February 25, 1928

To the Hunan Provincial Committee, please forward to the Central Committee:

(1) Regarding the letter from the Central Committee

The Central Committee's letter of June 4, having passed through the Jiangxi Provincial Committee and the Ji'an County Committee, only arrived at Jinggangshan on November 11. This letter is excellent; it has corrected many of our errors and resolved many contentious issues here. Upon its arrival, this letter was immediately distributed to the party headquarters at all levels in the military and the localities. On November 6, the troops that had set out for Suichuan were concentrated at Jinggangshan. The Special Committee convened a meeting of more than thirty people, including Special Committee members and local activists (Zhu De, Chen Yi, He Tingying, He Changgong, Yuan Wencai, Wang Zuo, Tan Zhenlin, Deng Ganyuan, Li Quefei, Chen Zhengren, Wang Zuonong, Xiao Wanxia, Liu Huixiao, Xie Chunbiao, Liu Di, Xiong Shouqi, Yang Kaiming, Cao Shu, Deng Jiuting, Mao Zedong, Song Qiaosheng, Peng Hu, etc., were all present; Yuan Desheng, the representative of the Hunan Provincial Committee, also participated), to discuss the Central Committee's letter. It was recognized that, with the exception of a few specific matters (such as the excessively wide guerrilla area and the abolition of the party representative system), all the principles and policies in the Central Committee's letter are suited to the actual situation and should be implemented accordingly. The party's highest organ is also to be organized as the Front Committee. In accordance with the letter, the Front Committee is now within the borders of Jiangxi and is under the guidance of the Jiangxi Provincial Committee; if it enters the borders of Hunan, it will be under the guidance of the Hunan Provincial Committee. At the same time, we request that the Central Committee directly command us at any time through the two provincial committees. Unfortunately, of the four attachments to the Central Committee's letter, only two, "Confiscation of Land and Establishment of Soviets" and the "International February Resolution," could be translated; the two on "Military Work" and "Organizational Issues" could not be translated. These two are urgently needed. Please quickly inform us of the translation method, or write another copy and send it.

The Border Area Separate Regime and the August Defeat

Within a single country, for one or several small areas of Red political power to arise amidst the encirclement of White political regimes is something that has only happened in China. We analyze its cause as being the continuous splits and wars within the comprador and gentry classes in China. As long as the splits and wars among the comprador and gentry classes continue, the armed separate regime of workers and peasants can exist and develop. The existence and development of the Soviet separate regime must have the following conditions: (1) a very good mass base; (2) a very good party; (3) a Red Army of considerable strength; (4) terrain favorable for operations; (5) economic strength sufficient for sustenance.

During periods when the ruling class political regime is stable and periods when it is ruptured, the strategy of the separate regime area toward the surrounding ruling classes is different. During periods when the ruling class is ruptured, such as in Hunan and Hubei during the Li Zongren-Tang Shengzhi war, or in Guangdong during the Zhang Fakui-Li Jishen war, our strategy can be comparatively adventurist, using military force to develop the separate regime area, and the area can be comparatively expanded. However, we must still pay attention to establishing a solid foundation in the central area, to prepare for the arrival of the White terror, so that we have a base and are not alarmed. If it is during a period when the ruling class is stable (relatively speaking), such as in the southern provinces after April of this year, then our strategy must be one of gradual advance. In military matters, one must most of all avoid dividing forces for rash advances; in mass work (distributing land, establishing Soviets, organizing the party, organizing local armed forces), one must most of all avoid scattering manpower, and instead pay attention to establishing a solid foundation in the central area. The failure of many small areas of Red political power in various places is due either to the objective conditions not being met, or to subjective strategic errors. As for why the subjective strategy was erroneous, it is entirely due to not having clearly distinguished between these two different periods: the period when the ruling class political regime is stable and the period when it is ruptured. During the period when the ruling class political regime is stable, some advocated for dividing forces for rash advances in military matters, and some even advocated for using only the Red Guards to defend a large Soviet political regime, as if the enemy, besides the landlords' militia, would not concentrate regular troops to attack. In mass work, they did not pay attention to establishing a solid foundation in the central area, and disregarding the possibilities of subjective strength, only sought unlimited expansion. If one advocates for the gradual expansion of political power in military matters, and advocates for concentrating manpower to establish a solid foundation in the central area in mass work, so as to stand on one's own feet, then this is called the "border area's conservatism."

