Secondly, the Party’s mistakes were relatively few in Jiangxi and Fujian provinces. With the exception of Zhejiang, where our understanding remains incomplete, both Jiangxi and Fujian boast stronger Party and mass bases than Hunan. In northern Jiangxi, De’an, Xiushui, and Tonggu still maintain a considerable base; while in Ninggang, Yongxin, Lianhua, Suichuan, and other counties of central Jiangxi, the Party organizations and the Red Guards continue to hold sway. Southern Jiangxi offers even greater prospects: the 2nd and 4th Independent Regiments of the Red Army in Ji’an, Yongfeng, Xingguo, and other counties are steadily growing. Moreover, Zhu Zhimin’s[1] 3rd Independent Regiment in eastern Jiangxi has not been annihilated. Together, these developments have created a situation whereby Nanchang is effectively encircled. We therefore propose that, amidst the protracted civil war among various Nationalist factions, the Central Committee should strive to secure control over Jiangxi while simultaneously extending influence into western Fujian and western Zhejiang. Our aim should be to expand the Red Army’s strength across these three provinces and establish widespread mass soviets, completing this plan within one year. During this period, we must also lay the groundwork for proletarian struggle in Shanghai, Wuxi, Ningbo, Hangzhou, Fuzhou, Xiamen, and other key cities, so as to provide leadership for the peasant movements in Jiangxi, Zhejiang, and Fujian. To this end, the Jiangxi Provincial Committee must be consolidated, and robust worker organizations should be vigorously established in Nanchang, Jiujiang, Ji’an, and along the Nanxun Railway line.

We arrived in Tingzhou on March 14, defeated Guo’s brigade, and killed Guo Fengming, only then learning of the rupture between the Guangxi and Guangdong cliques and the imminent outbreak of a full-scale Nationalist civil war. In light of this development, we decided that, during the initial phase of the Nationalist conflict, we would focus on a vast region encompassing more than twenty counties in western Fujian and southern Jiangxi. Employing guerrilla tactics, we would mobilize the masses, advance toward open soviet rule, deepen the land revolution, and establish worker-peasant governments. By linking this newly formed soviet with the one on the Hunan–Jiangxi border, we could forge a solid base of power to serve as a springboard for further advances. Accordingly, we did not proceed to Shanghang and Yongding nor to Longyan. Instead, we worked in Tingzhou for seventeen days before moving to Ruijin on April 1. We set April 8 as the date to occupy Yudu, where we planned to convene an enlarged meeting to discuss our operational plan with comrades from the Southern Jiangxi Special Committee and with Comrade Luo Shounan, dispatched by the Central Military Department. The people of western Fujian and southern Jiangxi proved exceptionally supportive. While operating in Tingzhou county town and in Xinqiao, Hetian, and other localities, we seized…

--- Notes

[1] Fang Zhimin (1899–1935), native of Yiyang County, Jiangxi, was a principal founder of the northeastern Jiangxi revolutionary base area and the Tenth Red Army.
[2] The “Third Independent Regiment” should probably read “First Independent Regiment.”
[3] Shanghang and Yongding refer to Shanghang and Yongding counties in Fujian Province.