——Changsha Dispatch, November 30, 1926——

(A) Organized Peasants at Present




(1) Statistics of County Peasant Associations

Officially established county peasant associations: 36 counties.

Counties with preparatory offices for peasant associations: 18 counties.

Total: 54 counties


(2) Population Statistics

I. Counted this month: 30 counties, 536,137 people.

Based on last month’s figures: 11 counties, 505,000 people.

Estimated without formal statistics: 13 counties, 30,000 people.

Total for 54 counties: 1,071,137 people.

II. Over 100,000 members—4 counties.

Over 50,000 members—6 counties.

Over 10,000 members—12 counties.

Over 5,000 members—12 counties.

Over 1,000 members—18 counties.

Fewer than 1,000 members—2 counties.


III. The county with the largest membership has 140,000 members.

The county with the smallest membership has 274 members.


IV. Membership Statistics by County

Notes:

A: Detailed reports available this month.

B: Estimated based on last month’s report.

C: No statistical data available.

D: Preparatory office of the county association.




Nan County A 7,000   Chaling A 11,266

Hengyang A 88,223   Dao County A 1,435

Zixing A 5,000   Luxi C 5,000

Suining A 1,100   Xiangfen B 100,000

Leiyang A 24,445   Qiyang B 50,000

Bin County A 10,000   Xiangxiang B 60,000

Liuyang A 139,190   ? BC 1,000

You County A 10,000   Changsha A 71,450

Liling A 50,000   Baoqing A Yun 3,777

Huarong A 10,000   Linxiang OC 5,000

HanShou A 7,229   Changning OC 5,000

Lanshan A 3,550   Ningde OC 1,000

Guiyang A 6,243   Anxiang OC 2,100

Xintian A 51,500   Xinning C 1,000

Ying County A 54,688   Xupu C 1,000

Yizhang A 74,183   Ningxiang B 50,000

Xiangyin A 176,000   XinHua OA 6,377

Yiyang A 156,800   Linyang OA 1,166

Anhua A 623,000   Yongming OA 2,181

Lingling A 700   Rucheng OA 8,865

Yueyang OA 20,700   Changde OA 95,450

Wugang OC 5,000   Zhijiang OA 274

Yuanjiang OC 1,000   Chengbu OA 889

? OC 1,000   Jiahe OC 1,000

Jiangping B 100,000   Taoyuan OC 1,000

Laiyang B 100,000   ? OC 1,000

Yongxing B 100,000   Feng County OD 2,549





(B) Peasants’ Participation in the Northern Expedition



I. Supply: Wherever the Northern Expeditionary Force passed, local peasants provided drinks and sometimes even food, cooking meals for the troops.

II. Guiding and Intelligence Gathering: This was common along the Zhuping Railway line, as well as in Liuyang, Pingjiang, Changsha, Xiangtan, Ningxiang, Hengshan, Nan County, and Huarong, among other places.

III. Transportation: In addition to individual peasants being hired by the army to carry supplies, organized groups also undertook transport duties for the military.

IV. Disrupting Enemy Rear Areas: Such activities occurred in Xiangtan, Pingjiang, Nan County, Liuyang, and along the Zhuping Railway corridor.

V. Direct Combat: While precise figures on casualties and captured weapons are unavailable, a general overview is as follows:

A. Zhuzhou: During the second Tang Army assault on Changsha, peasants joined forces with Ye’s troops, seizing over a hundred firearms, including machine guns and artillery.

B. Liling: When the Northern Expeditionary Force entered Changsha, peasants captured more than two hundred firearms and various pieces of heavy weaponry. Later, when remnants of the Jiangxi forces retreated into Liling in November, peasants again seized a large number of arms.

C. Pingjiang: In July, during the Northern Expedition’s advance into Pingjiang, twenty-five peasants were killed or wounded while engaging the enemy, capturing hundreds of rifles and several machine guns. In November, when a regiment mutinied, local peasants surrounded and disarmed the rebels, confiscating 250 firearms. The current government now seeks to reclaim these weapons, leading to ongoing tensions with the peasants.

D. Liuyang: Peasants rescued an encircled unit of the Northern Expeditionary Force, repelling retreating enemy troops. There were casualties on both sides, and numerous weapons were captured.

