On the basis of the above six practical reasons, we conclude that, before a
new war among the warlords breaks out, we cannot leave Ninggang, Yongxin,
and Lianhua for southern Hunan. As soon as the bases here are somewhat consolidated, and there are some good opportunities elsewhere, the Fourth Red
Army can leave Chaling, Youxian, and Liuyang to take part in the general
insurrection in Hunan. In the meantime, every effort must be made to maintain
the network of communication with Hunan, so that the two sides can correspond
with each other and cooperate to show our strength.
We beg the Provincial Committee to give further consideration to the above
opinions and to make new decisions according to the present situation. Such is
our hope. Please allow us to present the detailed reports about the army and the
local situation later.
Border Area Special Committee
Army Committee of the Fourth Red Army
City of Yongxin, July 4
Letter of the Special Committee of
the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Area to the
Hunan Provincial Committee
(August 1928)
Hunan Provincial Committee:
1. Comrade Du [Xiujing] has arrived and we have read the letter. The Army
Committee here called an Enlarged Session on May 30, at which Comrade Du
made a report on the political situation and read out the letter of the Provincial
Committee. The Enlarged Session accepted the letter without reservation and
attached great importance to Comrade Du's report, which synthesizes the lessons
of the actual struggle in various places. The things that are mentioned in the
letter of the Provincial Committee and call for an explanation are as follows: A.
Actual strength.
To pool the Red efforts in the south and east of Hunan and
those in the west of Jiangxi by means of guerrilla warfare depends solely on
strength, but a reconnaissance of the enemy situation should be made before
arriving at a decision on the action to be taken. B. We also agree that it is a
mistake to organize a small group of people with few arms into independent
regiments or battalions, but this has never been practiced here. C. Our [forces]
here consist of troops under Zhu and Mao and a peasant army from southern
Hunan. Now the southern Hunan peasant army has gone to operate in its home
area. Originally it was established as the X Division; afterward, this was changed
to the X Regiment.¹ Division headquarters have now been abolished, and army
headquarters set up to exercise direct command.
2. The Provincial Committee points out that it is wrong to burn cities. We
shall never commit this mistake again.
3. The Party has been formally organized throughout the army, the form of
organization being modeled on that of the Party in the Guomindang Revolutionary Army.
5. We will make great efforts to transform the army and cleanse it of the
lumpenproletariat.
6. We made a plan long ago to abolish the wage system for the soldiers, but
in fact the life of the soldiers is very difficult. Soldiers who bear such hardships
and stand such hard work are really hard to come by.
7. Please send a large number of Anyuan miners to serve in our army.
8. The Provincial Committee has nominated Zedong as chairman of the
Army Committee which has just been established. This seems unnecessary, because local work here is in more urgent need of hands. The Army Committee has
not been completely organized yet. The secretary is Comrade Chen Yi. This
instruction has not been carried out.
9. The Southern Hunan Special Committee has moved with the army to Zixin
and will go to Hengyang via Anren. The responsible person from Yichen has
returned....
Jinggangshan
(To the Tune of "Moon over the West River")¹
(Autumn 1928)

At the foot of the mountain, our flags and banners can be seen,
At its peak our drums and bugles are heard to respond.
The enemy troops besiege us thousands strong,
We stand alone and will not be moved.

Already our defense was like a stern fortress,
Now do our united wills form yet a stronger wall.
The roar of gunfire rises from Huangyangjie,²
Announcing the enemy has fled in the night.

Draft Resolution of the Second Congress
of Xian Party Organizations in the
Hunan-Jiangxi Border Area¹
(Buyunshan Mountain, Ninggang Xian, October 5, 1928)

I. Political Problems and Tasks of the Party Organizations
in the Border Area
A. The Internal and External Political Situation

The present rule of the new warlords of the Guomindang remains the rule of the
comprador class in the cities and the despotic gentry in the countryside. Abroad,
it has capitulated to imperialism, and at home, it has replaced the old warlords by
new ones, imposing even more savage economic exploitation and political oppression on the workers and peasants. The bourgeois-democratic revolution
launched from Guangdong had gone only halfway when the compradors and
despotic gentry seized the leadership and immediately shifted it to the road of
counterrevolution. The workers, peasants, other common people, and even the
bourgeoisie of the whole country are still subject to counterrevolutionary rule
and have not secured the slightest bit of political or economic emancipation.
Before the capture of Beijing and Tianjin, the four cliques of new
Guomindang warlords-Chiang Kaishek, the Guangxi warlords,² Feng

Yuxiang,³ and Yan Xishan⁴—had concluded a temporary alliance against Zhang
Zuolin.⁵ As soon as these cities were captured, the alliance immediately broke
up, giving way to a situation of acute struggle among the four cliques, and now a
war is brewing between Chiang and the Guangxi clique.⁶ The contradictions and
struggles among the various warlord cliques within China reflect the contradictions and struggles among the imperialist powers. Consequently,⁷ under no circumstances can there be a compromise, and all compromises can only be
temporary. A temporary compromise today prepares the ground for a bigger war
tomorrow.

