soldiers' movement, reactionary rule will quickly collapse. If, on the other hand,
we ignore the soldiers' movement and concentrate exclusively on work with the
peasants instead, the Chinese revolution will never succeed.
The Party organizations at all levels in the Border Area have always paid little
attention to work with the soldiers, and concentrated on the peasant movement
alone. (Some Party organizations have nothing but peasant work.) We should
bear in mind that many of our experiences of failure in the past can be attributed
mainly to the absence of participation by the soldiers' movement in the insurrection. (The uprising in Guangdong at the end of last year, the repeated failure of
uprisings in Hunan . . . [are examples of this].)44 If we continue to pay no
attention to this, then future failures can be predicted. It is very evident that if we
now rely solely on the subjective force in the Border Area, it will be impossible
to entertain vain hopes of carving out a kingdom for ourselves, or to set up a
bigger independent régime. Therefore Party organizations at all levels must
make great efforts to develop the soldiers' movement. We must never forget that
the policy of "an armed uprising to seize political power" can only be carried out
if the three forces of the workers, peasants, and soldiers are coordinated.
1. At the present the soldiers' movement is as important as the workers' and
peasants' movements. Every xian should select a large number of worker and
peasant comrades, in a planned and organized way, and send them to the reactionary army to become soldiers, porters, cooks, and so on, and thus play a role
within the enemy's forces. Special attention should be paid to this work in
Yongxin, Chaling, Suichuan and other xian where large numbers of enemy
troops are concentrated.
2. Strengthen the propaganda work directed toward the enemy soldiers.
3. Send some people to the interior of the enemy forces to organize the Party.
Do not organize soldiers' committees, so as to avoid organizational complexities,
and the risk of discovery by enemy officers.
4. Use inconspicuous comrades, and women in the rural areas, to conduct
oral propaganda and agitation.
5. Spread rumors and instigate terror, in order to shake the morale of the
enemy, thus leading to wavering and ultimately to collapse.

G. The Question of Propaganda

1. In the past the Party organizations in all the xian of the Border Area paid
no attention at all to propaganda, imagining that they could establish a kingdom
with nothing but a few rifles. They did not know that the Communist Party can

overthrow the enemy only by holding propaganda pamphlets in its left hand and
rifles and bullets in its right hand. Meanwhile in none of their work (such as
organizing soviets and insurrection teams, redistributing the land, organizing the
Party and so on) did they make propaganda about their methods and their significance. They made use only of military and political strength to force others to do
things, [saying] "If you don't obey, we will kill you." This was an extremely
serious mistake.

2. We must find a way to perfect propaganda departments in the Special
Committee as well as in the xian Party committees. Every week, slogans and a
propaganda outline should be sent out on time. The daily wall newspaper should
also be distributed to the Party organizations at every level for them to copy and
post. Whenever a guerrilla unit sets out on a guerrilla mission, there should be
good propaganda (mass assembly-speeches in makeup, propaganda team, and
individual propaganda).

3. In the future, the work reports of subordinate Party organizations to their
superior Party organizations must include a report on propaganda work. When
inspecting and investigating the work of lower levels, the higher levels should
also pay attention to the inspection and examination of their propaganda work.
The Special Committee as well as the xian Party committees should distribute
their propaganda outlines to all lower-level Party organizations on a weekly
basis.

4. For the present, we should try our best to make a political analysis of the
internal clashes among the warlords, and pay attention to propaganda work directed against the chaotic struggles among warlords. At the same time, we
should make extremely forceful propaganda about the great strength of the workers, the peasants, and the Communist Party, explaining that in the end the chaotic
struggles among the warlords will be wiped out by a worker and peasant insurrection.

5. At present, our propaganda toward the worker and peasant masses as a
whole should forcefully expose the policies of the warlords and despotic gentry
for cheating the workers and peasants, and forcefully propagate the views of our
Party.

6. The soviets, the agrarian revolution, communism, the Red Army, and the
insurrection teams should all be the subject of specialized propaganda outlines.
We should intensify this propaganda, and cause it to penetrate deeply into the
minds of the masses.

7. Right now we should analyze in detail for our comrades and for the
masses the political and economic contradictions and clashes within the ruling class. We should do our best to make propaganda about the strength of
the workers and peasants themselves, as well as the forces of insurrection in
various regions, and shatter the defeatist view that there is no hope of recovery. At the same time, we should also shatter among our comrades and the
masses the passive view of relying solely on the army. (Of course we do not

deny the strength of the army in launching uprisings, and in assisting the workers and peasants to launch uprisings).

H. The Question of Training

1. In the past, the reason why the local Party organizations were not strong
was that Party members lacked training, even to the extent that there was no
ceremony of admission into the Party. Now every Party member must receive
training in the basic theories of the Party.
2. The Special Committee will organize an education and propaganda committee, compile training materials, and plan the weekly training work.
3. The Special Committee should organize regular training classes. Every
xian should also run as many short-term training classes as possible, in order to
produce people qualified to be cadres.
4. At the Party organization meetings at various levels, and in the course of
actual work, we should try our best to promote worker and peasant elements, and
train these workers and peasants as people qualified to be cadres.
5. At present, basic training work should strive to eliminate the opportunist,
feudal, and petty-bourgeois thought of the ordinary comrades, and establish
among them the revolutionary outlook on life of the proletariat.
6. Raise the level of literacy and political education of our comrades. At the
same time, we should also launch a literacy drive, so as to raise the "writing" and
"reading" ability of our worker and peasant comrades.

I. The Question of the Soviets

1. In the past the politics of the soviet was really nothing but a metamorphosis of the peasant association, so its work was monopolized by the secretary
general and chairman. Some of the governments were even controlled by rich
peasants and became magistrate's yamens. These so-called soviet governments
should all without exception be reorganized.
2. The Special Committee should enact a law regarding soviet organization,
and all xian, district, and township soviets should be organized according to this
organization law.
3. The soviets must have workers, poor peasants, and revolutionary soldiers
as their main force. They must oppose the control of rich peasant secretaries
general, and put into practice "all political power to the Soviets."
4. The government of the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Region must once again be
thoroughly transformed.
5. The relationship between Party organizations and soviets at all levels
should be clarified, to eliminate the evil of equating the Party with the government. The Special Committee must issue a circular regarding the difference
between the Party and the government, and the Party organizations at various
levels should conduct extensive propaganda.

J. The Land Question. We Accept the Central Committee's Circular Regarding
the Land Question, and Will Hand It Over to the Special Committee for Discussion before Making a Final Decision.

K. The Question of the C.Y.

1. The Youth League is a political organization of the Party among the
worker and peasant masses. In the past many of the League headquarters at
various levels in the border region were unclear about the political tasks of the
Youth League. In the various xian of the Border Area, the Youth League only
carried out a few cultural movements intended to expand its influence. In reality
it became a subordinate organ of the party, and this led to an even more serious
mistake by the Party organizations at various levels in the Border Area they
advocated eliminating the League.

2. At present, all the xian of the Border Area should engage in the work of
building the Youth League. Since, however, the strength of the League itself is
deficient, and it can scarcely shoulder this responsibility alone, the Party organizations at various levels must set aside part of their strength [for this purpose],
and constantly pay attention to Youth League work. They should help it to
establish League branches in every xian in the Border Area, expand League
organizations, and perfect the leading organs of the Youth League.

3. The budget of the League should be independent, so that it will be able to
do what it wants as far as its operations are concerned, and avoid budgetary
dependence of the Youth League on the Party.

4. Paying attention to the work of the Youth League is a responsibility which
must be assumed by the Party organizations at all levels. From now on, the
reports of Party organizations at all levels to their superiors must include a
section entitled "the work of the Youth League." While investigating the work at
various levels, inspectors from higher levels must also pay attention to Youth
League work.

5. Most of the Party organizations and League organizations at various levels
have not understood the relationship between the Party and the League, and as a
result, there has been a tendency for each to go its own way.

Report of the Jinggangshan Front Committee to
the Central Committee
(November 25, 1928)

Hunan Provincial Party Committee: Please forward this report to the Central
Committee.

I. About the Letter from the Central Committee

The June 4 letter from the Central Committee passed through the hands of the
Jiangxi Provincial Committee and the Ji'an Xian Committee and did not reach
the Jinggangshan till December 2.² This is an excellent letter. It has corrected
many of our mistakes and resolved many controversial issues here. As soon as it
arrived, we sent copies to Party committees at all levels, both in the army and in
the localities. Troops which had set out for Suichuan gathered in Jinggangshan
on November 6, and the Special Committee called a meeting of over thirty
people to discuss the letter from the Central Committee. Participants were Special Committee members and activists in the army and in the localities. (Those
who attended included Zhu De, Chen Yi, He Tingying, He Changgong, Yuan
Wencai, Wang Zuo, Tan Zhenlin,³ Deng Ganyuan, Li Quefei, Chen Zhengren,

Our source for this document is Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 2, pp. 25-66, which reproduces the
text as published in the supplementary volume to the 1947 Jin-Cha-Ji edition of Mao's
selected works.
1. The title in the Selected Works is "The Struggle on the Jinggangshan." None of the
headings in this text, at whatever level, are numbered in the revised version. To avoid
confusion, we have not set the numbers alone (whether in roman numerals, letters, or
arabic numbers) in italics to show that they have been deleted. Words and phrases omitted
from the headings have, however, been set in italics—or in roman, where the heading itself
is in italics. As indicated by the use of italics, the whole of Section I has been omitted from
the Selected Works.
Wang Zuonong, Xiao Wanxia, Liu Huixiao, Xie Chunbiao, Liu Di, Xiong Shouqi,
Yang Kaiming, Cao Shuo, Deng Jiuting, Mao Zedong, Song Qiaosheng, and
Peng Gu. The representative of the Hunan Provincial Committee, Yuan
Desheng, also participated.) It was recognized that, apart from one or two points
relating to concrete circumstances (such as [the recommendations] that guerrilla warfare should be extended to an excessively wide area, and that the system
of Party representatives should be abolished), all the principles and strategies
embodied in the letter were extremely appropriate to the current situation, and
we should act accordingly. A Front Committee was also immediately organized
as the Party's supreme organ [in the border area]. In accordance with the
letter, the Front Committee now comes under the jurisdiction of the Jiangxi
Provincial Committee, because it is in Jiangxi at the moment. When it moves to
Hunan, it comes automatically under the jurisdiction of the Hunan Provincial
Committee. At the same time, it can request direct instructions from the Central
Committee through these two provincial committees. Unfortunately, of the four
appendices to the letter from the Central Committee, we have decoded only two.
The two that have been converted into plain texts are "Confiscate the Land and
Establish the Soviets" and "The February Resolution of the International." We
are unable to decode two other documents, "Military Work" and "Organizational Problems." We need them badly. Please send us as soon as possible the
deciphering code, or send us another copy.

II. The Independent Régime in the Border Area and
the August Defeat

The phenomenon of the emergence of one or more small areas under Red political power, surrounded on all sides by a White régime, is to be found only in
China. When we analyze the reasons for its appearance, we find that they lie in
the incessant splits and wars within the comprador and despotic gentry classes.
So long as these splits and wars continue, the existence and development of the
armed independent régime of workers and peasants will continue. Under such
circumstances of splits and wars within the comprador and despotic gentry

under Mao's leadership in September 1927 and thereafter accompanied Mao to the
Jinggangshan. He was one of the five members of the new Front Committee organized at
the beginning of November 1928, following the receipt of the Central Committee's June 4
letter.
4. The June 4, 1928, letter of the Central Committee stressed very heavily the importance of continued and rapid expansion of the area controlled by the forces of Zhu and
Mao, by using the Red Army to mobilize the masses and bring about an insurrection
patterned on that of Guangzhou. For Mao's opinion about the Central Committee's recommendation on the abolition of Party representatives in the army, see Section IVA5 of this report.
5. I.e., at the meeting on November 6, in obedience to the direct order contained in the
letter, the Special Committee was abolished and replaced by the Front Committee.
6. Is to be found → Is to be found in today's world

classes, the existence and growth of the independent soviet régime depend on
the following concrete conditions: (1) excellent masses; (2) an excellent Party;
(3) a fairly strong Red Army; (4) a favorable terrain for military operations;
(5) sufficient economic strength to provide for subsistence. In addition, the independent régime has different strategies toward the ruling classes which surround
them on all sides, depending on whether the ruling classes are stable or split up.
For example, during the war between Li and Tang in Hunan and Hubei, and the
war between Zhang and Lilo in Guangdong, we could adopt a comparatively
adventurous strategy, and the area carved out by military means could be relatively extensive. We must, however, still take care to establish a firm foundation
in the central districts, so that we shall have something secure to rely on when
the White terror comes. When the ruling classes¹¹ are stable (relatively speaking), as was the case in the southern provinces after April of this year, our
strategy must definitely be one of gradual advance. In military affairs, the thing
most to be avoided is to divide our forces in reckless advances; in mass work12
(such as land distribution, the establishment of soviets, 13 organizing14 the Party,
and organizing local militia), the thing to be avoided most is scattering our
personnel and neglecting to establish a solid foundation in the central districts.
The defeats of many small Red régimes in localities all over China have resulted
either from the absence of objective prerequisites or from subjective mistakes in
tactics. Subjective mistakes in tactics have been made solely because of failure to
distinguish clearly between periods of temporary stability and periods of splits in
the political power of the ruling class. In a period of temporary stability, some
comrades advocated in military affairs dividing up our forces for an adventurous
advance and even proposed using the Red Guards as the sole force to defend
large areas of the independent soviet régime, as though quite unaware of the fact
that the enemy could attack not only with the household militia, but even in
concentrated operations with regular troops. In mass work, they utterly neglected
to issue instructions to lay a solid foundation in the central districts and sought
boundless expansion without taking account of the limitations on our subjective
capacities. Anyone15 who called for a policy of gradual expansion in the military
domain, and for concentrating our manpower16 in mass work17 on laying a solid

