Central Committee: Your letter of February 7 was forwarded via the Fujian Provincial Committee and received in Ruijin on April 3.

The letter from the Central Committee takes an overly pessimistic view of both the objective situation and our subjective strength.

The Kuomintang’s third "encirclement and suppression" campaign against Jinggangshan marked the high tide of the counter-revolution. However, it stopped there; after that, the counter-revolutionary tide gradually ebbed, and the revolutionary tide gradually rose. Although the Party’s fighting capacity and organizational strength are as weak as the Central Committee describes, under the circumstances of a gradually ebbing counter-revolutionary tide, recovery will certainly be rapid, and the negative attitudes among Party cadres will quickly disappear. The masses will undoubtedly rally to our side. The policy of massacre may drive the fish into the deep, but reformism can no longer appeal to the masses. The masses’ illusions about the Kuomintang will surely vanish quickly. In the future situation, no other party will be able to compete with the Communist Party for the allegiance of the masses.

The political and organizational lines set forth at the Party’s Sixth Congress are correct: the current stage of the revolution is a democratic revolution, not a socialist one; the Party’s immediate task is to win over the masses, not to stage immediate uprisings. However, the revolution will develop very rapidly, and we should adopt an active attitude in promoting and preparing for armed uprisings. Amid the present great chaos, only active slogans and an active attitude can lead the masses. The restoration of the Party’s fighting capacity can only be possible under such an active attitude. We feel that the Party previously committed the grave error of putschism, but now in some places there is a tendency toward liquidationism. In the areas of western Fujian and southern Jiangxi where we have passed, the Party branches there display an extremely weak fighting spirit, letting many opportunities for struggle slip by lightly. The masses are broad and revolutionary, yet the Party branches stand aside, unwilling to lead. The examples of western Fujian and southern Jiangxi lead us to suspect that similar phenomena may exist elsewhere, so we must oppose the pernicious tendencies of putschism and commandism, while also vigorously guarding against the tendencies of liquidationism and immobilism. Proletarian leadership is the sole key to revolutionary victory. Establishing a proletarian foundation for the Party and creating Party branches in key urban industries are the primary organizational tasks at present; yet at the same time, the development of rural struggles, the establishment of Red political power in small areas, and the creation and expansion of the Red Army—especially in aiding urban struggles—constitute crucial conditions for advancing the revolutionary tide. Therefore, abandoning urban struggle is wrong; but fearing the growth of peasant forces, thinking that they may surpass the workers’ forces to the detriment of the revolution—if any Party member holds such a view, we consider it equally mistaken. For in a semi-colonial China, the peasant struggle can only fail if it lacks the leadership of the workers; there has never been a case where peasant struggle developed beyond the workers’ forces to the detriment of the revolution itself. The Sixth Congress pointed out the mistake of neglecting the peasant revolution. The Central Committee’s letter mentions “developing broad and widespread struggles in the countryside”—this view is correct.

