The Front Committee
A Letter from the Front Committee to the
Central Committee1

(Ruijin, April 5, 1929)

To the Central Committee:

On April 3, at Ruijin, we received your letter of February 7, which had been
forwarded to us by the Fujian Provincial Committee.2 The Central Committee's
letter makes too pessimistic an appraisal of the objective situation and of the
subjective forces. The third "suppression" campaign against the Jinggangshan
represented the high water mark of the counterrevolutionary tide. But there it
stopped, and since then the counterrevolutionary tide has gradually receded,
while the revolutionary tide has gradually risen. Although our Party's fighting
capacity and organizational strength have been weakened to the extent described
by the Central Committee, they will be rapidly restored, and the passivity among
comrades in the Party will quickly disappear as the counterrevolutionary tide
gradually ebbs. The masses will certainly come over to us. Butcherism3 only
serves to "drive the fish into deep waters," and reformism no longer has any
appeal to the masses. The illusions of the masses about the Guomindang will
assuredly be soon dissipated. In the circumstances which will arise, no other
party will be able to compete with the Communist Party in winning over the
masses. The political line and the organizational line laid down by the Sixth
Congress are entirely correct: the current stage of the revolution is democratic
and not socialist, and the present task of the Party is to win over the masses and
not to stage immediate armed insurrections. Nevertheless, the revolution is de-

We have translated this text from Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 1, pp. 54-63. There the source
is given as a handwritten copy in the Party archives. This letter was first published in
the 1941 edition of the internal documentary collection Liuda yilai (Since the Sixth
Congress).
veloping swiftly, and we should adopt a positive spirit in our propaganda about,
and preparations for, armed insurrection. In the present chaotic situation we can
lead the masses only if we have positive slogans and a positive spirit. Only by
having such a spirit can the Party recover its fighting capacity. We feel that the
Party committed the error of adventurism in the past, and now it has a rather
marked liquidationist tendency in some places. The Party branches in the localities that we have passed through in western Fujian and southern Jiangxi had very
low combat morale and had lightly let go many opportunities for battle. The
masses are vast, and also revolutionary, but the party branches are not taking the
lead. The examples of western Fujian and southern Jiangxi make us wonder
whether there are similar phenomena elsewhere. So we have to oppose the evil
tendency toward adventurism and commandism, but we must also energetically
guard against the tendency toward liquidationism and immobilism. Proletarian
leadership is the sole key to the victory of the revolution. Building up the Party's
proletarian basis and establishing Party branches in industrial enterprises in key
areas are the greatest organizational tasks for the Party at present. But, at the
same time, the development of the struggle in the countryside, the establishment
of soviets in small areas, and the creation and expansion of the Red Army are
prerequisites for aiding the struggle in the cities and hastening the revolutionary
upsurge. The greatest mistake would therefore be to abandon the struggle in the
cities and sink into rural guerrilla-ism. But in our opinion, it is also a mistake—if
any of our Party members hold such views—to fear the development of the
power of the peasants lest it outstrip the workers' leadership and become detrimental to the revolution. For the revolution in semicolonial China will fail only if the
peasant struggle is deprived of the leadership of the workers; it will never suffer just
because the peasant struggle develops in such a way as to become more powerful
than the workers. The Sixth Congress has pointed out the mistake of neglecting the
peasant revolution. In this letter from the Central Committee, the idea "develop a
vast struggle everywhere in the rural areas" represents the only correct view.
The Central Committee asks us to divide our forces into very small units and
disperse them over the countryside and to withdraw Zhu De and Mao Zedong
from the army, thus concealing the major targets, all this with the aim of preserving the Red Army and arousing the masses.⁴ This is a kind of ideal view. In the
winter of 1927-1928, we did start to plan to disperse our forces over the countryside, with each company or battalion operating on its own and adopting guerrilla
tactics in order to arouse the masses while trying not to present a target for the
enemy; we have tried this many times, but have failed every time. The reasons
are: (1) Most of the soldiers of the Red Army come from other areas and have a
background different from that of the local Red Guards. The peasants in
Ninggang and other xian of the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Area are willing to serve

southern Jiangxi and western Fujian, because our troops were centralized,
and the leading organ's (the Front Committee) and the leaders' (Zhu and
Mao) attitudes were unwavering, not only was the enemy unable to do anything to us but their losses were greater than their gains, and our gains were
greater than our losses. Our two victories in Ningdu and Tingzhou xian completely wiped out the combat effectiveness of the local bullies, Guo's and
Liu's brigades, resulting in the current mass mobilization in southern Jiangxi and
western Fujian.⁶ Without the centralization of the army and sound leadership,
this could not have been done. The tactics we have derived from the struggle of
the past three years are indeed different from any other tactics, ancient or modern, Chinese or foreign. With our tactics, the masses can be aroused for struggle
on an ever-broadening scale, and no enemy, however powerful, can cope with
us. Ours are guerrilla tactics. They consist mainly of the following points:

