Propaganda Guidelines of the
Chinese Guomindang in the War Against
the Fengtian Clique

(November 27, 1925)

Because of the importance of the war against the Fengtian clique, a war which is
by nature one episode in the national revolutionary movement against British
and Japanese imperialism, the Propaganda Department of the Central Executive
Committee of the Chinese Guomindang [instructs] party offices in every locality
and at every level immediately to direct all comrades to engage in widespread
propaganda so that the people of the whole country may understand the causes
and objectives of this war. We have specially prepared an outline for this propaganda, which begins with an analysis of various aspects of the war against the
Fengtian clique, then puts forward the main themes of propaganda, and finally
lists nine slogans. Proposed by Department Head Mao Zedong,¹ this was passed
at a meeting of the Central Executive Committee on November 27. The complete text follows.²

A. Analysis of Various Aspects of the War Against the Fengtian Clique

1. The Imperialists. Last year's war between the Fengtian and Zhili cliques
resulted from the attempt by the British and American imperialists to use the
Zhili clique to unify China and drive out the influence of the Japanese imperialists. Hostilities broke out in the form of the Jiangsu-Zhejiang war, in which
the American imperialists were seeking to gain a monopoly on the loans to
Jiangsu for radio telegrams and prevent Japan from providing the loans. At the
time, therefore, the United States and the pro-American faction put every effort

These guidelines appeared in the Guomindang organ Zhengzhi zhoubao, No. 1, December
5, 1925. Our source is the version reproduced in Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 1, pp. 101-7.
into helping Qi Xieyuan, while Japan and the pro-Japanese faction worked hard
to support Lu Yongxiang. 3 The present war against the Fengtian clique is a direct
continuation of this, with Japanese imperialism standing behind the Fengtian
clique and American imperialism standing behind the Zhili clique. As for the
British imperialists, having discovered following the Fengtian-Zhili war last year
just how useless the Zhili clique was, they had no choice during the nationwide
May 30th movement against the British but to make every effort to compromise
with Japan and use large bribes to induce Zhang Zuolin to suppress the
anti-British movement in Shanghai. Afterwards, it is rumored that Britain gave a
huge sum of money to help the Fengtian clique expand the Fengtian armaments
factories with the intent to use the Fengtian clique to unify China. At this point,
since the increase in troops in Shanghai under Yang Yuting, governor of Jiangsu,
and the conference on customs duties held in Beijing were to the advantage of
Zhang Zuolin, it was inevitable that the Zhili clique would soon be in trouble. In
the present war, it is still difficult to judge with certainty whether the crafty
British imperialists are helping the Fengtian clique or whether they are helping
the Zhili clique. Most likely, in its plan to resist the United States, Japan would
prefer to draw Britain into joint control over Zhang Zuolin. But if and when they
discover that the situation does not favor Zhang Zuolin, and that their old servant
Wu Peifu might be victorious, it is entirely conceivable that, in order to consolidate their sphere of influence in the Yangzi River basin, they would discard their
new favorite and associate again with their old friend. Thus the attitude of British
imperialism is to see which side has the greater chance of success and then to
help that side.

2. The Warlords. In the confrontation between the Zhili and Fengtian cliques,
the territory held by the Zhili side includes the seven provinces of Hunan, Hubei,
Jiangxi, Anhui, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Fujian. Sichuan under Yuan Zuming and
Guizhou, which is under Yuan Zuming's control, also belong nominally to the
Zhili clique. But each of these provinces has its own individual internal factions,
and a split between Wu Peifu and Sun Chuanfang is inevitable. While the war
against the Fengtian clique was raging, Sun and Wu naturally had to ally with
each other in the fight, but now that the fighting has stopped the signs of division
are already appearing, and when Zhang Zuolin and the Fengtian clique are defeated there can be no doubt that they must split. As for the Fengtian clique, it

has always had two factions, the old and the young. Ever since the defeat of the
Zhili faction last year, the internal struggle over the distribution of power has
become more and more severe. They are financially bankrupt, and the Fengtian
currency has fallen by more than 50 percent. The earlier seizure of Zhili,
Shandong, Jiangsu, and Anhui was an attempt to solve the financial problem. At
present, Jiangsu and Anhui have already been lost, and because of the threat of
the National People's Army, they will not be able to hold Shandong and the
Zhili section of the Beijing-Hankou railroad. Their financial resources south of
the Great Wall are exhausted. The several hundred thousand underfed troops
assembled in the vicinity of Shanhaiguan would be useful for a short war, but
they could not hold out for long. No matter which of these two warlord cliques
wins out, Fengtian or Zhili, it will be bad for China, for behind both of them
stand vicious imperialisms. During the nationwide anti-Fengtian movement, the
Zhili clique must, of course, be considered one participant in the common cause
of resisting our present powerful enemy. After the fall of the Fengtian clique, the
power of the people will liquidate the Zhili clique; this is a tactical necessity.

