**Commentary on Western Affairs**

**The Germans' Bitter Signing of the Treaty**

**Before the Signing:** In early May, the representative of an undefeated yet unyielding Germany, Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau, arrived in Paris. On May 7th, a solemn ceremony for the delivery of the peace treaty was held at the Palace of Versailles. The German representative's demeanor was very arrogant. Clemenceau stood and delivered his opening address. The German chief representative, Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau, remained seated and read the following speech:

"Germany's military has collapsed; the extent of Germany's defeat, she herself understands. But for this European war, responsibility does not lie with Germany alone; all of Europe shares the guilt. For fifty years, the imperialism of the European powers has truly poisoned the international situation. Germany's crimes during the war are undeniable; during wartime, the conscience of the people was clouded by emotion, hence the crimes. Yet, since November 11th of last year, many in Germany not involved in the fighting have died from the effects of the blockade, which the Allied and Associated Powers have viewed with indifference. President Wilson's Fourteen Points were endorsed by the whole world, and the Allied and Associated Powers have declared that the peace treaty would be based on these principles; therefore, Germany should not be left entirely without recourse. All nations are to be admitted to the League of Nations; Germany cannot be cast outside. Germany is willing to study the peace treaty in a spirit of goodwill..."

The peace treaty was a large volume with a gray-yellow cover. The Secretary-General of the Peace Conference, Dutasta, held it and delivered it into the hands of Count Brockdorff-Rantzau. Upon returning to his residence, the Count was silent throughout dinner. After dinner, he immediately ordered the treaty translated. The translation was completed at three o'clock in the morning and brought to his bedroom. Count Brockdorff-Rantzau read until dawn before finishing. Several copies were made and dispatched by special courier to Berlin. On the 8th, the German cabinet met to review it.

Premier Scheidemann addressed the committee considering the armistice:

"The terms of the peace treaty simply pronounce the death sentence upon Germany. The government must discuss this detestable and arrogant document with political composure..."

The terms were then telegraphed to the federal governments, asking for their opinions. Because of the deep pain felt, the public was ordered to cease public amusements for one week. Only the performance of tragedies, which closely match this suffering, was permitted in theaters. The stock exchange closed for three days, shaken by the impression of suffering. Upon learning that the peace treaty was to be signed, people from all walks of life were enraged and discussed the consequences of refusal. Hardly anyone thought they could even consider accepting such terms. Berlin newspapers unanimously condemned it: some said, "The harshness of the peace treaty exceeds the most pessimistic expectations; this is the product of rage and ignorance; if it cannot be amended, only a 'No' can answer it." Others said, "If we sign this treaty, we truly succumb to force. In our hearts, we should resolutely refuse." Only the organ of the Independent Social Democratic Party advocated signing, saying, "Experience shows that refusal only increases future calamities." At this moment, the attitude of German political parties was most noteworthy. The government faction of the Majority Social Democratic Party was against signing. The Democratic Party and the Centre Party held the same view. Only the Independent Social Democrats were different. On the 12th, the Independent Social Democrats passed a resolution advocating acceptance of the peace treaty, saying, "The current German government's revival of militaristic behavior makes others firm in their suspicion and fear of Germany. Germany has no alternative but to submit to a dictated peace. The German-Russian peace treaty and the German-Romanian peace treaty were both annulled after a short life. The Treaty of Versailles could also be annulled by revolutionary development." We assess that for Germany to be free from the treaty, she can only follow the path of Russia and Hungary and implement a great social revolution. This is what the Allied and Associated Powers fear most. Russia and Hungary sent no delegates, proposed no peace negotiations, and openly defied the Allied and Associated Powers, who have so far been unable to do anything about it. If last winter the social revolution of the German Independent Social Democratic Party's radical wing had succeeded, then linking with Russia in the east, connecting with Austria in the south, further uniting with Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and spreading far and wide the doctrine of world revolution, perhaps causing the long-suppressed socialist parties of Britain, France, and America to rise in response—could the governments of the Allied and Associated Powers still have swallowed their food? The Independent Social Democrats and the radical Spartacist wing were originally one party that split into two; their arguments like this are not surprising. The idea of annulling the peace treaty through revolutionary development should not be taken lightly.

On the same day, the German National Assembly discussed the peace terms. Scheidemann declared:

"Today is a matter of life and death for the German people! We must unite! We have no duty but to ensure the survival of the nation! Germany does not seek to pursue its nationalist dreams, nor is it a question of striving for power. Every person feels a hand at their throat, stopping their breath! Human dignity is now placed in your hands, to be upheld by you!"