7. Soviet régime → Armed régime of the workers and peasants
8. Stable → Temporarily stable
9. Li and Tang → Li Zongren and Tang Shengzhi
10. Zhang and Li → Zhang Fakui and Li Jishen
11. Ruling classes → Régime of the ruling classes
12. Mass work → Local work
13. Soviets → Political power
14. Organizing → Expanding
15. Anyone → If they encountered anyone
16. Manpower → Strength
17. Mass work → Local work

foundation in the central districts, so as to secure an invincible position, they
labeled a "conservative." This is 18 the root cause of the August defeat in the
border area and the simultaneous defeat of the Red Army in Hunan. 19
Work in the border area20 began in October of last year. At the outset, Party
organizations no longer existed in any of the xian. The local armed forces consisted only of the two units under Wang and Yuan21 in the vicinity of the
Jinggangshan, each having sixty rifles in bad repair. The arms of the peasants'
self-defense corps in Yong, Lian, Cha, and Ling22 xian had all been handed
over to the despotic gentry, and the revolutionary sentiments of the masses had
already been completely repressed. By February of this year, xian23 committees
had been established in Ninggang, Yongxin, Chaling, and Suichuan, Lingxian
had a special district, 24 and in Lianhua xian, there were the beginnings of a
Party organization, which had begun to establish connections with the Wan'an
xian committee. All xian except Lingxian had a few local armed units. In
Ninggang, Chaling, Suichuan, and Yongxin xian, especially in the latter two,
there were a good many guerrilla uprisings to massacre 25 the despotic gentry and
mobilize the masses; they did a great deal of work, and did it fairly well.26
During that period, nothing at all was done27 to deepen the agrarian revolution. The organs of political power were called the "Assembly of Workers',
Peasants', and Soldiers' Representatives," or the "People's Committee," or
Government of the Workers, Peasants, and Soldiers for short. The term "soviet" was not used as yet. Soldiers' Committees were set up in the army, and
the system of soldiering for pay was abolished. When guerrilla units went on
missions, 28 action committees were set up to direct them. These simple methods were partly the product of our own invention and were partly copied
from reports of the December 11 uprising in Guangzhou29 as we had read
about it in the newspapers (for example, People's Committees). This was
because all communication with the Provincial Committee had been cut off
since late November, and we knew nothing at all about the Party's positions
and policies. The resolution of the November Enlarged Plenum of the Central
Committee, which is of momentous significance in the history of the Chinese

18. This is Their wrong ideas were
19. The Red Army in Hunan → The Fourth Red Army in southern Hunan
20. Border area → Hunan-Jiangxi border area
21. I.e., of Wang Zuo and Yuan Wencai's bandits.
22. Yong, Lian, Cha, and Ling → Yongxin, Lianhua, Chaling, and Lingxian
23. Xian committees → Xian Party committees
24. Special district → Special district committee
25. Massacre → Overthrow
26. They did a great deal of work, and did it fairly well → All were fairly successful.
27. Nothing at all was done → Nothing was done as yet
28. Missions → Separate missions
29. I.e., the "Guangzhou Commune" of 1927.

revolution, 30 exerted an influence on Party organizations in the border area
only after Comrade Zhu De and others brought a copy from Hunan this April. At
this time, the leading organ³¹ was the Front Committee (with Mao Zedong as
secretary), which had been appointed by the Hunan Provincial Committee during
the Autumn Harvest uprising. The Front Committee was abolished in early
March at the suggestion32 of the Southern Hunan Special Committee and reorganized as the Divisional Committee (with He Tingying as secretary). It thus
became an organ responsible for Party affairs in the army alone, with no influence over local party organizations. This had great drawbacks. Moreover, at the
suggestion³³ of the Southern Hunan Special Committee, Mao's men were transferred to Hunan. 34 As a result, the border area was abandoned35 for more than a
month. At the end of March came the defeat in Hunan, 36 and in April, the forces
of Zhu and Mao, together with the Southern Hunan Peasants' Army, withdrew to
Ninggang and began to re-establish the independent régime in the border area.

From April onward, when the independent régime in the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Area was confronted with the temporary stability of the ruling forces in the
south, the number of regiments sent by the two provinces of Hunan and Jiangxi
to suppress us37 was at least eight or nine, and at times reached eighteen. Nevertheless, with a force of less than four regiments, we fought the enemy for four
whole months, daily expanding the territory of the independent régime, deepening the agrarian revolution, extending the soviet organization, 38 and expanding
the Red Army and the Red Guards. All this was possible because the policies of
the Party (the Party organizations in the army and in the localities) in the
border area were correct. The policies of the Special Committee39 (with Mao
Zedong as secretary) and the Army Committee (with Chen Yi as secretary) were
as follows:
Fight the enemy resolutely, create a political power in the middle section of the
Luoxiao mountain range, and oppose flightism in the case of defeat;

Deepen the agrarian revolution in regions controlled by the independent régime;
Let the army Party organizations help promote the development of the local

30. As noted in the Introduction to this volume, the Plenum of November 1927
adopted a radical leftist line of "permanent revolution" and removed Mao Zedong from the
Politburo because of his "military deviation."
31. Leading organ → Highest organ of the Party
32. Suggestion → Demand
33. Suggestion → Demand
34. Hunan → Southern Hunan
35. Abandoned → Occupied by the enemy
36. Hunan → Southern Hunan
37. To suppress us → The reactionary troops sent to "suppress" us
38. Soviet organization → Political power of the popular masses
39. Special Committee → Border Area Special Committee

Party organization, and let the army help promote the development of the local
armed forces;

Be on the defensive against Hunan, with its comparatively strong ruling power,
and take the offensive against Jiangxi, with its comparatively weak ruling power;

Devote great efforts to building up Yongxin, create an independent régime of the
popular masses, and make arrangements for a long-term struggle;

Concentrate the Red Army to fight the enemy, confronting them when the time is
opportune, and oppose the division of forces so as to avoid being destroyed one
by one;

In expanding the area under the independent régime, adopt the policy of advancing in a series of waves, and oppose the policy of rash advance.

It is only thanks to the appropriateness of these tactics, as well as to the terrain
of the border area, which was advantageous to our struggle, and to the imperfect
coordination of the invading forces from Hunan and Jiangxi, that we were able to
win all the victories during the four months from April to July and expand the
independent régime of the popular masses. Although the enemy was several
times our superior in numbers, he was not only unable to destroy our independent régime but created a situation in which it grew day by day.⁴⁰ The influence
of the independent régime on Hunan and Jiangxi provinces was also constantly
increasing. The August defeat resulted entirely from the failure⁴¹ to understand
that the period was one of stability⁴² for the ruling classes, and the adoption, on
the contrary, of a policy suited to a period of splits within the ruling classes,
dividing our forces for an adventurous advance toward southern Hunan, thus
leading to defeat both in the border area and in southern Hunan. The representative of the Hunan Provincial Committee, Du Xiujing, and the secretary of the
Special Committee⁴³ appointed by the Provincial Committee, Yang Kaiming,⁴⁴
took advantage of the fact that Mao Zedong, Wan Xixian, and other strong
dissenters were far away in Yongxin. Without examining the actual situation at
the time, or taking into account the resolution of the Joint Conference of the
Army Committee, the Special Committee, and the Yongxin Xian Committee
expressing opposition to the views of the Hunan Provincial Committee, they

40. Created a situation in which it grew day by day → Could not prevent it from
developing
41. Failure → Failure of some of the comrades
42. Stability → Temporary stability
43. Special Committee → Border Area Special Committee
44. Yang Kaiming (1905-1930), a native of Changsha, had received a mandate from
the Hunan Provincial Committee to supplant Mao as secretary of the Special Committee
for the border area. See below, Mao's account of changes in the Special Committee in
Section IVD6 of this report.

could think of nothing better than mechanically to apply the order of the Hunan
Provincial Committee to march to southern Hunan, and fell in with the action of
the Twenty-ninth Regiment (made up of peasants from Yizhang) who fled,45 and
wanted to return home. The result was defeat both in the border area and in
southern Hunan. This was truly an extremely great error.

In mid-July, the Eighth Army invaded the Jiangxi border area, but retreated
without achieving anything.46 The main force of the Red Army, which was
attacking Ling and Cha,47 changed its plans48 and turned toward southern Hunan.
Forces from Jiangxi,49 amounting to eleven regiments in all (five regiments50
commanded by Wang Jun and Jin Handing, and six regiments of the Sixth Army
commanded by Hu Wendou), launched an offensive against Yongxin. At this
point, our army had only one regiment (led by Mao Zedong) in Yongxin. Under
the cover provided by the great Red masses, it pinned down these eleven regiments within a radius of thirty li of the xian town for twenty-five days, by means
of guerrilla attacks from every direction. In the end, because the enemy had
learned our real situation, and launched a fierce assault, we lost Yongxin, and
then Lianhua and Ninggang. At that moment, internal dissensions flared up
suddenly within the Sixth Army; it hurriedly withdrew51 and engaged Wang
Jun's Third Army at Zhangshu. The remaining five Jiangxi regiments then hastily withdrew to the xian town of Yongxin. If our main force had not gone to
southern Hunan, there is no doubt whatsoever52 that, aided by the power of the
masses, we could have put this enemy force to flight and extended the territory
of the independent régime to include Ji'an, Anfu, and Pingxiang and link it up
with Pingjiang and Liuyang. As the main force was away, and the one regiment
we had was utterly exhausted, we decided to leave part of these men to defend
the Jinggangshan in cooperation with the two units under Yuan Wencai and
Wang Zuo, and Mao Zedong was ordered to53 lead one battalion54 to Guidong to
meet the main force and invite it back. By that time the main force bound for

45. Fled → Fled the struggle
46. The Eighth Army invaded the Jiangxi border area, but retreated without achieving
anything → The Eighth Army from Hunan, under Wu Shang, invaded Ningkang, penetrated to Yongxin, sought battle with us in vain (our men tried to attack them from a side
road but missed them), and then, being afraid of the masses who supported us, hurriedly
retreated to Chaling via Lianhua.
47. Which was attacking Ling and Cha→ Which, precisely at this time, was advancing from Ninggang to attack Lingxian and Chaling
48. Changed its plans → Changed its plans on reaching Lingxian
49. Forces from Jiangxi → Moreover, enemy forces from Jiangxi
50. Five regiments → Five regiments of the Third Army
51. Sixth Army; it hurriedly withdrew → Enemy forces from Jiangxi, and the Sixth
Army under Hu Wendou hurriedly withdrew
52. There is no doubt whatsoever → It is entirely possible
53. Mao Zedong was ordered to → That I should
54. One battalion → The rest

southern Hunan had already suffered defeat and was retreating55 to Guidong, and
on August 23 we joined forces there.

The enemy's Eighth Army from Hunan under Wu Shang invaded Ninggang,
and subsequently advanced to Yongxin, but they could not engage us in any way.
(It was not worthwhile to ambush them.) When, fearing our masses, they left
Yongxin to retreat back to Chaling via Lianhua, the enemy's Eleventh Regiment
from Jiangxi occupied the town of Yongxin the next day. At this time, the main
force of the Red Army (led by Zhu De) launched an offensive from Ninggang
against Chaling and Lingxian. When they reached Lingxian, 56 some soldiers (the
whole of the Twenty-ninth Regiment), suffering from homesickness, 57 wanted to
return to Hunan;58 some others59 opposed going to southern Hunan and wanted
to go to southern Jiangxi, but did not want to go to Yongxin to fight the enemy
either. Du Xiujing encouraged these tendencies, 60 and the Army Committee was
unable to prevent these harmful actions, so the main force set out on July 17
from Miandu in Lingxian for Chenzhou via Zixing. Our troops engaged forces 61
under Fan Shisheng62 in Chenzhou city on July 24. Initial victory was followed
by defeat, and the troops retreated at dusk63 and lost their way. Thereupon, 64 the
Twenty-ninth Regiment fled toward Yizhang; part of it was annihilated by Hu
Fengzhang65 at Lechang, and the remainder was scattered in the ChenzhouYizhang area, and no one knows what has become of it. Only about one hundred
rifles were mustered that evening. Fortunately, our main force66 suffered only
small losses, and on August 18, it occupied Guidong. When they were joined by
Mao Zedong and others from the Jinggangshan on the 23rd, it was resolved to
return to Ninggang. 67 In the afternoon of the same day, two regiments under Wu

55. The main force bound for southern Hunan had already suffered defeat and was
retreating → The main force was retreating from southern Hunan
56. When they reached Linxian → had arrived in Lingxian in mid-July
57. Some soldiers (the whole of the Twenty-ninth Regiment), suffering from homesickness → The officers and men of the Twenty-ninth Regiment, who were wavering politically
58. Hunan → Southern Hunan
59. Some others → The Twenty-eighth Regiment
60. These tendencies → The mistaken ideas of the Twenty-ninth Regiment
61. Forces → Enemy forces
62. Fan Shisheng, a native of Yunnan, had been acquainted with Zhu De when both
men were serving as soldiers in that province. At this time, he was commander of the
Guomindang Sixteenth Army in Guangdong. During the retreat from Nanchang and Shantou,
Zhu De's troops were given shelter and rations by Fan, on the pretext that they were still under
the Guomindang banner as a unit of Fan's army. This opportunistic alliance came to an end in
January 1928, when Zhu De moved into southern Hunan and took Yizhang.
63. Retreated at dusk → Withdrew from the battle
64. Thereupon → Thereupon, acting on its own,
65. Hu Fengzhang → Hu Fengzhang's bandits
66. Main force → Main force, the Twenty-eighth Regiment
67. Return to Ninggang → Return to the Jinggangshan by way of Chongyi and
Shangyou

Shang in Lingxian launched a sudden fierce attack on Guidong. The ferocious
battle lasted for half a day and resumed the next morning. Casualties on our side
were rather heavy (the enemy's losses were even greater), so we retreated into
Jiangxi. While the army was marching from Miandu to southern Hunan, the
original Army Committee was disbanded and was replaced by the Front Committee appointed by the Hunan Provincial Committee, with Chen Yi as secretary.
After we were defeated and evacuated Guidong, the Front Committee was dissolved, and an Action Committee was organized to take command, with Mao
Zedong as secretary. The army arrived at the foot of the Jinggangshan on September 8, after passing through Chongyi, Shangyou, and Suichuan. There were
six factors that led to the failure of our assault on Chenzhou: (1) Some soldiers
and officers were so homesick that they lost their combat capability; it was also
against the inclination of some of the officers and soldiers to go to southern
Hunan, against the sentiments of the masses. (2) The soldiers got tired on long
expeditions in the summer heat. (3) The army advanced recklessly for several
hundred li from Lingxian, thus cutting itself off from the border area, and becoming an isolated force. (4) The worker and peasant masses in southern Hunan
had not yet been aroused, so our action constituted a mere military adventure.
(5) We did not know the enemy's situation. (6) Preparations were inadequate,
and the officers and men did not understand the significance of the campaign.
When the campaign failed,68 Battalion Commander Yuan Chongquan defected
with an infantry company and an artillery company. Although the two companies
were subsequently brought back, Regimental Commander Wang Erzhuo lost his
life in this action, and the significance of this loss was considerable. On August
30, units of the Hunan army under Wu Shang and units of the Jiangxi army
under Wang Jun, four regiments in all,69 seized the opportunity offered by the
fact that our forces had been defeated in Guidong and were seeking to return but
had not yet reached their destination to launch a fierce assault on our
Jinggangshan. We had less than a battalion of soldiers, but we fought back,
taking advantage of the favorable terrain at Huangyangjie (the route leading
from Ninggang to the Jinggangshan), and repulsed the enemy after fighting from
noon till night. The enemies suffered very great casualties. This battle saved our
last base,70 and struck a blow at the morale of our enemies. Since then, they have
not dared to look down upon the Communist Army any more. This battle has
become one of the best-known encounters in the border area.