3. Political Tendencies. In the present war against the Fengtian clique, the
political factions whose attitudes should be watched are the Anfu clique, the
Research clique, the Federalist clique,& the New Foreign Affairs clique, and also
the comprador class in the Shanghai-Nantong area. At present the military power
of the Anfu clique may already be said to be nonexistent. Moreover, its political
power has long been split between the pro-Zhili and the pro-Fengtian factions. It

is only because of the loss of influence of the pro-Zhili faction that the pro-Fengtian
faction has taken power in Beijing. Thus the Beijing government has become entirely the creature of Zhang Zuolin. When Cao Kun and Wu Peifu came to power,
the Research clique subordinated itself to Cao and Wu, and although Cao and Wu
were defeated it is still controlled by Wu Peifu. With the present resurgence of the
Zhili clique, Jiang Fangzhen and others of the Research clique and some of the
piggish parliamentarians⁹ belonging to this clique have gathered in large numbers in
Hankou to take advantage of the situation. The Federalist clique, composed of minor
political factions such as the Mutual Benefit Society of the Political Studies clique
and politicians such as Zhang Binglin¹⁰ of the so-called Guomindang Comrades'
Club, have also now gathered under the banner of Wu Peifu to plot their actions. The
so-called New Foreign Affairs clique of Gu Weijun¹¹ has always been a traitorous
group of brokers between the Zhili clique and the British and American imperialists.
This clique is now intimately associated with the Research clique and the comprador
class of the Shanghai-Nantong area, all of whom have joined together under the
banner of the Zhili clique and are working hard on their movement to sell out the
country. During the anti-Zhili war last year, the comprador class of the Shanghai-Nantong area, at the direction of the American imperialists, sided with the Zhili
clique. With the present resurgence of the Zhili clique, at the suggestion of their
masters (the American imperialists), they immediately rallied to the Zhili call and
went so far as to become a major pillar of Zhili power. Except for the Anfu clique,
which represents the interests of Japanese imperialism and of the bureaucrats and is
on the side of the Fengtian clique, all the rest of the above political factions—the
Federalist clique and the Research clique, which represent the interests of the bureaucrats and of the landlord class; the New Foreign Affairs clique, which represents
British and American (especially American) interests; and the Shanghai-Nantong comprador class—are on the side of the Zhili clique.

4. The National People's Army. The National People's Army has no ties to
British, American, or Japanese imperialism and is thus sympathetic to the anti-

imperialist movement; this is its most important characteristic. For the present,
out of tactical necessity, it has not yet broken with Zhang Zuolin or has even
reached a temporary compromise, but this is only a temporary situation. Following the anti-Fengtian war, our party wishes to take a great stride forward toward
the success of the national revolution, and one of the important keys to this is
truly the victory of the National People's Army in the north.

5. The National Government. Our party's base in Guangdong is now already
the mass movement of workers, peasants, merchants, and students. In sum, the
party is actively preparing its forces in the shortest possible time so that, when
the situation in the north and south develops to the right stage, it can send troops
to the north and lead the people of the entire nation toward a thorough solution of
national issues. Our party has issued, in the name of the Central Executive
Committee, an announcement on the current situation which elucidates the ob-

12. Xiong Kewu (1884–1970), zi Jinfan, a native of Sichuan, had studied at the military academy in Japan and there joined the Tongmenghui. He participated in Cai E's
campaign of 1916 against Yuan Shikai, and in 1918–1920 he was military governor of
Sichuan. In January 1924, he was one of the few active military commanders elected to the
Central Executive Committee of the Guomindang. In the following year, he sought to
move his Sichuan army to Guangzhou. Because he had established links with Chen Jiongming, this action was regarded by Chiang Kaishek as participating in a joint attack against
the Guomindang forces, and when he reached Guangzhou he was placed under arrest and
detained for two years.
13. Beijiang (North River) and Dongjiang (East River) are two important rivers of
Guangdong that give their names to the adjoining areas of the province.
14. On Chen Jiongming, see the note to Mao's editorial of October 20 1925. By the
end of November 1925, his forces had, as indicated here, been virtually destroyed, and
Chen sought refuge in Hong Kong.
15. An officer of the Guangdong Army who had collaborated with Chen Jiongming.

jectives of the war against the Fengtian clique. Also, in the name of the National
Government Council,¹⁶ telegrams are being sent to the major leaders of both the
Zhili and the Fengtian cliques, urging them to coordinate their actions to overthrow Zhang Zuolin, and after Zhang's power in Fengtian is broken to join in
setting up a government and policies that are in accordance with the objectives
of the popular masses. This will serve as a test of whether they accept or reject
our party's proposal to uphold the interests of the masses.