China is in urgent need of a bourgeois-democratic revolution, and this revolution can be carried through only under the leadership of the proletariat. In the
1926⁸ revolution, which started from Guangdong and spread toward the Yangzi,
because the proletariat failed to exercise its hegemony resolutely, and leadership
was seized by the compradors and despotic gentry, there was a change in the
nature of the revolution.⁹ As a result, the bourgeois-democratic revolution met
with a historic¹⁰ defeat. Broadly speaking, this defeat was similar to that of the

chief subordinates Huang Shaohong and Bai Chongxi, established control over the whole
of Guangxi. In 1926, he rallied to the Guomindang, and his forces became part of the
National Revolutionary Army. Li played a major role in the victories of the Northern
Expedition, and in the final drive on Beijing in June 1928.
7. Here the words "as long as the situation persists in which China is divided among
the imperialist powers" have been inserted in the Selected Works version.
8. 1926 → 1926–1927
9. There was a change in the nature of the revolution → Revolution was replaced by
counterrevolution.
10. A historic → A temporary

Russian Revolution in 1905. The Chinese proletariat and peasantry suffered a
heavy blow in this defeat, and the Chinese bourgeoisie (but not the compradors
and despotic gentry) suffered similar blows. Yet in the last few months, organized strikes in the cities and uprisings in the countryside, by the workers and
peasants under the leadership of the Communist Party, have developed both in
the north and in the south. Hunger and cold are creating great unrest among the
soldiers of the warlord armies. Meanwhile, the bourgeoisie, led¹¹ by the
clique of Wang Jingwei and Chen Gongbo, 12 is promoting a campaign of
considerable proportions in favor of nationalism and people's rights and
against imperialism, warlords, and the compradors and despotic gentry, 13
everywhere in coastal areas and along the Yangzi. This campaign is a new
development; as regards its nature, it is part of the democratic revolution
China urgently needs.

China's democratic revolution, according to the instructions from the International and the Central Committee, consists in overthrowing the rule of imperialism and its warlord tools in China, so as to complete the national revolution, and
carrying out the agrarian revolution, thereby eliminating the feudal exploitation
of the peasants by the despotic gentry. Such a revolutionary movement has been
growing daily since the Ji'nan Massacre in May. 14

The situation in China has undergone tremendous changes in the last few
months, and the same is true of the international situation. Since the two developments represented by Japan's invasion of China, and the signing of the naval treaty
between Britain and France have taken place, America, on the one hand, and
Britain, France, and Japan, on the other, have found themselves polarized in
positions of irreconcilable opposition. The present international situation is that,
on questions touching China and Europe, the United States has adopted a policy
of active intervention, while Britain, France, and Japan have adopted a policy of
active resistance. Thus a world war is brewing, and its outbreak is merely a
matter of time.

11. Led → Urged on
13. Campaign... despotic gentry → Reformist movement
14. The massacre at Ji'nan (Tsinan in contemporary English-language sources) took
place while Chiang Kaishek and his armies were passing through the city in the direction
of Beijing, in the course of the Northern Expedition. Japan had sent troops there, ostensibly to protect her citizens residing in Ji'nan. Despite the conciliatory attitude of Chiang
Kaishek, clashes occurred, and when an ultimatum from the Japanese commander was not
immediately complied with, a Japanese offensive was launched on May 8. In three days of
fighting, thousands of Chinese soldiers and civilians were killed, in what proved to be the
first in a series of "incidents" leading to full-scale war between the two countries.

The prolonged existence inside a country of one or more small areas under Red
political power, surrounded on all sides by White political power, is something
which has never occurred anywhere else in the world. There are special reasons
for the emergence of this curious thing. Moreover, it can exist and develop only
under certain conditions. First, it cannot occur in any imperialist country, or in
any colony under direct imperialist rule. It necessarily takes place in economically backward and semicolonial China, which is under indirect imperialist rule.
For this strange phenomenon can occur only in conjunction with another strange
phenomenon, namely, war within the White régime. The most remarkable feature of semicolonial China consists in the incessant wars among the various
factions of old and new warlords within the country, supported by the compradors and despotic gentry, 16 since the very first year of the Republic. Such a
phenomenon is not to be found in any of the imperialist countries, nor in any of
the colonies under direct imperialist rule. It occurs solely in China, which is
under indirect imperialist rule. There are two reasons for the emergence of this
phenomenon: a localized agricultural economy (not a unified capitalist economy)
and the policy of the imperialist forces to divide and exploit through spheres of
influence. Because of the prolonged splits and wars among the White political
forces, one or several small areas of Red political power have come into existence surrounded on all sides by White political power. 17 The independent
régime on the borders of Hunan and Jiangxi is one of many such small areas. In
difficult and critical times, some comrades often have doubts as to the survival of
such Red political power and manifest negative tendencies. 18 This is because
they fail to find the correct explanation for the development and existence of
such Red political power. If only we know that splits and wars among the White
political forces will continue without interruption, we will have no doubts about
the emergence, survival, and daily growth of Red political power. Second, the
places in China where small areas under Red political power have come into
existence and lasted for a relatively long time are definitely not those unaffected
by the democratic revolution, such as Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, or the northern
provinces, but only regions like Hunan, Guangdong, Hubei and Jiangxi, where

15. Here, and throughout this text, "Soviet political power" (suweiai zhengquan) has
been replaced by "Red political power" (hongse zhengquan).
16. Compradors and despotic gentry → Imperialism and the compradors and despotic
gentry within the country
17. One or several small areas of Red political power have come into existence surrounded on all sides by White political power → The conditions have been created for the
emergence and survival of one or more small Red areas under the leadership of the
Communist Party amid the encirclement of the White political power.
18. Negative tendencies → Pessimistic feelings

