**Strategies for the Peasant Movement\***
(June 1, 1927)

To the provincial committees and the Party groups within peasant associations at all levels:

The outline of strategies for the peasant movement, as adopted at the [...] meeting of the Political Bureau (June 1), is hereby communicated as follows:

The Peasant Department must be swiftly instructed to direct the Party groups within peasant associations at all levels to earnestly implement the National Government's strategic outline for the peasant movement.

1.  In the recent period, unprecedented and acute conflicts have erupted between poor peasants and landlords, and the revolutionary peasant movement has developed suddenly. Consequently, the issue of fundamentally reforming the land system has also burst forth. This is a natural phenomenon of the revolution, not so-called "excesses." However, the continued development of ever more intense conflicts truly harbors great danger for the national revolutionary situation and the temporary united front. Our Party must foresee this danger and provide correct guidance to the peasant movement.

2.  At present, the officers of the National Revolutionary Army are still a vital core of the revolutionary army. However, they simultaneously hail from the landlord class, most being small landlords themselves. The poor peasants' struggle for land system reform strikes at the interests of the officers; therefore, the political attitudes of the officers will inevitably change. Currently, there are no reliable officers, nor is there a class-conscious army. If the officers now within the army were to completely abandon the revolution, it would suffice to cause a major rupture, even the destruction, of the entire revolutionary movement.

3.  Party departments at all levels must promptly implement the peasant political platform of the Fifth Congress—namely, non-confiscation

Strategies for the Peasant Movement

of the land and property of officers' families. This strategy is extremely necessary at this moment. But this does not mean that such a strategy can completely secure politically the officers who sympathize with landlords, binding them in an eternal alliance with the workers and peasants. The class relations among all owners of private property are very definite. This strategy merely delays the time of acute conflict with revolutionary officers, seeking the possibility of consolidating the organizational strength of the worker and peasant movement. By employing this strategy, we can gain sufficient time to organize the armed forces of the revolutionary workers and peasants, and our influence should penetrate deeply into the army: on the one hand, gradually improving the composition of the officer corps; on the other, raising the class consciousness of the army, making it difficult for counter-revolutionaries to utilize soldiers as tools against the workers and peasants.

4.  Now, special attention must be paid to the fact that although boundaries can be drawn among small landlords, and even among owner-peasants and semi-owner-peasants, their economies are all built upon the system of private ownership. Therefore, incorrect policies can truly cause the masses of owner-peasants to fall under the political influence of the landlord class (for example, equalization of land, equalization of tenancy rights, equal division of property, forced destruction of ancestral tablets, confiscation of money sent home by soldiers through the post, etc., are all improper policies).

    The slogan of equal distribution of land cannot be raised yet now (as for the equal division of property, it fundamentally should not be propagated). Equal distribution of land requires the prior implementation of land nationalization. Party departments at all levels must explain in detail the dangers of the slogan of equal distribution of land to the leaders of peasant associations. This slogan can drive small landlords and even wealthy tenants to stand on the side of the landlords.

5.  The foundation of peasant associations should shift from landless peasants to the majority of tenants and owner-peasants. At the same time, there must be concrete, temporary solutions for the urgent demands of landless peasants. As for fundamental policies like reclaiming wasteland for settlement, they must also be swiftly announced. The slogan "Those without land should obtain land" should be raised, but simultaneously, it must be explained to landless peasants that solving the problems of landless poor peasants through reclaiming wasteland using state financial resources, as well as implementing equal distribution of land, can only be realized after the revolution has been completed. Landless poor peasants are indeed the vanguard of the revolution; for now, they should join the revolutionary armed forces or even directly enter the revolutionary army.

6.  The struggle concerning land must have an extremely clear political platform—that is, the confiscation of large landlords. Regardless of the attitude of the National Government, the confiscation of large landlords' land must be carried out. The realization of this demand cannot rely solely on orders from the National Government; it also requires the peasants' own strength. However, for strategic reasons, the confiscation of large landlords' land should only be implemented after our Party has fully explained its stance towards small and medium landlords and the establishment of village self-government political power has begun. Confiscating the land of large landlords is the present duty of the peasant movement and must begin to be implemented in the recent [...] period.

