1. Following our defeat, the Xiangnan forces sustained virtually no losses; only the Xiangnan and Chaling local governments were overthrown and withdrew to the border region of Jiangxi. Outrageously, the county committees and governments of various counties in Hunan, accompanied by a large contingent of peasant militias, fled en masse and are now assembled here, numbering eighteen thousand.

2. The areas we currently hold comprise the three counties of Yongxin, Ninggang, and Suichuan, and we plan to expand our territory shortly.

3. The Yang Ruxuan Division, which had been pursuing Mao’s forces, was itself driven back toward the Jiangxi border. Its 81st Regiment was routed at Wudoujiang in Suichuan, while the battalion of its 79th Regiment that had previously been disarmed by Mao’s forces has now been defeated by Zhu’s troops in Yongxin. Meanwhile, Mao’s 31st Regiment has also moved up from Ninggang. The remnants of the former garrison in Yongxin have since retreated to Ji’an, where we seized an additional three hundred firearms this time.

4. We are not advancing directly on Ji’an because we are pursuing a strategy of deep penetration both internally and externally. With Yongxin as our base, we intend to incite uprisings in the surrounding counties—internally to build up the Party and the army, raise funds, and provide clothing, and externally to assist localities in launching worker-peasant insurrections, establishing worker-peasant governments, and implementing land distribution. Therefore, we have decided that it would be far more meaningful to devote our efforts to these tasks rather than to attacking Ji’an.

5. The Xiangnan Special Committee has resolved to merge Zhu’s and Mao’s forces into the Fourth Army, appointing Zhu De as commander and Mao Zedong as Party representative. Zhu’s unit will form the Tenth Division, and Mao’s will form the Eleventh Division. Peasant militias from the various counties of Xiangnan will be incorporated into these two divisions. Zhu will concurrently serve as divisional commander of the Tenth, with Wan Xixian as political commissar, while Mao will concurrently command the Eleventh (though Zhang Ziqing is officially the commander; owing to his injury, Mao is serving in his stead, with He Tingying as political commissar). A separate training regiment will be led by Chen Yi, and we have a modest complement of field artillery. Among our units, Zhu’s 18th Regiment and Mao’s 31st Regiment are relatively battle-worthy, whereas the others are merely adequate for combat.

6. Of our ten thousand rank-and-file soldiers, most suffer from poor discipline, except for a small minority; we are currently undertaking extensive reorganization, and conditions are steadily improving.

7. At all levels—from the Party Military Commission and divisional committees down to company-level Party branches—we have been conducting Party training sessions, with increasingly positive results.

8. Food supplies remain extremely scarce. For the past month, most personnel have received only three-tenths of a pound of rice per day, with nothing else. However, we have recently managed to raise nine taels in Yongxin. The border region between the two provinces comprises little more than a dozen counties, yet neither provincial committee has ever exercised effective control there. Thanks to the tireless efforts of our comrades, Party organizational activities have been steadily expanding. Nevertheless, after Comrade Zhou Lu, representing the Southern Hunan Special Committee, arrived in Ninggang in March and dissolved the Former Front Committee, we lost our central leadership, fell into a state of fragmented governance, and experienced a number of adverse consequences. As early as November of last year, the Former Front Committee proposed establishing a Border Region Special Committee, urging the Hunan Provincial Committee and the Central Committee to dispatch a capable comrade to serve as secretary. It was also suggested that Comrade Mao should not be burdened with concurrent responsibilities in military affairs.

9. Our permanent liaison points are: Yuan Wencai in Ninggang; the Five Wells area; and Wang Zuo at Jinzhushan, on the boundary between Suichuan and Ninggang.

10. Please send us political analyses and important Party documents on a regular basis.

11. We request that large numbers of insurgent elements who have been unable to gain a foothold elsewhere be transferred to us—regardless of whether they specialize in military, political, or technical matters; the greater the quantity, the better. Why does the Former Front Committee continue to create obstacles without offering any constructive criticism or taking action? Such inaction is, frankly, reprehensible. In light of your recent letter from Ji’an, which broadly suggests organizing a special committee, what are your views? To summarize, our aim is to establish a revolutionary base centered on Ninggang in the Luoxiao Mountains—a stronghold of robust Party organization and military strength—effectively making this region one of the primary revolutionary bases spanning Hunan and Jiangxi provinces. Comrade Mao and others have repeatedly brought this proposal to the attention of the authorities through multiple channels: first via the Xiangnan Special Committee to the Hunan Provincial Committee and then to the Central Committee. Yet we have never received an official written approval. Occasionally, letters from the Anyuan Municipal Committee mention that the Hunan Provincial Committee has already approved the plan, but such statements do not constitute explicit authorization from the provincial leadership. Just two days ago, we received a letter from the Ji’an County Committee stating that the Jiangxi Provincial Committee had likewise endorsed the proposal and appointed Comrade Mao as secretary. Even so, this still does not qualify as formal approval from the provincial authorities. How can we proceed under these circumstances? We are also apprehensive about being subjected to unwarranted criticism. Sincerely yours, Inside the New Town