"Divide our forces to arouse the masses, concentrate our forces to deal
with the enemy."

"The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy
tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue."⁷

"To extend stable base areas, employ the policy of advancing in waves;
when pursued by a powerful enemy, employ the policy of circling around."

"Arouse the largest numbers of the masses in the shortest possible time and
by the best possible methods."
These tactics are just like casting a net; at any moment we should be able to
cast it or draw it in. We cast it wide to win over the masses and draw it in to deal
with the enemy. Such are the tactics we have used for the past three years. When
we were in the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Area, once we had pulled the forces
together and defeated the enemy, we were able to scatter and work for two to
three weeks (in several big teams, and then each big team could again be subdivided), until the enemy once more marshaled his forces to attack us, at which
point we would get together again to defeat the enemy, then scatter again to
work. This time when the enemy pursued us, we used the spiral guerrilla tactics
and went through a vast area and mobilized vast masses. Whenever we came to a
place, we would stay a minimum of half a day and a maximum of five days.
First, we conducted propaganda on a large scale. (The press propaganda team
and oral propaganda teams, under the Political Department, are based on the
company; two teams per company and three people per team. Along the march
and wherever we went, propaganda was immediately conducted everywhere.)
Then we distributed money and goods (grain, clothing, and tools owned by big
landlords and reactionary elements), and we went ahead with organizing (Party
branches, underground workers' unions, and underground peasants' unions). Our
techniques of working with the masses have greatly improved. The Red Army now
is not purely a combat force; its main function is, rather, to mobilize the masses.
Combat is only a means. The time we spend on combat as compared with the time
we spend on mass work stands in a proportion of 1 to 10. The army today is
different from that in the days of Ye and He. The only occupation of the army of Ye
and He was to fight. This would not work today. It would not have survived. At no
time can the Red Army survive without a united leading organization for the Party
and the army; otherwise, it will fall into anarchy and will certainly fail.
At present the Party's leading organ is the Front Committee, with Mao
Zedong as secretary, and the military commanding organ is the headquarters,
with Zhu De as chief of the army. If the Central Committee needs Zhu and Mao
for other assignments, please send us capable replacements for them. We think
Comrade Liu Bocheng can take over the military post and Comrade Yun Daiying
can take over the Party and political work. If they can both come, they will be
able to do better work than we can. Last June in a letter from the Central
Committee, it was mentioned that Comrade He Long would be sent here to
inspect our work, but we don't know why he has not yet arrived. Now it is very
convenient to come here from Fujian. We hope that you will send people to
inspect our work at any time.
Since Liu's and Guo's brigades were wiped out, it may be said that we have
their fighting capacity is undoubtedly not great; Zhang Zhen¹¹ alone can put up
some sort of a fight, but according to an analysis made by the Fujian Provincial
Committee, even he has only two good regiments. In addition, Fujian is now in a
state of complete anarchy and disunity. In Jiangxi, there are sixteen regiments
under the two commands of Zhu Peide and Xiong Shihui; they are stronger than
the armed forces of either Fujian or Zhejiang, but far inferior to those of Hunan.
(When they have fought with us, apart from Li Wenbin's brigade, we have
defeated them all.) Secondly, fewer adventurist mistakes have been made in
these three provinces. We are not clear about the situation in Zhejiang, but the
Party's organizational and mass base is somewhat better in Jiangxi and Fujian
than in Hunan. Take Jiangxi, for example. In northern Jiangxi we still have some
bases in De'an, Xiushui, and Tonggu; in western Jiangxi the Party and the Red
Guards still have some strength in Ninggang, Yongxin, Lianhua, and Suichuan;
in southern Jiangxi the prospects are still much brighter, as the Second and Fourth
Regiments of the Red Army are steadily growing in strength in the xian of Ji'an,
Yongfeng, and Xingguo; in eastern Jiangxi, the Red Army's Third Regiment under
Fang Zhimin has by no means been wiped out. All this places us in a position to
close in on Nanchang. We hereby recommend to the Central Committee that during
the period of prolonged and chaotic warfare among the Guomindang warlords, we
should contend with Chiang Kaishek and the Guangxi clique for Jiangxi Prov9. Jiang Bocheng (?-1951), a native of Jiangxi, was commander of the local defense
forces.
10. Lu Xingbang (1880-1945) and Chen Guohui (1895-1933) were both natives of
Fujian. Each of them had spent several years as a bandit, before pursuing a military career.
At this time, Lu was commander of the Guomindang's newly organized Second Division;
Chen was commander of the First Mixed Brigade of the Fujian forces.
11. Zhang Zhen (1884-1963), a native of Fujian, had participated in the Revolution of
1911. At this time, he was commander of the Guomindang's Temporary First Division,
with responsibility for the campaign against the Red Army in Fujian.