The August defeat in the border area and the simultaneous complete defeat of the Red Army in southern Hunan had this as their fundamental cause. The party's organization and local armed forces were almost completely lost. There were only sixty-odd broken rifles near Jinggangshan. In the four counties of Yongxin, Lianhua, Chaling, and Suichuan, the peasants' self-defense army's rifles were all handed over to the gentry class, and the revolutionary sentiment of the masses had been suppressed. By November of this year, Ninggang, Yongxin, Chaling, and Suichuan all had county committees, Lingxian had a special district committee, and Lianhua had also begun to have party organizations. We also established relations with the Wan'an County Committee. As for local armed forces, apart from Lingxian, all counties had a small number. In Ninggang, Chaling, Suichuan, and Yongxin, especially in Suichuan and Yongxin, many guerrilla uprisings were carried out, killing gentry and mobilizing the masses, and they were carried out quite well. During this period, the land revolution was not carried out in depth. The political power organs were called the "Joint Conference of Workers, Peasants, and Soldiers," and were also called the "Workers', Peasants', and Soldiers' Government." The Soldiers' Committee was organized in the army. When the troops were on the move, an Action Committee was organized to command them. These methods were partly devised by ourselves behind closed doors, and partly learned from newspaper reports of the December 11 uprising in Guangdong (such as the People's Committee). Because communication with the provincial committee was cut off from the end of November, we knew nothing of the party's proposals and policies. It was not until April of this year, when Comrade Zhu De and others brought the resolutions of the Central Committee's November enlarged meeting, which was of great significance in the history of the Chinese revolution, to the border area, that the border area party was influenced by it. The command organ at that time was the Front Committee (with Mao Zedong as secretary), appointed by the Hunan Provincial Committee during the Autumn Harvest Uprising. The Front Committee was abolished in March on the advice of the Southern Hunan Special Committee and reorganized into a divisional committee (with He Tingying as secretary), becoming an organ that only managed the party in the army and could not concern itself with the local party. This was also a cause of the August defeat. The Southern Hunan Special Committee's order to move the Mao-led troops to southern Hunan caused the border area to be abandoned for a month. At the end of March, southern Hunan was defeated, and in April, the Zhu and Mao units and the southern Hunan peasant army retreated to Ninggang, and only then did the separate regime in the border area begin again.

After April, the separate regime in the Hunan-Jiangxi border area was established at a time when the ruling power in the south was temporarily stable. The armies sent by Hunan and Jiangxi provinces for "suppression" campaigns numbered eight or nine regiments at any given time, and at most reached eighteen regiments. Yet our forces, with less than four regiments, fought against the enemy for four months, causing the separate regime area to expand day by day, the land revolution to deepen day by day, the Soviet organizations to spread day by day, and the Red Army and the Red Guards to expand day by day. The reason for this was that the policy of the border area party (the local party and the party in the army) was correct. The policy of the Special Committee (with Mao Zedong as secretary) and the Military Commission (with Chen Yi as secretary) at that time was: resolutely fight the enemy, create a political regime in the middle section of the Luoxiao mountain range, and oppose flightism; deepen the land revolution in the separate regime area; the party in the army helps the development of the local party, and the army's arms help the development of the local armed forces; adopt a defensive posture against Hunan, where the ruling power is relatively strong, and an offensive posture against Jiangxi, where the ruling power is relatively weak; put great effort into managing Yongxin, create a mass-based separate regime, and prepare for a long-term struggle; concentrate the Red Army to meet the current enemy at the opportune moment, oppose dividing forces, and avoid being defeated one by one; adopt a wave-like advancing policy for the expansion of the separate regime area, and oppose an adventurist policy. Because of the appropriateness of these tactics, coupled with the border area's terrain being favorable for struggle and the attacking armies of Hunan and Jiangxi provinces not being entirely in accord, we had the military victories and the development of the mass-based separate regime from April to July. Although the enemy was several times our size, they not only could not destroy this separate regime, but also caused this separate regime to develop day by day. The influence of this separate regime on Hunan and Jiangxi provinces was growing stronger.

