Marginal Notes to: Friedrich Paulsen, A System of
Ethics (1917–1918)
This says that ethics belongs to the
arts.
Introduction
1. The concept of ethics.
The place of ethics is among the sciences. There are two kinds of science: one
mainly theoretical, the second mainly
practical. The former is called the study
of science, the latter is called the art of
science; the former belongs just to knowledge, while the latter shows that man
also uses his ability to manipulate things
and make them suitable to the purposes
of human life.
Seen in this way, ethics without doubt
belongs to the arts. Since ethics shows
what human life should be, so that it will
be suitable to the purposes of human life,
ethics stands at the head of the arts, and
broadly speaking, may indeed embrace
all the arts. Why is this so? All those
things that are called arts are used by
man to achieve the perfection of his life.
From commerce and industry to education and government, this is true for all of
them. Hence, we can make the statement
that all things called arts come within
the jurisdiction of ethics, and are part of
ethics.
This speaks of the relationship between the arts and learning.
All the arts are based on learning, since
they apply theory to the solution of practical issues. And ethics is based on anthropology and psychology. The purpose
of ethics is to determine our knowledge
of human nature and the laws of human life, and to use it to explain in
what way the life and actions of mankind
as a whole and as individuals may contribute to or impede the development of
human nature. This relationship will become clear by comparing it with other
arts… Based on a knowledge of the human body, the art of medicine is used to
improve human bodily life, to make the
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Human beings did not await the discovery of moral philosophy before distinguishing
between good and bad, just as they did not await the discovery of the art of hygiene
before being able to take care of the body. Before the art of medicine existed, hungry
men ate, those who were cold sought to clothe themselves, all of their own accord. If
the question were asked, Why is it that eating cures hunger? or Why is it that clothing
keeps out the cold? it would be like asking school children, Why is stealing wrong?
They would think, Why bother asking further about something that is self-evident
to everyone? Taking things that people had never thought worth inquiring about, as
problems for investigation, is the work of science… |

The
formation
of
society
comes
from the moral instincts.
Here and elsewhere I do not think
it is the conscience, but rather the
human desire to preserve one’s life
that comes from the concept of advantage and disadvantage.
The same is true for moral philosophy,
that before moral philosophy was invented, there already existed an unexamined, naturalistic morality that was publically accepted. Social life, like the human body, was also guided by a moral
instinct that did not depend on science.
It was from this moral instinct bringing
together all kinds of life that society was
formed. And the moral laws existed in
our consciousness as unquestionable commands, no different from the laws of hygiene. For example, do not kill, do not
steal, do not lie, all come simply from the
conscience, and require no further justification but naturally must be obeyed, no
differently from the cases of eating when
hungry or putting on clothing when cold.
(p. 6; Thilly 9)
This refers to the basic function of
moral philosophy.

The above says that the methodology of ethics is experiential, not intuitive. | Is it true, then, that what we call moral philosophy can do nothing but
collect the various positive and negative commands given by the conscience, and that
it cannot be called a science? I say: No, No, Not so. All natural morality frequently
simplifies its truths and puts them into proverbs. As in the case of, the best staff is
credibility. The saying that the best staff is credibility is not an imperative, but it
indeed contains a truth. An analysis of it would show that it means, you should keep
your word. You know that a walking staff will support you, and do you not know that
credibility will support you even better? This illustrates a truth. The basic function of
moral philosophy is to expand upon the truths contained within this kind of natural
morality to determine the strengths and weakness of various kinds of actions, (p. 7;
Thilly 9)
… Moral philosophy is based upon natural morality, which it then elaborates upon
and develops, and shows that a particular action is permissible or impermissible, and
determines the boundaries within which it may be applied, like demonstrating that
lying is wrong but then pointing out that there are times when one must lie. Furthermore, when things get very complicated, natural morality inevitably leaves too many
roads open, from among which only a very experienced person can choose the right
one. In laying down the general rules of experience, moral philosophy too must leave
particular decisions to someone familiar with the situation, but in comparison with
natural philosophy, it makes the choices clearer. |

What follows raises other issues.
