The Development of the Hunan Peasant Movement A. The State of Development: Although the Hunan peasant movement has been underway for only a short time, reports from April of this year indicate that organized peasant associations now exist in sixty-three counties across the province, with over five million members and nearly ten million peasants actively participating.
The movement is concentrated primarily in the Xiang River basin, followed by the lake-region counties and the Zijiang River valley—areas of significant military and political importance.
Given their strategic value, these regions naturally became the initial focus of the movement as part of preparations for the Northern Expedition.
By contrast, western Hunan remains in its early stages due to poor transportation links and prolonged rule by warlords such as Yuan Zuming.
B. Causes of the Movement: The rise of the Hunan peasant movement was entirely a product of feudal warlord rule.
Warlord politics rested on the exploitation of the peasantry; the bulk of their revenue came from land taxes, salt taxes, miscellaneous levies, and customs duties—burdens ultimately borne by the peasants.
Under regimes led by Zhang Jingyao, Fu Liangzuo, Zhao Hengti, and Ye Kaixin, peasants endured relentless tax hikes, new customs posts, and ever-increasing fees, leaving them stripped bare.
Nine out of ten households were reduced to destitution.
To enforce this system of exploitation, the warlords colluded with corrupt officials, local gentry, and unscrupulous landlords, turning institutions like customs offices and transport bureaus into lucrative havens where officials could amass tens of thousands of yuan through embezzlement and extortion.
Meanwhile, the local gentry served as the grassroots foundation of warlord rule: they monopolized village governance, used private militias to carry out massacres, imposed exorbitant rents and usurious loans, and drove peasant livelihoods into an inescapable abyss.
The combined oppression of warlords, corrupt officials, and the local elite left peasants with but two choices: revolution or death—starvation, freezing to death, banditry, or outright slaughter.
During the Northern Expedition, the Kuomintang, the Nationalist Government, and the National Revolutionary Army conducted extensive propaganda emphasizing the interests of the peasantry, encouraging the formation of peasant associations and self-defense forces, the abolition of oppressive taxes and levies, and the prohibition of excessive rents and interest rates.
It was this campaign that spurred the desperate masses of Hunan into action.
C. The Main Force of the Peasant Revolution: Poor peasants, constituting the largest and most aggrieved segment of the rural population, were the driving force behind the movement.
Deprived of land and living in constant insecurity, they faced daily uncertainty about their next meal.
In the feudal order, they occupied the lowest rung of society, with starvation and death as their inevitable fates, making them inherently revolutionary.
Wealthier peasants showed little initial interest in the uprising, whereas poor peasants wholeheartedly embraced the KMT’s promises and promptly joined the peasant associations.
As such, poor peasants were the true founders of the movement and the backbone of the peasant forces that participated in the Northern Expedition.
In other words, they were the leaders of the Hunan peasantry and the principal force behind the movement.
One of the movement’s earliest contributions was its role in leading the peasants to join the Northern Expedition—a development of equal significance to the Canton–Hong Kong General Strike.
Just as the strike effectively blockaded Hong Kong, enabling the revolutionary government to “catch the thief at home” by eliminating Chen Jiongming, Deng Benyin, Yang Ximin, and Liu Zhenhuan before launching the Northern Expedition, the participation of Hunan peasants provided the army with vital momentum, allowing it to swiftly advance through Hunan and eventually capture Wuhan.
If the Canton–Hong Kong strike paved the way for the Northern Expedition, then the peasant movement made it possible.
When the Northern Expeditionary Force descended upon Hengyang, peasants in Liling, Liuyang, Pingjiang, Linxiang, and Huayong took up hoes and spears to engage directly in combat, forming reconnaissance units, comfort squads, and assault detachments to support the troops.
Many lost their lives in these efforts, while others distributed tea and porridge to sustain the soldiers throughout the province.
D. Resistance Against Local Gentry and Landlords: The lower echelons of warlord rule relied heavily on corrupt officials and the local gentry, who controlled village governments and militia forces to perpetuate feudal exploitation.
Consequently, any effort to overthrow the warlords had to extend beyond the military leadership itself and target these intermediaries as well.
For the peasants, liberation first required breaking free from the immediate domination of these oppressors.