ince, and at the same time for western Fujian and western Zhejiang. In these
three provinces we should enlarge the Red Army and create an independent
régime of the masses, with a time limit of one year for accomplishing this plan.
During this one year, we must lay the foundations for the struggle of the
proletariat in Shanghai, Wuxi, Ningpo, Hangzhou, Fuzhou, Xiamen, and other
places, so that they can lead the peasant struggles in Zhejiang, Jiangxi, and
Fujian. The Jiangxi Provincial Committee must be soundly established, and
efforts must be made to build a basis among the workers in Nanchang, Jiujiang,
Ji'an, and on the Nanchang-Jiujiang Railroad.
We came to Tingzhou on March 14, after we had defeated Guo's brigade and
shot Guo Fengming. Then we found out about the rift between Chiang Kaishek and
the Guangxi faction, and how a chaotic struggle within the Guomindang will soon
come. As for our present arrangements, we have decided that during the initial stage
of the fighting within the Guomindang, with the twenty-odd xian of western Fujian
and southern Jiangxi as our sphere of action, we should mobilize the masses with our
guerrilla tactics, in order that the masses may openly establish an independent
régime. We must deepen the land revolution and establish worker-peasant political
power, and then join this régime to the one in the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Area to
form a strong force, which will be the foundation for future development. Therefore,
we did not go down to Hangyong or to Longyan. After working in Tingzhou for
seventeen days, we came to Ruijin on April 1. We plan to enter and occupy Yudu
on April 8. When we get to Yudu, we will call a big meeting to discuss our action
plans with the Southern Jiangxi Special Committee and with Comrade Luo Shounan
sent by the Military Department of the Central Committee. The masses in western
Fujian and southern Jiangxi are extremely well disposed. Several thousand had come
together to seize grain from the local tyrants at Changting xian seat, Xinqiao, Hetian,
and other places. At Tingzhou, we organized twenty underground peasants' unions
and five underground workers' unions, and also established the trade union federation. The party organization has doubled in size. One Red Guard unit was also
organized, but since it could not stand on its own, it has followed the army to Ruijin.
The first organ of political power was a provisional revolutionary committee, appointed by the Political Department. After several workers' unions and peasants'
unions had been organized, a representative assembly was called together to elect the
formal revolutionary committee. Both the provisional and the formal revolutionary
committees issued political programs. On arriving in Ruijin, we planned for four
days' work. The army was scattered to work in the xian town, Rentian City, Xijiang,
and Jiubao, and in each place each team was divided into subteams. The headquarters are in the xian capital. The masses of Ruijin have risen like a raging fire to
welcome us. They have fought very bravely against the landlords. Unfortunately,
there was formerly no organization, not a single comrade, and no local leading
organizations. Since the work was done in a rush, it was not well done, especially in
the xian town. After we get to Yudu, we will spend about one week there working in
the xian capital and the four cities. Later we may march toward Ningdu and
Guangchang, or toward Wan'an and Taihe, depending on the circumstances. We
will engage in guerrilla warfare for a while in southern Jiangxi before we move
to western Fujian. Then we will take on the remnants of Guo Fengming's and Lu
Xingbang's and Chen Guohui's units. The Fujian Provincial Committee must
make efforts to prepare for this.
As for the situation in the army, except for a small portion which has been left
in the border area, we have with us in the main force of the Fourth Army a total
of three thousand six hundred men and eleven hundred guns. We lost two hundred guns and six hundred men at Dayu, Xinfeng, and Xunwu (most of the men
lost contact during the fighting). Only a few score guns and a little more than one
hundred men were actually taken by the enemy. The shocking reports in the
newspapers were all lies of the enemy. After the Ningdu and Tingzhou battles,
we have not only recovered but even gained a little. The army is now organized
as the first, second, and third columns, each of which is in charge of two detachments (equivalent to battalions), and each detachment is in charge of three
groups [da dui] (equivalent to companies). Each column has about five hundred
guns and over twelve hundred men. When we divide the forces to wage guerrilla
warfare, we use the columns as units, spread them out, and then divide them
again into detachments. It is very convenient to divide the forces and bring them
back together again. Eight hundred men and five hundred guns from Comrade
Peng Dehuai's Fifth Army came to the Jinggangshan. Of those, six hundred men
and four hundred guns are now at Ruijin. They have been reorganized as the
Fifth Column of the Fourth Army. Comrade Peng Dehuai is now in command,
with the title of deputy army commander. Within the next few days, we need to
return to the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Area to rally the old troops, to restore political power, and to restore contact with southern Jiangxi, which is still under the
Front Committee. Political departments have been established. The army has a
political department, and each column has its own political department within
which there are the Secretariat, Propaganda, Organization (which includes sections for staff members, peasants, and Party affairs) and Political Security divisions. At the levels of detachments and companies there are Party
representatives. We plan to abolish the Party representatives at levels higher than
columns and have only the head of the Political Department. At Tingzhou, we have
had new clothes made for the whole army, and each man was given four yuan as
spending money. Provisions are no problem, and morale is high. Two other armies
from eastern Jiangxi and Lichuan (near Guangchang) want to join us. One consists
of five hundred men who have defected from Jin Handing with more than three
hundred guns. They have been reorganized as the Fourth Column, with Tian Guiqing as its commander. The other one is composed of over three hundred bandits
with more than two hundred guns. They had been battered from all sides and could
not find a way out. Now they have been reorganized as an independent battalion
with Hu Zhusheng as its commander. Both of these armies will arrive in Ningdu
after April 14 to be reorganized and trained. The Second and the Fourth Regiments
Lin Biao, translated below. We have used the same wording in both cases for the passages
which overlap.