The rules of experience are the function
of the doctrine of virtues and the doctrine of duties. All propositions in the
doctrine of virtues and the doctrine of duties are teleological and causal: in order
to reach such and such a goal, such and
such a behavior is necessary. But what really is the relationship between this goal
and my knowledge? From what source
does ethics derive knowledge of the perfect life? And how does it prove that its
rules for attaining the highest good are
correct?
These two passages say that purpose is unrelated to knowledge and
is related only to feeling and will.
For such problems as these the case is
inevitably somewhat different. Determining the character of the highest good is
not a function of my intellect, but is actually a function of my will. I have an
ideal of the perfect life, which appears
before my eyes and which, without any
thinking or deliberation, I believe to be
my highest goal. Such ideals as these, although they appear within the realm of
consciousness, they are definitely not intellectually arrived at, but in reality are a
reflection of my inner essence [benti]. At
this point, there are people whose ideas
are very different from mine, whose errors I would like to correct, but neither
the rules of logic nor empirical experience are sufficient to move them. I might
try to move their feelings by revealing
my highest ideal, and perhaps they will
be won over. At this point, the value of
the ideals they hold is not determined by
their intellect but entirely by the force
of their wills. The intellect determines
truth and falsehood, but cannot distinguish good from bad.
Is the source of morality the reason, or is
it the feelings? This has been discussed
by ethics since ancient times. But actually both are involved. The determination of what constitutes the perfect
life comes entirely from the unquestioned
feelings. Although various kinds of arguments might be raised, it is not these
that arouse the feeling of respect for an
ideal, just as the power of argument will
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FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS
All persons have the goal of selfpreservation.
Metaphysical and psychological introduction
7. Psychic life has two phases, will and knowledge. The will is expressed as impulses30
and feelings. Knowledge manifests itself in sensation, perception, and thinking.
1. The development of the will has three stages: (1) unconscious impulses, (2) the
desires of the senses, and (3) the rational will. And the goal at which it aims,
throughout all three stages, is the preservation and promotion of the individual
and the race.
2. The original form of the will is unconscious impulse. In consciousness, the unconscious impulses appear as conscious impulses. If our life activities satisfy our
impulses, a feeling of pleasure accompanies them. If these activities are obstructed
or go against our impulses, it is accompanied by a feeling of displeasure, (p. 24;
Thilly 220)
Chapter I: Good and Bad. Teleological and Formalistic Conceptions
On the distinction between good and evil.
The origin of pleasure and displeasure.
This regards feelings as part of the will.
1. The distinction between concepother says that it includes the result.
What is the criterion for distin- tions of good and bad. Where does guishing
between good and bad—one ethical thought come from? It springs view is that
it is only the motive, the from two questions. The first is, what is the ultimate
ground of moral value distinctions? The second is, What is the ultimate end of human
life? These two questions have often guided thinking people to the path of ethics. The
former question springs from the function of moral judgment, while the latter has its
origin in volition and action, (p. 26; Thilly 222)
The world view of these two philosophers.
Purpose.
Method.
The sense of this section has already been outlined in the previous section.
This section repeats the objections
… What we call ethics originated in the Platonic and Aristotelian theory of the
universe, which has often been thought of and called teleological because it is associated
with purpose. In the view of these two philosophers, all existence, all human beings in
the universe, have their own tasks. This is a fundamental insight of their ethics. And
all the various problems of ethics address the elucidation of these tasks, and of the
forms and functions of life that arise from them. (pp. 27–28; Thilly 223–24)
2. The meaning and power of the teleological view. Popular opinion inclines more
to the formalistic view: Acts are not morally good or bad according to their results;
they are good or bad in themselves. Differences in moral value depend upon intent,
not the effects. Even if the compassion of the good Samaritan in the Gospel had not
saved the man who fell among thieves, but on the contrary had caused his death, this
would not diminish the moral worth of the act. Or again, if a slanderous remark on
the contrary reveals the virtues of the person slandered and destroys the credibility of
the slanderer, even though the result might be very good, this does not alter the fact
that slander is evil.
