The political confiscation now being decided—of land belonging to tyrannical landlords, riffraff gentry, warlords, and the like—represents the first step. The next stage would be to confiscate all land that is leased out by owners who do not cultivate it themselves; this would be an economic measure. In Hunan, economic confiscation has already ceased to be a contentious issue: the peasants have proceeded to distribute the land among themselves. From a fiscal standpoint, however, without resolving the land question there is no viable course of action; there is simply no way forward. In Hunan, the warlords have been exploiting the peasantry. Even after the Nationalist Government took control of the province, it has still been unable fully to eliminate this exploitation. Owing to the ongoing war, the authorities have had no choice but to maintain the old policies, a situation that directly conflicts with the current revolutionary movement. If no solution can be found, the revolution is bound to fail. Under the present fiscal regime, registration taxes remain uncollected, substantial amounts of land tax go unpaid, and the myriad exorbitant and miscellaneous levies are virtually impossible to enforce. Therefore, the land question must be resolved. Settling this issue serves the interests of the revolution as a whole. Were Hunan to continue its current fiscal policy, annual revenues would amount to little more than ten million yuan (in 1925 they ranged from approximately fifteen to eleven million). Once the land question is settled, however, a land tax rate of ten percent alone could yield fifty-six million yuan, and if that rate were raised to fifteen percent, the fiscal difficulties would be immediately alleviated. Hence, in order to overcome these financial challenges, it is imperative to resolve the land question; otherwise, there is no way forward. It should be noted that the land of independent smallholders and middle peasants is not to be confiscated, whereas that of rich peasants is to be seized. For example, if five out of ten households are rich peasant families, their land must be redistributed to the remaining five. In Hunan, the peasants are already carrying out this redistribution on their own, convening meetings to make the allocations. Thus, considering the specific conditions in Hunan alone, political confiscation in its current form is insufficient; yet, viewed in general terms, only political confiscation can be employed. Accordingly, the Nationalist Government ought to issue a clear, comprehensive regulation to this effect, while simultaneously enacting special regulations tailored to particular regions, such as Hunan. Hubei cannot be compared with Hunan, nor can Henan be compared with Hubei; the appropriate solutions will naturally differ in each case. Consequently, attempting to move directly to economic confiscation often proves incompatible with objective realities… I have consulted China’s Land Survey, which presents a relatively reliable table and may serve as a useful reference.