While in Hunan, the Army (the Front Committee) organized xian Party
Committees in Guidong and Rucheng, which it passed through going and coming. A Special Committee was also set up to take charge of the existing xian

68. When the campaign failed → When we reached Chongyi
69. Units of the Hunan army under Wu Shang and units of the Jiangxi army under
Wang Jun, four regiments in all → Enemy units from Hunan and Jiangxi
70. Our last base → This base

committees in Zixing and Chenzhou. Du Xiujing was the secretary, and the
address was Gate 12, Longxia, Zixing. Eighty guns were distributed to arm the
newly established Red Guards in Zixing, Guidong, and Rucheng xian. In
Chenzhou there were Red Guards at Yaoling, with forty to fifty guns. Things
were unclear in xian such as Leiyang and Yongxing. The Thirtieth and Thirtythird Regiments of the Peasants' Army, which returned to southern Hunan in
May, have long since been dispersed, and the enemy has captured most of the
three to four hundred guns. The broad masses in southern Hunan, who were
mobilized by the Red Army in the spring, had been totally repressed by the
enemy. On this occasion, the Red Army again mobilized part of the local masses
while passing through Zixing, Rucheng, and Guidong xian, organized soviets,
and divided up the land in Shatian in Guidong. We do not know what conditions
have been created there at present. Because of the communications blockade, we
have received no correspondence as yet from the recently organized Southern
Hunan Special Committee.

III. The Independent Régime from September to the Present71

Since April of this year, the area under the independent régime72 has been
gradually extended. On June 23, in the battle of Longyuankou (on the border of
Yongxin and Ninggang) we defeated the enemy troops from Jiangxi for the
fourth time. After this, the independent régime reached the peak of its development, embracing the whole of Ninggang, Yongxin, and Lianhua xian, small
portions of Ji'an and Anfu, the northern part of Suichuan, and the southeastern
part of Lingxian. Most of the land73 had already been distributed, and the remainder was in the process of distribution. Soviets74 were set up everywhere in
the districts and townships. Ninggang, Yongxin, and Suichuan had xian soviets,75 and a border area soviet76 was established. Everywhere in the villages,
workers' and peasants' insurrectionary detachments, armed with spears, were
organized, and at the district and xian levels, Red Guards, armed with rifles,
were organized. In July the Jiangxi enemy launched an attack, and in August the
Hunan and Jiangxi enemy forces jointly attacked Huangyangjie.77 All the xian
towns and the plains in the border area were occupied by the enemy. Abetting
the evildoers, the peace preservation corps (armed with rifles) and the household
militia (armed with spears) ran amuck, inflicting White terror throughout the

71. The Independent Régime from September to the Present → The Current Situation
in the Area under the Independent Régime
72. Area under the independent régime → Red area
73. Most of the land → In the Red areas, most of the land
74. Soviets → Organs of political power
75. Soviets → Governments
76. Soviet→ Government
77. Huangyangjie → The Jinggangshan

towns and the countryside. The majority of the Party and government organizations collapsed. The rich peasants and the opportunists in the Party went over to
the enemy in droves. It was not until the battle of Huangyangjie78 on August 30
that the enemy realized there was no hope of overcoming the natural barrier of
the Jinggangshan, and the enemy troops from Hunan retreated to Lingxian,
while the enemy troops from Jiangxi continued to occupy all the xian seats, and
the towns and villages79 in the plains area. From beginning to end, however, the
enemy could not seize certain places:80 the western and northern districts of
Ninggang; the Tianlong, Xiaoxijiang, and Nannianshan81 districts in the northern, western, and southern sections of Yongxin, respectively; Shangxi district in
Lianhua; Jinggangshan district in Suichuan; and the Qinshigang and Dayuan
districts in Lingxian. During the two months of July and August, the Red Army
(about a regiment) and the Red Guards of the various xian fought scores of
battles, large and small. Although they were defeated, they lost no more than
about thirty guns, before retreating finally into the mountainous areas. The
enemy went all out to invade and finally launched an offensive against our
Jinggangshan base with the combined forces of the two provincial armies. They
were not successful in a single encounter and finally gave up and retreated. We
triumphed over combined forces sent to suppress us at Huangyangjie on August
30. Our army returned to the Jinggangshan on September 9 after its campaigns
in the south, and this marked the beginning of the new phase from September
onward.

As our army was marching back to the Jinggangshan via Chongyi, Shangyou,
and Suichuan, the Independent Seventh Division under Liu Shiyi from western82
Jiangxi, taking advantage of the fact that we were the remnants of a defeated
army, pursued us with five battalions all the way to Suichuan. On September 13,
we launched an attack on Liu Shiyi with four battalions and defeated him at the
town of Suichuan, capturing two hundred fifty rifles.83 We also took prisoners,
including one battalion and one company commander, three or four platoon
leaders, and some two hundred soldiers. The Action Committee (with Mao
Zedong as secretary) commanding the army and the Suichuan Xian Committee
jointly administered the affairs of the masses of Suichuan and provided for the
maintenance of the army. The army sent columns in four directions toward four
townships to wage guerrilla warfare, each branch setting up its own Action
Committee to take command. The branch heading east pushed as far as Wan'an

78. Huangyangjie → The Jinggangshan
79. The towns and villages → Most of the villages
80. Certain places → The mountain areas
81. Nannianshan → Wanshan
82. Western → Southern
83. On September 13, we launched an attack on Liu Shiyi with four battalions and
defeated him at the town of Suichuan, capturing two hundred fifty rifles → On September
13, we defeated Liu Shiyi, captured several hundred rifles, and took Suichuan.

and established liaison with the Wan'an Xian Committee. On September 24, Li
Wenbin's regiment of the Jiangxi army arrived from Taihe, and the Independent
Seventh Division arrived from Ganzhou and attacked the town of Suichuan.
Our forces were not concentrated, and we could commit only two battalions to
the battle. Although we could not sustain the fight and withdrew, the morale of
the soldiers remained intact. Our troops returned to the Jinggangshan on September 26. On October 1 at Ninggang, we engaged the Twenty-seventh Regiment of Zhou Hunyuan's brigade, which was part of Xiong Shihui's army. 84 We
captured one battalion commander, one company commander, two platoon leaders, one hundred soldiers, and a hundred and ten rifles. We drove the remaining
enemies to Yongxin and recovered the whole of Ninggang xian. Li Wenbin's
regiment thought that we would attack Ninggang. Consequently, it left Suichuan,
taking an indirect route through Taihe and Yongxin to bring reinforcements.
Suichuan was left in the hands of the Independent Seventh Division (the weakest
in manpower) alone. Since we expected that the masses in Suichuan would be
very highly mobilized, and since our army was hard pressed for supplies, we
recaptured Suichuan on October 13. The Independent Seventh Division fled
without firing a shot. The Suichuan Action Committee in command of the troops
(with Zhu De as secretary) joined the Suichuan Xian Committee in planning the
work in Suichuan. They decided to establish five guerrilla columns, distribute the
land, establish a soviet, expand the Party organization, and raise funds. At that
time, 126 soldiers of the Third Division of the Eighth Army85 under Yan
Zhongxing stationed in Guidong came over to us. They were formed into a
special task battalion, with Bi Zhanyun (who had served under Xiang Chenjie
before being placed under Yan Zhongxing) as commander. On November 2, two
regiments of the Twenty-first Brigade of the Jiangxi enemy (commanded by Li
Wenbin), together with a segment of the Independent Seventh Division, launched
a new offensive against us at Suichuan. In order to avoid a direct clash, our
army gave up Suichuan, intending to fall on the enemy with the suddenness of a
thunderbolt at Ninggang and Yongxin, where his forces were relatively weak,
thus breaking the siege. On November 9, we routed the Twenty-seventh Regiment86 of Zhou's brigade at the xian town of Ninggang and at Longyuankou. We
captured 160 guns, killed one enemy battalion commander and several dozen
enemy soldiers, and took prisoner two deputy battalion commanders, one company commander, one platoon leader, and over one hundred soldiers. On the
morning of the next day, we launched an attack on Yongxin87 to fight the

84. Xiong Shihui (1893–1974), a native of Jiangxi, had participated in the Northern
Expedition. He had been commander of the Fifth Division of the Guomindang armies
since August 1928.
85. Third Division of the Eighth Army → Hunan enemy forces
86. The Twenty-seventh Regiment → One regiment
87. We launched an attack on Yongxin → We advanced and occupied Yongxin, but
withdrew to Ninggang shortly afterward

Twenty-eighth Regiment of Zhou's brigade and the remnants of the Twenty-seventh Regiment. It was not until three o'clock in the afternoon that we forced the
enemy to retreat, and our vanguard occupied the town of Yongxin. Unexpectedly,
the enemy was reinforced by the Thirty-fifth Brigade from Hongtianhe (between
Ji'an and Yongxin), so we retreated toward Ninggang for fear of a disadvantageous battle. Although the enemy suffered heavy casualties that day, we, too, had
over a hundred casualties. This was the biggest battle after we returned to the
border areas. The Red Guards and the Insurrection Teams participated in both
these campaigns, although their strength was not very great. Present circumstances in the border area are as follows: the Fourteenth Brigade of Zhou
Hunyuan and the Fifteenth Brigade of Liu Shiyi are stationed on the Jiangxi
border. Both have already been defeated by us and are in the process of reorganization. The Twenty-first Brigade of Li Wenbin and the Thirty-fifth Brigade
(commander unknown) are our most powerful opponents. Wu Shang's Eighth
Army is still occupying Chaling, Lingxian, and Guidong xian on the Hunan
border. At present, the area of the Red Independent Régime88 extending from the
southern slopes of the Jinggangshan to the border of Lianhua xian in the north,
embraces the whole of Ninggang, parts of Suichuan, Lingxian, and Yongxin,
forming a narrow unbroken stretch from north to south. In addition, there are
also regions such as the Shangxi district of Lianhua, and the Tianlong and
Wannianshan districts of Yongxin, which are not firmly linked with this unbroken stretch, but are controlled by the Red Independent Régime. The enemy is
attempting to encircle the entire territory of the independent régime, and by
military attacks and economic blockade to eradicate this "den of Communist
bandits."89 The difficulty and intensity of the struggle are going to increase with
every passing day. We cannot afford a moment's repose.

IV. Existing Problems

A. Military Problems

1. The Military Period.90 The struggle in the border area is almost purely
military. Consequently, the Party and the masses must both be militarized. How
to deal with the enemy and how to wage war have become important items on
the daily agenda of the army, and of the local Party organizations at all levels,
and fighting has come to constitute our daily life.91 What we call an independent

88. The area of the Red Independent Régime → Our area
89. This "den of Communist bandits." → Our base area, and we are now preparing to
defeat his attacks.
90. This heading is missing in the revised version, as are subheadings nos. 4, 6, 7, 8, 9,
12, and 13 below. We have therefore set the whole of these heading in italics. Changes in
the other eight headings of this group are indicated by notes and italics in the usual way.
91. Our daily life → The central problem in our daily life

régime must be armed. Wherever such an area may be located, if it is unarmed or
insufficiently armed, or if, although it has arms, wrong tactics are used in dealing with the enemy, the White armed forces (the White army, the peace preservation corps, and the household militia) will immediately snatch away our
territory.92 As the struggle is getting fiercer every day, our problems have become extremely complex and serious.

2. Origins of the Red Army.93 Broadly speaking, the soldiers may be divided
into the following six categories: (a) troops formerly under Ye and He in
Chaozhou and Shantou;94 (b) the Wuchang Guards Regiment; (C) the Peasants'
Army from Liuyang and Pingjiang; (d) the Peasants' Army from southern Hunan
and workers from Shuikoushan; (e) soldiers we have captured from the armies of
Xu Kexiang, Tang Shengzhi, Bai Chongxi, Zhu Peide, Wu Shang, and Xiong
Shihui; (f) workers and peasants from various xian in the border area. The first
four groups form the backbone of the Red Army. After more than a year of
endless battles, however, the troops formerly under He and Ye, the Guards
Regiment, and the Peasants' Army from Liuyang and Pingjiang have lost twothirds of their men and have been reduced to only one-third of their original
strength. Even the Red Army95 from southern Hunan has suffered heavy losses in
killed and wounded in the eight-month struggle in the border area. Consequently, although the first four groups, because of their superior quality, constitute the mainstay of the Fourth Red Army, their number is much smaller than
that of the last two categories. Of the last two groups, prisoners of war are most
numerous. If we were deprived of reinforcements from this source, we would
have serious problems finding soldiers for the Fourth Army. Despite96 the existence of these reinforcements, of which the quality is inferior to the former
groups (though quite a few among them are good soldiers), enlistment still
cannot keep up with the increase in rifles. The rifles, once their number has
increased, are seldom lost; soldiers may be lost at any time through casualties,
sicknesses, and desertion. (A few soldiers desert every time we are defeated.)
Moreover, few of the peasants in the border area are willing to serve as soldiers.
As soon as the land is divided up, everyone goes to till it. Now the soldiers of
peasant or working-class origin in the Fourth Army in the border area constitute
an extreme minority. Thus the problem is still very great. The Hunan Provincial
Committee promised to send us workers from Anyuan, and we hope this will be
done very soon.