We would answer: This is indeed true, but this is not an objection against the teleological way of examining things. The teleological determination of whether a particular
act is good or bad does not rest on its actual result, but upon the fact that acts of
that type tend to produce certain results. It lies in the very nature of slander that it
may have the effect of hurting another person’s credibility and good name. Where the
effect is the opposite, as in the example raised above, this occurred for a particular
reason, such as the conscience and caution of the listener and his experience and understanding of the world, and certainly not because of anything inherent in the nature
of slander. In Aristotle’s terms, this slanderous remark was an accidental cause of the
good effect, not its true cause. Thus morality has to do not with actual effects, but
with the effects that may be expected to come from the very nature of the act. (pp.
28–29; Thilly 224–225)
to this view.
The writer emphasizes objective, material judgments.
1.
This section develops these two statements.
The above section says that objective material judgments have a teleological foundation, and this section says that subjective formal judgments
also must be reduced to the
Subjective, formal judgments, and objective material judgments. A further objection to my view might be: The facts are not like this. Moral judgments are concerned
with intention, not with acts. If the motivation for an act is good, we know that it
was done with good intentions. If the intent springs from a consciousness of duty, we
need not inquire into its content or effects. This is what Kant meant when he said
that there is no good other than what is a universally good intention, (p. 30; Thilly
226–27)

Finally, the subjective, formal judgment itself is reduced to the teleological view.
To act from conscientiousness or respect for duty is called good. This is upheld by
the subjective formal view. But why is conscientiousness good? Some might say that
this is an absurd question, but I do not think so. The answer to this question is that
conscientious acts are objectively good. Why? Conscientious intentions, in determining
our acts, have the effect of promoting the welfare of ourselves and our surroundings.
Although inclinations are inevitably diverse, conscience is the same for all the individuals of a people, and therefore actions that are determined by the conscience have
the quality of universality. Furthermore, the content of my conscience comes from the
positive morality of the people to whom I belong, which is inculcated by education,
example, and public opinion. But the general moral code simply contains the moral
laws of a people or of an entire civilized society. The investigations of anthropology
conclude that everything which is called morality is a moral instinct of social relations
that impels one to act so as to preserve individual and social life. For this reason, the
conscience simply determines the principles of action that promote my own most vital
interests and the vital interests of the society to which I belong. I shall discuss this in
detail in chapter five. (p. 35; Thilly 232–33)
teleological view.
This section says that only at the most appropriate times do the ends
justify the means.
1. The relationship between ends and means. Before further discussing the content
of the highest good, I shall first raise and respond to a few objections to my view.
The objection is made, Is not the general teleological principle the same as the
saying of the Jesuits (a medieval Catholic sect that flourished in Spain, the strengh of
whose disciples made the conquests of such places as the Philippines possible, whose
teachings and actions have been rejected, and today no longer exist) that the ends
justify the means. If the value of conduct depends upon its effects, does not the value
of all kinds of particular acts depend upon their effects? I would reply that there are two
interpretations of the Jesuit morality of what is called the ends justifying the means.
One is that if the end is good then no matter what means are used to achieve it, these
means must be good. Consequently, any improper illegal action could be regarded as
good.
This is a particular proposition and does not mean that all homicide is
wrong.
… A contradiction in the meaning of the terms. The words murder and falsehood
signify not merely an objective fact, intentional killing or intentional deception, but
they likewise imply condemnation. The judgment “Murder is wrong” is an analytical
judgment. This judgment can also be used in instances in which homicide is not considered legally or morally wrong. In order to make a pure judgment the implication of

condemnation must be eliminated from the term, and judgment must be pronounced
solely on the objective fact of intentional homicide. Then it becomes clear that some
cases may be considered good… (pp. 36–38; Thilly 233–36)
1. A brief discussion of egoism. Looked at from one aspect of moral philosophy, we
can supplement the above. To the question: What is the ultimate objective of
the will? the answer is simply, The welfare of the individual and of other human
beings.
Hobbes’ theory.