The Central Committee requests that we divide our forces into very small units, disperse them into the countryside, and have Zhu and Mao leave the main force to conceal the larger objective, with the aim of preserving the Red Army and mobilizing the masses. This is an impractical idea. Operating in independent companies or battalions, dispersed across the countryside, employing guerrilla tactics to mobilize the masses and avoid detection—we planned this as early as the winter of 1927 and attempted it many times, but each time ended in failure. The reasons are: (1) The main Red Army forces are mostly not local, and their origins differ from those of the local Red Guards. The peasants in Ninggang and other counties along the Hunan-Jiangxi border only want to serve in their own county’s Red Guards and are unwilling to join the Red Army, so the Red Army can hardly recruit any peasants from the border area. The composition of the Red Army includes veterans of the old National Revolutionary Army, peasant troops from Liuyang, Pingxiang, and southern Hunan, and prisoners captured in successive battles. (2) If divided, the leadership organs become unsound, and under harsh conditions they cannot cope, making failure more likely. (3) The divided forces are easily destroyed piecemeal by the enemy. (The Fifth Army in Pingxiang and Liuyang, and the Fourth Army in both the border area and southern Hunan, suffered defeat due to division of forces on five separate occasions.) (4) The harsher the environment, the more concentrated the forces must be, and the more resolutely the leaders must fight, so as to unite internally and deal with the enemy. Only in favorable conditions is it suitable to disperse for guerrilla operations; leaders must not leave during harsh times. This time, when we left Jinggangshan and marched into southern Jiangxi and western Fujian, our forces were concentrated, and the attitude of the leadership organ (the Front Committee) and the responsible persons (Zhu and Mao) was resolute. As a result, not only did the enemy fail to harm us, but their losses exceeded their gains, while our gains exceeded our losses. The victory in the battles at Ningdu and Tingzhou completely destroyed the fighting capacity of the local forces—Guo and Liu’s two brigades—and achieved the current success in mobilizing the masses across southern Jiangxi and western Fujian. Without concentrated forces and sound leadership organs, this would have been absolutely impossible. The tactics we have developed through three years of struggle are truly unlike any other, ancient or modern, Chinese or foreign. With our tactics, the masses’ struggle is mobilized on an ever-broadening scale, and no matter how powerful the enemy, they can do nothing to us. Our tactics are guerrilla tactics. In broad outline: "Divide the forces to mobilize the masses, concentrate them to deal with the enemy." "When the enemy advances, we retreat; when the enemy halts, we harass; when the enemy tires, we strike; when the enemy retreats, we pursue." "In fixed areas of occupation, adopt a policy of wave-like expansion. When a strong enemy pursues, use a circling policy of evasion." "In a very short time, with very good methods, mobilize a very broad mass of people." These tactics are like casting a net—one must be ready to open it at any moment and to draw it in at any moment. Open it to mobilize the masses, draw it in to deal with the enemy. For the past three years, we have consistently used these tactics. When we were on the Hunan-Jiangxi border, typically after concentrating our forces to smash the enemy once, we could disperse for two or three weeks of work (splitting into several large detachments, each further split into small detachments), until the enemy regrouped and came again, whereupon we concentrated once more, smashed them again, and then dispersed for work again. This time, with the enemy in relentless pursuit, we use circling guerrilla maneuvers, covering a wide area and mobilizing broad sections of the masses. At each stop, we stay from as little as half a day to as many as five days. We begin with extensive propaganda (the political department directly controls written and oral propaganda teams, each based on a company—one team per company, each team of three persons. Propaganda is disseminated immediately while marching and at every stop), followed by the distribution of property (grain, clothes, and household goods taken from large landlords and reactionaries). Then we carry out organization (Party branches, secret trade unions, secret peasant associations). The techniques of mass work are now much more skillful than before. At present, the Red Army is not simply a fighting instrument; its principal role is to mobilize the masses, with fighting being only a means to that end. Moreover, the time spent fighting versus the time spent on mass work stands in a ratio of one to ten. Today’s troops are completely different from those of the Ye Ting and He Long period. Those troops simply fought battles; if placed in today’s conditions, they could not survive. For the Red Army, at all times, unified Party and military command organs are absolutely indispensable; otherwise, anarchy sets in, and failure is certain. At present, the Party command organ is the Front Committee, with Mao Zedong as secretary; the military command organ is the headquarters, with Zhu De as army commander. If the Central Committee, for other reasons, needs to reassign Zhu and Mao to different tasks, we hope you will promptly dispatch capable replacements. In our opinion, Comrade Liu Bocheng could handle military affairs, and Comrade Yun Daiying could handle Party and political affairs. If these two can be sent, they would surpass us. The Central Committee’s letter of last June mentioned sending Comrade He Long on an inspection tour. We do not know why he never came. Now communication from Fujian is extremely convenient, and in the future we earnestly hope you will send people on inspection tours at any time.