92. The White armed forces (the White army, the Peace Preservation Corps, and the
Household Militia) will immediately snatch away our territory → It will be immediately
occupied by the enemy
93. Red Army → Red Army in the Border Area
94. Chaozhou and Shantou were places traversed by the forces under the command of
Ye [Ting] and He [Long] in their retreat after the Nanchang uprising of August 1, 1927.
95. Red Army → Peasants
96. Despite → Despite this

3. Composition.97 One part consists of workers and peasants, and the other of
vagrants.98 (So it is not true to say, as the Hunan Provincial Committee does,
that they are all vagrants). It is urgently necessary to replace this contingent of
vagrants by workers and peasants, but workers and peasants are hard to come
by. On the one hand, 99 fighting is going on every day, and the vagrants are after
all particularly good fighters. At the same time, casualties continue to mount. Consequently, not only can we not diminish the vagrants now in our ranks but it is difficult
to find more for reinforcements. Under the circumstances, the only solution is to
intensify political training, so as to effect a qualitative change in these elements.

4. Nature. The majority 100 of the soldiers are men from the mercenary armies who have been transformed. Once they join the Red Army, the mercenary
system is abolished. 101 Hitherto, there has been no system of regular pay, but
only an allowance for food and pocket money. 102 As for the distribution of land
to the officers and soldiers of the Red Army, 103 apart from those from the
various xian of the border area, whose families have been allotted land according to the regulations, it is rather difficult to allot land to those from distant
places. First of all, the independent régime is small, and much of it is mountainous, so local peasants themselves barely have enough land to share, and there is
no surplus. Secondly, the outcome of battles is unpredictable, and the independent régime does not have a stable territory. Yesterday, the land was distributed
by the Red power, but today the White power seizes it back and demands that the
peasants pay the rent to the landlords. Consequently, not only do the officers and
soldiers of the Red Army have no notion of sharing out the land themselves but
many, even among the peasants, do not consider the distribution of the land as
necessarily final. This is the result of the overwhelming strength of the White
Power and of the incessant and fierce struggles between Red and White. It is,
however, our unwavering principle that the Red Army soldiers should get land,
and we are continuing to discuss methods for implementing this principle.

5. Political training. 104 In general, the Red Army soldiers are all endowed
with class consciousness. They have acquired basic political knowledge about
such things as land distribution, establishing soviets, 105 and arming the workers

97. Composition → Composition of the Red Army
98. Here the Selected Works version adds the parenthetical remark: (Of course it is
inadvisable to have too many of the latter.)
99. On the one hand → But because
100. The majority → The majority of the Red Army soldiers
101. Is abolished → Is abolished, making the men feel they are fighting for themselves
and for the people and not for somebody else
102. An allowance for food and pocket money → Grain, money for cooking oil, salt,
firewood and vegetables, and a little pocket money
103. Red Army, → Red Army, land has been allotted to all those who are natives of
the border area
104. Political training → After receiving political education
105. Soviets → Political power

and peasants. They already know that they are fighting for themselves, and for
the workers and peasants. Consequently, they can endure even this miserable life
and these fierce struggles 106 without complaint. Soldiers' Committees have been
organized in companies, battalions, and regiments. The function of the committees is to supervise the officers, to represent the soldiers' interests, and to participate in army administration. They also carry out political training in the army,
and mass movements 107 outside the army. Once the Soldiers' Committee has
been fully established, the Political Department can be abolished. Its staff members can all be taken into the Soldiers' Committee and work there. This would be
better than having a separate Political Department. Before April this year, all
the armies here had Political Departments. Then they were abolished because of
the unfavorable influence they exerted. Whenever there is a Political Department, the officers and soldiers, as well as the masses, are led to think that
political work rests only with the few people in the Department, and that the job
of all the rest is merely to fight. Only if we abolish the Political Department, so
that everyone will have to fight and everyone will also have to do political work
(political training and mass movement), can the purely military mentality be
smashed. The system of Party representatives 108 has developed from experience,
and in our opinion it cannot be abolished yet. Party representatives at the army
and divisional levels (here there is no such thing as a division; the regiment is
directly subordinated to the army) can be abolished. At the regimental, battalion,
and company levels, especially in the company, they must not be abolished now.
Because Party branches are organized on a company basis, the company Party
representative 109 has to supervise the soldiers' committee of the whole company
in carrying out political training and guiding the movement of the popular
masses. He is, at the same time, secretary of the Party branch. Experience
demonstrates that companies which have a relatively good Party representative
are somewhat sounder than the others. 110 Because casualties among the lower
cadres are heavy at present, soldiers captured from the enemy are often made
platoon leaders or even company commanders overnight. Some of those captured in February and March this year are already battalion commanders. It is a
gross error to imagine that we no longer need Party representatives simply because our army is now called the Red Army. Zhu's forces¹11 abolished Party
representatives in southern Hunan at one time, but later felt this was not a good
idea and could not be maintained. When they reached the border area, they

106. Miserable life and fierce struggles → Bitter struggle
107. Mass movements → Mass work
108. The system of Party representatives → Experience has demonstrated that the
system of Party representatives
109. Representative → Representative is particularly important, and
110. Others → Others, and that the company commander can hardly play this important political role
111. Zhu's forces → The Twenty-eighth Regiment

restored the system. If we change the name to political instructor, this would lead
to confusion with the Guomindang political instructors, who are sincerely hated
by most captives. In addition, to change the name does not change the nature of
the system. Therefore, we have decided to make no change. Casualties among
Party representatives are very heavy, and while we have started training classes,
we hope that the Central Committee and the two Provincial Committees will send us
at least thirty men capable of serving as Party representatives.

6. Military training. Other people's¹12 soldiers need six months' to a year's
training before they go into battle. Our soldiers, recruited only yesterday, have to
fight today with virtually no training. Consequently, part of the middle- and
lower-ranking cadres, as well as many soldiers, know very little about the art of
war and rely only on their bravery. This is very dangerous. Since it is impossible
to have long periods of rest and training, the only thing to do is to see whether
we can avoid battle, 113 and thus obtain time for rest and training. As for training
lower-level officers, we now have an instructional corps of 150, and we intend to
continue this on a regular basis. We hope the Central Committee and the two
Provincial Committees will send a minimum of thirty114 officers, from platoon
leader and company commander upwards, to the border area.

7. Problems of Supply. The Hunan Provincial Committee has asked us to pay
attention to the material life of the soldiers and to make it at least better115 than
that of the average worker or peasant. At present, the very reverse is the case; no
doubt few people's lives are so miserable as that of the Red Army soldiers.
Because of the shortage of funds, each man gets only five cents a day for food,
apart from rice (which is supplied by local sources), and often even this rate is
hard to maintain. The common saying of the soldiers, "Overthrow the capitalists,
and eat pumpkin every day," reflects their misery. Probably there are not many
in this world who suffer more bitterly than the Fourth Army. The monthly cost of
food116 alone, other items being provided for by the provincial [committee], is
more than 10,000 yuan, which is obtained entirely from expropriating the local
bullies. But first of all, you can expropriate only once in a given locality; afterward, there would be nothing to take. Second, we are tightly surrounded by the
enemy, and in order to get at the local tyrants, we often have to break through
the enemy's lines, so we cannot go too far. Third, the hostile armies must be
taken seriously, and one or two battalions would not be able to raise funds on
their own. We need many soldiers in order to raise funds, so the problem is not a
simple one. We now have cotton padding enough to make winter clothing for the
whole army of five thousand men (the regular Red Army), but we still do not

112. Other people's → Ordinarily
113. Battle, → Some battles,
114. A minimum of thirty → More
115. Better → A bit better
116. Food Cooking oil, salt, firewood, and vegetables

have the cloth, and we do not know when this problem can be resolved. Cold as
the weather is, many of the soldiers are still wearing only two layers of thin
clothing. Fortunately, we are accustomed to hardship. Besides, everybody puts
up with the same hardship: from the army commander to the cook, everyone has
five cents for food.117 And when pocket money is dispensed, no one gets more
than the other: everyone has his twenty or forty cents. Everybody realizes that he
is "suffering on behalf of the proletariat," so there is no animosity toward
anyone. Despite this, financial problems have been and remain very serious.

8. Problems of the sick and wounded. After every engagement there are
wounded. Because of malnutrition, cold and other factors, many118 are ill. We
have founded a Red Army hospital on the Jinggangshan, which employs both
Chinese and Western medicine for diagnosis and treatment, but we are short of
both medicine and doctors, and the problem is very serious. In September, we
had over two hundred sick and wounded soldiers, and after the recent battle at
Yongxin, the number increased. At present, the number of people in the hospital
(including staff) is over eight hundred. If we do not take care of the sick and the
wounded, the morale of the army will be shaken. If we want to take good care of
them, we face truly great difficulties getting medical equipment and supplies.
The Hunan Provincial Committee promised us drugs a long time ago, but we
have still not seen any. We still hope the Central Committee and the two Provincial Committees will send us a few Western doctors, and some iodine tablets.

9. Democracy119 in the Army. Apart from the role played by the Party, the
reason why the Red Army can hold out despite such miserable material conditions and continuous fierce battles lies in its thorough implementation of democracy. 120 The officers do not beat the soldiers; officers and men have the same
food and clothing, and receive equal treatment; soldiers enjoy freedom of assembly and speech; overelaborate formalities have been abolished; all financial
transactions are completely open; and the soldier's representatives inspect the
accounts. The soldiers handle the mess arrangements, and although there is only
five cents a day for food, they manage to save some for pocket money (about
sixty or seventy cash per person per day). All these methods give great satisfaction to the soldiers. The newly captured soldiers in particular feel that the camp
of today and the camp of yesterday121 are worlds apart. They feel that, although

117. Food Food, apart from rice
118. Many → Many officers and soldiers
119. Here Mao employs to convey the idea of democracy the term minquanzhuyi,
derived from minquan or "people's rights," the second of Sun Yatsen's "Three People's
Principles." As can be seen from many of the texts in Volume II of this edition, this usage
was common on Mao's part in the 1920s.
120. Throughout this paragraph, the term minquanzhuyi has been replaced in the
Selected Works by minzhuzhuyi.
121. The camp of today and the camp of yesterday → Our army and the Guomindang
army

materially they are worse off in the Red Army than in the White army, spiritually
they have been liberated. Therefore, they are reasonably content. The fact that
the same soldier fights more bravely in the Red Army today than he did for the
enemy army yesterday reflects the influence of this democracy. The Red Army is
like a furnace, in which all captured soldiers are melted down and transformed
the moment they come over; that is a fact. In China, not only do the masses of
workers and peasants122 need democracy, but the army needs it too, even more
urgently. The thorough implementation of democracy in the army will, in future,
be an important policy for destroying the feudal mercenary army in China. For
the life of a soldier in the feudal mercenary army is simply more than any human
being can bear.

10. The Party in the army. 123 At present, it comprises four levels, the company branch, the battalion committee, the regimental committee, and the army
committee. There is a branch in the company, with a small group in each squad.
An extremely important reason why the Fourth Army124 is still able to hold
together after many difficult battles is precisely that "The Party branch is organized on a company basis." Two years ago, our organizations within the
Guomindang armies wholly failed to take hold among the soldiers. Even among
Ye Ting's troops there was only one branch to each regiment, a truly preposterous situation. 125 At present, the proportion of Party members to nonmembers in
the army is about one to three, or an average of one Party member to every four
soldiers. Recently, it was decided to recruit more Party members among the
combat soldiers, so as to reach the goal of a fifty-fifty ratio. At present, the
company branches are short of good secretaries, so we ask the Central Committee to send us a number of activists from among those who can no longer
function where they are now, to serve as Party representatives in the companies.
Party workers from southern Hunan are almost all doing Party work in the army
(and political work at the same time). Some of them were scattered to a certain
extent during the retreat in southern Hunan last August, so we have no people to
spare at present. In the seven months since the armywide conference of representatives last April elected the Army Committee (Party Committee in the Army), we
have held in all six armywide representatives' conferences. The Sixth Congress
was held on November 14 and 15, after we received the letter from the Central
Committee. Decisions were reached on political, military, organizational,
and propaganda matters, which all represented progress as compared to the
previous five conferences. A twenty-three-member Army Committee was
set up, with Zhu De as secretary (as designated by the Central Committee).

122. Masses of workers and peasants → People
123. The Party in the army → The Party organization
124. Fourth Army → Red Army
125. A truly preposterous situation → That is why we could not stand up to any
serious test

Within [the army] it serves as the highest organ of Party power in the army and
is subordinate to the Front Committee. Outside [the army] it serves as the Army
Committee of the border area soviet, in command of the Red Army and the local
militia. The model of the Party within the army has broadly taken shape already.
Some of the Party members are resolute in their revolutionary outlook, but the
majority still lack a good education, and in the future we must pay attention to
this.