the masses of workers, peasants and soldiers rose in great numbers in the course
of the bourgeois-democratic revolution two years ago.19 In many parts of these
provinces, trade unions and peasant associations were organized on a wide scale,
and many economic and political struggles were waged by the worker and peasant classes against the urban and rural bourgeoisie.20 As a result, an urban soviet
régime21 lasting three days emerged in Guangzhou, while independent peasant
régimes existed in Haifeng and Lufeng, in eastern and southern Hunan, in the
Hunan-Jiangxi Border Area, and in Huang'an, Hubei. As for the emergence of
the present-day Red Army, it can only be a split-off from the National Revolutionary Army, which underwent democratic political training and came under the
influence of the masses of the workers and peasants. Armies such as those of
Yan Xishan and Zhang Zuolin, which have received no political training at all
and have never come under the influence of the workers and peasants, cannot
possibly give rise to elements that can serve to constitute a Red Army. Third,
whether it is possible for the worker-peasant-soldier soviet political power22 in
small areas to "survive for a long time" hinges on whether or not the nationwide revolutionary situation continues to move forward. If it does, then not
only will the small areas under Red political power undoubtedly survive for a
long time, but they will definitely become one of the many forces contributing to the seizure of overall political power. If the revolution does not continue to move forward in the country as a whole, but stagnates for a fairly
long period of time, as in the case of Russia from 1905 to 1917, then longterm survival of the small areas under Red political power will be impossible.
What, then, is the situation of the Chinese revolution? In reality, it is continuing to develop along with the continuous splits and wars within the ranks of
the domestic bourgeoisie23 and the international bourgeoisie. Therefore not only
will the small areas under Red political power undoubtedly last for a long time, but
they will continue to develop and gradually approach the seizure of overall political
power. Fourth, the existence of a regular Red Army of adequate strength is a necessary condition for the existence of Red political power. If we had only Red Guards
of a local character, but no regular Red Army, we could deal only with the household militia,24 but not with the White armies. Consequently, even if there were the
most excellent worker and peasant masses, without adequate armed forces,25 it
would still be absolutely impossible to create an independent régime, let alone a
durable and constantly developing independent régime. It follows that the idea of

19. Two years ago → Of 1926 and 1927
20. Urban and rural bourgeoisie → The landlords and despotic gentry and the bourgeoisie
21. An urban soviet régime → A régime of the masses
22. Worker-peasant-soldier soviet political power → Political power of the popular
masses
23. Domestic bourgeoisie → The compradors and despotic gentry within the country
24. On the "household militia" (aihutuan), see the note to the text of June 18, 1928.
25. Armed forces → Regular armed forces

"establishing independent régimes of the workers and peasants by armed force" is an
important one, that must be fully assimilated by the Communist Party, and by the
masses of the workers and peasants in areas under the independent régimes. Fifth, in
addition to the above-mentioned conditions, there is another important prerequisite
for the long-term existence and development of the Red political power, namely, that
the Communist Party's organization must be strong, and its policy correct.

C. The Independent Régime in the Border Area
and the August Defeat

The splits and wars among the warlords have weakened the ability of the White
régime to rule. Thus opportunities have been provided for the rise of Red political
power in small areas. But fighting among the warlords does not go on every day
without ceasing. Whenever the White political power in one or more provinces
enjoys temporary stability, the ruling class of one province, or an alliance of the
ruling classes of several provinces, will surely exert every effort to destroy Red
political power. In areas where all the conditions for Red political power are not
completely met, it will assuredly be overthrown by them.26 That is why Red political
régimes emerging at favorable moments before last April in many small areas such
as Guangzhou, Hailufeng, the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Area, southern Hunan, Liling,
and Huang'an, were crushed one after another by the White political power. From
April onward, the independent régime in the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Area was confronted with a situation in which the ruling forces in the south were enjoying temporary stability. The troops sent by the two provinces of Hunan and Jiangxi to
annihilate us were always more than eight or nine regiments, and at times as many as
fifteen.27 Yet with a force of less than four regiments we fought the enemy for four
long months, daily enlarging the territory under our independent régime, deepening
the agrarian revolution, extending the soviet organizations, and strengthening the
Red Army and the Red Guards. This was possible because the policies of the Party
organizations (local and army) in the border area were correct. The policies of the
Border Area Special Committee and the Army Committee of the Party at that time
were as follows: Struggle resolutely against the enemy, set up political power in the
middle section of the Luoxiao mountain range, and oppose escapist defeatism;
deepen the agrarian revolution in areas under the independent régime; let the army
Party organizations promote the development of local Party organizations, and let
the regular army foster the development of local armed forces; concentrate the Red
Army units so as to deal at opportune moments with the enemy confronting them,
and oppose the division of forces to avoid being wiped out28 one by one; adopt

26. In areas where all the conditions for Red political power are not completely met, it
will assuredly be overthrown by them → In areas where all the necessary conditions for its
establishment and persistence are not fulfilled, Red political power is in danger of being
overthrown by the enemy.
27. Fifteen → Eighteen
28. Wiped out → Wiped out by the enemy

the policy of expanding the area under the independent régime in a series of
waves, and oppose adventurist tactics. Thanks to the appropriateness of these
tactics, to a terrain in the border area which was favorable to our struggle, and
to the inadequate coordination between the troops invading from Hunan and
those from Jiangxi, we were able to win victory on so many occasions in the
four months from April through July. The enemy, though many times stronger
than we were, was not only unable to destroy our independent régime but also
lent an impetus29 to its daily expansion, and our régime tended to exert an
ever-growing influence on the two provinces of Hunan and Jiangxi. The August
defeat resulted entirely from the failure to understand30 that the period was one
of temporary stability for the ruling classes and from the adoption of a strategy
suited to a time of political splits among the ruling classes, dividing our troops
for a rash advance, and thus bringing about a defeat both in the border area and
in southern Hunan. Comrade Du Xiujing, the representative of the Provincial
Committee, 31 did not investigate the actual situation and paid no attention to the
resolution passed at the Joint Conference of the Special Committee, the Army
Committee, and the Yongxin Xian Committee [on May 20, 1928]. He simply
applied formalistically the orders from the Hunan Provincial Committee and
fell in with the action32 of the Twenty-ninth Regiment, which wanted to evade
struggle and return home. His error was truly a grave one. 33

D. The Role of the Border-Area Independent Régime in the
Worker-Peasant Insurrections in Hunan, Hubei, and Jiangxi Provinces

The significance of the armed independent régime of the workers and peasants in
the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Area, with Ninggang as its center, is assuredly not
confined to the few xian in the border area; this régime has a very great role to
play in the process of worker and peasant insurrection to seize political power in
Hunan, Hubei, and Jiangxi. To extend the influence of the agrarian revolution
and of the soviet political power in the border area to the lower reaches of the
rivers in Hunan and Jiangxi and even as far as Hubei; constantly to expand the
Red Army and to enhance its quality through struggle, so that it will be able to
carry out its necessary mission in the coming general insurrection in the three
provinces; to enlarge the local armed forces in the various xian, that is, the Red
Guards and the worker-peasant insurrection detachments, and improve their
quality, so that they are able now to fight the household militia and small armed
units and will be capable in future of safeguarding the political power of the