The slogan calling for the overthrow of the local gentry was particularly resonant, as they were the direct agents of exploitation.
Peasants often referred to them as “those with teeth” or “those sitting on the long bench,” metaphors capturing their predatory practices and monopolization of village power.
In particular, peasants viewed the self-governing bodies controlled by these figures with greater fear and resentment than county governments or tax collection agencies, giving rise to terms like “the head office” or “the iron threshold.”
At present, the primary objective of the Hunan peasant movement remains the defeat of the local gentry, since the broader feudal establishment remains too powerful to challenge directly.
While some corrupt officials still retain influence in certain areas, the gentry have borne the brunt of the struggle, with far more of them having been removed than other elements of the feudal hierarchy.
That said, the actual scale of this campaign has not been as dramatic as commonly imagined: across the province, only a few dozen gentry members have been ousted, even as countless peasants fell victim to their brutal repression over the past two years.
Thus, while the movement continues to resist the gentry, it has yet to achieve their complete elimination.
Nevertheless, this resistance has already dealt significant blows to the feudal order in Hunan, toppling prominent figures such as Liu Zhao and Yang Zhize in Ningxiang, Yan Rongqiu in Xiangtan, Mei Shi in Huayong, and Yu Chihua in Changsha—men who held key positions within the gentry network.
The punishment of these major offenders has undoubtedly weakened the entrenched power structure, representing a major achievement of the peasant movement in the broader revolutionary process.
E. Building a New Era of Peace and Prosperity in the Countryside: No matter how vividly one might describe the turmoil plaguing Hunan’s rural areas, even the most powerful gentry leader would likely concede that the current situation is markedly more peaceful than under their own rule.
Since the late Qing dynasty, successive governments had repeatedly banned opium, yet under warlord rule, anti-narcotics bureaus often functioned as de facto drug dealerships.
Officials and gentry turned a blind eye to smoking in public, prosecuting only small-time users lacking connections.
The proliferation of exclusive opium dens in Wuhan and numerous talking shops in Guangzhou vividly illustrates the absurdity of these policies.
Despite decades of prohibition, opium use not only persisted but flourished.
However, in regions where the peasant movement gained traction, local authorities managed to eradicate it almost entirely within a remarkably short timeframe.
Following raids on gentry-owned opium dens and secret smoking sessions uncovered by township-level peasant councils, hefty fines were imposed on prominent citizens, many of whom had previously enjoyed considerable prestige.
As a result, no one dared to openly indulge in such activities anymore.
Similarly, gambling was stamped out through house-to-house searches conducted by youth groups, which confiscated mahjong tiles and other gaming equipment.
Traditional New Year celebrations, once marked by widespread gambling and boisterous festivities, have given way to more subdued events featuring lion dances, lantern parades, and public lectures.
Even notorious gamblers have been compelled to follow suit.
Foot-binding, once common across much of China, including the bustling metropolis of Wuhan, was also eradicated in remote parts of Hunan.
Today, female members of peasant associations can be seen walking barefoot or carrying spears through town alongside their fellow villagers.
Moreover, rural women have begun organizing small-scale workshops and cultivating fields independently.
Other initiatives have likewise won praise even from former opponents: repairing irrigation dams, constructing roads, and reclaiming wasteland.
Whenever a dam becomes blocked, the peasant council orders its clearing, compensating landowners fairly afterward.
Neglected rural roads are now being upgraded, transforming narrow paths into wide thoroughfares that greatly facilitate travel.
Recognizing the potential of unused hillsides and barren lands, the councils have arranged for impoverished farmers to lease and cultivate such plots.
These three projects—dam repair, road construction, and land reclamation—are all carried out by poor peasants, as determined by township-level peasant councils.
With unemployment virtually eliminated, incidents of theft have also disappeared, bringing Hunan’s villages closer to the ideal of secure homes and clean streets.
Additionally, evening schools have been established to combat superstition, converting temples dedicated to Guanyin and the God of Wealth into venues for educational lectures.
Statues of deities have been replaced with portraits of Sun Yat-sen, reflecting a shift toward rationalism.
Though scholarly elites may dismiss such efforts as mere rhetoric, ordinary peasants have demonstrated tangible results.