On the 14th, Count Brockdorff-Rantzau sent a note to Clemenceau, the main points of which were as follows:

The territorial clauses of the treaty deprive Germany of its vitally important productive lands. The harvests of potatoes and grain will decrease by 21%. Coal output will be reduced by one-third. Iron ore by three-quarters. Zinc by three-fifths. Germany, already economically crippled by the loss of colonies and its merchant fleet, will now be unable to obtain sufficient raw materials and will inevitably be devastated to a massive extent. At the same time, food imports must necessarily be vastly reduced. For the millions who depend on shipping and commerce for their livelihood, the German government cannot provide them with work and food, forcing them to seek survival abroad, but the key nations largely prohibit German immigration. Thus, signing the treaty is tantamount to pronouncing the death sentence upon millions of Germans...

In addition to the aforementioned note, Count Brockdorff-Rantzau sent two further notes to Clemenceau. The main point of the first was, "The Allied and Associated Powers' seizure of German territory is inconsistent with the principles declared by President Wilson." The second protested the reparation clauses, stating "Germany is willing to make reparation, but not because she bears responsibility for the war." Looking at Germany's protests, everyone focused on (1) not bearing sole responsibility for the war, and (2) unwillingness to lose the lands from which raw materials come. Other points, though protested, were not the most crucial.

On the evening of the 13th, there was a massive demonstration in Berlin. During the demonstration, Majority Socialists held forums and gave speeches saying, "The peace terms are more cruel and shameful than those Rome imposed on Carthage." Crowds marched through the streets and stopped in front of the Hotel Adlon, where the Allied commissions were staying. Someone addressed the crowd with a fierce momentum, wanting to storm the hotel, but was stopped by the police. When they reached the Premier's house, Scheidemann spoke from a window. Another large group of people, at dusk, marched singing to the Hotel Adlon, shouting "Down with the violent peace!" "Death to Clemenceau!" "Death to England!" The crowd then went to Scheidemann's residence and asked him to speak. When Scheidemann mentioned President Wilson's Fourteen Points, the crowd suddenly shouted, "Death to Wilson!" That day, the Independent Social Democrats held meetings in Berlin and the countryside, at forty locations.

On the 19th, a Berlin newspaper carried a speech by Social Democratic leader Dr. Eduard Bernstein, stating, "The terribly harsh peace terms are not solely born of anger and vengeance. Because German policy could no longer make itself credible, it deserves this treatment. All the ruin is Germany's fault. Germany's fulfillment of the demands is merely compensation for what she previously inflicted on others. I strongly disagree with the inflammatory speeches widely made by the public. Tell them! They must not display the same arrogance as on August 4, 1914!" This was a splash of cold water amid Germany's fervent opposition.

On the 20th, Count Brockdorff-Rantzau wrote to the Peace Conference, requesting a revision and a discussion period for the peace treaty. On the 22nd, Clemenceau replied, agreeing to extend the deadline until May 29th. On the evening of the 23rd, the German plenipotentiaries departed for Spa to meet with several cabinet ministers coming from Berlin and decide everything. On the 24th, Scheidemann and Erzberger traveled from Berlin to Spa by car; Count Brockdorff-Rantzau and sixteen delegates also arrived. An extremely long meeting was held, chaired by Scheidemann, which approved Germany's counter-proposals. After the meeting, the government ministers returned to Berlin, and Count Brockdorff-Rantzau and his delegation returned to Versailles.

On May 27th, Germany submitted its reply to the Peace Conference. The key points of the first part of the reply were as follows:

1.  Germany agrees to reduce its army to 100,000 men.
2.  Surrender large warships, but retain merchant ships.
3.  Oppose the decisions concerning the eastern territories. Demand a plebiscite in the region of East Prussia.
4.  Recognize Danzig as a free port.
5.  Demand the Allied and Associated Powers withdraw their troops four months after the signing.
6.  Demand admission to the League of Nations.
7.  Insist on the right to acquire substitute colonies.
8.  The total sum of reparation must not exceed 100 billion marks.
9.  Refuse the extradition of the Kaiser and other figures.
10. Germany must have the right to resume overseas trade.

The second part of the German reply also contained the following key points:

1.  During the transitional period, a large military force must be maintained to ensure public order.
2.  Germans must be permitted to hold popular assemblies to discuss territorial cessions. Austrians should also be granted the facility to unite with Germany.
3.  Refuse to cede Upper Silesia.
4.  Do not recognize Russia's right to receive reparations.
5.  No obligation to pay reparations to Italy, Montenegro, Romania, Poland, etc.