I really feel that this explanation is incomplete. Since human beings have
an ego, for which the self is the center of all things and all thought, selfinterest is primary for all persons. That this serves the interests of others
is due to the fact that those others who belong to the same category as
the self share related interests. Thus we may say that the self cannot but
benefit others. The starting point of altruism is the self, and altruism is
related to the self. It is impossible to say that any mind is purely altruistic
without any idea of self-interest. Nothing in the world takes the other as its
starting point, and the self does not seek to benefit anything in the world
that is totally unrelated to the self. Otherwise, such concepts as “individual
personality”, “self-discipline”, and “free There is also an opposing view which says that it is the nature of the will to regard
the welfare of the individual as its end, not universal welfare. This view states that
everyone strives for what is agreeable or useful to oneself, regardless of whether it
furthers or detracts from the welfare of others. This view, formulated as a theory, is
known as egoism; it is also called individualistic utilitarianism. In the early period of
modem philosophy, Hobbs [szc] was a representative of this view. He stated that the
real will of every animal takes self-preservation as its end, and that this is a natural
law. Therefore, whatever really benefits oneself is good, and whatever benefits others
is indirectly good if it also serves to preserve oneself indirectly.
I do not believe that we can maintain this theory without flying in the face of the
facts. The egoistic impulses of the mind [xzn] have as their goal self preservation, and
are inherent in all human life. All human beings without exception tend to stress selfinterest over the interests of others. But is there any human being who is only aware
of what is beneficial or detrimental to himself, and is unaware of what is beneficial
or detrimental to others? All human beings are as concerned about the welfare of kin
and friends as about their own. And our feeling of concern for the welfare of society
too is clearly obvious, as in the case of our extreme disgust and anger at someone
who betrays his country for personal gain, which shows that this action is absolutely
intolerable to our consciences. Thus we may say:
dom” would be absurd. These concepts are indeed a noble egoism, an
egoism of the spirit. If I open my eyes wide and say that mankind is the

greater self, and say that all living things are the greater self, and then say
that the universe is the greater self, does this negate self-interest? Why
should self-interest be unworthy?
[Next to the words in the text, “the welfare of the individual and of
others as its goal” is the comment:] Ultimately the individual comes first.
The human will seeks the welfare of the individual and of others as its goal, and
although the relationship between how much something benefits oneself and how much
it benefits others may be highly complex and variable, there is nothing in which the two
are not interrelated. Thus those we call unselfish33 tend to stress altruism, while the
so-called egoist simply leans toward emphasizing self-interest, (p. 44; Thilly 244–45)
This is indeed so, but we cannot say that they are equal, but rather that
one comes before the other. For animals the impulse for self-preservation
comes first, and the impulse to preserve the species comes second. When
young, animals cannot be said to have an impulse to preserve the species.
Alas! At this point I have a very strong feeling that there are many who
use the excuse of altruism to seek their own egoistic gain. Truth
In our consciousness, individual stimuli and social stimuli, egoistic feelings and
altruistic feelings, are usually both present, mixed together. Human beings cannot live
apart or in isolation from others; they can exist only as members of a whole society. This
is a biological fact. Objective biological factors manifest themselves in the subjective
psychological realm, in the constitution of the will and the feelings. The impulse of
self-preservation in all animals coexists with the impulse to preserve the species, (p.
45; Thilly 245)
As animals evolved into homo sapiens, the impulse to preserve the species became
stronger. All human beings regard themselves as being
is good; falsehood is bad. To act in self-interest may be small-minded,
but is at least true. To pretend to be benefiting others when really acting
in self-interest is a great falsehood. To extend self-interest to the greater
self of benefiting all mankind, to the greater self of benefiting all living
things, and to the greater self of benefiting the universe, this is to go from
a small truth to a great truth. The progress of human wisdom can achieve
this. When self and other are equal, their order is not clear and it is easy
to pretend to be acting for others when actually acting in self-interest, in
which case it is impossible to achieve the highest self-interest. I think that
the theories of our Confucian scholars are based on egoism, as in the saying,
“The way of heaven and earth has its origin in the relation of man and
wife,”31 and can be seen in, “He who first cultivates himself may afterward
31 See The Doctrine of the Mean, XIII, 4 (Legge, Vol. I, p. 393). Mao has recast the citation and
presented it in such a way as to stress the central importance of family relationships like that between

bring peace to the world,”32 and “He is first affectionate to his parents, and
then benevolent to the people and kind to creatures.”33
The theory of universal love34 is not altruism, for universal love includes
the self, is to extend the love of self to loving all men.
By basing the theory on self, it has a starting point, a criterion. If self
and other are treated as having equal weight, there is no starting point,
and the criterion is lost.
This kind of statement fully proves the validity of egoism.
Quite true, quite true!
Except for those who are sick and crazy, there definitely are no such
persons.
