy. After participating in the Northern Expedition under the command of Ye Ting, he joined, in August
1927, in the Nanchang Uprising, of which Ye was one of the principal leaders. In the
course of the retreat from Nanchang, he followed Zhu De and Chen Yi to the JiangxiGuangdong-Hunan Border Area at the end of 1927 and went up the Jinggangshan with
Zhu De in the spring of 1928. Earlier in 1929, he had played a role in the battles at Dabodi
and Shanghang, described by Mao in texts translated above. At this time, he was commander of the First Column of the Fourth Red Army.
2. Serious tensions had developed at this time between Mao Zedong and Zhu De, and
according to accounts recently published in China, Lin Biao did his utmost to exacerbate
the conflict. The letter to which Mao is responding here had been sent by Lin Biao only a
few hours before the Baisha meeting of June 8, 1929. The text of Lin's letter is not
available to us, but its main theme was the overweening ambitions of "certain comrades,"
meaning Zhu De. See Jin Chongji, Zhu De zhuan (Biography of Zhu De) (Beijing:
Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1993), pp. 175-80 (hereafter Jin, Zhu De). At the Baisha
meeting, the Army Committee was abolished, leaving the Front Committee in sole control,
and this decision was confirmed two weeks later at the Seventh Congress of Party Representatives from the Fourth Red Army. On the latter occasion, however, Mao lost his
leading position as secretary of the Front Committee. For more details regarding these
events, see the Introduction to this volume.

3. The conference of June 8, 1929, mentioned above, which was held in Baisha,
Shanghang xian, Fujian.
4. Kexuehua, literally, making scientific.
5. Here eight or nine characters are missing from the mimeographed text held in the
Party Archives in Beijing.

6. The Chinese text here reads jianshe (establish), but the editors in Beijing regard this
as an obvious typographical error for piping (criticize).
7. After this clause, seven or eight characters are missing from the original.
8. Here approximately thirty characters are missing.

9. The Fifth Army, under the command of Peng Dehuai, reached the Jinggangshan
base and joined forces with the Fourth Army in December 1928.
12. Here the Chinese has ce, meaning "roll" or "register." The Beijing editors suggest
that the reference is to huamingce, "muster roll."

13. I.e., at the Sixth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, held in Moscow in
June 1928, of which word had reached Mao and his comrades in January 1929.
14. This comment cannot fail to call to mind Mao's advocacy in earlier years, inspired
by Nietzsche, of the idea of the hero. See especially, in Volume I of this edition, his
comments on Paulsen, pp. 263-64.
15. This was a meeting of the Front Committee of the Fourth Army held at the end of
May 1929 in Hulei, Yongding xian, Fujian.

16. I.e., the Baisha meeting referred to in note 2 above.

17. Here three or four characters are missing in the original.

18. Zhu Yunqing (1907–1931), a native of Guangdong, was a graduate of the
Whampoa Military Academy. He joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1925 and served
on the Jinggangshan. At this time he was chief political adviser to the Fourth Army.
19. Literally, "have exerted the force of nine oxen and two tigers."

--- Notes

10. The Second and Fourth Independent Regiments of the Jiangxi Red Army joined
forces with the Fourth Army in Ji'an in February 1929.

11. The reference is to a meeting convened in Bolu, Ninggang xian, January 4-7, 1929,
with the participation of the Front Committee of the Fourth Red Army, the Border Area
Special Committee, the Army Committees of the Fourth and Fifth Armies, and the various
xian committees of the border area.

20. A detachment at this time was a guerrilla unit roughly comparable in size to a
battalion in the Chinese regular army.

21. Here seven or eight characters are missing from the original.

22. As indicated in the Introduction to this volume, Mao Zedong had received orders
from the Central Committee in February 1929 to leave the army and come to Shanghai. In
his letter of April 5 and in his report of June 1, translated above, Mao had agreed in
principle to comply, though he probably had no intention of actually doing so. Here Mao
goes a step farther than in his two previous communications, not only accepting the
necessity of a transfer but suggesting that he himself had actually requested it. This may
have been merely an attempt to save face, but he did suffer from illness at this time, as
suggested in point 3 below, and went to a hospital to rest shortly after writing the present
letter.

23. Mao here uses the Roman letter C to stand for "Communist" in the Chinese text.