2. The Central Committee's letter of February 7, 1929, has long been known only
from Mao's references to it and from other secondary sources. The full text has now been
published in Central Committee Documents (1929), pp. 29-37. As explained in the Introduction to this volume, it was drafted by Zhou Enlai.

3. I.e., the adversary's policy of massacring the population.


4. Such were, in fact, the orders of the Central Committee. See also the discussion in
the Introduction to this volume.
only in the local Red Guard units but not in the Red Army. Therefore, in the Red
Army, one can hardly find any peasants from the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Area.
The Red Army is made up of veterans from the National Revolutionary Army,⁵
the peasant army from Liuyang, Pingjiang, and southern Hunan, and prisoners of
war from the past. (2) Division into small units results in weak leadership and
organization and inability to cope with adverse circumstances, which easily lead
to defeat; (3) The units are liable to be crushed by the enemy one by one.
(Because of the division of forces, the Fifth Army in Pingjiang and Liuyang xian
and the Fourth Army in the border area and in Hunan have been defeated five
times.) (4) The more adverse the circumstances, the greater the need for concentration and for the leaders to be resolute in struggle, because only thus can we
have internal unity to resist the enemy. Only in favorable circumstances is it
advisable to divide our forces for guerrilla operations, and it is only then that the
leaders need not stay with the ranks all the time, as they must in adverse circumstances. This last time when we left the Jinggangshan and marched toward

5. I.e., the Guomindang army.

6. Regarding the battles with Guo Fengming and Liu Shiyi, see above, Mao's report of
March 20, 1929.

7. This terse summary of the Red Army's tactics, known in Chinese as the "sixteencharacter formula" because each of its four clauses consists of four characters, had been
coined by Mao Zedong and Zhu De in May 1928. It appeared for the first time in written
form in the present letter, and soon came to be regarded as the definitive formulation of
Mao's guerrilla principles.