7.  Over the past few months, within the developmental process of the revolutionary peasant movement, many unorganized actions have emerged. These actions, such as arbitrary arrests, punishments like wearing tall hats, parading through the streets, equal division of property, widespread fines, and bans on grain export ..., often implicate small landlords. Such unorganized actions naturally provoke opposition from officers and small landlords, causing them to unite with more well-off elements in the villages to carry out counter-revolutionary actions. Even within peasant associations, disturbances arise, with some peasants who own land conflicting with the peasant associations themselves. In some places, "moral campaigns" like prohibiting opium and alcohol have also been implemented, using coercive methods such as uprooting tobacco plants. As for general "property leveling" style confiscations and fine-like extortions, these even cause peasants to fight among themselves and provoke resentment among small merchants, leading to work stoppages and business strikes. Consequently, the financial and economic blockades imposed by imperialists, old and new warlords, and local bullies and evil gentry can more easily lead the petty bourgeoisie to jointly attack the peasant associations—because the village economy stagnates daily, eventually affecting the general economic [...] and commercial life within the territory of the National Government. These methods of unorganized struggle, all bearing the character of primitive Chinese poor people's uprisings, must be generally striven to be avoided, [...] and provided with correct guidance.

8.  However, those unorganized actions are, objectively, an inevitable phenomenon of the stormy period when the revolution first rises. These phenomena represent the fall and vacillation of the power and political authority of local bullies and evil gentry. Practically speaking, what is now needed is the direct establishment of peasant political power, moving from the stormy period into a period of consolidating the revolutionary victory—the period of peasant political power. The National Government's implementation of the policy of village self-government has been excessively slow, and to this day, it lacks the resolve to purge the feudal political power of the local bullies and evil gentry. Therefore, our Party should carry out the following duties:

    The peasant masses must serve as the backbone, uniting all oppressed people in the villages to thoroughly overthrow the forces of the gentry's feudal political power and establish village self-government. Confiscate the land of counter-revolutionaries and large landlords, satisfy the current demands of the poor peasants, and link the peasants' struggles in various localities with the National Government's overall struggle against imperialism and warlords, thereby building a deeper social foundation for the National Government. In summary, the main current duty is to establish a revolutionary peasant political power of village self-government, led by the peasants, using all possible and appropriate methods, in governmental form, to continue the struggle against local bullies, evil gentry, and large landlords.

    The significance of this new strategy for the peasant movement is: focusing on the struggle for peasant political power—this is what is most necessary for carrying out the agrarian revolution—and neutralizing the officers of the National Revolutionary Army and the small and medium landlords. It also means pushing the Left Wing of the Kuomintang to jointly support, with us, the peasants in carrying out the initial agrarian revolution of confiscating large landlords' land themselves.

    This strategy does not mean lowering the peasant movement; rather, it provides the peasant movement with even more conscious, correct guidance from the proletariat, leading the peasants to engage in a further struggle to consolidate the revolutionary victory.

9.  Therefore, the fundamental tasks of the peasant movement at present, and the tasks of our Party in guiding the peasant movement, are as follows:

    (1) Peasant associations must not only unite landless peasants, but must unite all levels of peasants who do not exploit others, in order to establish a revolutionary alliance. Moreover, small handicraftsmen, small merchants, primary school teachers, etc., should all be within this alliance.

    (2) According to the regulations promulgated by the Ministry of Agriculture and the policies decided by our Party, carry out the movement for village self-government and organize revolutionary peasant political power.

    (3) Disarm the local bullies and evil gentry, enabling the peasants to seize their arms, organize and consolidate the armed forces of the peasants (Peasant Self-Defense Corps). Members of the Self-Defense Corps should be drawn from the membership of the peasant associations. When village self-government political power is stable, the Peasant Self-Defense Corps shall be the sole governmental army in the villages (or perhaps called the Security Team), using a [...] conscription system to ensure that every revolutionary peasant receives military training.

    (4) Carry out preparatory work for reforming the land system: investigate the limits defining large landlords, collect necessary materials. Introduce KMT Party departments and their masses to participate in the movement for land system reform. Explain and propagate this issue among the peasant masses and the general populace.

    (5) Guide the struggle to improve the living conditions of poor peasants. Pay greater attention to the struggle to alleviate the exploitation of tenants. Implement a movement to reduce taxes and levies, propagate and demand the implementation of a unified, progressive agricultural tax. Study methods to improve the livelihood of hired farm laborers, and implement the establishment of consumer, credit, and production cooperatives.

    (6) Bring active elements from the peasantry into guiding work. Genuine peasants must not only participate more in the organs of township and district peasant associations but also participate in the executive committees of county and provincial peasant associations. Within the organs of peasant associations, the number of impoverished peasants who till the land should be greatly increased, making them the center of the associations.

10. The most dangerous malady of peasant associations at present is our Party's lack of Party guidance on many occasions.
    Party departments at all levels lack precise investigation into the situation of struggles in various places, the composition of peasant association organizations, and the composition of peasant association organs; they also lack clear observation of the tendencies among peasants of different classes; nor can they know in detail the number of peasant association members or the number of armed peasants. No locality has correct, collated materials.