Love of wife and parents is inescapable. Lions and tigers seem to have
this; can human beings not have it?
members of the entire society. Every human being thinks of himself as belonging to
a clan or society or nationality, and consequently human beings always take the goals
of their society as their own personal goals. It is indeed clear that the interests of the
individual are mutually interwoven with the interests of society, so that it is impossible
to draw a line demarcating the two. For this reason, it may be said that the goal of my
will is the common shared welfare of the individual and of society, or we may say that
the welfare of society includes the welfare of the individual. It is true that there are
persons in this world who are totally devoid of feelings for the interests of others, who
are oblivious to the interests of their neighbors, who even take pleasure in the suffering
of others. But this does not threaten this view, any more than the existence of idiots in
this world threatens the common principle that mankind possesses reason and speech.
husband and wife. The point of the original text is rather that, as Legge translates, “The way of heaven
and earth may be found, in its simple elements, in the intercourse of common men and women.” Cf.
also Couvreur’s Latin version, which says the way “habet initium in vulgaribus viris et mulieribus.” (S.
Couvreur, “L’invariable milieu,” in Les quatre livres [Paris: Cathasia], p. 35.)
32 A reference to the Great Learning, 4–5 (Legge, Vol. I, pp. 357–59). This passage, one of the most
famous in the entire Confucian canon, reads as follows: “The ancients who wished to illustrate illustrious
virtue throughout the kingdom, first ordered well their own States. Wishing to order well their States,
they first regulated their families. Wishing to regulate their families, they first cultivated their persons.
Wishing to cultivate their persons, they first rectified their hearts. Wishing to rectify their hearts, they
first sought to be sincere in their thoughts. Wishing to be sincere in their thoughts, they first extended
to the utmost their knowledge. Such extension of knowledge lay in the investigation of things. Things
being investigated, knowledge became complete. Their knowledge being complete, their thoughts were
sincere. Their thoughts being sincere, their hearts were then rectified. Their hearts being rectified, their
persons were cultivated. Their persons being cultivated, their families were regulated. Their families
being regulated, their States were rightly governed. Their States being rightly governed, the whole
kingdom was made tranquil and happy.” The cultivation of the self, or person (xiushen) alluded to here
is the same concept on which Yang Changji had lectured to Mao in 1913.
33 The reference is to the Mencius, VII, I, XLV (Legge, Vol. II, p. 476). Mao’s paraphrase is
reasonably close to the meaning of the original.
34 Jian’ai, the doctrine of Mozi (468–376 B.C.).

The person who lacks sympathetic feelings for others is ethically an abnormal person,
just as the idiot is abnormal. Physicians and anthropologists would simply call them
abnormal people.
After the concept of welfare has been more clearly defined, I shall come back to
the antithesis between egoism and altruism. Here I should simply like to state that in
my view the antithesis between these two is not as important as contemporary moral
philosophers make it. Schopenhauer and his followers regard this as the foundation
of moral philosophy. In their view, the natural man is simply and solely egoistic, and
therefore without
This is treating others as I would want to be treated.
To live in isolation divorced from others is indeed unbearable. Thus society is created by individuals, not individuals by society.
This is what is meant by mutual assistance, and the basis of mutual
assistance is fulfillment of the individual.
This is what is meant by sympathy, and sympathy arises from the self.