The August defeat was entirely due to not understanding that it was a time when the ruling class was stable, and instead adopting the policy of a time when the ruling class was ruptured, dividing forces for a rash advance into southern Hunan, leading to the defeat of both the border area and southern Hunan. The Hunan Provincial Committee representative Du Xiujing and Yang Kaiming, appointed by the provincial committee as secretary of the Special Committee, taking advantage of the fact that Mao Zedong, Wan Xixian, and others who held different opinions were far away in Yongxin, did not consider the environment at the time, disregarded the resolution of the joint meeting of the Military Commission, the Special Committee, and the Yongxin County Committee which disagreed with the Hunan Provincial Committee's proposal, and only knew to formally carry out the Hunan Provincial Committee's order to go to southern Hunan, and pandered to the Twenty-ninth Regiment (Yizhang peasant army) which was fleeing and wished to return home, resulting in the defeat on both the border area and southern Hunan fronts.

In mid-July, the Eighth Army of the Hunan enemy attacked the Jiangxi border, but retreated without success. The Red Army's main force, which had planned to attack Lingxian and Chaling, changed its plan and went to southern Hunan. The Jiangxi enemy, Wang Jun's and Jin Handing's five regiments and Hu Wendou's six regiments, a total of eleven regiments, attacked Yongxin. At this time, our army had only one regiment in Yongxin. Under the cover of the vast red masses, using guerrilla tactics for twenty-five days, we confined these eleven regiments to an area within thirty li of the county seat. In the end, due to the enemy's fierce attack, we lost Yongxin, and subsequently Lianhua and Ninggang. At this time, internal strife broke out in the Sixth Army of the Hunan enemy, which hastily withdrew and then fought with Wang Jun at Zhangshu. The remaining five regiments of the Jiangxi army also retreated in panic to Yongxin city. If our main force had not gone to southern Hunan, it is beyond doubt that we could have routed this enemy and expanded the separate regime area to Ji'an, Anfu, and Pingxiang, and linked up with Pingjiang and Liuyang. As the main force was not present and our one regiment was exhausted, it was decided to leave a part to defend Jinggangshan together with the Yuan and Wang units, and to order Mao Zedong to lead one battalion to take a side road to Guidong to welcome back the main force. At this time, the main force that had gone to southern Hunan had already been defeated and had retreated to Guidong. On August 23, they were met at Guidong.

When the Hunan enemy's Eighth Army under Wu Shang invaded Ninggang and then advanced to Yongxin, they could not find a battle (our army took side roads to attack, but it was not worth it), and fearing our masses, they hastily passed through Lianhua and retreated to Chaling. The eleven regiments of the Jiangxi enemy, a day later, again occupied Yongxin city. At this time, the main force of the Red Army (led by Zhu De) attacked Chaling and Lingxian from Ninggang. Upon reaching Lingxian, a part of the soldiers (the entire Twenty-ninth Regiment), eager to go home, wanted to return to Hunan and would not obey orders. Another part opposed going to southern Hunan and wanted to go to southern Jiangxi, and was also unwilling to turn back to Yongxin. Du Xiujing encouraged their flightism, and the Military Commission was also unable to avert this unfavorable action. Thus, on July 17, they set out from Lingxian and marched toward Chenzhou. On July 24, they fought with Fan Shisheng's troops at Chenzhou city, winning at first and then losing, and retreated at dusk. The Twenty-ninth Regiment then ran toward Yizhang. One part was annihilated by Hu Fengzhang at Lechang, and another part was scattered in the Chenzhou-Yizhang area, their whereabouts unknown. At the time, no more than a hundred men were gathered. Fortunately, the main force did not suffer great losses, and on August 18, they occupied Guidong. On August 23, they met with the troops from Jinggangshan and decided to return to Ninggang. However, Wu Shang's two regiments from Lingxian suddenly launched a fierce attack on Guidong that afternoon. After half a day of bitter fighting, the battle resumed the next morning, and our army suffered considerable losses (the enemy's losses were even greater). We then retreated into Jiangxi territory.

When the army departed from Lingxian for southern Hunan, the original Military Commission was abolished, and a Front Committee appointed by the Hunan Provincial Committee was organized, with Chen Yi as secretary. After the defeat and retreat from Guidong, the Front Committee was abolished, and an Action Committee was organized to command it, with Mao Zedong as secretary. Passing through Chongyi, Shangyou, and Suichuan, we arrived at the foot of Jinggangshan on September 8.

