Letter from the Front Committee of the Fourth Red Army to the Central Committee[1]

(March 20, 1929)

To the Fujian Provincial Committee and, urgent relay, to the Central Committee:

1. We (the Fourth Red Army) captured the city of Tingzhou[2] on March 14. Guo Fengming (commander of the Second Brigade of Fujian) was killed, and his corpse was displayed in the streets of Tingzhou for three days. We seized approximately five hundred rifles (mostly single-shot and nine-shot repeaters, not suitable for the Red Army's use), seven or eight horse carbines, three mortars, and over one hundred mortar shells. The remnants of Guo's brigade have routed and fled toward Shanghang.

2. The masses in Tingzhou are responding very well. After we distributed grain and property confiscated from local tyrants and reactionaries and expanded our propaganda campaign, the workers and peasants from the nearby countryside rose up in great numbers. Over the past few days, basic organizations of peasant associations and trade unions have been established (in two forms, secret and open), and within a day or two a provisional organ of political power—the Revolutionary Committee—will be formed. At present, the Political Department is acting in place of the political power organ.

3. As the general situation develops (we have seen the Shanghai newspaper of March 3, the newspapers of March 13..., as well as those of Zhangzhou and Shantou), we hope the Central Committee will provide us with general directives for western Fujian and southern Jiangxi. We particularly await urgent and rapid instructions on how the Red Army should act!

4. Regarding the general plan, our opinion is: throughout the entire country, we must vigorously seize the masses. At this moment, no faction, regardless of its guise, can deceive the masses as effectively as our Communist Party can with its practical work. Beyond workers and peasants, winning over the masses among the soldiers is also an extremely crucial task. For the focus of the general work, we are of the opinion that it should be placed in Jiangsu and Zhili[3]. The number of small Red Army-area soviets should be increased; such Red Army small-area soviets should be established not only in regions like Hunan, Jiangxi, Guangdong, and Fujian but also in northern Jiangsu, northern Anhui, northern Hubei, southern Henan, and Zhili.

5. The Front Committee has decided on the following actions for the Fourth Army, the Fifth Army, and the Second and Fourth Regiments of the Jiangxi Red Army: during the initial phase of the civil war among the Kuomintang warlords, we will operate within a range of over twenty counties in southern Jiangxi and western Fujian. Using guerrilla tactics, we will progress from mobilizing the masses all the way to openly establishing an independent regime under soviet political power, and from this independent area gradually link up with the independent area along the Hunan-Jiangxi border.

6. The Independent Second Regiment of the Jiangxi Red Army (under Li Wenlin's command) has about four hundred rifles and fairly good combat effectiveness; it is currently located at the junction of Xingguo, Taihe, and Ganzhou. The Independent Fourth Regiment (under Duan Yuequan's command) has about three hundred rifles and still weak combat effectiveness; it is currently at the junction of Xingguo and Yudu. The Red Army unit under Peng Dehuai[4] has about three hundred rifles (the remaining force after suffering attrition and desertions during the escape from Jinggangshan), and is located between Yudu and Xinfeng. On March 7, Peng's unit launched a surprise attack on the remnant forces of Liu Shiyi[5], capturing over one hundred rifles, one water-cooled and one air-cooled machine gun each, and seven loads of ammunition. The Fourth Red Army will likely continue working along the Fujian border for about ten more days; after ten days, it must proceed to the Ruijin-Ningdu area on the Jiangxi border for guerrilla operations. At that time, we will need to assess the situation of the war in Hunan and Jiangxi and decide our movements based on what is beneficial for the development of the Red Army and the masses of workers and peasants. We may return to the Fujian border, conduct more extended guerrilla operations in southern Jiangxi, or go toward Ji'an to approach the Nationalist war zone. However, the plan within the western Fujian and southern Jiangxi region—progressing from mobilizing the masses to openly establishing an independent regime—must be definitively set and cannot be abandoned under any circumstances, for this is the foundation for our advance.

7. The Fujian Provincial Committee must immediately dispatch a Special Committee for Western Fujian to Tingzhou to direct the work in the eight counties under the Tingzhou prefecture. The local Party branch in Tingzhou is too weak and cannot shoulder the responsibility of building political power. The main tasks at present are expanding the Party organization and mass organizations, constructing political power organs, and building the Red Army in western Fujian (there are now rifles available but no one to carry them). We hope the Provincial Committee will pay great attention to this place.