11. The internal situation of the peasant associations is also unsatisfactory. A close relationship has yet to develop between the provincial, county, township, and district levels of associations. Some responsible personnel guiding the peasant movement are often accustomed to falsely reporting the numbers of peasant organizations and exaggerating the facts of peasant struggles—this practically makes correct, practical guidance difficult and hinders the determination of political policy. The guiding organs of the peasant movement lack the participation of genuine peasants and non-Party comrades; this is a major shortcoming. The composition of advisors in provincial and county peasant associations often consists only of intellectuals ignorant of rural conditions.

12. Therefore, our Party's organizational responsibilities for the peasant movement are:
    (1) The composition of peasant association organs must be examined, and training classes for non-Party members and genuine peasants must be established, to seek the active participation of ordinary peasants in the work of peasant associations, allowing the Party's guidance to penetrate deeply into the rural masses. Provincial peasant associations must actively pay attention to implementing this matter.

    (2) Introducing revolutionary Kuomintang members to participate in the work of the peasant movement has great significance. If the Kuomintang does not participate in the peasant association movement, then not only will the Kuomintang detach itself from the peasant associations, but the urban petty bourgeoisie will also follow suit and detach itself from the alliance with the peasant movement. Therefore, simultaneously, the Kuomintang organization must be developed among the peasants. Expand and strengthen the foundation of the KMT Left Wing in the villages.

    (3) Energetic efforts must be made to rectify the work of Communist Party groups. The Party groups within peasant associations and the leading Party organs (Party committees at all levels) must achieve a close relationship. Party organ departments at all levels should constantly pay attention to discussing the peasant movement, especially the Peasant Departments of provincial and county Party departments and the Party groups within peasant associations at all levels. Only in this way can correct guidance be prepared. Most importantly, efforts must be made to develop the Communist Party organization among the peasants, and the work of Party branches must be strengthened. The Party's guidance over the masses must be genuinely established—we must win over the masses who have traditionally been under the guidance of old-style secret societies (such as the Gelaohui, Qingbang, Hongbang, etc.).

Party departments at all levels, especially those in Hunan, Hubei, and Jiangxi, upon receiving this outline, must study it in detail, swiftly formulate concrete methods to implement this new strategy, and report the plans for applying this strategy to the specific conditions in each locality to the Central Committee. This is of the utmost importance.

Central Standing Committee: An Zhongyuan
Central Peasant Department: Zong Rongmin

(Letterhead abbreviated) For your consideration:

Xu Kexiang, under the pretext that the peasant and labor movement in Hunan has gone too far, besieged trade unions and peasant associations in Changsha on the 21st of last month, disarmed the workers' picket corps and peasant self-defense forces, massacred revolutionary comrades, dissolved the provincial party headquarters and the Third Branch of the Central Military and Political School, raided educational institutions, closed the Changsha Normal School, expelled and searched the residences of the Director of the Department of Construction and the Director of the Department of Education of the Hunan Provincial Government, seized 70,000 yuan in rice funds from the Hankou People's Food Maintenance Association, and, in imitation of the traitor Chiang Kai-shek, organized a so-called Provisional Special Committee for Party Salvation in order to undermine the peasant and labor movement at all levels of the party headquarters. Whether the movement has gone too far or not—what connection does it bear to the party headquarters and schools? Are the Director of the Department of Construction and the Director of the Department of Education also to be considered so-called thugs, to be subjected to expulsion and house searches? The seizure of rice funds from the Hankou People's Food Maintenance Association and the obstruction of transportation between Hunan and Hubei are particularly disruptive to the rear of the Northern Expedition. Even if such actions were attributed to misunderstanding, their violation of revolutionary discipline, defiance of military orders, and disobedience to the government are already abundantly clear! The result is not only the ruthless trampling of workers and peasants but also the utter destruction of the central authority's prestige! The provincial government, under duress, is virtually dissolved—this is an entirely counter-revolutionary act. In the early stages, the mass movement, like untrained recruits, can hardly avoid immature actions entirely, as is well understood by revolutionary comrades; revolutionary soldiers must never, on this account, distance themselves from the workers and peasants, let alone impose oppression under such a pretext. Even if there are opinions, party discipline and military discipline must be absolutely respected, and the matter submitted to the government for handling. The workers and peasants are the main force of the revolution, and the goal of the National Revolution is precisely to relieve the suffering of the workers, peasants, and all oppressed people. Therefore, our Party previously passed a resolution prohibiting armed attacks on peasants, and more recently issued orders to protect the workers' picket corps. How could Xu Kexiang deliberately violate laws and decrees by raising troops to attack workers