cal power grows (or comes) out of the barrel of a gun.” (For the context, see the _Selected
Works_, Vol. II, pp. 224–25.)
Mao Zedong's Statement Regarding the
Resolution on the Struggles of the Peasants

(August 7, 1927)

1. A criterion must definitely be fixed for big and medium landlords. Otherwise, we will not know who is a big or medium landlord. In my opinion, we could take fifty _mu_ as the limit; above fifty _mu_, whether the land is fertile or barren, it should all be confiscated.
2. The question of small landlords is the central problem of the land question. The difficulty is that, if we do not confiscate the land of the small landlords, then since there are many localities where there are no big landlords, the peasant associations would have to cease their activity. Hence, if we wish basically to abolish the landlord system, we must have a certain method for dealing with the small landlords. At present we must resolve the small landlord question, for this is the only way we can satisfy the people.
3. The problem of owner-peasants. The land rights of rich peasants and middle peasants are not the same. The peasants want to attack the rich peasants, so we must adopt a clear orientation.
4. The bandit problem is an extraordinarily great problem. Because such secret societies and bandits are uncommonly numerous, we must have tactics [for dealing with them]. There are some comrades who hold that we can simply use them; this is [Sun] Zhongshan's1 method, which we should not follow. It suffices that we carry through the agrarian revolution, and then we will certainly be able to lead them. We must definitely regard them as our own brothers, and not as strangers.2

This text has been translated from _Baqi huiyi_, p. 73. Unlike Mao's comments on Lominadze's report, these remarks on the peasant problem do not appear in either of the other volumes cited in the source note to the previous document.
1. Sun Yatsen.
2. _Keren_. The usual meaning is “guest,” but here “stranger” seems more apt.

Hunan Is Important

(August 9, 1927)1

D:2 We have all read the report on the problem of Hunan (by Meyer3). From this report we can draw three conclusions: (1) The plan for the insurrection by He Ye of the Provincial Committee is erroneous; we should not organize a division in Hunan to take Guangdong together with the military forces from Nanchang, but should form a broad basis in Hunan, and extend it to include the whole province. (2) The Provincial Committee is not strong, there is not a single worker or peasant element, and it is the same with the C.Y.4 Judging by the way he talks, the secretary wants to protect the interests of the small landlords; this secretary is unsuitable, and the Provincial Committee should be reorganized. People close to the masses must join the Provincial Committee and guide the work there, and there should be five or six worker and peasant elements. (3) Their acceptance of the International's decisions is insincere, so they do not have a firm attitude toward the Party's position. At present, we should send capable comrades such as Dong5 to explain things in detail, and to support resolutely the views of the [August 7] Emergency Conference.

Dong: To organize a division to go to Guangdong is wrong. All of us should not look only at Guangdong; Hunan is also very important. The organization of the

This document has been translated from the extracts quoted in the article by Sun Gang in _Dangde wenxian_, no. 1, 1988, cited in the source note to the first text in this volume. Mao's own remarks are conveniently available in _Mao Zedong junshi wenji_, Vol. 1, p. 6, but without Lominadze's introductory statement, which provides the context.
1. The text translated below is an extract from the record of a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee held on this date.
2. Lominadze, the Comintern representative.
3. Meyer was the Soviet consul in Changsha, and concurrently a representative of the International. His report was highly critical of the Hunan Provincial Committee.
4. The Communist Youth League.
5. Mao Zedong. As indicated above, in a note to the text of August 1, 1927, the Central Committee decided on August 3 that a Southern Hunan Special Committee of four members, including Mao Zedong, should be set up right away, to direct operations there. (See the plan for the Autumn Harvest Uprising in the four provinces of Hunan, Hubei, Guangdong, and Jiangxi in Saich, _Rise to Power_, Doc. C.6, pp. 317–19.) Resolutions adopted at the Politburo meeting of August 9 stipulated that Mao Zedong and Peng Gongda were entrusted with the compilation of the list of the nine members of the new Provincial Committee, of whom at least three must be workers or peasants. Peng Gongda was appointed provincial party secretary. (See the letter of August 9, 1927, to the Hunan Provincial Committee transmitting these decisions, in Saich, _Rise to Power_, Doc. C.7, pp. 319–21.)