After lengthy discussion, the representatives of the four Principal Powers produced a reply to the German response, rebutting point by point every objection Germany had raised. The full text was very long. It essentially stated that Germany's war responsibility could never be shirked, that Germany must make reparation to the full extent of its capacity, must hand over the war leaders and those who committed brutal acts during the war for legal punishment, and must submit to special constraints for several years. The fundamental principles upon which the Allied and Associated Powers had constructed the peace treaty could hardly be altered. Only concessions regarding Germany's practical suggestions might be possible, etc.

After May 29th, at the repeated request of the German delegation, the deadline for signing was extended several times. The final deadline was extended to June 28th. The days in the first half of June were entirely occupied with back-and-forth exchanges of notes.

By June 18th, the German delegation returned to Germany from the French capital and unanimously advised the German cabinet to refuse to sign. The German cabinet then prepared to convene the National Assembly in Weimar to discuss this major issue. By this time, the Allied and Associated Powers were already making military preparations. As soon as Germany showed any sign of not signing, they would advance. Germany was now in a situation where it had no choice but to sign.

On June 22nd, the "Final Reply" of the Allied and Associated Powers was delivered to the German delegates, giving Germany five days to accept the treaty. The "Final Reply" outlined the concessions that could be made, as follows:

1.  A plebiscite in Upper Silesia.
2.  A redemarcation of the border of West Prussia.
3.  A temporary increase of German troops to 200,000 men.
4.  Germany's declaration of willingness to provide, within one month, a list of persons accused of violating the laws of war.
5.  Modifications to detailed financial provisions.
6.  A guarantee, conditional on Germany fulfilling its obligations, that Germany would become a future member of the League of Nations.

The Scheidemann cabinet, knowing the treaty could no longer be amended, decided to resign.

On the 22nd, a new German cabinet was formed. Chancellor: Bauer; Foreign Minister: Müller; Finance Minister: Erzberger; Interior Minister: David; Defense Minister: Noske; Colonial Minister: Bell; Postal Minister: Giesberts; Labor Minister: Schlicke; Public Works Minister: Schmidt; Economic Affairs Minister: Wissell; Treasury Minister: Scharrel; Food Minister: Schmidt. Chancellor Bauer and the cabinet members mostly belonged to the Majority Social Democratic Party and were essentially of the same political stripe as the previous cabinet. Amid this urgent diplomatic crisis, they stepped in to handle the difficult situation of signing the treaty. With the new cabinet formed, it could already be concluded that they were prepared to sign. Scheidemann resigned. The peace delegation appointed by the Scheidemann cabinet naturally resigned along with him, thus the German peace delegation changed personnel. The new delegation was composed of the new cabinet's Foreign Minister, Müller, Postal Minister, Giesberts, and others.

By this time, the National Assembly had already convened in Weimar. Chancellor Bauer went before the Assembly and delivered a deeply anguished speech, bitterly explaining the pain of joining the new government. He implored the Assembly to make a firm decision, otherwise, the war would resume. Chancellor Bauer said, "I raise my voice, for the last time in a free Germany, against this violently ruinous peace! Against this masquerade of the right of self-determination! Against this means of enslaving the German people! Against this new instrument that endangers world peace!" In the midst of shouts of "Oppose!" and "Approve!", the Assembly passed the motion to sign.

With the motion to sign approved, on the 23rd, Bauer again went before the Assembly to explain the necessity of unconditional signing. His speech declared, "The defeated nation, its body and soul subjected to the world's humiliation! Let us sign the treaty for the time being. As long as we still breathe, we hope that those who damage our honor will one day suffer retribution." At this point, the right-wing parties lodged a protest. A vote was taken. The result confirmed the authorization to sign. The President of the Assembly, Konstantin Fehrenbach, rose and delivered a short speech: "I commit our unfortunate Fatherland to the mercy of God!" He also stated, "Let the party leaders declare to the armed forces that the nation hopes the army and navy will set an example of self-sacrifice and assist the workers in rebuilding the Fatherland!" Germany's signing, which concerned the safety of the entire world, was fully decided amidst these intensely agonizing speeches. In all of history, there has likely never been a day of greater collective commemoration for the German people than that day.

After the signing was approved by the National Assembly, the new German delegation traveled to Paris and delivered a "note of acceptance of the treaty" to the Peace Conference. The main point of the note stated, "...The Government of the German Republic is aware that the Allied and Associated Powers are determined to compel Germany by force to accept the terms of peace. These terms, though devoid of any significant meaning, are intended to strip the German people of their honor. The German Government, though yielding to overwhelming force, protests regarding this peace treaty, which is unprecedented in its departure from justice..."