11. Local armed forces. They are divided into the Red Guards and the worker
and peasant insurrectionary detachments. The insurrectionary detachments are
armed with spears and shotguns. They are organized on a township basis, with
one detachment to every township, its strength being proportional to the size of
the township. Their task is to suppress the counterrevolution, to defend the
township government, and to assist the Red Army or the Red Guards in combat
when the enemy comes. The insurrectionary detachments started in Yongxin,
and originally they were secret organizations for carrying out the uprising. After
we seized power in the whole xian, they came out into the open. Subsequently,
this system spread to the whole of the border area, but the name was not
changed. The Red Guards use five-shot, nine-shot, and single-shot guns, mostly
five-shot. The number of guns in the various xian is roughly as follows: 140 in
Ninggang, 220 in Yongxin, 43 in Lianhua, 50 in Chaling, 90 in Lingxian, 130 in
Suichuan, and 10 in Wan'an, totaling 683. Most of these have been supplied by
the Red Army, but a few were captured from the enemy by [the Red Guards]
themselves. Most of the Red Guards from the various xian are constantly fighting with the armed forces of the despotic gentry, the peace preservation corps,
and the household militia, and as a result their marksmanship and ability to fight
are increasing all the time. Before the Horse Day Incident, 126 the peasants'
self-defense corps 127 had 300 guns in Youxian, 300 in Chaling, 60 in Lingxian,
50 in Suichuan, 80 in Yongxin, 60 in Lianhua, 60 in Ninggang (Yuan Wencai's
men), and 60 on the Jinggangshan (Wang [Zuo's] men), totaling 970. After the
Horse Day Incident, apart from Yuan and Wang's men, who kept their arms,
only six guns were retained in Suichuan, and one in Lianhua, all the rest having
been seized by the despotic gentry. The fact that they had no control at all over
the situation was entirely the result of the actions of the former opportunist
Party. 128 Even now the Red Guards of the various xian still have far too few
rifles. The despotic gentry have more guns than the Red Guards, so the Red
Army must continue to help the xian with arms. So long as this effort does not
damage the Red Army itself, 129 it must do everything possible to assist the local

126. Regarding the "Horse Day Massacre" of May 21, 1927, see above, the note to the
declaration of August 1, 1927, regarding Xu Kexiang.
127. The peasants' self-defense corps → All the xian in the border area had peasants'
self-defense corps, whose rifles numbered
128. Actions of the former opportunist Party → Opportunist line
129. Damage the Red Army itself → Lower the Red Army's fighting capacity

armed forces, 130 and to make them stronger every day. It has been laid down by
the armywide conference that the Red Army131 should adopt a four-company
system, with seventy-five rifles to every company. (Adding to this the rifles of
the special task company, machine-gun company, mortar company, regimental
headquarters, and battalion headquarters, each regiment will have 1,075 rifles.)
Additional guns captured in action should be used as much as possible to arm the
local workers and peasants. The commanders of the Red Guards should be
people who have been sent from the xian to the Red Army training corps and
have finished their training. The number of people sent by the Red Army from
outside areas to command local forces should be gradually reduced. Zhu Peide is
also stepping up greatly his effort to arm the peace preservation corps and the
household militia. The armed forces of the despotic gentry in the various xian of
the border area are of considerable size and fighting capacity. Consequently, it is
extremely urgent to expand our local Red armed forces in the border area.

12. The Strategy of the Red Army and the Red Guards. Besides adhering to
the principles laid down (annihilate small enemy forces swiftly with our main
forces; make use of the masses to combat large enemy forces; do not launch
foolhardy attacks), the principle for the Red Army should be concentration,
while that for the Red Guards should be dispersion. At the present time, when
the bourgeois 132 political power is stable, 133 and the enemy is capable of massing
huge forces to attack the Red Army, dispersion is extremely disadvantageous for
the Red Army, while concentration is advantageous. In our experience, the
dispersion of our forces has led almost every time to defeat, while concentrating
our forces to attack smaller, equal, or even slightly larger enemy forces has
frequently led to victory. The Central Committee has instructed us to wage
guerrilla warfare in an area extending several thousand li in all directions. This is
much too vast, probably because of an overestimation of our strength. (The
Hunan Provincial Committee is already informed regarding the number of guns
in the possession of the Fourth Army. Comrade Yuan Desheng has been asked to
brief you on this in person, so it is excluded from this report.) As for the strategy
of the Red Guards, dispersion is most advantageous, and they are all using this
method in their operations in all the xian.

13. Regarding organization. At present, we are still following the old methods of organization of the Guomindang. We are unable to decode the Central
Committee's "Resolution on Military Work" and are unable to guess at the
organization of the army of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom. 134 Please prepare

130. Assist the local armed forces → Arm the people
131. The Red Army → Each battalion of the Red Army
132. Bourgeois → Reactionary
133. Stable → Temporarily stable
134. The letter of June 4 declared that the forces of Zhu and Mao were "still a
Guomindang-type army," which needed to be transformed from a mercenary to a volunteer basis. They were instructed to abolish the system of Party representatives in the army,

another copy of the document and send it to us, so as to facilitate discussion.

14. Propaganda aimed at the enemy forces. The two most effective methods
are releasing captured soldiers, and giving medical care to wounded enemy soldiers. When we capture enemy soldiers, battalion and company commanders,
and platoon leaders, we conduct propaganda among them, and then divide them
into those who want to go and those who want to stay. Those who want to leave
are given money for their traveling expenses and set free. This concrete propaganda immediately knocks the bottom out of the enemy propaganda that "The
Communist bandits kill everyone and anyone on sight." No wonder Yang
Chisheng's Ninth Division Ten-Day Review exclaimed, regarding this method,
"How insidious!" The Red Army soldiers are extremely enthusiastic in welcoming and comforting 135 the prisoners, and the prisoners reciprocate with warm
gratitude in their speeches at every "Farewell Meeting for New Brothers." Giving medical care to the wounded enemy soldiers also has a very great effect.
Some of the more intelligent among our enemies (such as Li Wenbin) are copying our methods. They stopped killing our prisoners and started to treat our
wounded. But after staying in the enemy camp when captured or wounded, our
soldiers returned nevertheless, guns and all. This has happened twice already.
Very few Red Army soldiers have been captured by the enemy, since the Red
Army has suffered few defeats in the border area. We are also doing our utmost
to carry out written propaganda, for example, by painting slogans. We cover the
walls with slogans wherever we go. We are, however, lacking in people skilled
in painting, and we request the Central Committee and the two Provincial Committees to send us a few.

15. Military bases: Our first base is the Jinggangshan, situated at the junction
of Ninggang, Lingxian, Suichuan, and Yongxin xian. At its northern foot lies
Maoping in Ninggang; at its southern foot lies Huang'ao in Suichuan. The distance between the two points is 90 li. At its eastern foot lies Nashan in Yongxin;
at its western foot lies Shuikou in Lingxian. The distance between the two is
180136 li. The circumference measures 550 li, stretching from Nashan to
Longyuankou (both in Yongxin xian), Xincheng, Maoping, Dalong (all in
Ninggang), Shidu, Shuikou, Xiacun (all in Lingxian), Yingpanxu, Daijiapu,

which (as Mao himself indicates here) was modeled on the Guomindang, establish a Political
Department (zhengzhibu), and apply the "Taiping Heavenly Kingdom pattern of organization."
Directive No. 51 of the Central Committee, entitled "Outline of Military Work," May 25, 1928
(presumably the one Mao had been unable to decode), spelled out this point. It recommended
adapting the organization of the Red Army to the available arms, including old-fashioned guns,
swords, and so on. The "three-five system" was to be used: twelve men to a squad, three
squads to a platoon, five platoons to a company, five companies to a regiment, and five
regiments to a division, each division to have 4,500 men. "This system," asserted the directive,
"adopts the spirit of the Taiping system and seeks to adapt it to the needs of guerrilla warfare."
See Central Committee Documents (1928), pp. 222-38, especially p. 233.
135. Welcoming and comforting →→ Comforting and sending on their way
136.180-80

Dafen, Duiziqian, Huang'ao, Wudoujiang, Che'ao (all in Suichuan), and back to
Nashan. In the mountains there are paddy fields and villages at Dajing, Xiaojing,
Shangjing, Zhongjing, Xiajing, 137 Ciping, Xiazhuang, Xingzhou, Caoping,
Bainihu, and Luofu. Formerly, all these places were dens of bandits and deserters. 138 The population is, however, under two thousand, and the rice production
is less than 10,000 shi. All the grain required by the army must be supplied from
Ninggang, Yongxin, and Suichuan xian. All the strategic passes in the mountains
are strongly fortified. The Red Army Hospital, bedding and clothing workshops,
ordnance department, and regimental rear offices are all up here. At present,
grain is being transported to the mountains from Ninggang. Provided that we
have sufficient supplies (grain and money, the most important being money), the
enemy can never break in. There is a Defense Committee in the camp, in charge
of defense, with Wang Zuo as chairman. The second base is Jiulong, 139 at the
juncture of Ninggang, Yongxin, Lianhua, and Chaling xian. It is less important
than the Jinggangshan, but serves as the rearmost base for the local armed forces
of the four xian, and has also been fortified. Since the Red régime is surrounded on
all sides by the White régime, a military base in the mountains is indispensable. 140
Because the enemy is present on all four sides, and we must defend ourselves
on all four sides, it would be extremely difficult for the Red Independent Régime
to survive for long when the bourgeois political power is stable without taking
advantage of the natural barriers to make up for occasional deficiencies in
manpower (for instance, when the enemy's overwhelming numbers present
grave dangers).

B. The Land Problem

1. The Land Situation in the Border Areas. Broadly speaking, over 60 percent
of the land was in the hands of the landlords, and less than 40 percent in the
hands of the peasants. If we distinguish among the different cases, in the border
areas of Jiangxi, Suichuan showed the highest concentration, with about 80
percent of the land belonging to the landlords. Yongxin came next, with the
landlords owning about 70 percent. There were more owner-peasants in Wan'an,
Ninggang, and Lianhua. Apart from Wan'an, for which we do not have the
results of any direct investigations, there are a fair number of owner-peasants in
Ninggang and Lianhua, but nevertheless the landlords held the greater part of the
land, the proportion being about 60 to 40. The situation in Chaling and Lingxian

137. The preceding five place names mean, respectively, Big Well, Small Well, Upper
Well, Middle Well, and Lower Well.
138. Bandits and deserters → Bandits and deserters, but they have now been turned
into our base area
139. Jiulong → The Jiulong Mountains
140. A military base in the mountains is indispensable → It is essential to make use of
the strategic advantages offered by mountains

xian in the Hunan border area was rather similar, with the landlords holding
some 70 percent of the land.

2. The Problem of the Intermediate Class. Under the circumstances outlined
above, we can win the support of the majority of people for confiscating and
redistributing all land. Roughly speaking, there are three classes in the countryside: the despotic gentry class, who are big or middle landlords, the intermediate
class of small landlords and owner-peasants, 141 and also the class of the poor
peasants. 142 Within the intermediate class, the interests of the owner-peasants 143
are often interwoven with those of the small landlords. The owner-peasants144
account for a small proportion of the total land, but when their holdings are
combined with the land held by small landlords, the total is considerable. This is
probably more or less the case throughout the country. The policy in the border
area is to confiscate all land, and redistribute it thoroughly, so that in the areas of
Red political power, the class of the despotic gentry and the intermediate class
are both under attack. Such is our policy, but in applying it we have encountered
considerable obstruction from the intermediate classes. In the initial stage of the
revolution, the intermediate classes pretended to capitulate to the poor peasant
class, but in reality they were plotting to take advantage of their former social
status and clan influence to spread rumors and to intimidate the poor peasants,
so as to delay the distribution of the land. When higher-level political authorities
put pressure on them until they could no longer delay things, they either concealed their actual holdings or retained the good land and gave up the poor land
to others. During this period, the poor peasants, having long been trampled
down, and because145 the victory of the revolution was not assured, were often
tricked by the intermediate classes and did not dare to act resolutely. Vigorous
action is taken against the intermediate classes in the countryside only when the
revolution is on the upsurge, for example, when political power has been seized
in one or several xian, when the reactionary armies have suffered several defeats,
and when the Red Army has repeatedly demonstrated its prowess. For example,
it is in the southern section of Yongxin xian, where the intermediate classes are
most numerous, that delays in distributing the land and cheating in reporting
land-holding were most flagrant. Only after the Red Army won its great victory
at Longyuankou on June 23, and only after the district government killed146
several people for delaying distribution, was land actually distributed there. But
since the feudal family system is widespread in every xian, and all the families in
a village or group of villages often have the same surname, a fairly long time
will be required for class polarization to take place in the villages and for clan

141. Owner-peasants → Rich peasants
142. Poor peasants → Middle and poor peasants
143. Owner-peasants → Rich peasants
144. Owner-peasants → Rich peasants
145. Because → Because they felt that
146. Killed → Dealt with

ideology to be overcome. In the countryside, where clan organizations prevail,
the most troublesome are not the despotic gentry, but the intermediate classes.
This is the biggest problem.

3. The Defection of the Intermediate Classes under the White terror: The
intermediate classes had been under attack during the high tide of revolution, so
they defected as soon as the White terror arrived. It was none other than the
small landlords and owner-peasants147 in the two xian of Yongxin and Ninggang
who led the reactionary army to burn the homes of the revolutionary peasants
there. They were very bold about burning down houses and arresting people at
the direction of the counterrevolutionaries. When the Red Army returned to the
area around Ninggang (in September), Xincheng, Gucheng, and Longshi, several
thousand peasants who had heard and believed the reactionary propaganda that
the Communists would kill them fled with the counterrevolutionaries to
Yongxin. Only after we had conducted propaganda to the effect that "Peasant
defectors will not be killed," and "Peasant defectors are welcome to come back
to harvest their crops," did some of these peasants slowly return.

4. When the revolution is at low ebb in the country as a whole, the most
difficult problem in the areas ruled by the independent régime is keeping a firm
grip on the intermediate class. This class rebels mainly because it has received
excessively heavy blows from the revolution. When there is a revolutionary
upsurge in the country as a whole, the poor peasant class has something to rely
on and becomes bolder, while the intermediate class has something to fear and
dares not create a disturbance. When the war between Li Zongren and Tang
Shengzhi spread to Hunan, 148 the small landlords in Chaling sought to placate
the peasants. Some of them gave pork to the peasants as a New Year's gift (at
that time the Red Army had withdrawn from Chaling toward Suichuan). But
when the war was over, nothing was heard of such things again. Now that there
is a high tide of counterrevolution in the whole country, the intermediate classes
which have suffered our blows have gone over almost completely to the despotic
gentry, and the poor peasant class has become isolated. This is truly a serious
problem.