29. Lent an impetus → Was unable to prevent
30. The failure to understand → The failure of some of the comrades to understand
31. Provincial Committee → Hunan Provincial Committee
32. Action → Views
33. Here the Selected Works text adds the following sentence: "The situation arising
from this defeat was salvaged as a result of the corrective measures taken by the Special
Committee and the Army Committee of the Party after September."

border area; gradually to reduce the dependence of personnel34 on the assistance
of Red Army workers, so that the border area will be completely self-reliant and
will not only have its own personnel to take charge of work there but will even
be able to provide personnel for the Red Army and the expanded territory of the
independent régime such are the tasks of extreme importance for the border
area Party organizations, in connection with the insurrection unfolding in the
three provinces of Hunan, Hubei, and Jiangxi.

E. Economic Problems

The shortage of daily necessities and cash has become a very serious problem35
inside the White encirclement. Because of the tight enemy blockade, daily necessities such as salt, cloth, and medicine have been very scarce and dear in the
territory of the independent soviet régime in the border area throughout the
whole of the past year. As a result, the lives of the masses of the workers,
peasants, and petty bourgeoisie, as well as of the masses of the soldiers of the
Red Army have been disrupted, sometimes to an extreme degree. The Red Army
has to fight and provision itself at the same time. It even lacks funds to pay the
daily food allowance of five cents per person;36 the soldiers are undernourished,
many are ill, and the wounded in hospitals suffer even more. Such difficulties
are, of course, unavoidable before the nationwide seizure of political power. It is,
however, urgently necessary to overcome them to some degree, that is, to make
life a little easier and, in particular, to secure more adequate supplies for the Red
Army. Unless the Party in the border area can find appropriate methods for
coping with the economic problems, the future of the independent régime will be
filled with difficulties if the stability of the enemy forces lasts for a relatively
long period. A proper solution of these economic problems truly deserves the
attention of every Party member.

F. The Problem of Military Bases

There is yet another task facing the Party in the border area, namely, to consolidate the two military bases of Five Wells and Jiulong. Five Wells, 37 at the
juncture of the four xian of Yongxin, Lingxian, Ninggang, and Suichuan, and
Jiulong, 38 at the juncture of the four xian of Yongxin, Ninggang, Chaling, and
Lianhua, both have topographical advantages; not only are they important military bases for the border area at present but they will remain among the import-

34. Personnel → Local personnel
35. Serious problem → Serious problem for the army and the people
36. Here the Selected Works text adds: "... which is provided in addition to grain."
37. Five Wells → The Five Wells mountain district
38. Jiulong → The Jiulong mountain district

ant military bases for the future insurrections in the three provinces of Hunan,
Hubei, and Jiangxi. This is particularly true of Five Wells, where we have the
popular masses,39 as well as a terrain that is especially difficult and strategically
important. The way to consolidate these bases is, first, to build up a system of
defense; second, to store a sufficient amount of grain; and third, to set up relatively good Red Army hospitals. The Party in the border area must devote the
utmost efforts to the effective completion of these three tasks.

II. The Transformation of the Party in the Xian of
the Border Area and Some Recommendations40

The Special Committee of the Border Area was founded only four months ago.
During this short period of time, it has done a great deal in leading the Workers'
and Peasants' Red Army in tasks such as carrying out the "land revolution,"
"establishing the Soviets," and striking devastating blows at the old society.
Nevertheless, because of the rural economic environment of the border area,
because the history of the Party is very short, and because there have been very
few independent struggles (since there is the Red Army to rely on), the tendency
toward a peasant party marked by an opportunist heritage is frightfully apparent
in every Party branch at all levels in the Border Area. It is an important responsibility
of every Party branch from now on to point out all the past errors within the party,
eliminate the evil legacy of opportunism within the Party, reform the Party branches
at all levels, and cause the Party to take the road of true proletarian leadership.

The Party has not yet been set up in Youxian. The influence of the Party in
the other xian can only reach most or part of those xian. Strong central districts41
have not been set up, nor has the Party extended its influence to the broad masses
in every direction. Hence it is also an important responsibility of Party branches
in the Border Area from now on to set up a Party branch in Youxian and strong
central districts in every xian, and establish a foundation for the Party in every xian.

A. The Past Mistakes of the Party

1. In the past the evil legacy of opportunism has been excessively strong in
the Party in every xian, and we have relied on the army rather than leading an
independent struggle of the masses. This has been a very great error.

39. Popular masses → Support of the popular masses
40. As indicated above, in the source note, Part II of this text, amounting to more than
half of the whole, is omitted not only from the official Selected Works, but from all other
previously available versions. Because this passage is so long, we have not set it in italics,
as has been done in the case of all other passages deleted by Mao in 1950.
41. Zhongxin qu, here translated "central districts," were temporary Party organs set
up in the fluid and rapidly changing circumstances prevailing at the time, in places where
the strength of the Party was insufficient to justify establishing xian-level organizations.

2. In the past, the Party in every xian had strongly marked characteristics of a
peasant party, and showed a tendency to evolve toward non-proletarian leadership. The Party in Yongxin wanted to break away publicly from the special
committee and set up an "independent kingdom." The other xian, such as
Ning[gang], Ling[xian], Lian[hua] and so on also paid no attention to reporting
to the Special Committee and thereby forming a connection with it. These were
all serious organizational errors.