The reasons for the failure of the attack on Chenzhou were six in total: (1) Some officers and men were eager to go home and lost their fighting capacity; some officers and men were unwilling to go to southern Hunan, which went against the psychology of the masses. (2) A long expedition in the height of summer, the troops were exhausted. (3) A rash advance of several hundred li from Lingxian, losing contact with the border area, becoming an isolated army. (4) The worker and peasant masses of southern Hunan did not rise up, making it a purely military adventure. (5) The enemy situation was unclear. (6) Preparations were poor, and the officers and men did not understand the significance of the battle. During the retreat after the defeat, battalion commander Yuan Chongquan led one infantry company and one artillery company in a mutiny. Although these two companies were later pursued and brought back, the death of regimental commander Wang Erzhuo in the line of duty was also a significant loss.

On August 30, the Hunan army under Wu Shang and the Jiangxi army under Wang Jun, a total of four regiments, taking advantage of the fact that our army was about to return but had not yet returned, jointly launched a fierce attack on Jinggangshan. Our forces, less than one battalion, fought fiercely for a whole day and night, relying on the dangerous terrain, and repulsed the enemy. This battle preserved our last base area, and also struck fear into the enemy, so that they dared not take the Communist army lightly. It was one of the famous battles of the border area.

When the army (Front Committee) was in Hunan, it organized two county committees, Guidong and Rucheng, in the places it passed through. Together with the existing Zixing and Chenzhou county committees, a special committee was organized to command them, with Du Xiujing as secretary, located at Longxi Sandong in Zixing. The three counties of Zixing, Guidong, and Rucheng were given a total of eighty rifles to organize Red Guards. Chenzhou had a Red Guard unit of forty to fifty rifles in Yaoling. The situation in Leiyang, Yongxing, and other counties is unclear. The Thirtieth and Thirty-third Regiments of the peasant army that returned to southern Hunan in May had long since dispersed, with a total of three to four hundred arms, most of which were seized by the enemy. The broad masses mobilized by the Red Army in southern Hunan in the spring were completely suppressed by the enemy. This time, the Red Army passed through the three counties of Zixing, Rucheng, and Guidong, mobilized a part of the local masses, organized Soviets, and distributed land in Shatian of Guidong. The current situation is unknown. The Southern Hunan Special Committee organized this time has not sent any letters due to blocked communications.

(3) The Border Area Separate Regime from September to the Present

Since April of this year, the separate regime area has gradually expanded. After the battle of Longyuankou (on the border of Yongxin and Ninggang) on June 23, which defeated the Jiangxi enemy for the fourth time, the separate regime area reached its peak, comprising the three entire counties of Ninggang, Yongxin, and Lianhua, small parts of Ji'an and Anfu, the northern part of Suichuan, and the southeastern part of Lingxian. Most of the land was distributed, with a small part in the process of distribution. District and township Soviets were universally established. Ninggang, Yongxin, Lianhua, and Suichuan all had county Soviets, and a Border Area Soviet was established. Worker-peasant insurrectionary detachments were universally organized in the villages, and Red Guards were organized at the district and county levels. In July, the Jiangxi enemy attacked, and in August, the Hunan and Jiangxi enemies jointly attacked Huangyangjie. The county seats and plains of all the border counties were occupied by the enemy. The peace preservation corps and the landlords' militia, acting as tigers' accomplices, ran rampant, and White terror filled the cities and countryside. The party's organizations and political power organizations were mostly crushed. The rich peasants and opportunist elements in the party defected one after another. After the battle of Huangyangjie on August 30, the Hunan enemy began to retreat. The Jiangxi enemy in Ninggang County then withdrew to the west and north. The Red Army then recovered the two districts of Gucheng and Longshi in Ninggang, the Tianlong and Wanniangshan districts in northern Yongxin, the Shangxi district in Lianhua, the Jinggangshan district in Suichuan, and the Qingshigang and Dayuan districts in Lingxian. In July and August, the Red Army and the Red Guards of various counties fought dozens of battles, large and small, but the loss of rifles totaled no more than thirty. Finally, they retreated into the mountain areas. The enemy, after one unfavorable battle, retreated in dismay.