6. The Popular Masses. In the consciousness of the popular masses, the present anti-Fengtian movement is a movement that opposes the warlords of the
Fengtian clique, who support British and Japanese imperialism and suppress the
patriotic movement. Thus the main body of this present anti-Fengtian movement
should be the revolutionary popular masses of the entire nation. The initiative
taken by the Zhili clique represents merely one branch of the forward units and
cannot be considered the main body of the movement. This time the people's
anger against the warlords of the Fengtian clique is greater than ever before. The
concept of the popular masses of the whole nation according to which opposing
the Fengtian clique means opposing British and Japanese imperialism, and victory over the Fengtian clique means victory over the British and Japanese, is the
same as the concept held by the popular masses of Guangdong according to
which the punitive expedition against Chen Jiongming meant striking a blow at
British imperialism, and the victory of the Eastern Expedition was a victory for
the strikes. Thus, this war against the Fengtian clique, from the perspective of the
consciousness of the popular masses, is different from all the several "Zhili-Anfu" and "Fengtian-Zhili" wars.

B. Our Propaganda and Preparations

Responsible comrades in the party organizations at all levels in all localities
must, in an organized and planned way, seek every opportunity and bend every
effort to explain to comrades, and to propagate among the popular masses, the
following points:

1. The plots of the various imperialists in the present war.
2. The grave danger that a victory for the warlords of the Fengtian clique,
who are running dogs of the British and Japanese imperialists, would pose to the
popular masses.
3. The popular masses can make use of the Zhili clique's opposition to the
Fengtian clique for the time being, but the Zhili clique must not be allowed to

¹⁶. The National Government Council (Guomin zhengfu weiyuanhui), established in
Guangzhou on July 1, 1925, and chaired by Wang Jingwei, was the most inclusive organ
of the national government; it was, of course, subordinated to the leading party bodies.

replace Zhang Zuolin and the Fengtian clique at the helm of government, because if the Zhili clique simply replaced Zhang and the Fengtian clique it would
be extremely dangerous for the people. The people should not forget the previous
experience when the Zhili clique took over the state. In the areas of all provinces
along the Yangzi River where the atmosphere of welcoming Wu Peifu and Sun
Chuanfang is very prevalent among the merchant class, this point is especially
worth emphasizing in our propaganda.

4. All counterrevolutionary groups, including the Anfu clique, the Research
clique, the Federalists, the New Foreign Affairs clique, and the comprador class,
have interests that are absolutely incompatible with those of the people, and we
must exhaust every effort to reveal and reject totally all of their self-serving
schemes.

5. Among the various forces that are opposing the Fengtian clique, the
difference between the Feng Yuxiang faction and the Wu Peifu-Sun Chuanfang
faction is that Feng has no ties with the imperialists and supports the national
revolution, whereas Wu and Sun take instructions from the imperialists and are
hostile to the national revolution. Thus, for the people the distinction between
who is a friend and who is an enemy depends entirely on whether or not someone has connections with imperialism. If anyone, no matter who or when, establishes links with imperialism, the people will not recognize him as a friend.

6. The true leader of the people is the Chinese Guomindang. The true government of the people is the national government in Guangzhou. The true army
of the people is the Guangdong National Revolutionary Army. Because the
Guomindang, the national government, and the National Revolutionary Army
are the spearhead of anti-imperialism, they are the defenders of the interests of
the people, the bearers of comfort and relief to the suffering of the people. (Point
out the facts of the Guangdong opposition to imperialism and the present unification and active reconstruction of Guangdong.)

7. The whole of the oppressed popular masses of China is the master of all
the problems of China. It is the people who should be the commander-in-chief of
this present war against the Fengtian clique. The people must immediately get
organized and take charge of this anti-Fengtian movement.

8. The four proposals of Guomindang propaganda regarding the current
situation are: (1) Establish a unified nationwide national government; (2) This
national government must, as soon as possible, convoke a National Assembly
Preparatory Congress; (3) This national government must, in the shortest possible time, convene a National Assembly Preparatory Congress to achieve a fundamental solution to the unequal treaties; (4) This national government must
guarantee to the people freedom of speech, association, and assembly. This is the
only way to bring an end to the present war. If these four items are not fulfilled,
then an end to warfare would still leave the situation under the joint control of
the warlords and imperialists, and this would be just as dangerous for the people
as what they suffered previously.
zhoubao. Since Mao was editor in chief of this magazine, the note may also be attributed
to him. In some versions, the Propaganda Guidelines are dated December 3, 1925, because
that is when they were first publicly released.


