To His Excellency Mr. Zeng Yi, 1902-6218:  I have carefully read your kind letter.
Your wise words and sound arguments fill me with profound admiration.
The situation in Hunan is utterly deplorable, owing chiefly to the fact that the majority of the people remain unconscious of their own interests and fail to rise up and assert themselves; they keep silent when they should speak out and withhold their rightful claims.
Thus the warlords of North and South have been able to exploit this vacuum and trample upon the province.
They have made Hunan their fiefdom, plundering the people’s wealth and hoarding it for themselves.
Let us leave past grievances unmentioned.
As for our course going forward, on the negative side we should abolish the office of military governor and disarm the troops; on the positive side, we must build a system of popular self-government.
Judging by present conditions, there is little hope of establishing such a system throughout China within the next ten years.
During this period, Hunan would do best to maintain its territorial integrity and govern itself, treating the province as a sort of “land of peach blossoms,” oblivious both to other provinces and to any central government, functioning much as one of the North American states did a century ago.
We should run our own schools, develop local industries, construct railways and roads, and fully unleash the spirit of the Hunanese, thereby creating a distinct Hunanese civilization within the province’s borders.
This is not an attempt to isolate ourselves into some small tribal enclave; indeed, we have no other viable path before us.
For four thousand years, Chinese politics has consisted merely of grandiose structures and sweeping schemes, which invariably proved hollow at heart—strong on the surface but weak within, imposing above yet trivial and corrupt below.
Since the founding of the Republic, eminent statesmen and great figures have engaged in endless debates over constitutionalism, parliamentary systems, presidential regimes, and cabinet governments.
Yet the more they argued, the worse matters became.
It is like trying to erect a multi-story building on shifting sands: before completion, the edifice has already collapsed.
We, however, propose to confine our efforts to Hunan and advocate for its self-determination and self-governance.
We boldly proclaim that Hunan belongs to the Hunanese.
Whether it be Lu Rongting, Tang Jiyao, or Duan Qirui, anyone who is not a native of Hunan and has no legitimate claim to reside within its territory should have no say whatsoever in Hunan’s affairs.
If there is such a thing as a fundamental principle, then this is surely it.
Hunan is a great province: bounded to the south by the Five Ridges, to the north by Dongting Lake, rich in its three Xiang rivers and seven marshes, truly a land abounding in talent.
It should provide for its own food, clothing, and shelter, exporting surplus tea, rice, and minerals in exchange for foreign currency and essential supplies.
In due course, it could rival the finest regions of earth—Switzerland in the West, Japan in the East.
Is this mere boasting?
Not at all.
With the concerted effort of our thirty million fellow provincials, it is entirely attainable.
The mistake of the Chinese people over the past four millennia has been to attempt to build upper stories without first laying a solid foundation; more recently, the people of Hunan have erred by tending others’ fields while neglecting their own.
Our “Hunanese Self-Determination Doctrine” is neither tribalism nor separatism.
Rather, it holds that since Hunan constitutes a distinct cultural sphere, its inhabitants bear sole responsibility for shaping its civilization—they cannot shirk this duty, nor should they.
Those who stand opposed to the creation of a Hunanese civilization are the warlords, including the Inspectors-General of Hunan, Guangdong, and Guangxi; the Inspectors-General of Hunan and Hubei; and the various armies raised in the name of defending or pacifying the country.
All such adversaries must withdraw beyond Hunan’s borders and never again enter to confront the Hunanese.
Only then can the people of Hunan freely cultivate their innate qualities and forge their own civilization.
This is what we mean by the Hunanese Self-Determination Doctrine.
The gist of your letter is: “Hunan shall govern itself; abolish the offices of military governor and disarm the troops.
Rise above the North-South factional strife and establish Hunan as a buffer zone.”
These noble and far-reaching principles command my wholehearted approval.
Your suggestion to maintain “not a single soldier” is particularly lofty and leaves no room for objection.
However, our association advocates abolishing all garrison units and regional commanders, while temporarily retaining a single regular, disciplined army division.
Your proposal envisions using only constabulary forces to uphold local order—a concept that, while not entirely without merit, differs fundamentally in practice.