On August 30, the joint suppression army was defeated at Huangyangjie. On September 8, our southern expeditionary force returned to Jinggangshan, thus creating a new situation since August. When our army passed through Chongyi and Shangyou and arrived at Jinggangshan, the remnants of the Jiangxi Independent Seventh Division under Liu Shiyi, with five battalions, pursued us to Suichuan. On September 13, we attacked Liu Shiyi with four battalions and defeated him at Suichuan city, capturing 150 rifles, one battalion commander, one company commander, three or four platoon leaders, and over a hundred soldiers. The rest of the troops retreated to Ganzhou. The Action Committee commanding the army (with Mao Zedong as secretary) and the Suichuan County Committee jointly managed the masses of Suichuan and raised provisions for the army, dividing into four routes to conduct guerrilla warfare in the countryside, with an action committee organized to command each route. The eastern route once advanced to Wan'an and established contact with the Wan'an County Committee. On September 24, the Jiangxi army's Li Wenbin regiment came from Taihe, and the Independent Seventh Division came from Ganzhou, to attack our Suichuan city. Our forces were not concentrated, and we fought with only two battalions. Although we could not hold and retreated, our morale was not hurt. On September 26, we returned to Jinggangshan. On October 1, we fought with Xiong Shihui's Zhou Hunyuan brigade at Ninggang. We won, capturing one company commander, one platoon leader, and seventy soldiers, and seizing over seventy rifles. We then pursued the enemy to Yongxin and recovered the entire county of Ninggang. Li Wenbin's regiment, seeing that we were attacking Ninggang, took a detour from Suichuan through Taihe and Yongxin to reinforce them, leaving only the Independent Seventh Division (the weakest force) in Suichuan. The hope of mobilizing the masses of Suichuan was great, and our army's supply problem was very urgent, so on October 13, we reoccupied Suichuan. The Independent Seventh Division fled without a fight. The Suichuan Action Committee commanding the army (with Zhu De as secretary) and the Suichuan County Committee jointly planned the work in Suichuan, dividing into five routes for guerrilla warfare, distributing land, establishing Soviets, developing party organizations, and raising cash. At this time, Yan Zhongxing's unit of 126 rifles from Guidong defected to our army and was organized into a special service battalion, with Bi Zhanyun (formerly under Xiang Yingjie, incorporated into Yan Zhongxing's unit) as battalion commander. On November 2, the Jiangxi enemy's Twenty-first Brigade (with Li Wenbin as brigade commander), two regiments, and a part of the Independent Seventh Division again attacked our Suichuan. To avoid a hard fight, our army withdrew from Suichuan, intending to attack the weaker enemy forces in Ninggang and Yongxin with lightning speed, to break one side of the encirclement. On November 9, we defeated the Twenty-seventh Regiment of Zhou's brigade at Ninggang county seat and Longyuankou, capturing 160 rifles, killing one enemy battalion commander and dozens of soldiers, and capturing one deputy battalion commander, one company commander, one platoon leader, and over a hundred soldiers. The next day at dawn, we attacked the Twenty-eighth Regiment of Zhou's brigade and the remnants of the Twenty-seventh Regiment in Yongxin. We fought until three in the afternoon before repulsing the enemy, and our vanguard occupied Yongxin city. Unexpectedly, the enemy's Thirty-fifth Brigade arrived as reinforcements from Hongtianhe (on the border of Ji'an and Yongxin). Fearing an unfavorable battle, our army withdrew toward Ninggang. Although the enemy suffered many casualties that day, our side also suffered over a hundred casualties, which was the biggest battle since our return to the border area. The Red Guards and insurrectionary detachments participated in both of these battles, but their strength was not great.

The current environment in the border area: On the Jiangxi side, there is Zhou Hunyuan's Fourteenth Brigade and Liu Shiyi's Fifteenth Brigade. These two brigades have been defeated by us and are reorganizing. There is also Li Wenbin's Twenty-first Brigade and a certain Thirty-fifth Brigade. These two brigades are formidable foes. On the Hunan side, the three counties of Chaling, Lingxian, and Guidong are still occupied by Wu Shang's Eighth Army. At present, our Red political power area extends from the southern foot of Jinggangshan in Suichuan in the south to the border of Lianhua in the north, including the entire counties of Ninggang and Suichuan and parts of Yongxin, forming a long, narrow, and contiguous block from north to south. The Shangxi district of Lianhua, the Tianlong and Wanniangshan districts of Yongxin, are not very contiguous with the main block. The enemy is currently attempting to use military attacks and an economic blockade to eliminate this "communist bandit lair." We have a slight respite.