After this statement was published, the rejoicing in the Entente countries was naturally inexpressible. On the 28th, the final extended deadline arrived. And so, in the Palace of Versailles, the great, unprecedented ceremony of signing took place.

At the Moment of Signing

At five minutes past three on the afternoon of June 28, 1919, a meeting was convened at the Palace of Versailles. A high platform, solemn and imposing, was set up in the palace. The plenipotentiaries of the Allied Powers assembled first. Next came the German plenipotentiaries—only Foreign Minister Müller and Transport Minister Bell; the rest were unwilling to attend. Clemenceau presided and first delivered a brief, concise declaration, saying: "The Allied and Associated Powers’ Governments have all approved the peace terms. The signing today signifies their fidelity in upholding a solemn understanding." He then followed with, "I invite the representatives of the German Republic to sign first." A loud cry suddenly burst from the seats of the German representatives: "Deutschland! Deutschland!" Clemenceau thereupon changed his wording to "Germany." The German representatives rose and signed the treaty, with Bell signing first. It was then twelve minutes past three in the afternoon. Fountains in the gardens spouted forth, and the booming of cannon erupted. As the German representatives returned to their seats, joyful expressions spread throughout the assembly. Next came the signing by the United States; then by Great Britain; then by France; then by Italy; then by Japan. The last to sign was the Republic of Czechoslovakia. At thirty-five minutes past three, the signing was complete. Clemenceau announced the closing of the session.

After the signing, when news that the German Reichstag had approved the treaty spread, patriotic demonstrations erupted across Germany. Crowds marched, singing war songs and the national anthem, cheering in tribute to the aged military commanders. Every newspaper expressed extreme indignation over the question of judging the Kaiser. One newspaper implored the army officers of 1914 to declare that if the Kaiser were to be judged, they too would willingly face the judgment of the Allied Powers; it also urged the formation of organizations that might even enter the Netherlands to protect the Kaiser. Riots and strikes broke out in succession across various regions. And when news of the peace treaty’s signing (on the 28th) reached Berlin, a certain Berlin newspaper published an article saying, "The Germans will ultimately avenge the shame of 1919!"—for which it was banned by the government. On the 29th, every newspaper bore "black lines," signifying mourning. All carried deeply pessimistic commentaries. Railway workers and tram workers in Berlin and elsewhere went on strike. Transportation services in the city of Berlin came to a complete halt. Disturbances occurred in Hamburg and other places. The strikes across the nation showed signs of widening.

Commentary

I have described the signing, with deliberately focused attention on how Germany felt about it. In recounting Germany's signing, I have focused solely on the point of the spiritual anguish felt by the German nation. What does this mean? The truth is that this peace treaty, aside from the League of Nations, is entirely directed against Germany. The Germans, a Teutonic people long renowned in history for their eminence, possess a stubborn strength. Once the rupture came, their newly honed sword was unsheathed, and it nearly proved unstoppable for the entire human race. We must not regard Germany's militarism as merely the personal initiative of the Kaiser. The Kaiser is the crystallization of the German nation. Because there is a German nation, there is a Kaiser. In recent times, the German nation has been molded by the "upward-striving" and "active" philosophies of Nietzsche, Fichte, Goethe, Paulsen, and others. Resounding in spirit and substantial in force, it awaited the right moment to burst forth. Even today, they still say they were not defeated—that it was "not the fault of battle." The German nation is the nation richest in a spirit of "loftiness" in the world. It is precisely this spirit of "loftiness" that is most capable of sweeping aside all hardship and uniquely realizing what it calls the "lofty." Toward the Kaiser, we abhor, on the one hand, his militarism and reckless abuse of power, yet on the other, we cannot help but shed a sympathetic and heartfelt tear for him—stirred precisely by this spirit of "loftiness." The German nation, having been defeated, has stopped. Humiliating terms such as these—they bear them in silent endurance. With their first transformation, they have already turned from an empire into a republic. Their second transformation may well see them discard even the republic. I dare make a rough conclusion here: let us look at the West—are not Britain and France their foes? Since Britain and France are their foes, then their good friends must be none other than Russia, Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland—barriers to the east and south. If they do not align with Russia, Austria, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, where else can they turn? To align with Russia, Austria, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, they must necessarily adopt systems similar to those nations. The social revolutions in Russia and Hungary have already succeeded—that goes without saying. The same tendency exists in Austria and Czechoslovakia; a recent telegraph report said that Czechoslovakia has already become a workers’ and soldiers’ republic. Last winter, the Spartacist group, the radical wing in Germany, came but a hair’s breadth from success in their sudden bold action. The Ebert government was established with the Majority Socialists in power, reliant solely on a handful of troops and rifles to subdue the radicals. With the peace treaty achieved, the soldiers are to be disbanded; the rifles will have to be surrendered. What then will the government rely on? The utter ruin of German industry and commerce can only be rebuilt by depending on the laboring masses. Henceforth, the great task the government must undertake is to bow ever more deeply to the laborers. And the weapons of the radicals are none other than these same laborers. Thus, considering the trends from the diplomatic angle, I conclude that Germany will inevitably align with Russia, Austria, and Hungary, and transform into a communist republic. The same conclusion can also be drawn by considering the trends from the domestic political angle.