I too disagree with Schopenhauer. There are two points here. The first
point is that natural man is only egoistic, and that since the existence of the
individual is incompatible with the universe, he must moral worth. To have
moral worth, the motivation for an act must be the interests of others. But since such
motivation necessarily cannot exist in the natural constitution of mankind, morality
is supernatural. I do not think that this is true. Is the world in which we live really so
degenerate? What we call compassion does indeed exist within the natural order. Only
pessimists like Schopenhauer believe that compassion is supernatural. Schopenhauer
once said that, “The natural man would, if forced to choose between his own destruction
and that of the world, annihilate the whole universe merely for the sake of preserving
himself.” If forced to make such a choice under the threat of imminent danger, perhaps
there are some who would do this. But if the world were annihilated, how could I alone
exist? The unbearable senselessness would make him regret the error of his choice and
force him to seek an immediate end to his life. At this point, even the egoist would
also realize that living in isolation from others is unbearable. The desires of human
beings to be admired or feared or envied all depend on other people. Not only do we
depend on others, it is also clear that there is no human being who can totally ignore
the interests of others and deny human nature, (pp. 4546; Thilly 246)
preserve himself. I say this is not true. Self-interests are indeed primary
for human beings, but it does not stop here. It is also of our nature to
extend this to helping others. This is one and the same human nature, so
working for the interests of others is in my own self-interest. Self-interest
is primarily benefiting one’s own spirit, and the flesh is of no value in
benefiting the spirit. Benefiting the spirit means benefiting the feelings
and will. For example, since I cannot forget the feeling I have toward the
one I love, my will desires to save her and I will do everything possible to

save her, to the point that if the situation is desperate I would rather die
myself than let her die. Only thus can my feelings be satisfied, and my will
be fulfilled. In all times, there are filial sons, faithful widows, loyal ministers,
and devoted friends, those who die for love, for their country, for the world,
for their ideals—all to benefit their own spirits. I do not agree with the
first point, that moral values apply only to those acts that are motivated
by altruism. Morality does not necessarily depend on others. What depends
on others is objective moral law; what is independent of others is subjective
moral law. My desire to fulfill my nature and perfect my mind is the most
precious of the moral laws. There are assuredly human beings and objects
in the world, but they all exist because of the self, and the image I have of
them disappears when I close my eyes; thus the objective moral law is also
the subjective moral law. If I were the only person
in the world, I could not fail to fulfill my nature and complete my mind,
simply because it would be no loss to others. I would still have to fulfill
and complete them. Such things are done not for others, but for ourselves.
This, the narrowest form of egoism, does not exist in this world.
The welfare of the individual and the welfare of society are closely interwoven, in
the narrow sense with family and friends, and in the larger sense with community
and country. If others do not fare well, then the individual too cannot fare well. This
is recognized by the great majority of the people. This is true not just for objective
events, it is true also for the feelings. Such purely egoistical people may exist in theory,
but they do not exist in reality. Thus the egoist school of ethics manufactures them in
order to justify their false theory.
In a certain sense, egoistic feelings are humanly inevitable. Even the most unselfish
person desires the welfare of others because he knows that it will also benefit himself.
Alleviating the woe of others and bringing others happiness also brings one pride and
satisfaction. If this were not true, if he were indifferent to the pain and pleasure of
others, they could not become an object of his willing. My will can only be moved by
my feelings; I cannot have and feel the feelings of others. Thus, the ego remains the
center of things. This, however, is not the ordinary meaning of the word egoism, which
is that one is not saddened by the misfortunes of others, nor pleased by their good
fortunes. The abstract moral philosophers, who believe that conflict with one’s natural
will is a characteristic of fulfilling one’s duty, and that it is an
Is this indeed the philosophy of Schopenhauer? The theories concocted
by the abstract moral philosophers do not agree with reality. Why is conflict
with the natural will a necessary characteristic of the fulfilment of duty?
To take conflict as a characteristic is to take falseness as a characteristic. Is
there really any morality that believes that it is an article of moral value
that the self must have no sense of pleasure? When one already has a sense

of pleasure, why get rid of it? This is an extreme kind of altruism. The
abstract moral philosophers who are troubled by this, like Schopenhauer
when he says that only an altruistic act has moral value, do not understand
true egoism.
In the past, teleology was called utilitarianism, to emphasize the result
of actions.
This was the inherent result of this kind of act.
If you want to achieve a certain result, you must engage in an action
article of moral value that the self must have no sense of pleasure, will be troubled by
the fact that giving happiness to others invariably gives oneself a feeling of pleasure.
In order to maintain their false theories, they disregard the evidence of the facts.
Let me add another statement. It has been said that utilitarian moral philosophy
cannot explain self sacrifice, that the Roman legend of Regulus necessarily contradicts
utilitarianism.
However, if we do not regard pure egoism as central to the theory of utilitarianism, there is no contradiction. Having been captured by the Carthaginians, upon the
conclusion of a cease-fire between the two states, Regulus returned to Rome where he
argued against the peace agreement so that the Romans disavowed the agreement and
declared war, whereupon he had to return to Carthage to meet his death. This act may
be as easily explained by teleological moral philosophy as by the formalistic theory of
ethics. Regulus’ martyrdom had indeed a high and lofty purpose, that of being willing
to sacrifice himself for the good of his state as an example for
that implies that result. Thus sacrificing oneself for a good cause is also
respected by teleological ethics.