Since the defeat of Liu and Guo’s two brigades, it can be said that there are no enemy forces left in western Fujian and southern Jiangxi. The Jiangxi-Guangxi forces are closing in on one another in the Jiujiang area, and a major battle is imminent. The recovery of the mass struggle, combined with the deepening of internal contradictions within the reactionary ruling bloc, heralds the rapid arrival of a revolutionary high tide. In laying out our work against this backdrop, we feel that among the southern provinces, Guangdong and Hunan have too strong military forces tied to the comprador-landlord class. In Hunan, moreover, due to the Party’s putschist errors, almost all support both inside and outside the Party has been lost. Fujian, Zhejiang, and Jiangxi, however, present a different situation. First, enemy military strength is weakest in these three provinces. Zhejiang has only Jiang Bocheng’s small provincial defense force. Although Fujian has fourteen regiments across five divisions, Guo’s brigade has already been smashed; the forces of Chen and Lu are both bandit troops with very low combat effectiveness; the two marine brigades stationed along the coast have never fought before and cannot be very combat-worthy; only Zhang Zhen can fight to some degree, but according to the Fujian Provincial Committee’s analysis, only about one of Zhang’s regiments has relatively strong combat capability. Moreover, Fujian is now in a state of complete chaos and disunity. In Jiangxi, Zhu Peide and Xiong Shihui together have sixteen regiments—stronger than the military forces in Fujian and Zhejiang, but still much weaker compared to Hunan. (Of those we have fought, except for Li Wenshan’s brigade, all have been defeated by us.) Second, the errors of putschism in the Party have been relatively minor in these three provinces. Apart from Zhejiang, where we do not have a clear picture, Party and mass foundations in Jiangxi and Fujian are both better than in Hunan. Taking Jiangxi as an example: in northern Jiangxi, De’an, Xiushui, and Tonggu still have considerable foundations; in western Jiangxi, Ninggang, Yongxin, Lianhua, and Suichuan, the strength of the Party and the Red Guards still exists; southern Jiangxi holds even greater hope—the First and Fourth Regiments of the Red Army in Ji’an, Yongxin, Xingguo, and other counties show a trend of beneficial growth; in eastern Jiangxi, Fang Zhimin’s Red Army has not been wiped out. This has created a situation that effectively encircles Nanchang. We suggest to the Central Committee that, during the prolonged period of war among the Kuomintang warlords, we should contend with both the Jiangxi and Guangxi factions for control of Jiangxi, while simultaneously extending into western Fujian and western Zhejiang. In these three provinces, we should increase the numbers of the Red Army, create mass-based occupied areas, and complete this plan within one year. During this year, we must build a foundation for the proletarian struggle in places such as Shanghai, Wuxi, Ningbo, Hangzhou, Fuzhou, and Xiamen, so that they can lead the peasant struggle in Jiangxi, Zhejiang, and Fujian. The Jiangxi Provincial Committee must be strengthened, and the worker base in Nanchang, Jiujiang, Ji’an, and along the Nanchang-Jiujiang Railway must be built up through hard work.

We arrived in Tingzhou on March 14, defeated Guo’s brigade, and killed Guo Fengming. Only then did we learn of the Jiangxi-Guangxi split and that a great internecine war among the Kuomintang was imminent. Regarding the current disposition of our work, we decided that during the initial stage of the Kuomintang civil war, we would take a large area encompassing more than twenty counties in western Fujian and southern Jiangxi as our sphere, using guerrilla tactics to mobilize the masses, establish open mass occupation, deepen the agrarian revolution, and set up workers’ and peasants’ political power. This occupied area would then link up with the occupied area along the Hunan-Jiangxi border, forming a solid base of strength to serve as the foundation for future advances. Therefore, we will neither go down to Shanghang and Yongding, nor head to Longyan. We worked in Tingzhou for seventeen days, then on April 1 moved to Ruijin, and plan to enter and occupy Yudu on April 8. Upon arriving in Yudu, we will convene an enlarged meeting with the Southern Jiangxi Special Committee and Comrade Luo Shounan, dispatched by the Central Military Department, to discuss the operational plan. The people in western Fujian and southern Jiangxi are all extremely good. During our work in Changting county seat, Xinqiao, Hetian, and other places, we seized grain from local bullies and landlords, and the masses who joined us gathered in the thousands. In Tingzhou, we established twenty secret peasant associations and five secret trade unions; a general trade union was also set up. The Party organization developed twice as much as before. A Red Guard was organized but could not stand on its own, so it followed the army to Ruijin. The political power organ at first was a provisional revolutionary committee, appointed by the political department. After several peasant and trade union associations were formed, a representative conference was convened to elect a formal revolutionary committee. Both provisional and formal revolutionary committees issued governing programs. In Ruijin, we formulated a four-day work plan, dispersing the troops to the county seat, Rentian, Xijiang, and Jiubao for work, with each location further splitting into smaller detachments; the command organ remained in the county seat. The masses of Ruijin welcomed us like a raging fire, displaying extraordinary courage in struggling against the landlords. Unfortunately, they had no prior organization at all—not a single comrade, no local leading organization—so the work was rushed and difficult to do well, especially in the county seat. After arriving in Yudu, we will spend about a week working in the county seat and surrounding areas; thereafter we may move toward Ningdu and Guangchang or toward Wan’an and Taihe, depending on circumstances. After a period of guerrilla activity in southern Jiangxi, we will proceed again to western Fujian. At that time, we will have to fight the remnants of Guo Fengming’s troops and the forces of Lu Xingbang and Chen Guohui; the Fujian Provincial Committee must prepare diligently.