Before 1919, the world's supreme authority lay in Germany. After 1919, the world's supreme authority lies in France, Britain, and the United States. Germany's authority was a political authority, an international authority. The result of this great war is that the political and international authority of the Allied Powers has overthrown the political and international authority of Germany and Austria. After 1919, the authority of France, Britain, and the United States will be a social authority, an economic authority. If there is war after 1919, it will be class war; the result of class war will be the triumph of the doctrines of the Eastern European nations—that is, the triumph of the socialists. We must not look down upon the Germans of the future. Nor should we overestimate those lofty and swaggering great men now at the peace conference. The days when they can eat in peace are fast approaching their end! The day will soon come when their heads will ache! Thus, whether this peace treaty "can be stable" is far from certain. If one were to speculate by the precedents of the "Treaty of Brest-Litovsk" and the "Treaty of Bucharest," I fear it is merely a matter of time, sooner or later. The ignorant old man Clemenceau, still clutching that thick gray-yellow volume, thinking that signing it makes it as solid as the Alps—how pitiable indeed!

World Commentary

Exultation and Deep Sorrow
Clemenceau, upon receiving in his office the telephone call that Germany had accepted the peace treaty, was overjoyed. He rose and shook hands with the cabinet members and colleagues present, saying, "Gentlemen! I have quietly waited for this moment for nineteen years!" How full of exultation these words are. Yet, not only exultation, but also how much deep sorrow they contain. In 1871, when Wilhelm I and Bismarck, seated high in Versailles, accepted the instrument of France's submission, how exultant they were. The result fermented into this very war. Though Wilhelm I and Bismarck were exultant, they too carried deep sorrow. From 1800 to 1815, Napoleon trampled Germany underfoot, divided its states, seized its lands, disbanded its armies. The King of Prussia submitted, acknowledged vassalage, and paid tribute. How exultant Napoleon was. The result fermented into the war of 1871. Though Napoleon was exultant, he too carried deep sorrow. From 1789 to 1790, the Holy Alliance, with Germany and Austria as its leading champions, detested German democracy and freedom, repeatedly ravaged French territory, and besieged Paris. The result was the rise of Napoleon, who in turn trampled Germany and gave the Germans cause for aching heads. When we examine history in the light of cause and effect, exultation and deep sorrow are constantly linked—inseparable. When one side's exultation reaches an extreme, the other side's deep sorrow must also reach its extreme. Let us look at what this peace treaty contains: how does it differ from Napoleon’s treatment of Germany? Dividing Germany's land, seizing Germany's territory, disbanding Germany's army—what difference is there? When Clemenceau's exultation reaches its extreme, the German people's deep sorrow will also reach its extreme. I guarantee that ten or twenty years hence, you Frenchmen will once again have a great aching in your heads. May you remember these words.

Karl and Puyi
The former Emperor Karl of Austria resides in seclusion in Switzerland. A newspaper reporter seeking an interview met his attendant. The attendant said, "His Majesty the Emperor's abdication was truly not of his own will; thus he hopes for a restoration of the monarchy. For the time being, however, he lives in temporary seclusion and does not concern himself with politics." There has never been an emperor who did not wish to be emperor again. There has never been an official who did not wish to hold office again. Such is the habitual nature of psychological concepts. Westerners do things thoroughly; in history, there are many instances of putting kings to death. The English executed Charles I (1648); the French executed Louis XVI (1793); the Russians executed Nicholas II (1918). In each case, it was deemed that only thus could the root of calamity be cut off. Napoleon was imprisoned on Saint Helena. Now it is proposed that Wilhelm II follow in Napoleon’s footsteps and face the judgment of the Allied Powers—a fate considered quite lenient. Karl, residing in seclusion in Switzerland, and Puyi, lurking in Beijing, if the people do not take deliberate precautions, will sooner or later still prove to be roots of calamity.