In sum, the peasant movement has ushered in a new era for Hunan’s countryside—an era characterized by democratic governance, industrial revitalization, improved customs, and unemployment relief.
Yet the peasants’ most pressing demand remains unchanged: “land nationalization,” which would fundamentally dismantle the economic foundations of feudalism and complete the economic revolution within the broader national undertaking.
Peasants are deeply committed to the revolution, yet they never lose sight of their ultimate goal.
Indeed, the revolutionary process has only intensified their longing for it.
Having surpassed the more advanced Guangdong province, the Hunan movement has emerged as a vanguard, clearly proclaiming “land nationalization” as its central banner—the very cornerstone of overturning feudalism.
Over the past few months, a popular slogan circulating among peasants has been “equal land distribution,” championed by poor peasants as a means of opposing land monopolization.
Most members of peasant associations, being poor themselves, advocate for allocating land based on the number of households in each locality.
However, this approach has proven impractical, leading to disputes over “land bans.”
Such conflicts arise precisely because poor peasants lack access to land.
Another widely circulated slogan, often dismissed as humorous by intellectuals, calls for the “abolition of unequal treaties” and “equality.”
For peasants, however, these so-called “unequal treaties” refer not to international agreements like the Treaty of Nanking or the Xinhai Treaty, but rather to exploitative lease contracts governing land tenure—for example, the infamous “seven shares for the landlord, three for the tenant” arrangement, along with arbitrary charges for deposit refunds, duck eggs, chicken eggs, and seasonal gifts known as “human relations.”
Tenants are also expected to perform unpaid labor during landlords’ weddings and funerals.
These oppressive practices are precisely what poor peasants believe the KMT and the Nationalist Government seek to abolish, making the call for “equality” seem paradoxical.
Yet it reflects a deeper desire for land reform, as these unequal terms leave poor peasants permanently excluded from securing arable land, trapping them in extreme poverty and rendering them uniquely motivated to join the revolution.
The peasants’ proposal for “equal land distribution,” however, remains unfeasible; even if implemented, it would address only the symptoms of the problem without resolving the underlying issue of land ownership, which remains concentrated in the hands of large landholders.
Consequently, rural economies continue to stagnate under feudal conditions.
This has prompted peasants to further advocate for “equality”—a principle articulated by Premier Sun Yat-sen in his famous dictum, “to each tiller, his own field.”
Sun had evidently anticipated the trajectory of the Hunan peasant movement.
The urgency surrounding land issues among Hunan peasants is palpable, manifesting most clearly in their campaigns against price gouging and export restrictions on grain.
Western European farmers typically hope for rising crop prices, as agricultural products often fetch lower returns than industrial goods, creating what is known as the “scissors gap.”
In Hunan, however, the situation is reversed: peasant associations actively suppress grain prices and prevent exports, a practice that, while unusual, underscores the fundamental nature of the land question.
Western European farmers are generally smallholders cultivating mechanized farms and thus resemble industrial workers, naturally aspiring to higher crop prices.
Chinese farmers, including those in Hunan, present a different picture: ninety percent of them are either landless or possess insufficient land, forcing them to purchase grain at inflated prices from wealthy landlords.
This stark contrast in attitudes toward grain pricing highlights the unique circumstances facing Hunan’s peasants, who instead seek lower, more affordable prices, driven by the pervasive burden of high rents and usury.
Measures such as price stabilization and export controls may indeed disadvantage landowning farmers, as they interfere with agricultural trade and strain government finances.
Nevertheless, these are fundamentally land-related issues, and meaningful solutions can only be achieved by addressing land ownership itself.
Only when every farmer has adequate land to cultivate will they naturally favor higher grain prices, obviating the need for such interventions.
At its inaugural provincial congress, the Hunan peasant movement adopted resolutions advocating “storing surplus grain locally” and “allowing unrestricted grain circulation,” despite repeated directives from the provincial peasant association to the contrary.
Faced with the urgent needs of starving poor peasants, who lacked viable alternatives to maintaining these measures, the movement resorted to mass mobilization to uphold them—actions that cannot substitute for genuine land reform.
As the majority of China’s population consists of farmers, Premier Sun Yat-sen famously declared that the success of the National Revolution depended on the active participation of both workers and peasants.
But how can peasants be truly engaged?
