Hunan and Jiangxi, the Red Army will arrive at places with consolidated independent régimes that cannot easily be wiped out by the enemy. The reasons are
as follows:
1) The life-style of the Fourth Red Army is itself much marked by the habits
of roving insurgents in the past. So the troops are extremely unwilling to stay in
one place for a long time and to carry on the difficult work of the mass struggle.
They are still much under the influence of the Red Army's pernicious traditions
of adventurism. Only after nearly a month of many-sided education to wash
away these traits, and only because, at the same time, the masses in Yongxin and
Ninggang xian have generally stood up, have the troops of the Fourth Red Army
gradually given up this idea and begun to understand that the policy to build
Ninggang as the general headquarters suggested last time by the Central Committee and the Hunan Provincial Committee is correct. If we suddenly change
our policy now and ask the Fourth Red Army to return to its roving path, it
would be even more difficult to transform this army. It is pointed out in the last
letter from the Provincial Committee that the Fourth Red Army has already
traveled thousands of miles and moved like roving insurgents. They should
choose a place to rest, so that they can better transform themselves. This directive is extremely correct and should not be rashly changed just as it is being
implemented.
2) On the enemy side, the troops of Hunan Province are very tough and have
real military strength. They are not as easy to attack as the enemy troops in
Jiangxi. The latter have been defeated four times in succession, and they are
scared out of their wits. Besides, their soldiers' morale is much shaken because
of the impact of our practice of setting the captives free. The only troops that are
able to fight are those of Wang Jun's Seventh Division.² The First Division and
its First Regiment are stationed in Pingxiang, and its Second Regiment is in
Jiujiang and Nanchang. We judge that it will be difficult to move these troops to
attack us. Even if they are sent here, we can also use appropriate strategies to
defeat them. The situation is different for the enemy troops from Hunan. After
five or six engagements with them, we could put only a small number of these
troops to flight, without inflicting casualties on them, and they are as strong as
they were before. It is, therefore, not appropriate to rush ahead toward southern
Hunan if we are to avoid tough battles. Otherwise we may get deeply caught in
the encirclement of the enemy troops and suffer the misfortune of losing our
whole army. The enemy troops from southern Hunan now consist of two divisions of the Guangxi clique, the Twenty-first Army, one army of Shang Chengjie
(three thousand rifles), one division of Xu Kexiang, and one army of Wu Shang.

2. Wang Jun (1891-1936), zi Zhiping, was a native of Yunnan, and received his
military training there. In the fall of 1925, when the National Revolutionary Army was
established, he was appointed commander of the Seventh Division of the Third Army. In
September 1929, he became commander of the Third Army.
These troops are seven or eight times stronger than the enemy troops of Jiangxi.
Even if our army can win battles against the troops of Shang Chengjie and Xu
Kexiang, there is no way we can defeat the armies of Wu Shang and the Guangxi
clique. As soon as we arrive there, we would be caught in the encirclement of
Wu Shang, the Guangxi clique, Shang Chengjie, and Xu Kexiang and would
face the danger of being wiped out immediately. It seems that the Provincial
Committee has not taken this fact into consideration.
3) Ninggang can become the general headquarters for our military forces
because it is located in a highly strategic position among the big, steep mountains, and its roads lead to the two provinces. If we are victorious, we can
certainly defend it. If we lose, we can easily retreat. Moreover, there is absolutely no way for the enemy troops to encircle us. If you add to this the Party and
mass base in the various xian, we can indeed engage in a protracted struggle
against the enemy. If we now recklessly abandon Ninggang, then "a tiger on the
plain may be attacked by a dog," and the Fourth Red Army would be in very
serious danger.
4) Our proposal by no means reflects conservative ideas. In the past the
insurrections throughout the country were at one time very vigorous, but
when one day the enemy troops launched counterattacks, they were easily
swept away like water flushing the river bed. All this is the result of seeking
only to build up the momentum of the insurrections without attempting to
consolidate the bases. At present we are trying our best to correct this mistake by building a general headquarters for the military forces on the one
hand, and by consolidating the bases on the other, to prepare the way for
future uprisings in the two provinces of Hunan and Jiangxi. We are working
hard in Yongxin and Ninggang and making progress every day. We are also
moving toward Lianhua, Anfu, and the southwest of Ji'an to deepen the
agrarian revolution and to create local armed forces. After one more month's
work, we will be reasonably confident of winning a victory if the enemy
troops come again to attack us.
5) From the economic standpoint, because the troops of the Fourth Army are
so numerous, the daily cash allowance for meals, even practicing the utmost
economy, is 700 yuan. Apart from burning and killing in the xian of southern
Hunan, the local economy is bankrupt, and the local bullies have taken everything. After they arrived at Leiyang in February, the troops of Zhu De were not
able to raise a single cash. They could keep alive only by selling opium. It is now
absolutely impossible for them to go to southern Hunan to resolve their economic difficulties. Only in the Hunan-Jiangxi border area can the present economic difficulties truly be resolved.
6) Our wounded soldiers have increased in number to five hundred. If we
rush forward toward southern Hunan [with the wounded soldiers], the soldiers'
morale will be shaken. But we cannot leave them behind either. This is also one
of the most difficult problems.


On the basis of the above six practical reasons, we conclude that, before a
new war among the warlords breaks out, we cannot leave Ninggang, Yongxin,
and Lianhua for southern Hunan. As soon as the bases here are somewhat consolidated, and there are some good opportunities elsewhere, the Fourth Red
Army can leave Chaling, Youxian, and Liuyang to take part in the general
insurrection in Hunan. In the meantime, every effort must be made to maintain
the network of communication with Hunan, so that the two sides can correspond
with each other and cooperate to show our strength.
We beg the Provincial Committee to give further consideration to the above
opinions and to make new decisions according to the present situation. Such is
our hope. Please allow us to present the detailed reports about the army and the
local situation later.

Border Area Special Committee
Army Committee of the Fourth Red Army
City of Yongxin, July 4