As for the army’s situation: apart from a small detachment left on the border, the bulk of the Fourth Army that came out numbers 3,600 men with 1,100 rifles. Losses at Dayu, Xinfeng, and Xunwu amount to about 200 rifles and 600 men (most were out of contact during battle); the number actually seized by the enemy is no more than a few dozen rifles and a little over a hundred men. Those alarming reports in the newspapers are all enemy deceptions. After the battles of Ningdu and Tingzhou, not only have we recovered our previous condition, but we have grown somewhat. The entire army is now organized into three columns: the First, Second, and Third. Each column has two detachments (equivalent to battalions), and each detachment has three units (equivalent to companies). Each column has roughly over 500 rifles and over 1,200 men. When dividing for guerrilla operations, we proceed by columns, splitting them off, and then further divide into smaller detachments—both dispersing and re-concentrating are convenient. Comrade Peng Dehuai’s Fifth Army arrived at Jinggangshan with 800 men and 500 rifles. The 600 men and 400 rifles that reached Ruijin have now been incorporated as the Fifth Column of the Fourth Army, under the nominal command of Comrade Peng Dehuai as deputy army commander. In a few days, they must return to the Hunan-Jiangxi border to gather old units, restore political power, and establish contact with southern Jiangxi, still under the direction of the Front Committee.

The Political Department has been established. The army has set up a Political Department, and each column has established a Column Political Department, which includes a Secretariat, a Propaganda Section, and an Organization Section (divided into three units: workers, peasants, and Party affairs), as well as a Political Security Section.

At the levels of detachment and brigade, Party representatives have been appointed. For levels above the column, it is planned to abolish the role of Party representatives, retaining only the director of the Political Department.

The entire army has been outfitted with neat uniforms in Tingzhou, and each person has been issued four yuan in pocket money.

Supplies are no longer a problem, and morale is extremely high.

In the Lichuan area of eastern Jiangxi (close to Guangchang), two units have expressed interest in making contact. One consists of over 500 men who rebelled from Jin Handing’s forces, with more than 300 rifles, reorganized as the Fourth Column under Column Commander Tian Guiqing*. The other is a bandit group of over 300 men with over 100 rifles, finding no way out after repeated defeats, now reorganized as an Independent Battalion under Battalion Commander Hu Zhusheng (possibly Desheng).

These two units are expected to arrive in Ningdu after April 14 for reorganization and training.

The First and Fourth Regiments of the Jiangxi Red Army are currently in the Xingguo area and are maintaining good contact with us.

After being defeated once, the Hunan-Jiangxi border region now has an opportunity for recovery. Apart from Wang Zuo’s unit, which has over 200 rifles belonging to the Fourth Red Army, the Red Guards of the six counties of Ninggang, Yongxin, Lianhua, Suichuan, Lingxian, and Chaling collectively possess 800 rifles. At a time when the warlords are mired in conflict and unable to attend to the area, it can not only be defended but also expanded. When Comrade Peng returns with his troops, there will be even better prospects. The secretary of the Special Committee for the Hunan-Jiangxi border region is Comrade Deng Qianyuan.

In Hunan, since the failure of the uprising in March of last year, the Party’s foundation has been completely destroyed under the influence of putschism. Peasant arms were seized by the gentry, and the masses have been suppressed. In August last year, when the Red Army attacked Chenzhou, three county Party committees were organized in Zixing, Rucheng, and Guidong, along with three armed peasant Red Guard units. A special committee was also established to oversee them, with Du Xiujing serving as secretary. Recent reports indicate that they have again fallen victim to putschism. After the uprising in Liling last spring, the Party organization was broken and its armed forces eliminated. In the summer, seventy rifles were obtained from the Fourth Army, but by autumn, the entire force was wiped out at Huangtuling on the border of Youxian and Liling. This clearly demonstrates the difficulty of sustaining small armed forces in isolation.