3. In the past, in the early period, the Party organs were all individual dictatorships, autocracies of the Party secretary; there was no collective leadership or
democratic spirit whatsoever. For instance, Mao Zedong was the only member of
the Special Committee, and Liu Zhen was the only member of the Party committee of Yongxin xian. In practice, this led to the error that the masses knew only
the individual but not the Party. This is absolutely not a Bolshevik Party. Although this mistake was forcefully pointed out at the Emergency Conference, 42
and there are always three Standing Committee members supervising the work
of the Special Committee, it is still impossible to set up the various departments
and the Secretariat because of the shortage of personnel. In addition, many
people working for the Special Committee are ill. Politics is constantly changing,
the relationship between the Party committees of the various xian and the Special
Committee cannot become intimate, and as a result, the Special Committee itself
opposes the instructions from the general headquarters at various levels, and has
not tried its best to carry out the decisions of the Emergency Conference.

4. Most of the leading organs are headed by petty bourgeois intellectuals, and
not enough attention is paid to promoting people of worker and peasant background to serve on the leading organs.

5. In the expansion of the Party organization in the past, attention was paid
exclusively to quantitative development, rather than to improving the quality.
Party and class were not clearly distinguished, and press-ganging was the only
method of recruitment employed. This will ruin the Party organization, and as a
result the Party will become incapable of struggle.

6. In the past the Party neglected the basic organization the branch.

7. In the past, the Party's method of work was wrong. The authority for
dealing with every problem concerning the Party should be concentrated in the
Standing Committee, and in the Organization Department, the Propaganda Department . . . , and so on, which are after all the technical departments of the
Standing Committee. In the Party in the Border Area, however, not only is power
not concentrated in the Standing Committee, but there is not even an organization department. It is merely a matter of the autocracy of the Party secretary.

42. The reference is not to the August 7, 1927, conference, but to the emergency
conference called by Mao in mid-August 1928 at Jiupi in Yongxin xian, when Yuan
Desheng brought a letter from the Hunan Provincial Committee demanding that the Red
Army immediately march toward eastern Hunan. (See above, the brief account of this
meeting in the Introduction.)

After the Emergency Conference, things in the Special Committee itself and in
the Party committee of Yongxin xian improved a bit (all work is decided by the
standing committee). The Party organizations at various levels below the Special
Committee still suffer, however, from the same defects, and have not corrected
these errors at all.

8. In the past the Party in the various xian of the Border Area paid much too
little attention to secret work, to the point where quite a large number of Party
members did not understand secret work. When taking political power, they
made everything public; when they lost power, they would simply "lie in ambush."

9. In our work in the past, the upper levels were always separated from the
lower levels, nor did the upper levels satisfactorily inspect and supervise the
lower levels. The Party only paid attention to the work in the various organs, and
committed the error of separating itself from the masses.

10. In the past the Party paid very little attention to the work in the urban
areas, and to the workers' movement.

11. In the past the Special Committee only paid attention to military dispositions, for example, to the work in the two xian of Ninggang and Yongxin. It did
not take account of the whole, to the extent that it became a subsidiary of the
army. If the army took a certain xian, it would begin to pay attention to the work
there; if the army did not reach a certain xian, the work in that xian would be
ignored.

12. In the past the Party slighted the work of the Youth League to an extreme
degree, or even displayed a tendency to eliminate the Youth League.

B. Transforming and Building the Party From Now on

1. The Party must be thoroughly transformed, starting with the transformation of the branches, eliminating opportunist leadership both in organization and
in policy.

2. The Special Committee and the xian committees should each have at
least four inspectors. They should regularly guide the work at the lower levels,
and aid in the transformation of Party organizations at all levels.

3. Do your utmost to promote as many worker comrades as possible to leading
organs. Executive committees and standing committees at every level should have
more than half worker and peasant comrades participating. In promoting worker and
peasant elements, we should pay special attention to the significance of education.

4. The party organs at every level must be fully organized, and individual
leadership must be opposed. All power should be concentrated in the standing
committee, while the various departments are the technical organs.

5. In the course of transforming the Party, we must adopt a completely
proletarian point of view. We must make the utmost efforts to pay attention to
discussing and carrying out the new policies of the Party. We must resolutely

[distance ourselves] from the petty-bourgeois, liberal, independent, and romantic
elements in the Party's past, and be strictly on guard against the tendency to form
"independent kingdoms."

6. The Party should extend democratization to the highest possible degree.
Every policy should be discussed enthusiastically and understood thoroughly by
the Party members, so that the mass of Party members will be able to establish
their work plans in accordance with the policies. The Party committee members
as well as the secretaries at every level should be chosen by the method of
elections.

7. Party members should consist of progressive, conscious, loyal, and courageous poor workers and peasants; strict limits should be set on petty-bourgeois
elements, intellectuals, and rich peasants.

8. In the development of the Party, special attention should be paid to quality. When introducing Party members, the sponsors should do a lot of propaganda work toward, and investigation work about, those being introduced.
Whenever a new comrade is introduced, he should be approved at a Party branch
meeting, and then endorsed by the district committee. We oppose the press-gang
method of recruiting Party members. We must make sure that every Party member is a proletarian fighter. The Party organization must not seek to become
universal, but should pay special attention to creating the basis for a strong Party
in the central districts.

9. The Party should pay attention to its basic organization-the branch, and
put into practice the slogan "All of our work depends finally on the branch." At
the same time, special attention should be paid to branch work in the urban areas,
and excellent worker comrades should also be promoted to become branch Party
secretaries and committee members in the rural areas, so as to increase the
leadership capacity of the workers and be strictly on guard against the tendency
toward a peasant party. We must choose progressive elements among the Party
members in the rural areas, and give them special training, so as to prepare them
to become the backbone of the Party.

10. The organization of the Party should be absolutely secret. Every Party
member in every Party organization at every level should make the utmost effort
to pay attention to secret work. We oppose relying on military and political
strength to organize the Party. The Party should be organized secretly within the
area controlled by the enemy group; fleeing and "lying in ambush" should be
opposed.