8. In the entirety of Fujian Province, Zhejiang Province, and the two border regions of eastern and southern Jiangxi, the military strength of the ruling class is extremely weak (compared to the rest of the country). We wonder if the Central Committee has ever discussed a plan to use these three areas as targets for first creating an openly established independent regime. These three areas not only have weak ruling forces but also have access to seaports, which is worthy of attention.

9. We have been separated from Jinggangshan since January 14, the main reason being that we had no economic means there. On January 20, we fought an unsuccessful battle against Li Wenbin[6] at Dayu. We then skirted along the Guangdong border, passing through Nanxiong and entering Xinfeng, Anyuan, and Xunwu in southern Jiangxi. We had three engagements with pursuing troops, fighting while retreating each time. On February 1, we reached Luofuzhang[7] at the junction of Fujian, Guangdong, and Jiangxi provinces and halted for one day. The entire route lay through areas devoid of Party organization and mass support, with five regiments of pursuing troops closely dogging our rear and reactionary militia forces boosting their strength and arrogance. This was the period of greatest hardship for our army. After arriving at Luofuzhang, in order to settle our wounded, find a resting place where the Party and the masses were present, and rescue Jinggangshan, we decided to proceed to Donggu (on the border of Ningdu, Xingguo, and Ji'an, under Ji'an's jurisdiction). On February 11, we reached Dabodi in Ningdu and engaged the two vanguard regiments of Liu Shiyi's 15th Brigade, routing them completely. Our army's morale was greatly boosted. We captured over two hundred rifles, six water-cooled and air-cooled machine guns, and took many prisoners. The remaining enemy forces routed and fled to Ganzhou. By the time the follow-up pursuing force led by Li Wenbin (three regiments) arrived, we had already gone to Donggu. We rested at Donggu for a week, joined forces with the Second and Fourth Regiments of the Jiangxi Red Army, established contact with the Southern Jiangxi Special Committee (in Yudu), and settled our wounded. After Li Wenbin (commanding the most elite unit of the Jiangxi forces) pursued us to Donggu, we decided to abandon the policy of openly maintaining a fixed independent area and adopt instead a flexible, mobile guerrilla policy (the policy of "circling"[8]) to counter the enemy's tactic of relentless pursuit. On February 25, we left Donggu, passed through Yongfeng, Le'an, Guangchang, and Shicheng, and re-entered Rentian Market in Ningdu-Ruijin. Our rear guard was only one li away from the enemy, which was the reason we left Rentian Market for Tingzhou. Zhang's brigade[9] suddenly turned back; likely, with the outbreak of war in Hunan, Chiang Kai-shek's clique needed to concentrate its forces and thus recalled Zhang's brigade. This allowed us to deal with Guo Fengming's brigade without interference. On the 13th and 14th, we twice routed Guo's 2nd and 4th Regiments, while the Red Army also developed in the Xingguo-Yudu area. Since the Fourth Army departed from Jinggangshan, our total losses amount to about two hundred rifles and six hundred personnel. The greatest loss, and most regrettable, is the loss of many cadres. The difficulties encountered this time were the greatest since the founding of the Red Army. Only by exerting all our energy did we pull through this crisis and achieve our current success. Strong internal unity (very few soldiers deserted even during the hardest times; only a few cadres like Yuan Wencai[10] broke away from the ranks) and correct guidance from the Party were also reasons for overcoming these difficulties.

10. The highest Party organ within the army is the Front Committee appointed by the Central Committee (due to practical needs, a few additional members beyond the Central Committee's list were added). Excluding the portion remaining on the Hunan-Jiangxi border, the force of the Fourth Army that has come out is now organized into three columns, totaling three thousand men, with fifteen hundred rifles and very little ammunition. Due to excessive combat, veteran cadre losses have been severe, and combat effectiveness is not what it used to be. However, the spirit of exhaustion and defeat that prevailed after departing Jinggangshan has now been restored, and morale is once again high. As a result of the two engagements and losses, the shortage of officers and political workers has reached a critical point. We urgently hope the Central Committee will send personnel to supplement us; at a minimum, several military and political instructors must be sent to establish a training school here.