3. Regarding Qi and Lu, see the note to the text of September 10, 1924, "On the
Question of Opposing the War between the Warlords of Jiangsu and Zhejiang." Although,
as indicated there, Qi Xieyuan, supported by Wu Peifu, had been victorious in this area,
the Zhili clique suffered a grave defeat in the wider war for control of China, because of
the split between Wu Peifu and Feng Yuxiang.

4. The Special Conference on the Chinese Customs Tariff was convened in Beijing on
October 26, 1925. It was adjourned in July 1926 following the collapse of the Beijing
régime.


5. The "old" faction was that around Zhang Zuolin himself; the "young" faction was
that loyal to his son Zhang Xueliang and to the effective commander of the latter's forces,
Guo Songling.

6. The Guominjun, or National People's Army, had been organized by Feng Yuxiang
and other generals after they had defeated Wu Peifu and driven him out of Beijing in
October 1924. Feng Yuxiang (1882-1948), zi Huanzhang, had risen through the ranks to
become an influential military figure by 1914. In that year, he joined the Methodist
church and was henceforth commonly known as the Christian general. In 1918, he instituted methods of training and indoctrination involving a combination of Christian and
traditional Chinese values, centering on the individual's moral obligations to society.
During the years 1918-1922, he was associated with Wu Peifu, but in 1923 Feng turned
against Wu and supported Cao Kun's coup d'état against him. In the fall of 1924, after
Feng Yuxiang's troops occupied Beijing, he became commander-in-chief of the newly
formed Guominjun. In April 1925, in return for Russian instructors and military aid, Feng
agreed to permit Guomindang political work in his army, but at the same time intensified
his own program of indoctrination.

7. On the Anhui or Anfu clique, and the Research clique, see the notes to the text of
April 10, 1923.

8. The partisans of the liansheng zizhi yundong, or "movement for a federation of
self-governing provinces" (abbreviated here to lianzhi), were mainly representatives of the
bourgeoisie, seeking emancipation from bureaucratic rule. See Marie-Claire Bergère, in
Cambridge History of China, Vol. 12, pp. 778-80.


9. Literally, "little pig parliamentarians" (Zhuzai yiyuan). The reference is to those of
the remaining members of the 1913 Parliament who had joined in electing Cao Kun to the
presidency in 1923. They were known under this derogatory epithet because they had
sold their votes for 5,000 yuan each.

10. On Zhang Binglin, see above, the relevant note to Mao's letter of December 1,
1920, to Xiao Xudong and others.

11. Gu Weijun (1888–1985), zi Shaochuan, better known in the West as V. K. Wellington Koo, studied at Columbia University, where he received a Ph.D. in 1912. After
serving as minister in Washington and London, and as China's representative to the
League of Nations, he became foreign minister in early 1922. Gu held this post for most
of the time from 1922 until July 1924 and served as acting premier from July to October
1924, when he was forced to resign following Feng Yuxiang's overthrow of the Beijing
government. At the time that Mao wrote this article, Gu was living in the foreign concession in Tianjin.


fully secure. The detachments of Xiong Kewu¹² in the Beijiang¹³ area were
disposed of some time ago. The forces of Chen Jiongming¹⁴ in the Dongjiang
area, too, have already been eliminated, and troops have been dispatched to
pursue and mop up those small detachments that have fled into the Fujian border
area. The troops of Deng Benyin¹⁵ in the southern region will also be disposed of
any day now. The unification of the entire region may be said to be completed.
The plot of British imperialism, in collusion with Chen Jiongming, et al., to
extinguish the revolutionary power of our party has already failed completely.
The Hong Kong merchants and the Hong Kong government already realize that
they have no further resource for standing up against the problem of the
Guangzhou-Hong Kong strike. Right now they are looking for a way out, and a
victorious solution can shortly be achieved. At present, the main efforts of our
party in Guangdong are focused on strengthening and expanding the military
might of the revolutionary army, on cleaning up and reorganizing the financial,
judicial, and educational system of the people's government, and on expanding


--- Notes

--- Notes

1. As indicated above in a note to his speech of October 27, 1925, Mao's title was, in
fact, that of acting head.

2. This note preceded the text of the guidelines when it was first published in Zhengzhi