11. The Special Committee should pay the utmost attention to the soundness
of its own organization, as well as that of every xian committee. The Youxian
Xian Committee should be set up at once, and there should be overall arrangements for the Party's work in each and every one of the xian in the border area.

12. "Iron discipline" is the primary trait of a Bolshevik party. Only in this
way can we prevent the Party from taking a non-proletarian road. Only by
wiping out opportunists and eliminating corrupt elements who refuse to struggle

can we gather together the strength of the revolutionary progressive elements
and unite them around the Party, so that the Party will be strongly fortified and
march in step to become a powerful fighting organization. Only thus can we enhance
the leadership capacity of the proletariat. Consequently, the strict application of
discipline is an important task in transforming and building the Party center.

C. The Question of the Work in Every Xian

It is the responsibility of the Special Committee to discuss the detailed plan for
the work in every xian.

D. The Question of the Struggle in the Rural Areas

1. In the past, the struggle in the rural areas did not carry out the "land
revolution" at all resolutely. The so-called redistribution of the land wholly
failed to satisfy the thoroughgoing demands of the impoverished farm laborers.
Instead it was an equal distribution based on the compromising standpoint of the
rich peasants, middle peasants, and poor peasants. This is a great mistake which
has been made in the past.

2. In the past, while carrying out the "land revolution," we entirely failed to
impose a severe Red terror, and to massacre the landlords and despotic gentry as
well as their running dogs (this was done somewhat better in Lianhua and Chaling).

3. In the past, under the Red political power in the rural areas, we largely
neglected the class struggle between the rich peasants, the middle peasants and
the poor peasants in the countryside. As a result there was no unity and strength
of the poor peasants under the White terror, the rich peasants defected, and the
middle peasants wavered.

4. Our overall strategy in the rural struggles from now on is: unite the poor
peasants; pay attention to the middle peasants; plunge into the land revolution;
strictly impose Red terror; massacre the landlords and the despotic gentry as well
as their running dogs without the slightest compunction; threaten the rich peasants
by means of the Red terror so that they will not dare to assist the landlord class.

5. On the basis of this strategy, we should immediately organize the following: (1) A farm laborers' union (poor sharecroppers should join this organization), which will serve to unite the farm laborers, enhance their strength, and
make them the backbone in the countryside. (2) Red execution teams or insurrection teams, which should be organized under the White terror from the bravest
workers and peasants. Each Red execution team should consist of five to seven
persons. They should carry out guerrilla attacks in the dead of night to create a
Red terror in the countryside. When political power has been seized, the Red
execution team can be changed into Red Guards. (3) Select the brave elements
from among the workers and peasants, and organize them into insurrection teams
to develop the insurrection in the countryside and seize political power there.

E. The Question of the Workers' Movement
1. Workers are the vanguard of all the toiling masses, they are the leaders of
all the toiling masses. In the past we paid no attention to the workers' movement,
let alone leadership by the workers. As a result, the tendency toward a peasant
party emerged. This is a very serious crisis for the Party.

2. Our Party should make a great effort to organize unions among the handicraft workers in the countryside, as well as among the workers in the urban
areas, lead the workers from fragmentary economic struggles to armed uprising,
and correct our past mistake of ignoring the workers' movement.

3. Party headquarters and soviets at every level should make great efforts to
promote workers, so that they will be able to assume leadership positions and
lead the struggle.

F. The Question of the Soldiers' Movement
The reason the Chinese Communist Party advocates the policy of "armed uprising to seize political power" is that in carrying out this policy it is necessary to
coordinate very well the three forces represented by the workers, peasants, and
soldiers, for only then will a victorious uprising be possible. Because China's
"democratic revolution" has not yet been carried out, the warlords, despotic
gentry, and comprador class are able to make use of feudal relationships to fool
the workers and peasants and make mercenaries of them, claiming that [the
warlord armies] are instruments for protecting them. As a result, the majority of
those now serving as soldiers feel quite at ease living a hungry and bitter life
under the command of their class enemies (some soldiers in the enemy armies
have not received any pay for years). Before the Guomindang turned traitor, the
National Revolutionary Army had, however, received some kind of propaganda
regarding "class struggle." As for those who gravitated to the military camps
after the incident43 (employees of the peasants' associations or the labor unions),
they are naturally endowed with even more consciousness. Under great pressure
and close watch from the reactionary officers, it is not easy for these conscious
elements to find leaders, so they do not dare rashly to conduct propaganda and
organizational work in the reactionary military camp. In reality, however, they
are filled with revolutionary sentiments, and are very willing to defect. This
serves to demonstrate that the possibility of a soldiers' movement already exists
objectively. Moreover, the success of this kind of movement has been proven a
reality in Hunan, Guangdong, and other provinces. The present obstacle of reactionary force depends entirely on the several millions of as yet unawakened
soldiers of the National Revolutionary Army. If we do a good job with our

43. Shibian, i.e., the rupture of the Guomindang with the Communist Party in the
spring and summer of 1927.

soldiers' movement, reactionary rule will quickly collapse. If, on the other hand,
we ignore the soldiers' movement and concentrate exclusively on work with the
peasants instead, the Chinese revolution will never succeed.