E. Huarong: On one occasion, when Cai Jian’s forces invaded Huarong, peasants cooperated with stationed troops to drive them back. A second time, over three thousand peasants independently defeated Cai’s army.

F. Yuanjiang: When Huarong first fought off Cai Jian’s forces, farmers from Yuanjiang participated.

G. Xiangtan: Peasants set up decoy units to assist the Northern Expeditionary Force in crossing rivers and attacking retreating enemy troops.

H. Ningxiang: They rescued an encircled Northern Expeditionary Force unit, attacked fleeing enemy soldiers, and captured weapons.

I. Along the Zhuping Railway: Clashes with enemy forces resulted in damage to railway lines.

[J]. Changsha: Peasants besieged and disarmed deserting officers, helping government forces round up rebellious troops.

VI. Reasons for Peasants’ Participation:

A. The influence of Communist Party propaganda; peasants understood that the Northern Expeditionary Force championed workers’ and peasants’ interests and that supporting its success would ultimately benefit them.

B. Deep-seated animosity toward Northern and Southern armies, exacerbated by comparisons of their respective discipline.

C. Direction by the Peasant Association (though some participation was voluntary).

D. By mid-September, many peasants were eager to join the fighting primarily to acquire firearms, as demands for peasant armament had begun to rise.

VII. Impact of Peasants’ Participation:

A. Advancement of peasants’ political consciousness.

B. Increased self-confidence among peasants.

C. Greater recognition by the government of peasant power, influencing its shift to the left.




(C) Current Trends Among Peasants



(1) Peasants now feel they have earned rewards for their wartime contributions; even in counties where no combat took place, there is a widespread belief that Party promises should be fulfilled.

(2) Economic Demands: These have become prevalent across all regions involved in the peasant movement, with the following being the most common:

I. Rent Reduction—there has not yet been a call for complete rent abolition among tenant farmers.

II. Interest Rate Reduction—peasants would be satisfied if interest rates could be lowered from eight or nine percent to four or five percent.

III. Resolution of Famine Food Shortages—this has led to widespread campaigns against speculative grain hoarding and price gouging.

IV. Tax and Levy Reduction—some areas have seen calls for tax exemption.

V. Deposit Reduction and Prohibition of Arbitrary Eviction—these issues have not yet gained clear traction.

These demands can be considered quite modest and immediate. In some locales, peasants are raising multiple concerns simultaneously, while in others only one or two are prominent. Farmers in southern Hunan, near Guangdong and Guangxi, tend to express higher-level economic aspirations compared to those in central Hunan.

(3) Political Demands:

I. Reform of Local Defense Units—peasants remain highly vigilant regarding officials in charge of these organizations.

II. Resistance Against Local Authorities—many local authorities have lost their legitimacy, resulting in frequent attacks on township heads.

III. Desire for a Better Government.

Both economic and political demands among peasants remain rather rudimentary. Slogans such as “election of county magistrates by popular vote” have yet to resonate with the peasantry, and even political aspirations are largely negative in nature. As for reactionary rumors about “land confiscation” or “establishment of a workers’ and peasants’ government,” these have virtually no basis in reality.

(4) Demand for Armament: The need for weapons among peasants is becoming increasingly urgent. Many seek to seize firearms from demobilized or rebel troops, as exemplified by the recent campaign in Pingjiang to retain captured arms (see previous section on combat participation), which has gained considerable momentum.




(D) Ongoing Peasant Struggles




(1) Rent Reduction Campaigns:

I. Hengyang Rent Reduction Movement: Officially, rents were split equally between landlords and tenants, but in practice, tenants rarely received half. Since 1916, due to flooding and increased education funding, rents throughout the county gradually rose. Although the increases varied, no area was exempt. As a result, what tenants actually kept fell far short of even fifty percent. Following Tang’s withdrawal from Hunan, peasants affiliated with the Peasant Association in Hengyang began pressing for substantial rent reductions. They launched a campaign to restore pre-1916 rental rates. Ultimately, the entire county reverted to those earlier rates. Approximately seventy thousand peasants joined the association during this movement. Simultaneously, counter-revolutionary elements coalesced within it. Notably, both association members and non-members participated in this effort.