They must be provided with the resources necessary to take part.
The attitude of the peasantry serves as a critical indicator of whether the revolution will succeed or fail.
The Hunan movement has underscored the paramount importance of resolving the land question as the foremost item on the revolutionary agenda.
Four Obstacles Facing the Hunan Peasant Movement 1. The Offensive of the Local Gentry: I remain convinced that, at present, the movement has not yet succeeded in “overthrowing” the local gentry, but rather in resisting their oppression.
Many outsiders, unfamiliar with the realities of Hunan, tend to assume that the peasants have gone too far, executing scores of gentry members.
In truth, however, the situation is quite different.
As previously noted, only a handful of gentry leaders have been killed, whereas the number of peasants brutally murdered by them has been shockingly high—exceeding ten thousand during the reign of Zhao Hengti alone, under the guise of suppressing banditry.
Despite attempts to obscure this fact, everyone acknowledges the revolutionary fervor of the Hunan peasantry, yet few are aware of the extraordinary cruelty and cunning displayed by the local gentry, which surpasses that of any other region.
The primary obstacle confronting the movement today is the sheer number of gentry figures—thousands upon thousands—who stand opposed to it.
Between the peasants and the gentry exists a life-or-death struggle, with the entire gentry camp relentlessly targeting the movement.
There are six main fronts involved: 2. Utilizing Private Militias for Massacres: In Hunan, private militias have long been employed to suppress peasant resistance, serving as a crucial pillar of warlord rule, especially during the Zhao Hengti era.
For instance, the powerful Tong clan of Ningxiang, related by marriage to the ruling Zhao family, wielded immense influence over the county’s militia forces.
Under such arrangements, these armed groups effectively functioned as extensions of local landlords, becoming tools for arresting and massacring dissenters.
Whenever a gentry member gave the signal, peasants risked being “brought in”—a euphemism for summary execution.
In one notorious incident, Yang Zhize of Ningxiang orchestrated the killing of over four hundred people without facing any legal consequences.
Another case involved a dispute between two villages over a dragon dance performance.
Liu Zhao incited his supporters to attack residents of the opposing village, resulting in a violent clash.
An ironworker later cursed Liu for his actions, prompting him to dispatch his militia to apprehend the man.
On the mountain path leading to the temple, Liu ordered his men to gouge out the ironworker’s eyes, castrate him, and shove a metal rod into his mouth, shouting, “Do you still dare to curse me?”
The unfortunate man was subsequently executed after being dragged five li away.
The use of extralegal methods such as hanging half a pig, stepping on victims, forcing them onto “happy benches,” severing tendons, applying chili smoke, or suspending individuals upside down was commonplace among militia units, instilling terror in the populace.
Those who resisted such treatment often paid with their lives, or else suffered lifelong disabilities.
When the Northern Expeditionary Force passed through Hunan, militia units from Ningxiang, Xiangxiang, and Anhua gathered at Snow Peak Mountain to stage a final stand on behalf of the Zhao regime.
Under the direction of the local gentry, however, these militias served solely as instruments to counter the peasant movement.
In Jiashan County, the local militia chief refused to attend a ceremony marking the establishment of a party branch, prompting a group of farmers passing by to confront him about his absence.
Unwilling to explain himself, the officer opened fire, fatally shooting dozens of villagers on the spot, with many more injured.
In another incident, Wang Zemin, the militia chief of Jiahe County, hosted an illegal gambling session, drawing the ire of local peasants.
They stormed his headquarters, executing him and looting his property.
In Chaling County, militia officials secretly lured a student activist back to his hometown under the pretext of discussing the peasant movement, only to set him ablaze with kerosene and firewood, reducing his body to ashes and disposing of the remains to conceal their crime.
Furthermore, there have been multiple instances of militia units collaborating with bandits in an attempt to destroy peasant associations, occurring roughly once a month. 3. Collusion with Bandits: As the local gentry’s control over village governance began to erode following the rise of the peasant movement, their private militias gradually lost their effectiveness.
Many dissolved altogether, while those that remained came under the management of respectable figures.
Perceiving the continued threat posed by the associations, the gentry abandoned traditional tactics and turned to bandits as new allies.