The Party organizations at all levels in the Border Area have always paid little
attention to work with the soldiers, and concentrated on the peasant movement
alone. (Some Party organizations have nothing but peasant work.) We should
bear in mind that many of our experiences of failure in the past can be attributed
mainly to the absence of participation by the soldiers' movement in the insurrection. (The uprising in Guangdong at the end of last year, the repeated failure of
uprisings in Hunan . . . [are examples of this].)44 If we continue to pay no
attention to this, then future failures can be predicted. It is very evident that if we
now rely solely on the subjective force in the Border Area, it will be impossible
to entertain vain hopes of carving out a kingdom for ourselves, or to set up a
bigger independent régime. Therefore Party organizations at all levels must
make great efforts to develop the soldiers' movement. We must never forget that
the policy of "an armed uprising to seize political power" can only be carried out
if the three forces of the workers, peasants, and soldiers are coordinated.
1. At the present the soldiers' movement is as important as the workers' and
peasants' movements. Every xian should select a large number of worker and
peasant comrades, in a planned and organized way, and send them to the reactionary army to become soldiers, porters, cooks, and so on, and thus play a role
within the enemy's forces. Special attention should be paid to this work in
Yongxin, Chaling, Suichuan and other xian where large numbers of enemy
troops are concentrated.
2. Strengthen the propaganda work directed toward the enemy soldiers.
3. Send some people to the interior of the enemy forces to organize the Party.
Do not organize soldiers' committees, so as to avoid organizational complexities,
and the risk of discovery by enemy officers.
4. Use inconspicuous comrades, and women in the rural areas, to conduct
oral propaganda and agitation.
5. Spread rumors and instigate terror, in order to shake the morale of the
enemy, thus leading to wavering and ultimately to collapse.

G. The Question of Propaganda

1. In the past the Party organizations in all the xian of the Border Area paid
no attention at all to propaganda, imagining that they could establish a kingdom
with nothing but a few rifles. They did not know that the Communist Party can

44. The reference is to the Guangzhou commune of December 1927, the Autumn
Harvest Uprising of September 1927 in Hunan, and the uprising in the spring of 1928 in
southern Hunan. Mao may also have been thinking of events in the early summer of 1927
documented in Volume II of this edition.

overthrow the enemy only by holding propaganda pamphlets in its left hand and
rifles and bullets in its right hand. Meanwhile in none of their work (such as
organizing soviets and insurrection teams, redistributing the land, organizing the
Party and so on) did they make propaganda about their methods and their significance. They made use only of military and political strength to force others to do
things, [saying] "If you don't obey, we will kill you." This was an extremely
serious mistake.

2. We must find a way to perfect propaganda departments in the Special
Committee as well as in the xian Party committees. Every week, slogans and a
propaganda outline should be sent out on time. The daily wall newspaper should
also be distributed to the Party organizations at every level for them to copy and
post. Whenever a guerrilla unit sets out on a guerrilla mission, there should be
good propaganda (mass assembly-speeches in makeup, propaganda team, and
individual propaganda).

3. In the future, the work reports of subordinate Party organizations to their
superior Party organizations must include a report on propaganda work. When
inspecting and investigating the work of lower levels, the higher levels should
also pay attention to the inspection and examination of their propaganda work.
The Special Committee as well as the xian Party committees should distribute
their propaganda outlines to all lower-level Party organizations on a weekly
basis.

4. For the present, we should try our best to make a political analysis of the
internal clashes among the warlords, and pay attention to propaganda work directed against the chaotic struggles among warlords. At the same time, we
should make extremely forceful propaganda about the great strength of the workers, the peasants, and the Communist Party, explaining that in the end the chaotic
struggles among the warlords will be wiped out by a worker and peasant insurrection.

5. At present, our propaganda toward the worker and peasant masses as a
whole should forcefully expose the policies of the warlords and despotic gentry
for cheating the workers and peasants, and forcefully propagate the views of our
Party.

6. The soviets, the agrarian revolution, communism, the Red Army, and the
insurrection teams should all be the subject of specialized propaganda outlines.
We should intensify this propaganda, and cause it to penetrate deeply into the
minds of the masses.

7. Right now we should analyze in detail for our comrades and for the
masses the political and economic contradictions and clashes within the ruling class. We should do our best to make propaganda about the strength of
the workers and peasants themselves, as well as the forces of insurrection in
various regions, and shatter the defeatist view that there is no hope of recovery. At the same time, we should also shatter among our comrades and the
masses the passive view of relying solely on the army. (Of course we do not

deny the strength of the army in launching uprisings, and in assisting the workers and peasants to launch uprisings).

H. The Question of Training

1. In the past, the reason why the local Party organizations were not strong
was that Party members lacked training, even to the extent that there was no
ceremony of admission into the Party. Now every Party member must receive
training in the basic theories of the Party.
2. The Special Committee will organize an education and propaganda committee, compile training materials, and plan the weekly training work.
3. The Special Committee should organize regular training classes. Every
xian should also run as many short-term training classes as possible, in order to
produce people qualified to be cadres.
4. At the Party organization meetings at various levels, and in the course of
actual work, we should try our best to promote worker and peasant elements, and
train these workers and peasants as people qualified to be cadres.
5. At present, basic training work should strive to eliminate the opportunist,
feudal, and petty-bourgeois thought of the ordinary comrades, and establish
among them the revolutionary outlook on life of the proletariat.
6. Raise the level of literacy and political education of our comrades. At the
same time, we should also launch a literacy drive, so as to raise the "writing" and
"reading" ability of our worker and peasant comrades.

I. The Question of the Soviets

1. In the past the politics of the soviet was really nothing but a metamorphosis of the peasant association, so its work was monopolized by the secretary
general and chairman. Some of the governments were even controlled by rich
peasants and became magistrate's yamens. These so-called soviet governments
should all without exception be reorganized.
2. The Special Committee should enact a law regarding soviet organization,
and all xian, district, and township soviets should be organized according to this
organization law.
3. The soviets must have workers, poor peasants, and revolutionary soldiers
as their main force. They must oppose the control of rich peasant secretaries
general, and put into practice "all political power to the Soviets."
4. The government of the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Region must once again be
thoroughly transformed.
5. The relationship between Party organizations and soviets at all levels
should be clarified, to eliminate the evil of equating the Party with the government. The Special Committee must issue a circular regarding the difference
between the Party and the government, and the Party organizations at various
levels should conduct extensive propaganda.

J. The Land Question. We Accept the Central Committee's Circular Regarding
the Land Question, and Will Hand It Over to the Special Committee for Discussion before Making a Final Decision.