8. The reference is to the forces of Ye Ting and He Long, at the time when these
commanders were leading them on the retreat from Nanchang.
no more enemies in western Fujian and southern Jiangxi. The armies of Chiang
Kaishek and the Guangxi warlords are approaching each other in the vicinity of
Jiujiang, and a big battle is imminent. Henceforth, the rule of the Guomindang
will disintegrate, and the revolutionary high tide will arrive very quickly. As for
how our work should be arranged under these circumstances, we feel that, so far
as the southern provinces are concerned, the armed forces of the compradors and
landlords in Guangdong and Hunan Provinces are too strong, and that in Hunan,
moreover, we have lost almost all the masses, inside as well as outside the Party,
because of the error of the Party's adventurist policies. In the three provinces of
Fujian, Jiangxi, and Zhejiang, however, the situation is different. First, the military forces are weakest there. In Zhejiang, there is only a small provincial defense force under Jiang Bocheng. In Fujian, although there are five groups of
enemy troops totaling fourteen regiments in all, Guo's troops have already been
smashed; the troops under Chen and Lu10 are bandits of small fighting capacity;
the two brigades of marines stationed along the coast have never seen action and and their fighting capacity is probably not great. Only Zhang Zhen is relatively capable of fighting, but according to the analysis of the Fujian Provincial Committee, even he has only two good regiments, and moreover the five units are completely without unified command and are disunited.

In Jiangxi, the two units of Zhu Peide and Xiong Shihui together have sixteen regiments. They are stronger than the armed forces of either Fujian or Zhejiang, but much weaker than those of Hunan. More than half of them have fought against us, and except for Li Wenbin's brigade, all the rest have been defeated by us.

Second, the Party made fewer adventurist mistakes in these three provinces. Except for Zhejiang, whose situation we do not know clearly, the Party and mass base in Jiangxi and Fujian are somewhat better than in Hunan. In northern Jiangxi, there are still some bases in De'an, Xiushui, and Tonggu; in western Jiangxi, the Party and the Red Guards still have some strength in Ninggang, Yongxin, Lianhua, and Suichuan; in southern Jiangxi the prospects are still brighter, for the Second and Fourth Independent Regiments of the Red Army in Ji'an, Yongfeng, and Xingguo are steadily growing stronger; in eastern Jiangxi, Fang Zhimin's Third Independent Regiment of the Red Army has by no means been wiped out. Thus a situation has been created for the encirclement of Nanchang.

We recommend to the Central Committee that during the period of prolonged and chaotic warfare among the Guomindang warlords, we should contend with Chiang Kaishek and the Guangxi clique for Jiangxi Province, and at the same time for western Fujian and western Zhejiang. In these three provinces we should expand the Red Army and create an independent regime of the masses, setting a time limit of one year for accomplishing this plan. During this one year, we must lay the foundations for the proletarian struggle in Shanghai, Wuxi, Ningbo, Hangzhou, Fuzhou, Xiamen, and other places, so that they can lead the peasant struggles in Zhejiang, Jiangxi, and Fujian. The Jiangxi Provincial Committee must be soundly established, and efforts must be made to build a base among the workers in Nanchang, Jiujiang, Ji'an, and on the Nanchang-Jiujiang Railway.

We arrived in Tingzhou on March 14, after defeating Guo's brigade and shooting Guo Fengming. Then we learned of the rift between Chiang Kaishek and the Guangxi faction, and that a chaotic struggle within the Guomindang would soon come. As for our present arrangements, we have decided that during the initial stage of the fighting within the Guomindang, taking the twenty-odd counties of western Fujian and southern Jiangxi as our sphere of action, we should mobilize the masses with our guerrilla tactics, so that the masses may openly establish an independent regime. We must deepen the land revolution and establish worker-peasant political power, and then link this regime with the one in the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Area to form a strong force, which will be the foundation for future development. Therefore, we did not go down to Hangzhou or Yongding, nor to Longyan. After working in Tingzhou for seventeen days, we came to Ruijin on April 1. We plan to enter and occupy Yudu on April 8. When we get to Yudu, we will call an enlarged meeting to discuss our action plans with the Southern Jiangxi Special Committee and with Comrade Luo Shounan sent by the Military Department of the Central Committee.

