The peasant question is the central issue of the National Revolution; if the peasantry does not rise up to participate in and support the National Revolution, the revolution will not succeed. Unless the peasant movement is rapidly launched, the peasant question cannot be resolved. And unless the peasant question receives a proper solution within the current revolutionary movement, the peasants will not rally behind this revolution. Yet even now, many people—within the revolutionary party itself—still fail to grasp these fundamental truths. They do not understand that, in an economically backward, semi-colonial country, the primary target of revolution is the patriarchal-feudal class in the countryside—the landlord class. In such a country, imperialism and its ruling class chiefly oppress and exploit the peasantry. Their ability to carry out this oppression depends entirely on the feudal landlords’ unwavering support; without it, they would be unable to extract wealth from the masses. Therefore, the feudal class in the rural areas of an economically backward, semi-colonial nation constitutes the sole, solid foundation for both the domestic ruling class and foreign imperialists. As long as this base remains unshaken, its superstructure can never be toppled. China’s warlords are merely the leaders of this rural feudal class. To speak of overthrowing the warlords while leaving the rural feudal order intact is to confuse priorities—a clear example can be seen in Guangdong: wherever local tyrants, ruffians, and corrupt officials have been forced into retreat, it has invariably been in counties where the peasant movement has gained momentum and large numbers of peasants have joined the Peasant Associations. In other words, the districts where Chen Jiongming’s influence has waned are precisely those where the peasantry has risen up. Let us state this plainly: a year ago, Guangdong belonged to Chen Jiongming; the revolutionary government virtually had no foothold there. Over the past year, however, the revolutionary government and Chen Jiongming have come to share control over Guangdong, even though Chen himself is no longer present within the province. Going forward, only when the peasantry across Guangdong’s various counties gradually rises up will we be able to confirm that Chen Jiongming’s power is indeed being steadily eroded throughout the region. In Chen Jiongming’s native county of Haifeng—historically a hotbed of local tyrants, ruffians, and corrupt officials—the establishment of a county-level Peasant Association comprising 50,000 households and 250,000 members has brought about a level of governance far superior to that found in any other county in Guangdong. The county magistrate dares not engage in wrongdoing, tax collectors refrain from extorting extra fees, banditry has disappeared, and instances of local bullies oppressing the populace have almost completely ceased. From this we can see that the crux of the Chinese revolution lies in the antagonism between two opposing forces: on one side, the imperialist-warlord alliance, propped up by local tyrants, ruffians, and corrupt officials who suppress the peasantry; and on the other, the revolutionary forces, whose strength derives from the peasantry rising up to challenge and dismantle that very same network of oppressors. There exists no alternative form of revolution in China. Only when every corner of the country achieves conditions comparable to those in Haifeng can we truly claim victory for the revolution; otherwise, whatever progress may seem to have been made remains illusory. Similarly, only when the foundations of the imperialist-warlord regime are genuinely shaken across the board can we assert that the revolution has made substantial headway; otherwise, such claims remain hollow. It follows, then, that the so-called National Revolutionary Movement is, in essence, a peasant movement. Consequently, anyone who disregards—or worse, despises—the peasant movement is, in reality, sympathetic to the interests of local tyrants, ruffians, and corrupt officials; in effect, such a person opposes both the overthrow of the warlords and resistance to imperialism.

Some argue that the rampant power of the comprador class in the cities is entirely analogous to the dominance of the landlord class in the countryside, and that the two should be considered together. While it is true that both groups exert considerable influence, their situations are not identical. The comprador class is concentrated primarily in a handful of coastal and riverine cities—Hong Kong, Guangzhou, Shanghai, Hankou, Tianjin, Dalian—and its sphere of influence is far more limited than that of the landlord class, which extends throughout all provinces and villages of China. Politically, the major and minor warlords nationwide are all drawn from the ranks of the landlord class (excluding bankrupt smallholders), serving as its representatives. These feudal landlords, in turn, rely on urban compradors to curry favor with imperialist powers; in practice, however, it is the warlords who hold the real leverage, with the compradors playing a subordinate role. Financially, the annual expenditures of warlord governments amount to tens of millions of yuan, ninety percent of which is directly or indirectly extracted from peasants subjected to the yoke of the landlord class. By contrast, the comprador class—represented by banks and trade unions—provides only limited credit to the Beijing government under conditional terms. For this reason, I believe that workers, students, and small merchants in urban areas ought to unite in vigorously confronting the comprador class and directly challenging imperialism. The progressive working class, above all, should assume leadership among all revolutionary elements. Nevertheless, without the peasantry rising up in the countryside to shatter the privileges of the patriarchal-feudal landlords, the combined forces of the warlords and imperialists will never be fundamentally overthrown.