5. The Pressure of Daily Life as a Cause of the Defection of the Intermediate
Class: The Red independent régime and the White areas are now facing each
other like two countries at war. As a result of the enemy's tight blockade, and
our unduly harsh treatment of the petty bourgeoisie, trade between the two areas
has almost entirely ceased. Necessities such as salt, cloth, and medicines are
scarce and costly, and agricultural products such as timber, tea, and oil cannot be

147. Owner-peasants → Rich peasants
148. In September 1927, Tang Shengzhi opposed the formation of a Central Special
Committee to function as an interim government, with the aim of reconciling the Nanjing
and Wuhan factions of the Guomindang. Thereupon, Nanjing launched a punitive expedition against him in October 1927, with Li Zongren as commander-in-chief. Tang was
obliged to abandon Wuhan, and Li came to control both Hubei and Hunan.

shipped out. As a result, cash income149 is cut off, and the people as a whole are
affected. The poor peasant class is better able to bear such hardships. The intermediate class, when it can bear them no longer, will go over to the despotic
gentry. This economic problem is extremely serious. Unless the splits and wars
within the despotic gentry and among the warlords in China continue, and unless
a nationwide revolutionary situation develops, the small fragmentary Red
régimes will come under extreme economic pressure, and their long-term existence will be called into question. For not only is such economic pressure unbearable for the intermediate classes but a time may well come when even the
worker and peasant classes150 and the Red Army will not be able to endure it. In
Yongxin and Ninggang xian there was no salt for cooking, and supplies of cloth
and medicines were completely cut off, not to mention other commodities. Now,
because it is not the extreme high tide [of counterrevolution], salt can be had
again, but it is extremely expensive. Cloth and medicines are still unattainable.
Timber and tea-oil, which are produced abundantly in Ninggang, the western
part of Yongxin, and the northern part of Suichuan (all currently part of our
areas) still cannot be shipped out. The shortage of cash is extremely acute. If the
captured despotic gentry do not send us money, we have no money to use. All
this poses an enormous problem.

6. Criteria for Land Redistribution: In a given region, the township serves as
the unit for distribution. In mountainous areas where arable land is scarce, such
as Xiaojiang District in Yongxin, three or four villages were sometimes taken as
a single unit for land distribution, but such cases were very rare. The human
criterion used to be that everyone, male or female, old or young, got an equal
share. Now we have switched to the method of the Central Committee, which
takes labor power as the criterion. The able-bodied get twice as much as those
who cannot work.

7. The Question of Concessions to the Owner-peasants: As yet, this has not
been discussed in detail. The rich peasants among the owner-peasants have put
forward the demand that productive capacity should be taken as the criterion, so
that those with more manpower and capital (farm implements, etc.) would get
more land. The rich peasants feel that neither equal distribution nor distribution
according to labor power are advantageous to them. Their idea is that, as regards
manpower, they are willing to work harder, and that if, in addition, account is
taken of their capital, they can raise bigger crops. If they receive the same
allocation as everyone else, and their special efforts and extra capital are ignored
(left unused), they will not like it. Here we are still applying the method of the
Central Committee. But this question must be discussed further, and when conclusions have been reached, we will submit another report. On the one hand, we
request the Central Committee and the two Provincial Committees to instruct us

149. Cash income → The peasants' cash income
150. Worker and peasant classes → Workers and poor peasants

as soon as possible regarding the methods (the concrete methods, not merely the
broad policy) used by Soviet Russia in dealing with the rich peasants, especially
during the democratic revolution, when the Soviet government was surrounded
by the White régime. As for not confiscating the land of owner-peasants, the
whole of it has already been confiscated on the territory of the independent
régime in the border area, so of course the problem will not arise again. When
opening up new territories, we will adopt a no-confiscation policy in the initial
stage. In this way, we can make use of the strength of the owner-peasants to
support the poor peasants, and to attack the despotic gentry.

8. The Land Tax. The rate in Ninggang is 20 percent, or 5 percent more than
that set by the Central Committee. Since the tax is already being collected, we
cannot very well make a change now, but the rate will be reduced next year.
Apart from this, there are portions of Suichuan, Lingxian, and Yongxin under the
independent régime which are situated in mountainous areas where the peasants
are so poverty-stricken that they should not be taxed at all. For the expenses of
the government and of the Red Guards we rely on expropriating the despotic
gentry in the White areas. As for the provisioning of the Red Army, rice is
obtained for the time being from the land tax in Ninggang, but in this case too,
cash is obtained entirely from expropriating the despotic gentry. During our
guerrilla operations in Suichuan in October, we collected more than ten thousand
yuan. This will last for some time; we will give the matter more thought when it
has been spent.

C. The Problem of the Soviets 151

1. Soviets 152 in the Border Area at the Xian, District, and Township Levels.
Soviets have been organized everywhere at each of these levels, but more in
name than in reality. The majority of the worker and peasant masses, and even of
Party members, have not yet understood the idea of a soviet. In many places,
there is no such thing as the council of workers', peasants', and soldiers' representatives. The executive committees of the soviets 153 at township, district, or
even xian level have all been elected by the masses. 154 But mass meetings called
on the spur of the moment can neither discuss questions nor offer political
training, 155 and they can easily be manipulated by intellectuals or opportunists.
The greatest error regarding the organs of political power in many localities in
the border area consists in ignorance of what is meant by a soviet, ignorance of
the fact that the council of workers', peasants', and soldiers' representatives is
the supreme permanent organ of power, and the executive committee is merely

151. The Soviets → Political Power
152. Soviets → People's political power
153. Soviets → Governments
154. By the masses → At a mass meeting
155. Training → Training for the masses

the organ in charge of day-to-day affairs when the council is not in session.
Some places do have a council, but it is regarded as nothing more than a temporary body for electing the executive committee. Once the election is over, all
power is monopolized by the committee, and the council is never mentioned
again. It is not at all the case that there are no soviet organizations156 worthy of
the name; it is simply that there are very few of them. The reason lies in the
great lack of propaganda and education regarding this new political system
called the soviets. 157 The evil habits of the arbitrary despotism of the feudal era
are deeply ingrained in the minds of the masses, and even of ordinary Party
members, and cannot be eradicated all at once. When something happens, they
seek the most convenient solution and have no liking for this troublesome democratic system. Democratic centralism can be widely and genuinely established in
mass organizations only when its efficacy is demonstrated in the revolutionary
struggle, and the masses understand that it is the best method for mobilizing their
forces and is extremely advantageous for their struggle. We are presently engaged in drafting a detailed law (based on Central Committee's outline) for the
organization of the soviets 158 at all levels, in order gradually to correct previous
mistakes. Soldiers' soviets (conferences of soldiers' representatives at all levels)
are now being established in the Red Army on a permanent basis, so as to correct
the previous mistake of having only permanent soldiers' committees, and not
permanent conferences of soldiers' representatives.

2. Executive Committees at All Levels. At present, the masses of the people
are all familiar with the "soviet government of the workers, peasants, and soldiers" at various levels. In Ninggang, the popular masses call it the "ai159 government" for short (In the dialect of settlers from other provinces we use the
same character; the ai government means "our government"). In some other
places, it is known in a truncated form as the "su government." What they call by
this name is actually the executive committee, because they are still unaware of
the powers of the council and think that the executive committee alone is the real
power. Such an attitude is not universal. An executive committee without a
council of representatives, or a properly constituted council of representatives,
behind it, often deals with matters without taking account of the views of the
masses. Everywhere there are instances of hesitation and compromise on the
confiscation and redistribution of land, of squandering or embezzling funds, and
of recoiling before the White forces or fighting only half-heartedly. In addition,
the committee seldom meets in full session, all business being decided and
handled by its standing committee. In the district and township governments

156. Soviet organizations → Councils of workers', peasants', and soldiers' deputies
157. Soviets → Councils
158. Soviets → Councils
159. In other words, they refer to it by the third of the characters su-wei-ai used in the
Chinese phonetic transcription of the word "soviet."

even the standing committee rarely meets, and business is decided and handled
separately by the four individuals who work in the office, namely the chairman,
secretary, treasurer, and commander of the Red Guards (or insurrectionary detachment). Thus democratic centralism has not become a regular practice even in
the work of the government.

3. The Problem of Petty Bourgeois Control of Government Committees. In the
early period, small landlords, rich peasants, and intellectuals vied with one another
to get on the government committees, especially at the township level. Wearing red
arm sashes and feigning great enthusiasm, they wormed their way into the government committees by trickery and seized control of everything, relegating the poor
peasants to a supporting role. They can be thoroughly cleared out only when they are
unmasked in the course of struggle, and the poor peasant class rises up. Although
such a state of affairs is not universal, it has occurred in a number of places.

4. The Relationship between the Party and the Government Organs. Although the Party does not order the government organs around, neither does it
realize the importance of respecting the independence of government organs.
The Party enjoys extremely great prestige and authority among Party members
and the masses, the government much less. The reason is that, for the sake of
convenience, the Party handles many things directly and brushes the government
organs aside. This is a common mistake in many places. In some places, there
are no Party or Youth League leading groups; in other places, they exist, but are
not functioning properly. In the future, the Party must act as back-stage boss.160
With the exception of propaganda, the Party's policies and the measures it recommends must be carried out through the mass161 organizations. We need to
avoid the Guomindang's error of running the government directly.

5. The Supreme Soviet. We proclaimed "The Soviet Government of Workers,
Peasants, and Soldiers in the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Area" as early as May, but
because of the pressure of time, it was far from perfect. We have now decided to
reshuffle the border soviet and its committee, which will be the highest organ of
political power in the border area.

D. The Present State of the Party in the Border Area162

1. The Course of the Struggle against Opportunism. It may be said that
around the time of the Horse Day Incident,163 the Party organizations in every
xian of the border area were entirely opportunist.164 As a result, when counter-

160. Act as back-stage boss → Carry out its task of leading the government
161. Mass → Government
162. The Present State of the Party in the Border Area → Questions of Party Organization
163. Regarding the "Horse Day Incident" of May 21, 1927, see the note to section
IVA11.
164. Opportunist → Dominated by opportunism

revolution set in, there was very little resolute struggle. In October of last year,
when the Red Army (the First Regiment of the First Division of the First Army
of the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army) arrived in the xian of the
border area, only a few individual Party members who had gone into hiding were
left, and the Party organization had been entirely destroyed. The four months
from November of last year to April of this year were a period of rebuilding the
Party. The period since May has been one of rapid expansion. During the past
year, manifestations of opportunism have been widespread within the Party.
Some Party members have no stomach for fighting and have turned into
ambushists (when the enemy comes, they hide in the remote mountains, calling
this lying in ambush). Others are filled with activism, but have turned into
idealist insurrectionists. 165 Both tendencies are the result of petty bourgeois consciousness. 166 This situation has finally changed only after a long period of
tempering in practice and inner-Party struggle. 167 During the same period, this
kind of stupidity resulting from petty bourgeois consciousness 168 has existed for
a long time in the Red Army as well. When the enemy comes, they advocate
either desperate resistance or flight. This sort of desperationism or flightism
often existed side by side in the views put forward by the same individual
regarding a given situation. 169 This opportunist ideology has been gradually
corrected through prolonged inner-Party struggle and through lessons learned
from actual events, for instance, from the losses incurred in reckless battle and
the reverses suffered during precipitate flight.

2. Localism. The economy in the border area is not only agricultural, it is
still170 in the age of the mortar and pestle. (In the mountainous areas, mortar and
pestle are still in general use for husking rice, while in the plains there are many
treadle-operated stone pestles.) Everywhere the unit of social organization is the
clan organization, consisting of people with the same surname. As regards Party
organization in the villages, because of the way people live together, Party
members with the same surname often make up a branch, and the branch meeting is simply171 a clan meeting. In these circumstances, it is very difficult indeed
to build a "militant Bolshevik Party." Such people do not really understand that

165. Turned into idealist insurrectionists → Resorted to blind insurrection
166. Result of petty bourgeois consciousness → Expression of petty bourgeois ideology
167. Tempering in practice and inner-Party struggle → Tempering through struggle
and inner-Party education
ogy
168. Stupidity resulting from petty bourgeois consciousness → Petty-bourgeois ideol169. This sort of desperationism or flightism often existed side by side in the views
put forward by the same individual regarding a given situation → Often both ideas
emanated from the same individual in the course of the discussions on what military action
to take
170. It is still → In some places it is still
171. Simply → At the same time

the Communist Party does not distinguish between countries and provinces, nor
do they understand that a sharp line should not be drawn between xian, districts,
and townships. Localism exists to a serious extent in the relations between xian,
and it is deeply rooted also in the relations between districts and townships
within the same xian. In modifying such localism, subjective reasoning alone can
at best produce only limited results. For the most part, it takes White oppression,
which is by no means localized (such as joint suppression campaigns by the two
provinces), in which people share a common lot in the course of their struggles,
gradually to induce them to abandon their localism. Amid many such objective
lessons, localism is gradually weakened.