Constabulary forces, after all, are often complicit with bandits: bandits cannot operate without the protection of these forces, while the latter find in banditry a convenient source of employment and substantial unofficial income derived from rural depredations.
A properly organized, tightly disciplined army, by contrast, inspires a measure of fear among bandits.
Moreover, if we were to deploy a single army division across Hunan while simultaneously establishing numerous constabulary commands—say, seven or eight separate headquarters and three or four regional commanders—the overall troop strength would increase substantially.
That said, there remains an important point: the Hunanese Self-Determination Doctrine is by no means synonymous with nonresistance.
Should aggression recur, we cannot simply allow ourselves to be carved up.
In such circumstances, resolute, organized resistance remains indispensable.
The doctrine calls for a unified front among the Hunanese: Hunan belongs to the Hunanese; outsiders must refrain from interfering in provincial affairs, and natives of other provinces likewise ought not to meddle in Hunan’s affairs.
Anyone who does so, however, should be met with firm opposition.
The decision to retain a single regular army division takes into account both the people’s capacity and the presence of banditry, but also acknowledges the imperative of being prepared to mount a decisive defense against renewed aggression—this constitutes our third rationale.
Alas, Hunan!
From King Yu Xiong, who laid the foundations of the state, through the pioneering efforts of Zeng and Zuo, to the exemplary leadership of Huang and Cai, our ancestors bequeathed us a rich heritage.
Yet today the province lies prostrate, menaced from the south by Guangdong and Guangxi, from the west by Yunnan and Guizhou, and from the north by the Beiyang clique.
Yueyang has been reduced to a northern outpost for six long years, while Changsha has repeatedly endured the brutal occupation of generals like Tang Xiangming, Fu Liangzuo, and Zhang Jingyao.
Who can fail to feel deep sorrow at such a fate?
Nevertheless, though Hunan may be sorely oppressed, its spirit is far from extinguished.
Even under the most crushing pressure, there exists within the people a latent power of passive resistance—an impulse to rise up and refuse to be cowed.
Witness the successful ouster of Tang Xiangming, Fu Liangzuo, and Zhang Jingyao.
This capacity for quiet, determined defiance persists in the collective consciousness.
What we must now attend to is the active work of reconstruction: monitoring global trends, implementing genuine popular self-government, promoting culture, reforming education—tasks that brook no delay.
Thirty million people—that is roughly the population of Japan during the Meiji Restoration.
Geographically, Hunan possesses advantages that Switzerland lacks: abundant resources, vast expanses.
Yet lacking the knowledge, skills, and training of the Swiss or Japanese, we have too often relied on sheer courage alone, resulting in passive, half-hearted resistance.
Neither Switzerland’s radiant prosperity nor Japan’s robust development has yet been realized in the great river basin of Hunan.
Fellow Hunanese, your letter conveys precisely the sentiments I share regarding our province’s plight.
We, the members of this association, are ordinary citizens dedicated to transforming Hunan, as set forth in our published manifesto and detailed terms of reform.
Our primary aim is self-determination; our secondary objective is the establishment of popular self-government.
Comrades Tan Zu’an and Zhao Yanwu, who led the campaigns against Zhang Jingyao, deserve high praise for their tireless labors and outstanding contributions to our homeland.
Going forward, I urge them to ensure, first, that they adhere to the principle of self-determination and do not invite the tiger into the house—indeed, should a tiger have already entered or seek to enter, they should firmly repel it.
Second, they must embrace the principle of popular self-government, recognizing themselves as one among the common people and shedding any vestiges of officialdom, bureaucracy, or aristocratic airs.
Moving forward, all our actions will be guided by the collective will of our thirty million fellow citizens.
Above all, we must abolish the offices of military governor and disarm the troops.
Funds should be directed instead toward education, with the goal of making schooling universally accessible, and toward guaranteeing every citizen the freedoms of speech, publication, assembly, and association—these are our greatest aspirations.
Your letter has already been submitted to the Shanghai Gazette for publication.
In the initial phase of this movement, thirty million people must each have a voice, advancing unique proposals while collectively shouldering the responsibility for reform.
We would be most grateful for any further guidance you might offer.
The Hunan Reform Promotion Association o•.r two CO two female New People’s Society materials People’s Publishing House nineteen works nine persons Shanghai Shenbao one force two persons .six .two eight