This statement is very well put.
This statement shows that Paulsen, too, takes individualism as his foundation. This is an individualism of the spirit, and may be called spiritual
individualism. There is no higher value than that of the individual. All
values depend on the individual. If there were no individuals (particulars)
there would be no universe. Thus, it can be said that the value of the individual is greater than that of the universe. Thus there is no greater crime
than to suppress the individual or to violate particularity. Therefore our
country’s three bonds35 must go, and the churches, the capitalists, monarchy, and the state constitute the four evil demons of the world. Some say
that the individual’s dependence on the group for his existence is as important as the fact that the group exists because of the individual, that
they are mutually dependent on each other, and that neither should be
over-emphasized. This is not true. It is a fact that there are individuals
before there is a group, and that the individual cannot exist alone apart
35 The relations between prince and minister, father and son, and husband and wife, which constituted the core of Confucian morality.

from the group, but the group in itself has no meaning, it only has meaning
as a collectivity of individuals. The individual may rebel against the group,
but citizens of his own state, and he also wanted to show the enemy the high and
lofty character of the Roman people. I doubt that the idea of just rigidly abiding by
an agreement could have prompted so lofty an act.
Besides, every real sacrifice also implies preserving the ego, that is, it is a means
of preserving that person’s concept of his ego. The reason that Regulus’ goal was not
life, was simply because his goal was his spiritual life, rather than his material life. His
service to his state, whether in peace or in war, required total dedication to his efforts,
even unto death. Thus he felt that anything short of bringing honor to the Roman
people, of glorifying their name, would have been not fulfilling his duty. And this is
why for the Roman nation his name has remained immortal over the years.
there is no such thing as the group rebelling against the individual, since
this would make the group meaningless. Furthermore, a group is an individual, a greater individual. The human body is constructed of the aggregation
of a number of individual parts, and society is constructed of the aggregation of a number of individual persons, and the nation is constructed of the
aggregation of a number of societies. Separated they are many, together
they form a single whole. Thus the individual, society, and the state are
individuals. The universe is also an individual. Thus, it is also possible to
say that there are no groups in the world, only individuals.
1.
These words contain the true features of Paulsen’s thought.
This passage again raises my doubts.
Conclusion. The conduct of any person is morally good if, in the objective realm, it
is able to increase the happiness of the self and others, and is directed toward perfecting
life and if, subjectively, it is in conscious fulfillment of his duty. Otherwise it is bad. If
just the objective quality is absent it is bad, but if it also lacks the subjective quality,
then it is evil.
Only when both the objective and subjective are satisfied is someone
called good.
Thus, we call a person good or bad depending upon whether or not there was an
objective quality, and virtues and vices are also explained in terms of the different
kinds of good and bad. Corresponding to the many different problems of life there are
forces of the will that are equally complex. The complexity of the virtues and vices is
similar.
The concept of good, therefore, presupposes a point of relation, or

This term “point of relation” is most important.
It is not that any particular thing in itself contains a transcendent good,
rather it is called good simply because of its relationship to life.
At this point, I also have a sense that people casually say that a particular
thing is good or not good depending on the way in which it is related to
human life, and that this does not refer to any intrinsic reality in the thing
itself. Thus, people say that a particular event or thing or action, that may
not be bad in itself, is bad because it hurts life. How unjust!
Each individual.
Every virtue.
point of reference; it means good for something. It is commonly said that something
is good when it is proper for the use to which it is put, and that a person is good when
he is able to fulfill his function. For example, a good businessman, a good official, a
good father, a good friend, etc., means that that person is able to fulfill the function
of businessman, official, father, or friend. The same is true in ethics. Good means
that a certain action is proper. A good person is thus one who can fulfill his human
function. These all refer to their particular points of reference. It is for this reason
that something is regarded as good, when it is good not just for some particular thing
but for the perfect life of society as a whole. Every particular action, every particular
virtue, every particular person, is a reference point of goodness. The good person is
the person who combines all these points of reference, takes them as his function or
duty and is able to fulfill this function.
