Report by the International Representative: All of these points are of great importance. First, the Nationalist Party question has been a long-standing issue for our Party, and it remains unresolved to this day. Initially, the debate centered on the question of membership; later, the discussion shifted to who should be admitted—specifically, whether industrial workers ought to join. In practice, however, not only were industrial workers discouraged from joining, but even peasants lacked the resolve to do so. At that time, the prevailing view was that the Nationalist Party belonged to others—that it was an empty house waiting for occupants. Subsequently, much like a newlywed being carried onto the bridal sedan chair, we were more or less compelled to move into this vacant edifice, yet we never truly assumed the role of its masters. I regard this as a grave error. Later, when some comrades advocated admitting industrial workers as well, and word reached us that Hubei had adopted such a decision, it turned out to be merely a paper resolution, never put into effect. Occasionally, within the mass movement, there were instances where local Party organizations, defying central directives, seized control of lower-level Nationalist Party branches and effectively took possession of those “houses.” Yet this was in direct contradiction to the central leadership’s intentions. Only recently have we changed our strategy, enabling the working-class and peasant masses to enter the Nationalist Party and assume leadership roles therein.

Second, regarding the peasant question: the peasantry is revolutionary, and any Party organization that seeks to draw close to the peasantry must also be revolutionary. However, the higher echelons of the Party have often taken a different stance. Before my arrival in Changsha, I found myself unable to oppose resolutions that placed the Party squarely on the side of the landlords. Even after reaching Changsha, I still could not formulate a coherent response to this issue. It was only after spending more than thirty days in Hunan that my position underwent a complete transformation. I presented my views in a report delivered in Hunan and simultaneously submitted another to the Central Committee; the former had a tangible impact, while the latter left no impression whatsoever. While broad layers of both Party members and non-Party sympathizers were eager for revolution, the Party’s leadership remained unrevolutionary—indeed, one might even speak of a certain counter-revolutionary tendency. This assessment arose directly from the guidance provided by the peasantry. At the time, I regarded the opinions of our leading comrades as correct, and accordingly did not press my own views with sufficient vigor. When they declared my ideas untenable, they simply failed to gain traction. As a result, the Party’s line ended up following Xu Kexiang. Most peculiar of all, General Tang himself acknowledged the destruction of only eight officers’ households, whereas our Party seemed willing to concede that an unknown number had been wiped out. In sum, throughout this period, the influence of the masses over the Party leadership has been woefully inadequate.

Third, concerning military affairs: formerly, we criticized Sun Yat-sen for focusing exclusively on military action, while we ourselves, in contrast, eschewed military work in favor of purely mass movements. Chiang Kai-shek and General Tang both rose to power through the barrel of a gun, whereas we paid them no attention at all. Although we have since begun to take military matters more seriously, we still lack a firm and resolute conception. For example, the Autumn Harvest Uprising could not have succeeded without a military component; this conference should accord this issue the utmost priority, and the Standing Committee of the new Politburo must strengthen its focus on it. The failure in Hunan may be said to have stemmed entirely from the subjective errors of armchair theorists. Henceforth, we must pay very close attention to military questions. We must bear in mind that political power is won by the barrel of a gun.

Fourth, organizational issues. Going forward, higher-level Party organs should listen attentively to reports from their subordinate units; only then can we effect a transition from a non-revolutionary to a revolutionary orientation.