The Party’s leading organ for the Red Army is the Front Committee appointed by the Central Committee. In a letter dated June 4 last year, the Central Committee stated: “Regarding the front command organ, the Central Committee deems it necessary to establish a committee. The list of committee members is designated as follows: Mao Zedong, Zhu De, one worker comrade, one peasant comrade, and the secretary of the local Party committee where the Front Committee is stationed, making a total of five members, with Mao Zedong serving as secretary. In addition, a workers’ committee must be organized, with the worker comrade of the Front Committee as its secretary, and a military committee, with Zhu De as its secretary. The membership lists of the military and workers’ committees are to be decided by the Front Committee. The extent of jurisdiction shall be determined according to circumstances, and all work within the area under jurisdiction shall be entirely directed by the Front Committee. When in Jiangxi, the Front Committee is under the direction of the Jiangxi Provincial Committee; when in Hunan, under the direction of the Hunan Provincial Committee. The responsible provincial committee, upon receiving a report from the Front Committee, should respond immediately and forward both the Front Committee’s report and the provincial committee’s reply to the Central Committee.” We find this organizational directive from the Central Committee to be highly appropriate and suited to the needs of the struggle. A Red Army with a supra-local nature not only should not be directed by county or special committees but also should not be restricted to the direction of any single provincial committee. The Fifth Army in Pingjiang-Liuyang and the Fourth Army in Hunan and along the Hunan-Jiangxi border have suffered multiple defeats under localist command. A supra-local Red Army must operate under the direct command of the Central Committee to meet the needs of the revolutionary environment and avoid the poison of localism.

Since March of last year, three reports have been sent to the Central Committee. The first was a long letter written by Mao Zedong last August during the failed campaign on the border, discussing the issue of establishing a base area and the policies of the Hunan Provincial Committee, forwarded to the Central Committee via the Hunan Provincial Committee; the original draft has been lost. The second was a report prepared by the Front Committee starting last November, upon receiving the Central Committee’s June letter instructing that the Red Army must return to the Hunan-Jiangxi border. This report provided a historical account of the struggles on the Hunan-Jiangxi border and the policy plans for establishing a base area, forwarded via the Hunan-Jiangxi Provincial Committee; the original draft is still preserved, and a rewritten copy is hereby attached. The Central Committee has received neither of these two important reports, so it is no wonder that it is completely out of touch with our situation. The third was a letter sent by the Front Committee from Changting on March 20, forwarded via the Fujian Provincial Committee; it is unknown whether it has been received. It is hereby sent again. For three years, we have not received a single issue of the Central Committee’s periodicals. Only upon reaching Tingzhou did we see issues three and four of *The Young Pioneer*, issue three of *The Chinese Worker*, issue one of *The Human Word* published in Beijing, and issue one of *Outpost* produced by comrades from Tingzhou staying in Shanghai. While on the Hunan-Jiangxi border, due to enemy blockades, we went two or three months at a time without seeing a newspaper. After September last year, we could buy newspapers in Ji’an and Changsha, but they were still very difficult to obtain. Since arriving in southern Jiangxi and western Fujian, the postal routes are extremely convenient, and we can see newspapers from Nanjing, Shanghai, Fuzhou, Xiamen, Zhangzhou, Nanchang, and Ganzhou every day. Upon reaching Ruijin County, we could see He Jian’s official newspaper, the *Changsha Republic Daily*. Truly, it is like parting the clouds and seeing the blue sky, an indescribable joy. From now on, we hope the Central Committee can send us a letter every month, and we will also send at least one report to the Central Committee each month. We also hope that measures can be taken to send us the Central Committee’s periodicals.

--- Notes

Documents on the Fourth Red Army and Gutian Conference Materials, Fujian People’s Publishing House, 1979.12  [Female?] Selected Historical Materials on the Central Revolutionary Base Area (Volume 2), Jiangxi People’s Publishing House, 1982.5  Letter from the Front Committee to the Central Committee 45