The masses in western Fujian and southern Jiangxi are extremely well disposed. At Changting county seat, Xinqiao, Hetian, and other places, several thousand people had gathered to seize grain from the local tyrants. In Tingzhou we organized twenty secret peasant associations and five secret trade unions, and also established the trade union federation. The Party organization has doubled in size. We also organized a Red Guard unit, but since it could not stand on its own, it has followed the army to Ruijin.

The first organ of political power was a provisional revolutionary committee, appointed by the Political Department. After several trade unions and peasant associations had been organized, a representative assembly was called to elect the formal revolutionary committee. Both the provisional and the formal revolutionary committees issued political programs.

On arriving in Ruijin, we planned for four days' work. The army was scattered to work in the county seat, Rentian City, Xijiang, and Jiubao, and in each place each team was divided into sub-teams. The headquarters are in the county seat. The masses of Ruijin have risen like a raging fire to welcome us. They have fought very bravely against the landlords. Unfortunately, there was formerly no organization, not a single comrade, and no local leading organizations. Since the work was done in a rush, it was not done well, especially in the county seat.

After we get to Yudu, we will spend about one week working in the county seat and the four townships. Later we may march toward Ningdu and Guangchang, or toward Wan'an and Taihe, depending on circumstances. We will engage in guerrilla warfare for a while in southern Jiangxi before we move to western Fujian. Then we will take on the remnants of Guo Fengming's, Lu Xingbang's, and Chen Guohui's units. The Fujian Provincial Committee must make efforts to prepare for this.

As for the situation in the army, except for a small portion left in the border area, we have with us in the main force of the Fourth Army a total of three thousand six hundred men and eleven hundred guns. We lost two hundred guns and six hundred men at Dayu, Xinfeng, and Xunwu (most of the men lost contact during the fighting; only a few score guns and a little more than one hundred men were actually taken by the enemy). The shocking reports in the newspapers were all enemy lies. After the battles of Ningdu and Tingzhou, we have not only recovered but even gained a little.

The army is now organized into the first, second, and third columns, each of which commands two detachments (equivalent to battalions), and each detachment commands three groups (equivalent to companies). Each column has about five hundred guns and over twelve hundred men. When we divide our forces for guerrilla warfare, we use the columns as units, spread them out, and then divide them again into detachments. It is very convenient to divide the forces and bring them back together again.

Eight hundred men and five hundred guns from Comrade Peng Dehuai's Fifth Army came to the Jinggangshan. Of these, six hundred men and four hundred guns are now at Ruijin. They have been reorganized as the Fifth Column of the Fourth Army. Comrade Peng Dehuai is now in command, with the title of deputy army commander. Within the next few days, he needs to return to the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Area to rally the old troops, restore political power, and restore contact with southern Jiangxi, which is still under the Front Committee.

Political departments have been established. The army has a political department, and each column has its own political department, within which there are the Secretariat, Propaganda, Organization (which includes sections for staff, peasants, and Party affairs), and Political Security divisions. At the levels of detachments and companies, there are Party representatives. We plan to abolish Party representatives at levels higher than columns and keep only the head of the Political Department.

At Tingzhou, we had new clothes made for the whole army, and each man was given four yuan as spending money. Provisions are no problem, and morale is high.

Two other armies, from eastern Jiangxi and Lichuan (near Guangchang), want to join us. One consists of five hundred men who have defected from Jin Handing with more than three hundred guns. They have been reorganized as the Fourth Column, with Tian Guiqing as its commander. The other is composed of over three hundred bandits with more than two hundred guns. They had been battered from all sides and could not find a way out. They have been reorganized as an independent battalion, with Hu Zhusheng as its commander. Both of these armies will arrive in Ningdu after April 14 to be reorganized and trained.

The Second and Fourth Regiments of the Red Army in Jiangxi are now in the Xingguo area, and we are in contact with them.

After the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Area suffered a setback, there must now be an opportunity for recovery. Apart from Wang Zuo's unit of two hundred guns which belongs to the Fourth Red Army, the Red Guard units of the six counties of Ninggang, Yongxin, Lianhua, Suichuan, Lingxian, and Chaling have eight hundred guns in total. At a time when the warlords are too busy fighting among themselves to pay attention, we can not only hold on but also expand outward. Comrade Peng will have even more room for maneuver when he returns.

The secretary of the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Area Special Committee is Comrade Deng Qianyuan.

