Announcement of the Chinese Guomindang
to All Party Members Throughout the
Country and Overseas Explaining the
Tactics of the Revolution
(December 4, 1925)

For the consideration of party branches at all levels, and of all comrades throughout the country and overseas: Ever since the time when the former Director
General was still alive, we observe that revolution has had a long but unsuccessful history. When it was resolutely decided to reorganize our party, already at
that time there were a band of good-for-nothing rightist party members who
wanted to avoid genuine revolution, for they knew that reorganization and renovation were not advantageous for thieving idlers, monopolists, and those who
seek office in order to enrich themselves. They obstructed it in every possible
way, and after the First National Congress decided on revolutionary tactics,
people of that ilk, knowing that obstruction could not in the end prevail, openly
rebelled. Feng Ziyou, Ma Su, and others colluded with Duan Qirui and Zhang
Zuolin, and formed a group urging them on. After Yang Ximin and Liu

This text does not bear Mao's name, but according to a handwritten copy from the
Guomindang archives it was drafted by him in his capacity as acting head of the Propaganda Department on November 27, 1925. It was approved by the Central Executive
Committee of the Guomindang on December 4 and published on December 5, 1925, in
the first issue of Zhengzhi zhoubao. It also appeared on the same day in the Guangzhou
Minguo ribao. The latter version omits the reference to tactics in the title and emphasizes
three brief passages by setting them in large characters. It also contains minor typographical errors. Our translation follows the text as printed in Zhengzhi zhoubao.
1. Feng Ziyou (1882-1958), zi Jianhua, was born in Yokohama of parents from
Guangdong. In Japan he organized the Youth Society, joined the Tongmenghui, and was
an anti-Qing activist. In 1914 Sun Yatsen sent him to the United States to take charge of
affairs there, and on his return to China in 1917 he was elected to the Beijing Senate as a
representative of overseas Chinese. Although present at the First Guomindang Congress
in January 1924, he was excluded from higher party councils because of his strong
opposition to Sun Yatsen's policy of cooperation with the Chinese Communist Party.
After Sun's death he played a leading role in setting up the Guomindang Comrades' Club,
the group alluded to here, which was on friendly terms with the militarists and politicians
in Beijing. Ma Su was also an early associate of Sun Yatsen, who had been his personal
representative in Washington at one time. He, too, had opposed Sun's policy of collaboration with the Communists and had joined in setting up the Comrades' Club.


Zhenhuan had colluded with British imperialism to cause trouble in the rear,²
Liang Hongkai, Zheng Runqi, Mo Xiong, Zhu Zhuowen, and others acted even
more ruthlessly in savagely assassinating our brave Comrade Liao Zhongkai.³
Thus they sought to overturn the Guangzhou revolutionary base at a single
stroke. At this juncture, when the existence or ruin, the disappearance or survival
of our party are at stake, we cannot but take the sternest measures against those
party members who have betrayed the party, in order to preserve our party's
revolutionary position. Fortunately, we can rely on the prestige of the former
Director General's revolutionary spirit,⁴ and on the resolute and courageous
efforts of all the comrades. In June of this year, we swept away Yang and Liu,
and in September we eliminated⁵ all the traitors of the Liao affair. Thus the
Guangzhou base was returned from danger to security, and the cause of revolution, after a detour, returned to its old course. Thus our unity was tempered, and
further advances could be expected. We did not provide for the fact that those
people, with their unspeakably evil hearts, would once again collude with Xiong
Kewu in an attempt to take Guangzhou from north of the river, attacking from
three directions, together with Chen Jiongming and Deng Benyin, under the

2. Yang Ximin, commander in chief of the Yunanese forces, and Liu Zhenhuan, who
commanded a small army from Guangxi, had participated in the struggle to retake
Guangzhou from Chen Jiongming in 1923, after which they never left the Guangzhou
area. In order to conciliate them, Sun Yatsen had given them high positions within the
Guomindang, but they were uninterested in revolution. Their monopolization of revenues
and collection of opium and smuggling taxes made them extremely unpopular. They
occupied a key position in Guangzhou at the time of the May 30th Incident, because most
of the other Guomindang forces were in eastern Guangdong, pursuing the campaign
against Chen Jiongming. They sought an understanding with the British and refused to
allow antiforeign demonstrations in the city, thus causing "trouble in the rear." Troops
from the Eastern Expedition thereupon returned to fight them, and in a battle lasting from
June 6 to June 12 both generals were defeated and forced to flee to Hong Kong.
3. Regarding the assassination of Liao Zhongkai, see above, the note to Central Circular no. 15 of July 21, 1924. For Zheng Runqi and Mo Xiong, see above, the note to the
Manifesto of the First Guangdong Provincial Congress of the Guomindang, dated October
26, 1925. Liang Hongkai (1887-1956), zi Jingyun, was a native of Guangdong. An early
member of the Tongmenghui, he became commander of the first Guangdong army in
1924. In 1925, he was imprisoned for three years, on suspicion of complicity in Liao
Zhongkai's murder. Zhu Chao (?-1936), zi Zhuowen, a native of Guangdong, was a
veteran follower of Sun Yatsen who had participated in the establishment of the
Gemingdang (Revolutionary Party) in 1913. In the early 1920s, he was involved in aviation in Guangdong. The circumstances surrounding Liao's death have never been fully
elucidated, but apart from Liang, the four persons mentioned here are not commonly
regarded as among the main culprits.
4. Here, and wherever they appear subsequently in this text, the three characters xian
zongli (the former Director General) are preceded by a blank space—the equivalent of
elevating each mention of Sun to the top of the next line as a sign of respect.
5. The term translated "eliminate," suqing, is the same one Mao used in the 1950s to
designate the Movement to Eliminate Counterrevolutionaries.