II. Other Local Rent Reduction Efforts: Outside Hengyang, such initiatives were sporadic, often involving individual tenant–landlord negotiations. Whenever tenancy changed or land ownership transferred, rents tended to increase excessively, prompting tenants to request reductions. Many of these disputes were resolved through the Peasant Association, thereby strengthening peasants’ trust in it. Although these were not full-scale struggles, they did contribute to growing confidence in the organization.

III. Rent reduction remains a pressing demand nationwide, but as the harvest season has already passed, no major confrontations have occurred. Most peasants anticipate that next year will bring a decisive battle over this issue.


(2) Interest Rate Reduction Campaigns:

I. Anhua successfully implemented a county-wide interest rate cut without significant backlash, reducing rates from around 7–8 percent per month to 4–5 percent, which most peasants consider satisfactory.

II. A partial interest rate reduction campaign in Yueyang is still underway and appears likely to succeed.

III. A petition by farmers in Xiangyin seeking debt forgiveness was unsuccessful.

IV. Interest rate reduction efforts across various counties have generally proceeded without major conflict.


(3) Deposit Reduction Campaigns:

I. Liuyang achieved a county-wide reduction of deposits to two yuan per dan of grain rented, though whether this will lead to further conflicts remains uncertain.

II. In Yueyang, some lake landowners proposed increasing deposits by seven yuan per dan, prompting strong resistance from local farmers. The landowners responded by coordinating with neighboring county defense units, suggesting that this could escalate into a serious confrontation.

III. Smaller deposit reduction campaigns are ongoing in several counties.


(4) Tax Reduction Campaigns:

I. You County, Liling, and Yizhang have all undertaken tax reduction initiatives.

II. Anxiang abolished the per-mu tax across the entire county but replaced it with an additional land tax surcharge.

III. A movement in Yueyang calling for the abolition of both the per-mu tax and the local defense levy has yet to yield results.


(5) [Reclamation] of Barren Land Campaigns:

In Anhua, farmers are demanding the right to freely cultivate miscellaneous crops on uncultivated land during winter without paying rent. Some progress has been made, while other cases remain unresolved.


(6) Grain Price Control and Hoarding Prevention:

I. Background: Hunan has experienced repeated famines in recent years. Each lean season brings severe food shortages or soaring prices, prompting widespread peasant movements to prevent grain hoarding and stabilize prices.

II. Such efforts are now common in roughly 70–80 percent of areas with organized peasant groups, though the specific forms vary considerably. Examples include:

A. Decisions made by the Peasant Association or village assemblies setting maximum grain selling prices.

B. Establishing different price tiers for various types of grain, designating certain grades for household consumption.

C. Restricting the export of grain beyond county borders.

D. Completely prohibiting grain exports.

E. Postponing grain price discussions until after the lean season.

F. Allowing only a limited portion of harvested grain to be retained.

III. Conflicts arising from these measures:

A. Grain Boycotts: If landlords refuse to sell grain, peasants may resort to forceful requisitioning, facing fines or physical punishment.

B. Crackdowns on Illegal Transport: Seizure of illegally transported grain or imposition of penalties.

C. Disputes over grain pricing itself.

IV. Consequences: Both landlords and merchants have expressed strong dissatisfaction, while even large-scale farmers and tenant farmers are reluctant to continue this approach. With governments urging repayment of land taxes, landowners find it difficult to sell their produce, further frustrating authorities. Despite the provincial Peasant Association’s policy limiting grain retention to what is necessary for lean-season distribution and discouraging blanket hoarding bans, public sentiment remains deeply entrenched, making change challenging.


(7) Conflicts with Local Defense Units:

I. In Ningxiang, all local defense unit chiefs operating at the township level are now elected by village assemblies, and wherever Peasant Associations exist, villagers pay close attention to who is chosen.

II. Yueyang.

A. The local defense unit once prohibited villagers from holding meetings, leading to protests. Eventually, the unit was dissolved.

B. Peasants have been engaged in prolonged disputes with local defense units over tax collection, with no resolution yet.