11. Over the past two years, due to interrupted communications, we have only received two dispatches from the Central Committee. One was a long letter dated June 4 of last year, received on Jinggangshan in November; the other consisted of the resolutions[11] of the Sixth Congress (on politics, military affairs, land, political power, peasants, the congress itself...totaling six documents [12]), received in Yongxin this January. As for letters we sent to the Central Committee: a long letter from Mao Zedong last August, forwarded through the Hunan Provincial Committee; and a detailed report from the Front Committee last November, forwarded through both the Hunan and Jiangxi Provincial Committees. This report recounted in detail the course of the struggle on the Hunan-Jiangxi border over the past two years and the Red Army's current plans, etc. We wonder if any of these have been received?

12. The resolutions of the Sixth Congress are entirely correct, and we accept them with elation. We have previously mimeographed over five hundred copies and distributed them to Party branches along the route from Jinggangshan; now we are lithographing one thousand copies for use in expanding organizations in western Fujian and southern Jiangxi. Only the three resolutions on organization, propaganda, and workers are missing; please forward them immediately!

13. The Western Fujian Special Committee must be rapidly established. The Southern Jiangxi Special Committee is very isolated from the Jiangxi Provincial Committee but has already established close relations with the Front Committee. Since its establishment last May, the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Special Committee has had relatively close ties with the Hunan Provincial Committee but fewer ties with the Jiangxi Provincial Committee. Among the Party branches in southern Jiangxi, Yudu and Donggu are the best, followed by Xingguo, Xinfeng, Ningdu, Anyuan, and Xunwu; there is still no organization in Ruijin, Huichang, and Shicheng. Changting is at the beginning stages of development; the best is Yongding, but it is over three hundred li from us. To respond to events in Jiangxi, the Red Army cannot go to Yongding at this moment. Comrade Ruan Shan's[13] Red Army unit must come to Tingzhou; it is essential that this happens, for only then can the political power in Tingzhou continue after we leave for Jiangxi, enabling it to maintain close liaison with us. With Guo Fengming dead, no one manages Tingzhou anymore. The central work for the eight counties should be based in Changting; we hope the Provincial Committee will carefully consider this.

14. When the Central Committee assesses our strength, it must not overestimate us.

Front Committee
March 20, 1929

--- Notes

[1] This is a letter written by Mao Zedong in the name of the Front Committee of the Fourth Army of the Chinese Red Army to the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.
[2] Tingzhou, formerly a prefectural seat, is present-day Changting in Fujian Province.
[3] Zhili is a former province encompassing present-day Beijing and Tianjin municipalities, most of Hebei Province, and small parts of Henan and Shandong provinces. It was renamed Hebei Province in 1928.
[4] Peng Dehuai was then the commander of the Fifth Army of the Red Army.
[5] Liu Shiyi was then serving as deputy commander of the 5th Division and commander of the 15th Brigade of the 1st Group Army of the Nationalist forces.
[6] Li Wenbin was then commander of the 21st Brigade of the 7th Division of the 1st Group Army of the Nationalist forces.
[7] Luofuzhang, a village name, located in eastern Xunwu County, Jiangxi Province.
[8] The policy of "circling" was Mao Zedong's vivid description of the Red Army's guerrilla tactics in the early days on Jinggangshan.
[9] Zhang's brigade refers to the 35th Brigade, 12th Division, 1st Group Army of the Nationalist forces, whose brigade commander was Zhang Yuren.
[10] During the Fourth Red Army's shift of operations through southern Jiangxi and western Fujian in 1929, Yuan Wencai left the ranks and returned to Jinggangshan, where he continued revolutionary activities and served as a member of the Standing Committee of the Ninggang County CPC Committee.
[11] The Sixth Congress refers to the Sixth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, held in Moscow from June 18 to July 11, 1928. At the congress, Qu Qiubai delivered a report titled "The Chinese Revolution and the Communist Party," Zhou Enlai delivered reports on organizational and military issues, and Liu Bocheng delivered a supplementary report on military issues. The congress adopted resolutions on political, military, organizational, and other issues.
[12] Reproduced as in the original text.
[13] Ruan Shan was then one of the leaders of the Red Army guerrilla units in western Fujian.