command of British imperialism, in the hope of destroying our revolutionary
forces.⁶ Once again, thanks to our comrades' united efforts, within two months
these obstinate enemies approaching from three sides were eliminated and the
forces of revolution were strengthened. At this time, a small number of comrades
in Beijing once again announced the convening of the Fourth Plenum of the
Central Executive Committee.⁷ Now it would appear that, in accordance with the
decision reiterated at the Third Plenum of the Central Committee on May 21 and
May 23, the Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee can only be held in
Guangzhou. For it has long been decided that the Second National Congress
should meet in Guangzhou, and also that a Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee should be held to prepare resolutions for the Congress. On October 30, the
Central Committee decided that the Fourth Plenum should be convened three
weeks before the national Congress. This being the case, and Guangzhou being
our party's revolutionary base, whereas Beijing is a place where warlords
and counterrevolutionaries gather and exert great pressure, and given that
the Congress is public in nature, how can we reject Guangzhou and go to
Beijing?⁸ Manifestly, a band of party members who oppose the party has seized
a fraudulent occasion and is egging on a minority of Central Committee members whose revolutionary convictions are wavering, with a view to actions that
are not in the interest of our party. One of them is Zou Lu. Now we observe that
in our party, from its reorganization to the present, reactionary party members
from Feng Ziyou to Zou Lu have consistently attacked our party and its government; they have uttered accusations such as "Communism," "uniting with Russia," "accepting Communist elements," "supporting Communism" and so on.
This is a tactic used by the imperialists and the warlords to sow dissension
within the alliance of all the classes for the national revolution. Since our
comrades have no affinity with the imperialists and the warlords, they
should not aid their propaganda, thereby causing confusion in the national
consciousness. Moreover, facts are facts, and these rumors cannot survive for
long. For uniting with Russia, and accepting Communists, are important tactics
of our party in pursuing the goal of victory in the revolution. The late Director
General was the first to decide on them, and after they were adopted at the First
National Congress, they had an objective basis and a profound justification.
Now, today's revolution is an episode in the final decisive struggle between the

6. For another reference to the "three-cornered uprising" of Chen, Deng, and Xiong,
see the "Manifesto of the First Guangdong Provincial Congress" of October 26, 1925.
7. Regarding this announcement, in a telegram of November 6, 1925, from Lin Sen
and others, see also, above, "The Central Executive Committee of the Chinese
Guomindang Sternly Repudiates the Illegal Meeting of Beijing Party Members," dated
November 27, 1925.
8. The passage in bold is emphasized in the Minguo ribao text by setting it in doublesized characters.
9. This passage is also set in big type in the Minguo ribao version of the Chinese text.

two great forces of revolution and counterrevolution in the world. It is different
in nature from all other revolutions in history. Consequently, the progress of the
revolution is naturally different as regards its tactics. Today imperialism has long
since banded together to exercise pressure on our party. If our party's revolutionary strategy does not take as its starting point union with Soviet Russia; if it does
not secure the great masses of the worker and peasant classes as its foundation; if
it does not accept the Communists, who advocate the interests of the peasants
and workers; then the revolutionary forces will sink into isolation, and the revolution will not be able to succeed. The reason our party could not achieve victory
in the 1911 Revolution is that at the time, the counterrevolutionary forces were
united on an international basis, whereas the revolutionary forces of our party as
yet belonged to no international union. Moreover, within our country, a great
mass basis had not yet been called into being, and we were reduced to isolation
and therefore were obliged to accept compromises, which ultimately led to defeat. Things having reached the point where they are today, how can we follow
along in the same old track? Those imperialists and militarists are truly terrified
lest we adopt revolutionary tactics, and they seek on every hand to sow dissension and to sabotage us, with the aim of making our party lose all its friends and
allies inside and outside the country, and of placing us once more in our previous
isolated situation. Thus the cause of revolution could never triumph, and those
people would finally realize their dream of ruling China forever. Their scheme is
truly as venomous as this. A small group of our comrades, making inadequate
observations, has always been fooled by these divisive policies. Most of the
disruption within the party over the years originates with this. We must recognize that in today's situation, he who is not for the revolution is for counterrevolution. There is absolutely no neutral ground in the middle. But if you want
revolution, you must unite with all revolutionary factions internationally and
within the country. Only if you unite as one can you fight the decisive battle
against counterrevolution without being defeated. Otherwise, there is no way you
can avoid defeat. Not only will you be defeated, but you yourself might fall into
the danger of sinking into counterrevolution. The cases of all those party members who have betrayed the party, from Feng Ziyou to Zou Lu, are proof of this.
The matter of this meeting in Beijing has already been the subject of a severe
warning from this committee,¹⁰ and it has moreover been decided that the Second Congress will meet on January 1 of next year. On December 11 of this year,
the Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee will meet in Guangzhou. We have
already telegraphed to all members of the committee in Beijing and Shanghai
urging them to come south on that day to participate in the meeting. The majority
of the committee members are of the same mind, so originally there was no
problem at all. Recently, however, rumors have been rife inside and outside the

10. The reference is no doubt to the telegram of the Central Executive Committee
dated November 27, 1925, already cited above.
party, many of them arising from failure to understand our party's policy. Consequently, we are sending this circular telegram to comrades everywhere
throughout the country, regarding the process of struggle with counterrevolution since reorganization and the revolutionary principles adopted by the
former Director General. We hope that every comrade will support the Director General's views and will not be misled by heterodox doctrines.¹¹ The
future of the revolution depends unequivocally on this. The present announcement is sent to make this known to you.

The Central Executive Committee of the
Chinese Guomindang
December 4 of the fourteenth year of the
Republic of China

11. Emphasized in the *Minguo ribao* version.