3. The Problem of the Native Inhabitants and the Settlers. 172 There is another
peculiar feature in the border area, namely the division between the native inhabitants and the settlers. A profound gulf has long existed between the native
inhabitants and those who came here as colonists from Guangdong and Fujian 173
hundreds of years ago. Their traditional feuds are deep-seated, sometimes erupting in violent "national" struggles. From the Guangdong 174 border, all the way
along the border areas of Hunan and Jiangxi, up to southern Hubei, there are
probably several millions of such settlers. These settlers occupy the mountainous
areas, are oppressed by the native inhabitants who live in the plains, and have
never had any political rights. They all, without exception, welcomed the national revolution of last year and the year before, thinking that the day had come
for them to raise their heads. But unexpectedly the revolution turned into a
counterrevolution, 175 and the settlers continue to be oppressed by the native
inhabitants as before. Within our independent border area, the problem of the
native inhabitants and the settlers exists in Ninggang, Suichuan, Lingxian, and
Chaling, but it is in Ninggang that it is most serious. Last year and the year
before, the revolutionaries among the native inhabitants joined together with the
settlers, under the leadership of the Communist Party, overthrew the political
power of the native despotic gentry, and took control of the whole xian. Last
June, the government of Zhu Peide turned counterrevolutionary. In September,
the despotic gentry served as guides for Zhu Peide's army in its suppression

172. Mao refers here to the "native inhabitants" and "settlers" respectively as tuji and
keji. These designations correspond to bendi and kejia, commonly represented in Englishlanguage sources by their Cantonese transcriptions, Punti and Hakka. A convenient survey
of the relations between these two ethnic groups since the nineteenth century can be found
in S. T. Leong, "The Hakka Chinese of Lingnan: Ethnicity and Social Change in Modern
Times," in Ideal and Reality: Social and Political Change in Modern China, 1860-1949,
ed. David Pong and Edmund S. K. Fung (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America,
1985), pp. 287-323. Leong's article includes brief biographies of eight Hakkas who began
their Party careers during the period of the Jiangxi soviet, and played important roles after
1949.
173. Colonists from Guangdong and Fujian → Migrants from the north
174. Guangdong → Guangdong and Fujian
175. Turned into a counterrevolution → Failed

campaign against Ninggang, in a war which still continues. 176 In theory, this kind
of schism should not extend to the oppressed workers and peasants, let alone to
the Party. In reality, however, by force of long historical tradition, the division
between the native inhabitants and the settlers still leaves considerable traces. 177
For example, after the August defeat in the border area, when the native despotic
gentry returned to Ninggang, bringing the troops178 with them, they conducted
large-scale propaganda claiming that the settlers were going to massacre the
native inhabitants. As a result, most of the native peasants defected, put on white
ribbons, and led the army179 to burn down houses and comb the mountains. And
when, in October and November, the Red Army twice defeated the White army, the
native peasants fled with them, and the settlers hastened to confiscate the pigs, cattle,
clothes, and other property of the native peasants. When reflected in the Party, this
sort of historical residue 180 takes the form of pointless arguments. 181 The way to
settle this is to proclaim to the masses that "peasants who have defected will not be
killed" and that "peasants who have defected will also get their share of land when
they return," thus leading them to shake off the influence of the despotic gentry, and
return home without misgivings. (Many of them have already done so.) At the same
time, the xian soviet 182 must compel the settlers to return confiscated cattle and
property to the original owners, and notices must be posted stating that native
peasants will be protected. Within the Party, the causes of differences should be
eliminated, and education should be intensified in order to achieve unity.

4. The Defection of the Opportunists. During the revolutionary upsurge (in
June), many opportunists took advantage of open recruitment to make their way
into the Party. In a very short time, the number of Party members in the border
area jumped to more than ten thousand. Branch leaders, and even district committee leaders were mostly new Party members, who had not been able to receive
a good inner-Party education. As soon as the White Terror struck, the careerists
defected. In many places, they led the reactionaries to hunt down our comrades. As a
result, the majority of Party organizations in White territory collapsed.

5. Party Purification and the Establishment of Underground Organizations.
Since September, the Party has carried out a drastic purge and has set strict
class qualifications for membership. Party organizations in Yongxin and
Ninggang xian were completely dissolved, and re-registration was carried out.
Re-registration has been completed in Yongxin, and Ninggang will soon follow.
Although the number of Party members has been greatly reduced, the Party's

176. In a war which still continues → And once again stirred up the conflict between
the native inhabitants and the settlers
177. Still leaves considerable traces → Still exists
178. Troops → Reactionary troops
179. Army → White army
180. Historical residue → Situation
181. Arguments → Struggles
182. Soviet → Government

fighting capacity has, on the contrary, increased. Formerly, the Party's organization relied on open political power, 183 almost completely neglecting the importance of secret work. Since September, we have carried out the work of
building 184 a complete underground organization. 185 At the same time, we have
made every effort to penetrate deeply into the White regions, in order to exercise
an influence in the enemy camp. In some areas, this has begun to show some
results. In the towns, 186 however, we still have no foundation at all. The reasons
are, first, that the enemy is relatively strong in the towns, and second, we had
harmed the interests of the petty bourgeoisie in the cities too much, business is
slow, the craftsmen have ceased to work, and as a result we can scarcely find a
foothold. We are now correcting our former mistakes and striving to establish
our organizations in the cities, but so far without much success.

6. Leadership Organs 187 at All Levels. The branch executive council has been
renamed the branch committee. The branch is under the district committee, and
the district committee is under the xian committee. Where there are special
circumstances, a special district committee has been organized between the district committee and the xian committee. Cases in point are Beixiang Special
District and Southeast Special District in Yongxin xian. In the border area there
are five xian committees in all: Ninggang, Yongxin, Lianhua, Suichuan, and
Lingxian. There used to be a xian committee in Chaling, but because the work
there did not take root, most of the organizations established last winter and
spring were smashed by the powerful White forces. For the past six months, we
have been able to work only in a narrow band of mountainous territory in the
vicinity of Ninggang and Yongxin, so the xian committee was changed to a
special district committee. We have sent people to Youxian and Anren, both of
which can be reached only via Chaling, but they have returned without accomplishing anything. The Wan'an Xian Committee was cut off for more than six
months after the joint meeting with the former Front Committee 188 in Suichuan
in January. It was not until September, when the Red Army reached Wan'an in a
guerrilla operation, that we resumed contact. According to a letter from the
Wan'an Xian Committee, it lost its previous nine district committees and all its
120 guns. At present, our organizations exist only in the Guards Regiment. Our
comrades there have taken some of the guns. One battalion of the Red Army
guerrilla forces reached a point close to the Wan'an xian town, and then returned, after the responses previously arranged from within the city and from
other places totally failed to materialize. Eighty revolutionary peasants followed

183. Relied on open political power → Was entirely open
184. Carried out the work of building → Built
185. Organization → Organization, so as to prepare the Party for carrying on its
activities when the reactionaries come
186. Towns → Nearby towns
187. Leadership organs → Organs of Party leadership
188. The former Front Committee → Us

[our troops] to the foot of the Jinggangshan and were organized into a detachment of Wan'an Red Guards, with ten guns. There is no Party organization in
Anfu. Ji'an borders on Yongxin, but for all this time our independent régime has
been in existence, the Ji'an Xian Committee has been in touch with us only twice
and has given us no help at all. This is truly strange. In the Shatian area of
Guidong, land distribution was carried out twice, in March and August. Party
organizations have been established and are currently under the jurisdiction of
the Southern Hunan Special Committee, with its center at Shiertong in Longxi.
All the xian committees are placed under the Special Committee of the HunanJiangxi Border Area. On May 20, the First Party Congress of the border area was
held at Maoping in Ninggang and elected twenty-three people as members of the
First Special Committee, with Mao Zedong as secretary. In July, the Hunan
Provincial Committee sent Yang Kaiming here, and he became acting secretary.189 In September, Yang fell ill, and Tan Zhenlin took his place. In August,
when the main force of the Red Army went to southern Hunan, and the White
forces were pressing hard on the border area, an emergency meeting was held in
Yongxin. In October, after the Red Army returned to Ninggang, the Second
Congress of the border area was called together, once again at Maoping. The
congress started on October 4190 and lasted for three days. It adopted resolutions
on political problems, the tasks of the Party in the border area, problems of
organization, problems of propaganda, and the land problem. It also elected
nineteen people as members of the Second Special Committee (Tan Zhenlin, Zhu
De, Chen Yi, Long Chaoqing, Zhu Changkai,191 Liu Tianqian, Yuan Panzhu,
Tan Sicong, Tan Bing, Li Quefei, Song Yiyue, Yuan Wencai, Wan Zuonong,
Chen Zhengren, Mao Zedong, Wan Xixian, Wang Zuo, Yang Kaiming, He
Tingying), and five standing committee members, with Tan Zhenlin (a
worker)192 as secretary and Chen Zhengren (an intellectual) as deputy secretary. On November 14, the Sixth Party Congress of the Red Army elected
twenty-three people to constitute the Army Committee, with a five-member
standing committee and Zhu De as secretary. The Special Committee and the
Army Committee are both subordinated to the Front Committee. In accordance with the directives of the Central Committee, the Front Committee was
set up193 on November 6 and consisted of five members: Mao Zedong, Zhu
De, the local Party secretary (Tan Zhenlin), a worker comrade (Song
Qiaosheng), and a peasant comrade (Mao Kewen), with Mao Zedong as secretary. For the time being, the Front Committee has set up a secretariat, a
propaganda section, an organization section, a labor movement committee, and a

189. I.e., as noted above, he replaced Mao.
190. 4 → 14. According to Nianpu, Vol. 1, p. 254, the date of October 4 is correct.
191. Zhu Changkai → Zhu Changjie
192. Tan had had only three years' schooling and had worked briefly in the labor
movement in 1926.
193. Set up → Reorganized

military affairs commission (i.e., the one elected by the Red Army Congress
mentioned above). Now that it has been established, the Front Committee will
supervise local party organizations in every xian. The Special Committee still
has its raison d'être, since the Front Committee is often on the move. 194 The
problem of the leading role of proletarian consciousness 195 in the Party is extremely important. It can almost be said that the Party organization in all the
xian of the border area is entirely a peasant party. If they do not receive leadership196 from the urban proletariat, they are bound to develop erroneous tendencies. Besides correcting previous mistakes and paying active attention to the
workers' movement in the xian seats and in other large towns in the countryside,
it is also extremely necessary to increase worker representation in the soviets 197
and to have Party members from among the workers, poor peasants, and soldiers join all levels of leadership in local Party and military organs. We have
paid attention to this point during the past year, and the proportion of workers
and peasants in local Party leadership has gradually increased. Soldier participation in Red Army organs at all levels is also relatively satisfactory. The only
thing we need to do is further to increase their quantity and pay attention to their
quality, so that they may take "real control," and gradually divest themselves of
petty bourgeois consciousness, becoming truly pure.

E. The Problem of the Character of Revolution

1. We agree completely with the International's resolution on China: at present, China is definitely still at the stage of bourgeois-democratic revolution.
Carrying through198 a thoroughgoing democratic revolution in China comprises,
externally, the overthrow of imperialist privileges, in order to achieve complete
national liberation and unification; internally, it comprises the elimination of the
power and influence of the comprador class in the cities, the abolition of feudal
relationships in the countryside, the completion of the agrarian revolution, and
the overthrow of the warlord system, 199 which is a metamorphosed form of the
political organization of the despotic gentry. Only in the process of such a
democratic revolution can a genuine foundation for workers' political power200
be formed, so as to advance to the socialist revolution. In the past year we have
fought in many places and are acutely aware that the revolutionary tide is ebbing
daily in the country as a whole. Although Red political power has been established in a few tiny spots, ordinary democratic rights do not yet exist throughout

194. Often on the move → Often on the move with the army
195. Consciousness → Ideology
196. Leadership → Ideological leadership
197. In the soviets → In the leading organs of the Party at all levels
198. Carrying through → The program for
199. The warlord system → Warlord power
200. Workers' political power → The transition to socialism

the country as a whole. Neither workers, nor peasants, nor even the democratic
faction among the bourgeoisie have freedom of speech or assembly. The Communist Party201 is the most heinous crime. Wherever the Red Army goes, people
are cold and aloof, and only after we have conducted propaganda do the masses
gradually come forth.202 Whatever enemy units we face, they all fight stubbornly, and there are hardly any cases of mutiny or desertion to our side. This
holds true even for the Sixth Army, which recruited the greatest number of
"rebels" after the Horse Day Incident. This cannot be called an insurrection, it is
merely contending for the country. 203 This method of contending for the country
cannot succeed. The reason for this is that there is absolutely no revolutionary
high tide in the country as a whole. The whole country is suffering the ruthless
feudal domination of the despotic gentry, and the vast forces of the oppressed
classes have not yet been set in motion. So we are reduced to contending for the
country in this cold atmosphere. We have an acute sense of our isolation, which
we keep hoping will end. Only by launching and carrying through a democratic
revolution204 in the political and economic domains, with the participation of the
petty bourgeoisie, 205 can we turn the revolution into a seething high tide that will
engulf the entire country. Consequently, the resolution of the International is
entirely correct.

2. Policy toward the Petty Bourgeoisie. Up to February of this year, this
matter was handled well in the border area. In March, the representative of the
Southern Hunan Special Committee, Zhou Lu, arrived in the border area. He
criticized us206 for not burning and killing enough, for not carrying out the policy
of "turning the petty bourgeois into proletarians and then forcing them to make
revolution." Thereupon, 207 the policy underwent a transformation. In April, after
the whole of our army arrived in the border area, there was still not much
burning and killing, but the expropriation of the middle merchants in the towns
and the collection of compulsory contributions from the small landlords and rich
peasants in the countryside were rigorously enforced. The slogan of "All factories to the workers," put forward by the Southern Hunan Special Committee, was
also given wide publicity. This excessive 208 policy of attacking the petty bourgeoisie drove most of them to the side of the despotic gentry, with the result that

201. The Communist Party → Joining the Communist Party
202. Come forth → Arise
203. Da jiangshan, literally "fighting for the rivers and mountains" (i.e., for the land
of China). The use of this expression implies an attempt to conquer the country in an
old-fashioned way, like the aspirants to the imperial throne who set out in the past from a
limited territorial base.
204. Revolution → Struggle
205. Petty bourgeoisie → Urban petty bourgeoisie
206. Criticized us → Criticized us for being too rightist
207. Thereupon → Thereupon, the original leadership of the Front Committee was
changed, and
208. Excessive → Ultraleftist

they put on white ribbons and opposed us. Recently, with the gradual change in
this policy, the situation has been steadily improving. Especially in Suichuan, relatively good results have been achieved. The small merchants in the xian town and
other market towns no longer avoid us and quite a few speak well of the Red Army.
The fairs at Gelin and Shangfeng (the fair is held at noon every three days) attract
twenty thousand people, more than ever before. This shows that our policy has
already changed. 209 As for the overthrow of the feudal exploitation of the despotic
gentry (in Suichuan the Pacification Guards imposed extremely heavy taxes; there
are five tax posts on the seventy li from Huang'ao to Caolin, which collect tax on
every kind of produce), the peasants and small merchants are all in favor of it. 210
3. The Central Committee wants us to issue a political program taking account of the interests of the petty bourgeoisie. We, for our part, propose that the
Central Committee work out a program for the entire democratic revolution,
taking account of workers' interests, the agrarian revolution, and national liberation, and that they also decide on a slogan, to be followed everywhere.
4. A peculiarity of the revolution in China, a country with a predominantly
agrarian economy, is the use of military action to develop insurrection. We
recommend that the Central Committee devote great effort to military work. The
most important form of military activity is within the enemy armies. The development of the Red Army remains secondary at present.