K. The Question of the C.Y.

1. The Youth League is a political organization of the Party among the
worker and peasant masses. In the past many of the League headquarters at
various levels in the border region were unclear about the political tasks of the
Youth League. In the various xian of the Border Area, the Youth League only
carried out a few cultural movements intended to expand its influence. In reality
it became a subordinate organ of the party, and this led to an even more serious
mistake by the Party organizations at various levels in the Border Area they
advocated eliminating the League.

2. At present, all the xian of the Border Area should engage in the work of
building the Youth League. Since, however, the strength of the League itself is
deficient, and it can scarcely shoulder this responsibility alone, the Party organizations at various levels must set aside part of their strength [for this purpose],
and constantly pay attention to Youth League work. They should help it to
establish League branches in every xian in the Border Area, expand League
organizations, and perfect the leading organs of the Youth League.

3. The budget of the League should be independent, so that it will be able to
do what it wants as far as its operations are concerned, and avoid budgetary
dependence of the Youth League on the Party.

4. Paying attention to the work of the Youth League is a responsibility which
must be assumed by the Party organizations at all levels. From now on, the
reports of Party organizations at all levels to their superiors must include a
section entitled "the work of the Youth League." While investigating the work at
various levels, inspectors from higher levels must also pay attention to Youth
League work.

5. Most of the Party organizations and League organizations at various levels
have not understood the relationship between the Party and the League, and as a
result, there has been a tendency for each to go its own way.

--- Notes

4. In the past, the Southern Hunan Special Committee instructed us to orgaOur source for this document is Jinggangshande wuzhuang geju, pp. 156–57. The same
text is reproduced in Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 2, pp. 309-10.

1. From the texts of October and November 1928 which follow, it is clear that the unit
number, omitted here, was "Twenty-ninth."
nize the CY2 in the army. Our experience of the past few months shows that this
is not convenient for our work. Then the Second CY Congress of the Fourth
Army made a decision to merge the two,3 and this time the Enlarged Session
again confirmed the necessity of the merger. But this cannot be done on a partial
and local basis and necessarily calls for a final decision from the Provincial
Committee. This position differs from that of the Liquidationists, as the CY
maintains a secretariat which enables it to participate fully in the work.

Our source for this poem is Shici duilian, pp. 23–25.

1. For the convention of "tune title" (cipai), see note 1 to Mao's 1927 poem, "Autumn
Harvest Uprising.”

We have translated this document from Jinggangshan geming genjudi (The Revolutionary
Base on the Jinggangshan), Vol. 1 (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi ziliao chubanshe, 1987),
pp. 181-95. This is the only known source which includes Part II. The version in the
supplementary volume to the 1947 Jin-Cha-Ji edition of Mao's selected works, reproduced in Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 2, pp. 15-23, breaks off at the end of Part I, with the
indication "balance omitted," and this section does not appear in Vol. 1 of the official
Selected Works.

1. In the Selected Works, this document has been given the title "Why Is It That Red
Political Power Can Exist in China?" The First Congress of the Party in the border area
had taken place in May 1928 (see above, the note to the report of June 16, 1928). The
Second Congress met from October 4 to 6, 1928. As noted in the Introduction to this
volume, it marked the first stage in Mao's return to a leading position, after the period
during which he had been reduced to the role of a military commander by the emissary
from the Hunan Provincial Committee, Du Xiujing.

2. Communist Youth League. As already noted, it was common at the time to use the
initials of English expressions as a shorthand or code in this way.

2. A strategic access route to the Jinggangshan occupied by enemy forces in August
1928, from which they were driven after a decisive battle on August 30. For Mao's own
account of this campaign, see below, Chapter III of his report of November 25, 1928.


2. The leader of the so-called Guangxi clique, Li Zongren (1890-1969), zi Delin, was
a native of Guilin in Guangxi. In the course of the two years 1924-1925, Li, with his two


3. I.e., the Youth League and Party organizations in the army.


3. On Feng Yuxiang, see above, the note to the declaration of August 1, 1927.

4. Yan Xishan (1883–1960), zi Baichuan, was a native of Shanxi. After graduating
from the Military Academy in Japan, he became an instructor in the New Army and
participated in the 1911 revolution. After the death of Yuan Shikai, he established himself
as the sole ruler of Shanxi, allying himself with the Anfu clique of Duan Qirui. In 1922
and 1924, he supported the Zhili faction of Cao Kun and Wu Peifu against Zhang Zuolin,
but after Feng Yuxiang's coup in Beijing in 1924, Yan established good relations with him
as well. In 1927, he announced his allegiance to the Guomindang, and in 1928 his forces
led the drive on Beijing.

5. Zhang Zuolin (1875–1928), zi Yuting, was a native of Fengtian (now Liaoning).
From 1919 until his assassination in 1928, he ruled the northeastern provinces as a virtually autonomous state. Volume II of our edition contains a number of discussions by Mao
of Zhang's role and of his conflicts with Wu Peifu's Zhili faction. See, in particular, pp.
239–46, the text of November 27, 1925, "Propaganda Guidelines of the Chinese
Guomindang in the War against the Fengtian Clique."

6. Although Li Zongren, Feng Yuxiang, and Yan Xishan had all supported Chiang's
Northern Expedition against Zhang Zuolin's Fengtian faction, it is quite true that this did
not signal the end of conflict among them. After the fall of Beijing and Tianjin in June
1928, Chiang, Li, Feng, and Yan met in July to discuss military reorganization, but failed
to come to an agreement.

12. I.e., by the leaders of the former Left Guomindang régime. On Wang, see, above,
the declaration of August 1, 1927. Chen Gongbo (1892-1946), a native of Guangdong,
was a founding member of the Chinese Communist Party who participated in the First
Congress, but he soon became disillusioned and gravitated toward the Guomindang. From
1927 onward, his political fortunes were linked to those of Wang Jingwei.