In southern Hunan, after the failure of the March 1928 uprising, the Party's base was completely destroyed under adventurism, the peasant armed forces were seized by the gentry, and the masses were suppressed. In August of last year, when the Red Army attacked Chenzhou, three county Party committees were organized in Zixing, Rucheng, and Guidong, along with three peasant Red Guard units, and a special committee was established to govern them, with Du Xiujing as secretary. Recent reports indicate that they, too, were sacrificed under adventurism.

After the Liling uprising last spring, the Party organization was broken and the armed forces annihilated. In the summer, seventy guns were obtained from the Fourth Army, but in the autumn they were all wiped out at Huangtuling on the border of Youxian and Liling. This shows how difficult it is for small isolated armed units to survive.

The Party's leading organ for the Red Army is the Front Committee appointed by the Central Committee. A letter from the Central Committee on June 4 of last year stated: Regarding the front leading organ, the Central Committee deems it necessary to organize a committee. The list of committee members is designated as follows: Mao Zedong, Zhu De, one worker comrade, one peasant comrade, and the secretary of the Party branch at the Front Committee's location — five persons in all, with Mao Zedong as secretary. In addition, a workers' committee should be organized, with the worker comrade of the Front Committee as secretary, and a military committee, with Zhu De as secretary. The membership lists of the Military Committee and the Workers' Committee are to be decided by the Front Committee. The scope of jurisdiction is to be determined according to circumstances, and all work within the area of jurisdiction is to be directed by the Front Committee. When the Front Committee is in Jiangxi, it is under the guidance of the Jiangxi Provincial Committee; when in Hunan, under the Hunan Provincial Committee. The responsible Provincial Committee, upon receiving a report from the Front Committee, must reply immediately and forward the Front Committee's report together with its own reply to the Central Committee. We regard this organizational directive from the Central Committee as entirely appropriate and suited to the needs of the struggle.

A Red Army that transcends local boundaries should not only refrain from being under the command of county and special committees, but should also not be limited to being under the command of any one provincial committee. Red Armies that transcend local boundaries must be under the direct command of the Central Committee in order to suit the needs of the revolutionary environment and avoid the harm of localism.

Since last August, we have sent a total of three reports to the Central Committee. The first was a long letter written by Mao Zedong in August of last year during the setback at the border, discussing the question of establishing independent regimes and the policies of the Hunan Provincial Committee. It was forwarded to the Central Committee via the Hunan Provincial Committee; the original has been lost. The second was a report made by the Front Committee in November of last year after receiving the Central Committee's June letter ordering the Red Army to return to the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Area. It gave a historical account of the struggle at the border, the question of establishing independent regimes, policies, plans, etc. It was sent via both the Hunan and Jiangxi Provincial Committees. The original of this letter is still preserved; we are sending a copy again now. Neither of these two important reports was received by the Central Committee; no wonder they are completely in the dark about our situation! The third is a letter sent by the Front Committee from Changting on March 20, forwarded by the Fujian Provincial Committee. We do not know whether it has reached you. We are sending it again now.

In the past three years, we have not received a single issue of the Central Committee's publications. Only upon arriving in Tingzhou did we see issues 3 and 4 of Young Pioneer, issue 3 of Chinese Worker, issue 2 of Ren Yan published in Beijing, and issue 2 of Qian Xiang published by Tingzhou comrades studying in Shanghai. At the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Area, due to the enemy blockade, we sometimes went two or three months without seeing a newspaper. After September of last year, we could buy newspapers in Ji'an and Changsha, but still with great difficulty. Since arriving in southern Jiangxi and western Fujian, postal routes are extremely convenient. We can see newspapers from Nanjing, Shanghai, Fuzhou, Xiamen, Zhangzhou, Nanchang, and Ganzhou every day. In Ruijin, we can even see He Jian's organ, the Changsha Republican Daily. It is as if the clouds have parted and we see the blue sky — the joy is truly indescribable!

We hope that from now on the Central Committee will send us a letter every month, and we will also send at least one letter every month to report to the Central Committee. We also hope you will find a way to send us the Central Committee's publications.

The Front Committee
Ruijin, April 5, 1929

(Printed according to the copy preserved in the Central Archives.)

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--- Notes

1. Large portions of this text were quoted by Mao in his letter of January 5, 1930, to