F. The Problem of the Independent Régime
The area stretching from northern Guangdong along the Hunan-Jiangxi border
into southern Hubei lies entirely within the Luoxiao mountain range. We have
traversed the whole range, and a comparison of its different sections shows that
the middle section, with Ninggang as its center, is the most suitable for our
independent régime. 211 The northern section has terrain which is less suitable for
our taking either the offensive or the defensive, and it is too close to the enemy's
big political centers. Unless we plan a quick seizure of Changsha or Wuhan, it is
very dangerous to station large forces in and around Liuyang, Liling, Pingxiang,
and Tonggu. The southern section has better terrain than the northern section, but
our mass base there is not so good as in the middle section, and from a political
standpoint, we cannot exert as much influence on Hunan and Jiangxi as we can
from the middle section. The middle section has the following advantages: (1) A
mass base, which we have been cultivating for over a year. (2) A fairly good
basis for the Party. 212 (3) Local armed forces which have been well tempered in

209. Has already changed → Is correct
210. The peasants and small merchants are all in favor of it → When we crushed the
Pacification Guards and abolished these tolls, we won the support of all the peasants as
well as of the small and middle merchants.
211. Independent régime → Armed independent régime
212. Party → Party organizations

battles, having been built up for more than a year-a rare achievement. With the
support of the Fourth Red Army, they will prove indestructible in the face of any
enemy force. (4) We have an excellent military base in Jinggangshan, and every
xian has its own local military bases. (5) [The middle section] can exert influence on both provinces and on the lower valleys of their rivers. This endows it
with much more political importance than that possessed by southern Hunan or
southern Jiangxi, each of which can influence only its own province or at most
the upper river valley and the hinterland of its own province. The defect of the
middle section is that, since it has long been under the independent régime, and
faces large enemy encirclement and suppression forces, its economic problems,
especially the shortage of cash, are extremely difficult.

Within a few weeks in June and July, the Southern Hunan Special Committee213 changed its mind three times about the policy214 we should adopt here.
First Yuan Desheng brought a letter and approved the plan to establish political
power in the middle section. 215 Then Du Xiujing and Yang Kaiming came with a
letter advocating that the Red Army move toward southern Hunan without the
slightest hesitation, leaving only two hundred rifles to defend the border area,
together with the Red Guards. They stated, moreover, that this was an "absolutely correct" policy. The third time Yuan Desheng came again, barely ten days
later, carrying a letter which, apart from abusing us at great length, proposed that
the Red Army go to eastern Hunan. Once again, it was stated that this was the
"absolutely correct" policy and should be carried out "without the slightest hesitation." These rigid directives put us in a truly difficult position, because failure
to comply would verge on insubordination, while we knew very clearly that
compliance would mean defeat. When the second letter arrived, the Army
Committee, the Special Committee, and the Yongxin Xian Committee held a
joint meeting. Considering that it would be dangerous to move toward southern
Hunan, they decided not to carry out the Provincial Committee's instructions. A
few days later, however, Du Xiujing and Yang Kaiming, holding to the views of
the Provincial Committee, and taking advantage of the homesickness of the
Twenty-ninth Regiment, which in turn used the Provincial directive as an excuse, dragged the Red Army off to attack Chenzhou, thus bringing defeat both to
the border area and to the Red Army. The Red Army lost about half its
fighting strength. 216 Countless houses were burned down, and countless people
were killed in the border area. One xian after another fell to the enemy, and some
of them have not been recovered even now. As for going to eastern Hunan, it
was certainly not advisable for the main force of the Red Army to do so at a time

213. Southern Hunan Special Committee → Hunan Provincial Committee
214. Policy Plan of action
215. The middle section → The middle section of the Luoxiao mountain range.
216. Regarding these events of June and July, and the letters brought by the emissaries
from the Hunan Provincial Committee, see also the Introduction to this volume.

when there was as yet no split within the political power of the despotic gentry class
in Hunan, Hubei, and Jiangxi. Had we not advanced on southern Hunan in July, we
would not only have avoided the August defeat in the border area; we could have
taken advantage of the fighting at Zhangshu217 between Cheng Qian's218 Sixth
Army and Wan Jun, routed the enemy troops in Yongxin, and swept through
Ji'an and Anfu, thus enabling our vanguard to reach Pingxiang and make contact
with the Fifth Army in the northern section. Even if all that had happened, the
proper place for our general headquarters would still have been Ninggang, and
only guerrilla forces should have been sent to eastern Hunan. Since war had not
broken out among the despotic gentry, and powerful enemy forces were still
present in Pingxiang, Chaling, and Youxian on the Hunan border, if the main
force had moved north, the enemy would certainly have taken advantage of it. The
Central Committee told us to go to eastern or to southern Hunan, but either course
was very dangerous. Although the decision to go to eastern Hunan was not carried
out, we do have the experience of southern Hunan. One false move, and the
whole chess game is lost. The Fifth Army suffered defeat for loss of contact
between the border area in southern Hunan and Pingxiang and Liuyang. Anyuan
also suffered setbacks. We should always remember this painful experience.

We are now in a period when the despotic gentry class is not yet split, and the
suppression forces of the enemy deployed around the border area number more
than ten regiments. If we can continue to find ways of getting cash (food and
clothing no longer constitute a big problem), then with the foundations for our
work established in the border area, we shall be able to cope with these enemy
forces, or even with larger ones. As far as the border area is concerned, it would
at once suffer devastation, just as it did in August, if the Red Army moved away.
Although not all our Red Guards would be wiped out, the Party and our mass
base would receive a crippling blow. Apart from bandit-style bases in the mountains, of which the independent régime could still maintain a few, in the plains
we would all have to go underground as we did in August and September. If the
Red Army remains, it can expand gradually in all directions from its current
base, and the prospects will be very bright. If we want to enlarge the Red Army,
the only tactic is to engage the enemy in a prolonged struggle in the vicinity of
the Jinggangshan (that is to say, in the four xian of Ninggang, Yongxin, Lingxian, and Suichuan), where we have a good mass base. We must take advantage
in this struggle of the conflicting interests of the enemy troops from Hunan and
Jiangxi, and of their inability to concentrate their forces because they must
defend themselves on all sides, and wage a long-term struggle against the enemy.
We must employ advantageous219 tactics, fight no battle unless we can win it, be
victorious every time we fight, capture arms and men, and thus gradually expand

217. Zhangshu → Zhangshu in Jiangxi Province
218. Cheng Qian's → The Guomindang's
219. Advantageous → Correct

the Red Army. Considering the preparatory work that had already been done
among the masses of the border area between April and June, there is not the
slightest doubt that the Red Army could have been enlarged in August if its main
force had not gone off to southern Hunan. Despite that mistake, the Red Army
has returned to the border area, where the terrain is favorable and the people well
disposed, and our prospects are still not bad. In a place like the border area, it is only
by being resolved to fight, and by fighting with indomitable courage, that the Red
Army can expand its arsenal and train good soldiers; apart from this, there is no
other effective method. The red flag has already been flying in the border area for a
year now. Although it has incurred the bitter hatred of the despotic gentry class in
Hunan, Hubei, and Jiangxi, and indeed in the whole country, it has gradually aroused
hope among the workers, peasants, and soldiers of the neighboring provinces. As
regards the soldiers, the warlords are treating "bandit suppression" as a matter of
major importance and are putting out propaganda favorable to us such as "a year has
been spent and a million yuan used up in the effort to eradicate the bandits" (Lu
Diping), or even "they have twenty thousand men and five thousand guns" (Wang
Jun). Because of this propaganda favorable to us, the attention of enemy soldiers
and of junior officers with no prospects is gradually being drawn to us, and more and
more of them will defect to our side, thus providing another source of recruitment for
the Red Army. The uninterrupted presence of the Red flag on the border is an
indication not only of the strength of the Communist Party but also of the bankruptcy
of the ruling class, and is of great nationwide political significance. Therefore, our
contingent plan to use "southern Jiangxi as a retreat" will not be put into effect
unless our economic situation worsens to such a degree that southern Jiangxi becomes the only place where we could survive. We might have to go there some time;
but it would be entirely for economic rather than political reasons. Politically speaking, we have held from the very beginning that the strategy of creating and expanding political power in the middle section of the Luoxiao mountain range is absolutely
necessary and correct.

G. Communications and Other Matters

1. It is of crucial importance to establish an organ in charge of communication.
Two hundred yuan (four liang220 of gold) has been entrusted to Comrades Yuan and
Xiao, who will be in full charge of establishing this organ. Necessary expenses will
be met by us. The organ will be located in Pingxiang. Another such organ is also
required in the Ji'an area; the Jiangxi Provincial Committee will be responsible for it.
2. When we had almost finished writing this letter, we received a letter from
the Central Committee. The copy from Hunan includes Notice No. 47 (on secret
organizations), although it still does not contain the resolution on military affairs. In addition, there is also Comrade Runxian's August 15 letter, stating that a

220. One liang or Chinese ounce (sometimes referred to as a tael) is equivalent to
approximately 1.3 ounces avoirdupois.

messenger had been sent to deliver the Central Committee's letter and notice, but we
have never received either of them. We did not receive the three poems either. 221
3. We have ready access to newspapers now. We are a lot happier than before,
when we could not get hold of a paper for two or three months at a stretch. We still
hope, however, that you will regularly send us analyses of the political situation.
4. The August southern expedition army held a representatives' conference
on arrival at Shatian in Guidong. It resolved to ask the Provincial Committee to
punish Du Xiujing for his mistakes, since he is the representative of the Provincial Committee.
5. The Front Committee approves completely Mao Zedong's long letter of
August to the Provincial Committee, which is to be forwarded to the Central
Committee.222 Comrade Yuan will again be the messenger.
6. It is only now that Comrade Yuan Desheng is returning to the Provincial
Committee, because he was waiting for the completion of the discussion of the
letter from the Central Committee and our reply.
7. We earnestly request that future directives from higher levels223 should be
based on our reports, rather than on inspectors' biased reports. 224 The inspector
who came here in June, Du Xiujing, made his report to the Provincial Committee
from a completely false standpoint (two hundred guns plus the Red Guards were
enough to defend the independent régime in the border area; the Red Army at
that time was conservative, and so on), and since the Provincial Committee
decided to act in accordance with that kind of report, defeat was sure to follow.
In addition, future directives from higher levels regarding military action must,
above all, not be too rigid. The Central Committee's letter is the most appropriate and leaves us room for maneuver, as it orders us to take independent decisions based on current situations. Even more disastrous was that the Hunan
Provincial Committee and Southern Hunan Special Committee believed in the

221. The letter of August 15 from "Comrade Runxian" (code name for the Hunan
Provincial Committee), and the three poems mentioned here, are not included in the
available documentary collections. Circular No. 47, on reorganization of the Party under
the White terror and developing secret work, can be found in Central Committee Documents (1928), pp. 200-208. It stresses that secret work is carried out, not to shield the Party
from danger, but to enable it to fulfill more effectively its mission of leading the masses. More
than 80 percent of Party members in the countryside should be farm laborers, sharecroppers,
and handicraftsmen. Owner-peasants and intellectuals should be kept under observation.
222. This letter appears above, in this volume.
223. The Chinese term xiongchu, literally "elder-brother department," was commonly
used at the time for any hierarchical superior; here, the reference is in the first instance to
the Central Committee.
224. In fact, by the time Mao produced this report, the Central Committee had already
sent, in September or October 1928, another letter to him and Zhu De asserting that,
despite some errors of detail, the instructions of the Hunan Provincial Committee, including the order to march to southern Hunan, had all been "extremely correct." For further
text, see Central Committee Documents (1928), pp. 661-81.

rumors spread by Su Xianjun (a regimental commander expelled from the Party
by us, who was a criminal army deserter and informer who later arrested Guo
Liang) and He Jie (chief of staff, responsible for the burning and massacre at
Chenzhou). Please do not listen to any more irresponsible words in the future.
8. Yang Kaiming is seriously ill. Wan Xixian is kept here by important tasks
and cannot come to southern Hunan.

9. The Special Committee of the Youth League will report to the Provincial
Committee regarding the state of the Youth League. We will not weary you with
it here.

10. There are three copies of this letter. The Hunan Provincial Committee is
to forward one to the Central Committee and one to the Jiangxi Provincial
Committee. The Ji'an Xian Committee is to forward one copy to the Jiangxi
Provincial Committee, which is to forward it to the Central Committee. Thus one
copy should certainly arrive.

Front Committee
Mao Zedong, Secretary

--- Notes

2. December 2 is a misprint; the correct date, given in a number of sources, is November 2. For the full text of the letter, see "Zhongyang zhi Zhu De, Mao Zedong bing qianwei
xin" (Letter of the Central Committee to Mao Zedong and Zhu De, and to the Front
Committee), in Central Committee Documents, Vol. 4, pp. 239-57.

3. Tan Zhenlin (1902-1983) was born in Yuxian in Eastern Hunan, not far from the
Jinggangshan. He worked in bookstores and in the printing trade from the age of 12 and
joined the Communist Party in 1926. He participated in the Autumn Harvest Uprising


44. The reference is to the Guangzhou commune of December 1927, the Autumn
Harvest Uprising of September 1927 in Hunan, and the uprising in the spring of 1928 in
southern Hunan. Mao may also have been thinking of events in the early summer of 1927
documented in Volume II of this edition.