(A) Military Issues

1. Military Era: The struggle in the border area has almost entirely become a military struggle. Therefore, the party and the masses have had to become militarized together. How to deal with the enemy and how to fight have become the daily agenda of the party headquarters at all levels in the army and the localities. The so-called separate regime must be an armed one. Wherever there is no armed force, or the armed force is insufficient, or the tactics for dealing with the enemy are wrong, the area is immediately taken over by the White armed forces (White army, peace preservation corps, landlords' militia), and the separate regime is lost. This struggle is becoming more intense day by day, and the problems are extremely complex and serious.

2. Sources of the Red Army: (A) Old troops of Ye Ting and He Long from the Nanchang and Chaozhou-Shantou uprisings; (B) The Wuchang Garrison Regiment; (C) Liuyang and Pingjiang peasant armies; (D) Southern Hunan peasant armies and Shuikoushan workers; (E) Captured soldiers from the armies of Xu Kexiang, Tang Shengzhi, Bai Chongxi, Zhu Peide, Wu Shang, and Xiong Shihui; (F) Worker and peasant elements from the counties of the border area. However, the old troops of Ye and He, the Garrison Regiment, and the Liuyang-Pingjiang peasant armies, after more than a year of fierce fighting, have been reduced to less than a third of their original number. Even the southern Hunan Red Army, after eight months of struggle in the border area, has suffered a great number of casualties. Therefore, although the first four categories, due to their sound quality, still form the foundation of the Fourth Red Army, in terms of quantity, they are far outnumbered by the latter two categories. Of the latter two categories, the captured soldiers from various armies are the largest in number. Without this category as a supplement, the troop strength of the Fourth Army would be a major problem. Although there is this supplement, their quality is not as good as the former categories (though there are many very good ones among them). Also, because the increase in rifles is not commensurate with the increase in soldiers—rifles are not easily lost, while soldiers can be lost at any time due to injury, death, illness, or desertion (which happens occasionally in defeat)—and because the peasants of the border area are reluctant to become soldiers, as once the land is distributed, everyone goes to till the land, the number of worker and peasant elements from the border area in the Fourth Army is now extremely small. Therefore, the problem of the composition of the army has become very serious. The Hunan Provincial Committee has promised to send some workers from Anyuan, and we eagerly hope they will be sent. As for the lumpenproletariat (the Hunan Provincial Committee's reply says that the lumpenproletariat is not a fact), this lumpen element urgently needs to be replaced by worker and peasant elements, but there is no way to find them. We are fighting every day, and the fighting capacity of the lumpen elements is particularly good, and at the same time, the number of casualties is large, so not only can we not do without the existing lumpen element, but we are also afraid we cannot find more lumpen elements to supplement them. Under these circumstances, the only way is to intensify political training.

3. Most have been transformed from mercenary troops into a Red Army. Although they are called a Red Army, they are still mercenary in nature. They receive no pay, only money for food and pocket money. The matter of distributing land to the officers and men of the Red Army is quite difficult, except for those from the border counties serving in the Red Army, whose families are distributed land as a rule. For officers and men from distant places, it is difficult to distribute land: first, because the separate regime area is small and mountainous, and the peasants of each township find the land in their own township too little to distribute, with no surplus; second, because the outcome of battles is uncertain and the separate regime area is not fixed—yesterday it was Red power and the land was distributed, today it is seized by White power and rent must be paid to the landlord again. Therefore, not only do the officers and men in the Red Army not have the idea of getting their own share of land, but even among the peasants, many still hold the view that the distribution of land is not yet a settled matter. This is the result of the frequent and fierce struggle between the Red and White forces. But the principle that Red Army soldiers should be given land is an unshakeable one, and we must still discuss ways to implement it.

4. Political Training: The officers and men of the Red Army all have class consciousness, and they have a common understanding of distributing land, establishing Soviets, and arming the workers and peasants. They know that they are fighting for themselves and for the worker and peasant classes. Because of this principle, they do not complain despite such a hard life and such fierce struggle. The company, battalion, and regiment all have soldiers' committees that represent the interests of the soldiers, conduct political training, and carry out mass movements externally. All matters can be handled by the soldiers' committee organ, which is better than setting up a separate political department. The army here had political departments before April of this year, but they were abolished because of their bad influence. With a political department, the officers and men thought that political work was only the job of a few people in the political department, while the rest had the sole duty of fighting. After the political department was abolished, everyone had to fight and also do political work (political training and mass movements), thus breaking the purely military mindset.