In Anhua County, for instance, gentry members partnered with bandits to murder over a hundred peasants, a pattern documented in nine out of ten cases reported to the provincial peasant association.
These conspiracies typically involved drinking rooster blood, taking solemn oaths, and coordinating attacks aimed at annihilating association leaders and destroying the organization.
Through such schemes, the gentry succeeded in inflicting significant losses on the movement. 4. Formation of Counterrevolutionary Groups: Leveraging private militias and bandits represents only a temporary strategy.
To mount a more systematic counteroffensive, the gentry have established formal organizations designed to consolidate their forces and serve as command centers for counterrevolutionary operations.
For example, Xiangxiang County maintains a “Village Preservation Association,” while Hengyang hosts a “White Purification Party,” and Liling and Liuyang have formed “Three Loves Parties.”
Liling also boasts a “Dog-Beating Society,” whose members specifically target peasants.
The “Production Protection Party,” prevalent throughout central Hunan, comprises similar groups dedicated to combating the peasant movement.
Any act of violence against peasants or destruction of associations is orchestrated by these clandestine councils.
Although some of these networks have been exposed, they persist, continually devising new ways to undermine the movement.
In areas where local leadership is weak or absent, cunning gentry members infiltrate peasant associations, spreading misinformation and deliberately proposing unrealistic demands to disrupt the associations’ consistent policies or sabotage the revolution.
The loss of popular support for the movement can largely be attributed to the infiltration of spies planted by these gentry factions. 5. Creation of Puppet Associations: Aware that direct military suppression of the movement is futile and that their previous tactics have failed, the gentry have shifted to overtly endorsing it, hoping to co-opt it for their own purposes.
For a time, influential figures with vested interests frequently visited peasant associations, demanding the establishment of new branches in their respective hometowns or regions.
They invoked familial and regional ties as justification, leading to the proliferation of local associations that prioritized kinship and exclusion of outsiders.
Many gentry members have also sought to manipulate official recognition of their associations as special zones, thereby legitimizing their schemes to exploit the movement undetected. 6. Spreading Disinformation: Following their defeat in the peasant uprising, Hunan’s gentry fled to Shanghai, Hankou, and Changsha, establishing new strongholds from which they launched a relentless campaign of disinformation.
Despite evading justice, they remained committed to undermining both the peasant movement and the revolution itself.
Their most effective tactic was to disseminate outrageous rumors—such as claims that soldiers spent six months at the front without returning home, leaving their wives to be “shared” among association members, or that the assets of generals and division commanders were confiscated and their fathers executed—in order to sow discord between revolutionary soldiers and peasants and isolate the latter from broader revolutionary sympathies.
In Hankou, this counterpropaganda has reached particularly sophisticated levels.
Five Deficiencies of the Hunan Peasant Movement and Future Directions Revolutionaries do not shy away from acknowledging their mistakes; it is through continuous reflection and correction that they improve.
The Hunan peasant movement will never resort to the bizarre and inflammatory tactics employed by the gentry, such as fabricating stories about communal wives, because such errors stem from a lack of unified revolutionary strategy.
The primary oversight lies in the movement’s relative neglect of the interests of small landowners and merchants, despite their significant role in the broader struggle.
However, this failure is ultimately attributable to the revolutionary parties themselves, which have failed to provide adequate leadership and guidance to the peasantry.
Once oppressed for millennia, the peasantry inevitably exhibits certain naiveties in its actions.
Had the revolutionary parties effectively assumed leadership and formulated policies tailored to rural conditions, these shortcomings could have been avoided.
Regrettably, the movement has advanced rapidly while the parties lagged behind.
In Hunan, for example, it has proven exceedingly difficult to identify even a single revolutionary-minded peasant among hundreds, rendering it impossible to develop targeted policies that genuinely resonate with rural populations.
Going forward, our sole priority must be to intensify efforts to expand the KMT’s presence in the countryside, strive to secure the peasantry’s leadership, and vigorously implement the following six measures: 1. Confiscate all assets belonging to corrupt officials, the local gentry, and other counterrevolutionary elements. 2. Protect the land and property of revolutionary soldiers. 3. Safeguard the interests of small landowners and merchants. 4. Expedite the implementation of central policies pertaining to the peasant movement. 5. Establish democratic village governments. 6. Arm the peasantry.