C. Two separate clashes with defense units resulted in the deaths of over ten peasants.

III. In Jiahe, local defense forces have shot and killed peasants.

IV. In Guiyang, counter-revolutionary elements colluded with defense authorities to deploy troops, forcibly dissolving a peasant association.

V. In Zixing, the local defense unit forced the reorganization of a peasant association.

VI. In Xiangtan, peasants clashed with defense forces, resulting in one fatality.

VII. In Yueyang, the local defense unit prohibits villagers from forming associations.

VIII. Across the province, similar conflicts between peasants and defense units are frequent, often ending in favor of the latter.


(8) Conflicts with Local Gentry and Petty Bourgeoisie:

Peasants’ confrontations with local gentry and petty bourgeoisie occur almost everywhere. These elites intensify their attacks on peasants daily, while peasants respond with violence, lawsuits, public shaming, fines, and expulsion. Such clashes typically erupt because of the gentry’s aggressive behavior towards the peasantry.



(E) Situation of Rural Governance



(1) In some villages, the Peasant Association has effectively taken control of local administration.

(2) Village assemblies have been established in many counties and serve as the highest legislative bodies at the village level. In a few counties, positions such as head of the local defense unit and village chief can also be filled through elections held by these assemblies.

(3) In a small number of areas, joint organizations comprising Peasant Associations, teachers’ unions, chambers of commerce, and labor unions have assumed rural governance roles.

(4) In many regions, however, local Nationalist Party branches hold sway, either sympathizing with or actively supporting the peasant movement.

(5) In most areas, local gentry and petty bourgeois still dominate, oppressing the peasantry. Where Peasant Associations exist, conflicts frequently arise.




(F) Peasant Self-Defense Organizations



(1) In southern Hunan counties, encouraged by Tang Shengzhi, neighborhood defense teams have been organized. Although these groups are nominally led by local gentry and landlords, their rank-and-file members and lower-level commanders are predominantly peasants. In areas where Peasant Associations already exist, such teams form naturally with little effort. These neighborhood defense teams are unarmed, relying mainly on spears, shotguns, and sabers. They conduct regular drills, for which each participant pays a nominal fee—about 500 wen per session. Similar organizations also exist in central Hunan counties like Pingjiang, Liuyang, and Changsha, but they are less widespread and lack drill fees. These teams played a significant role in the recent fighting and bandit suppression. Their exact membership numbers are unknown.

(2) Apart from neighborhood defense teams, Hunan peasants currently lack other formal self-defense organizations. Previous attempts to establish peasant militias or self-defense corps were abandoned due to insufficient funding.

(3) In Pingjiang, Anhua, Liling, Xiangtan, and other areas, peasants have managed to seize a small number of firearms—Pingjiang alone reportedly secured 250 weapons, though the status of these remains unresolved—which could potentially be used for self-defense purposes.




(G) Sabotage of the Peasant Movement by Local Gentry and Reactionaries



Local gentry and all counter-revolutionary forces are increasingly coordinating their efforts. Their attacks on the peasant movement take various forms:

1. Secret organizations such as the Wealth Preservation Society, Property Protection League, and White Purge Party, alongside openly formed entities like district councils and township federations.

2. Propaganda claiming that the Peasant Association plans to impose conscription and poll taxes, or that Wu Peifu will execute dissenters to intimidate peasants into staying away from the association.

3. Spreading false rumors that the Peasant Association is communist and advocates a “three-three-one” system.

4. Establishing fake peasant associations and issuing declarations promoting the “three-three-one” scheme.

5. Infiltrating legitimate peasant organizations to manipulate them, and if that fails, deliberately sowing chaos.

6. Buying off, inciting, or promoting local customs, patriarchal ideologies, and superstitions to turn peasants against the Peasant Association.

7. Embedding themselves within the Nationalist Party apparatus to oppress peasants and hijack the Peasant Association.

8. Publicizing the supposed failure of the Northern Expedition.

9. Colluding with right-wing politicians like Zhao and Sun.

10. Staging mock peasant uprisings to disrupt tax collection offices, aiming to erode public sympathy for the peasant movement.

11. Directly exploiting local defense mechanisms to oppress peasants, massacre them, and dissolve peasant associations.

All these sabotage tactics appear to be systematically coordinated across different regions.