For these reasons, in addition to our ongoing work organizing workers, students, and small merchants, our comrades must resolve en masse to undertake the immense task of mobilizing the peasantry. We need to immediately commit ourselves to studying the peasant question, seek authorization from the Party, and set out for familiar or unfamiliar rural communities—braving the scorching summer sun or braving bitter winter winds—to join hands with the peasants, inquire about their sufferings and aspirations, and guide them toward organization. We should encourage them to struggle against local tyrants and corrupt officials, to collaborate with urban workers, students, and small traders in building united fronts, and to participate actively in the anti-imperialist, anti-warlord National Revolutionary Movement. Our projections indicate that, among China’s more than three hundred million peasants, if just one-tenth were to join the Peasant Associations, we could assemble a force of over thirty million organized peasants. Special emphasis should be placed on several politically pivotal provinces: Guangdong and Jiangxi in the south, Zhili, Shandong, and Henan in the north, and Hubei and Anhui in the central region. Once the peasantry in these key provinces gains momentum, the remaining regions will naturally follow. Only then can the foundations of the imperialist-warlord regime be truly shaken, and can the National Revolution achieve genuine victory.

When it comes to researching the peasant question, we find ourselves severely lacking in relevant materials. Naturally, the availability of such resources will grow richer as the peasant movement develops further. At present, however, peasant movements elsewhere outside Guangdong are still in their infancy, leaving us with an exceptionally meager supply. In this volume, we have compiled what little material could be gathered, presenting it as a reference for comrades engaged in peasant work across the country. One section consists of surveys of rural conditions conducted by over three hundred students attending the sixth session of the Peasant Movement Training Institute. These surveys were discussed within each student’s respective provincial research group on peasant issues and underwent careful review before publication. Prior to this, detailed studies of rural conditions were scarce; accordingly, the information presented here is necessarily broad and general. Even so, having at least some preliminary data is preferable to having none at all, and we regard this compilation as a valuable starting point. Over time, we intend to build upon these initial outlines, drawing on practical experience and field observations to produce a comprehensive, concrete national survey. Regarding materials on agricultural production, this book contains only five items (nos. 22–26). While resources on this topic are not particularly scarce, hasty preparation prevented us from including more. Additional compilations on this subject are planned for future publication. The peasant question encompasses two main dimensions: the artificial pressures imposed by imperialist warlords and the landlord class, and the natural adversities faced by farmers, such as floods, droughts, pestilence, and poor agricultural techniques leading to reduced yields. Although the former represents the more pressing concern at present and rightly commands our immediate attention, the latter is equally grave, and we must address it proactively. Resolving the latter will require a revolutionary government backed by scientific methods—an undertaking that cannot be accomplished overnight, but for which the time is fast approaching, and for which we should begin preparing now. This volume includes eight sections devoted to Guangdong, constituting its most substantive portion. These materials elucidate the methods of peasant mobilization, offering guidance to those unfamiliar with how to organize such a movement. They also shed light on the nature of the Chinese peasant movement, revealing it to be a class struggle that integrates political and economic struggles. Notably, its political dimension sets it apart from urban labor movements. Urban workers today primarily seek full freedom of assembly and association, without yet aiming to immediately dismantle the bourgeois political order. In contrast, rural peasants confront head-on the centuries-old power wielded by local tyrants and major landlords to oppress them—that is, the very foundation of the warlord regime. Without overturning this oppressive system, peasants cannot attain genuine agency. This distinctive feature defines the current phase of the Chinese peasant movement. Having observed peasant movements across the country over the past five years, and having studied documents such as the resolutions of the Guangdong Peasant Congress, the report on the Haifeng peasant movement, and the accounts of two peasant uprisings against landlords in Guangning and Puning, we are compelled to reflect further. The book also includes a small selection of foreign materials (nos. 15–18), though these are quite limited. Countries like Russia possess abundant literature on peasant movements and agrarian economics, yet much of it remains untranslated. Among these, the essay on Russian peasants and the revolution stands out as relatively detailed, providing a useful point of comparison with the Chinese context.

(Reprinted from a facsimile held by the Jiangxi Provincial Museum)