5. The Party Representative System: Based on experience, we believe that it cannot yet be abolished. The party representatives at the army and division levels (we do not have a divisional level here; regiments are directly under the army) are particularly important because the party branches are built on the company. The company party representative supervises the soldiers' committee in carrying out political training for the whole company, directs mass movements, and is the secretary of the branch within the party. Facts have shown that the better the company party representative, the sounder the company. The lower-level cadres now, because so many have been killed or wounded, are often captured from the enemy army yesterday and have to be made platoon leaders or even company commanders today. Some soldiers captured between January and February of this year are now battalion commanders. To think that the current Red Army can do without party representatives is a great mistake. Zhu and Mao once abolished the party representatives in southern Hunan, but later restored them. If they are renamed "directors," they will be confused with the directors of the Guomindang. Most of the captured soldiers detest the name "director." Moreover, changing the name does not affect the essence of the system, so we have decided not to change it. Too many party representatives have died. Apart from running our own training schools, we ask the Central Committee and the two provincial committees to send at least thirty people who can serve as party representatives.

6. Military Training: We are always fighting, and there is no so-called special training. As for military skills, our soldiers are too poor. They have just joined the army yesterday and have to fight today. They only rely on bravery in combat. Long periods of rest and training are absolutely impossible. We can only try to avoid battles and seek a long period for training, to see if it is possible. To train lower-level officers, we have set up a training detachment of 150 people, and plan to run it regularly. We hope the Central Committee and the two provincial committees will send more military officers of company and platoon leader level and above, at least thirty or more, to the border area.

7. Material Life: The Hunan Provincial Committee wants us to pay attention to the material life of the soldiers, at least to make it better than that of the ordinary workers and peasants. The life in the army now is the opposite; I am afraid that few people's lives are as bad as the Red Army's. Because of the lack of cash, the five cents of silver dollar per person per day for food (rice is supplied by the locality) is often hard to maintain. "Overthrow the capitalists, eat pumpkin every day" is a proverb of the soldiers, expressing their hardship. The Fourth Army is more able to endure hardship than any other army. The army only receives food money; it does not receive any other pay. The monthly cash requirement is over ten thousand yuan. We rely entirely on "striking local tyrants." But first, the places that have been struck have nothing left to strike; second, the enemy's encirclement is very tight, and often we cannot go far to strike local tyrants until we have defeated one side of the enemy; third, the enemy situation is serious, and a single battalion or two simply cannot go out to raise funds. To raise funds requires more troops, so the problem is not simple. Now the whole army of five thousand has a shortage of cloth and cotton for winter clothing, and it is still difficult to raise the money. It is so cold now, and many soldiers are still wearing two layers of unlined clothing. Fortunately, they are used to hardship. And everyone is treated the same; from the army commander to the cook, everyone eats five cents' worth of food. As for pocket money, two jiao is two jiao, four jiao is four jiao, for everyone alike. The soldiers feel that they are "suffering for the proletariat," so they do not resent anyone. Nevertheless, the economic problem is always very serious.

8. The Problem of Wounded and Sick Soldiers: After every battle, there is a batch of wounded soldiers. Due to malnutrition, cold, and other reasons, there are many sick soldiers. The hospital is set up on the mountain, with both Chinese and Western medicine for diagnosis and treatment. The lack of medicine and doctors is a big problem. In September, there were over a hundred wounded and sick soldiers. The recent battle in Yongxin has added many more. Now the hospital, including the nurses, has over eight hundred people. If the wounded and sick soldiers are not cared for, the morale of the army will be shaken. To care for them well requires a lot of money. The Hunan Provincial Committee promised to provide medicine, but none has been sent so far. We still ask the Central Committee and the two provincial committees to help by sending a few Western-style doctors and some iodine tablets.

9. The Role of the Party: The reason why the Red Army can maintain itself without collapsing, despite such poor material life and such bitter fighting, is, apart from the role of the party, the implementation of thorough democracy. The officers do not beat the soldiers; officers and soldiers are treated equally; soldiers have the freedom to hold meetings and speak out; cumbersome formalities are abolished; the accounts are made public. The soldiers manage the food, and can save about sixty or seventy wen per person per day from the five cents of food money for pocket money. These methods make the soldiers very satisfied. Especially the newly arrived captured soldiers feel that the barracks of yesterday and the barracks of today are two completely different worlds. They feel that although the material life of the Red Army is not as good as that of the White army, their spirit is liberated. The same soldier who was not brave when fighting for the enemy army yesterday is very brave when