But we must add that, in the moral world, each human being is one entity within
the whole moral world, and thus each is part of the highest good. If we address those
ends that are not relative to something else, then one’s own ends are also part of the
highest good. The same is true of the virtues. All the virtues are aspects of the good
person, and thus, referring to those ends that are not relative to something else, they
are not just external functions, they are also themselves a part of the perfect life and
Ends.
This is excellent. It may be called one of the great discoveries of ethics.
This section has the defect of praising blind morality. What people today
call good deeds, such as building bridges and repairing roads, is just blind
morality. A moral action depends on feeling and will, which must precede
the moral action about which there must be a conscious decision followed
by this action that is done voluntarily. Blind morality has no value at all.
The discovery of the preceding section, that the spirit includes both
means and ends, could bring about a change in the meaning of humanity’s
view of life. How? In the past, everyone thought that ultimate ends have
not much value before something occurs. Consequently, everything that
takes place before the objective is attained is utterly meaningless, and the
road traveled is seen as worthless. Now we know that both the ends also a

kind of end in themselves. Therefore, moral actions are not just external means, they
may also be said to be realizations of this end. As in a work of art or poetry, everything
is both a means and an end. The same is true of the moral world. Thus nothing can
be said to be exclusively an external function. Thus, from the perspective of the final
end, a work of art, a poem, and morality are all part of the whole, and the value of
each part is derived from their relationship with the whole. Just as when reading a
poem we realize that a particular stanza is indispensable to the whole piece. So too,
are virtue and duty indispensable to the perfect life of the individual and of society.
However, we need not be conscious of this relation of ends for our actions to have
moral value. As in the case of the good old mother mentioned above, who despised
theft simply because it violates the Christian eighth com- mandmant [the Chinese has
“seventh commandment”], not because it is her ideal, yet whose actions are moral. It is
only the philosopher who comprehends the importance of the property system among
the laws of human life, and abides by it. But what makes him abide by it is not his
knowledge, but rather his instincts. But the moral value of his action is not thereby
diminished. (pp. 44–50; Thilly 246–50)
and the means are ever enjoyable. Since every day of life is valuable,
people will not fear death. Living another hundred years is fine, and dying
today is fine.
The above talks of the morality of the person of great wisdom, even
though the average person, who for the most part just does things by
instinct, is also able to lead a full life. This instinct is the experience of
our ancestors passed down from generation to generation, which in the
beginning was self-conscious, but which over time has become social habit
that, in the brain of the individual, has become a kind of unthinking and
automatic reflex that is called instinct
On what the ends are.
Here the schools of thought are described very clearly.
Chapter II: The Highest Good. Hedonistic and Energistic Conceptions
1. For utilitarianism, pleasure is not the purpose of action… There is a school of
thought that is more influential than our view, which says that the highest good does
not consist in the objective content of life, but in the feeling of pleasure which life
produces, that the feeling of pleasure in itself has value, and that everything else has
value only as it produces pleasure. This view we commonly call hedonism, and the
theory opposed to it is energism. (p. 50; Thilly 251–52)
The antagonism between these two schools is of long standing; it runs throughout
all of Greek philosophy. The former are the Cyrenaics and the Epicureans; the latter
are the followers of Plato and Aristotle, and include the
This statement is very true. Whether or not something has value is manmade, while whether it is true or false is natural. Thus the scholar should

seek the truth in the natural properties of something, and then ask whether
or not it has value.
Stoics. This antithesis appears in the modem world, with on the one side the empirical psychologists, and on the other the seventeenth- and eighteenthcentury rationalists,
and the German philosophers following Kant. According to the former, the subjective
feeling of pleasure, regardless of how it is produced, is the highest good. According
to the latter, the highest good lies in the objective condition of the individual and of
society, regardless of whether it yields pleasure or not, though they do believe that
actually it will bring a subjective sense of satisfaction.
If we wish to understand hedonism better, we must ask whether the hedonistic
view is true or false, not whether or not it has value. Scholars have long attempted to
prove that hedonism is false by saying that it is worthless. A maxim of the Stoics that
rejects both hedonism and atheism in the same breath is not a legitimate argument.
Theories are worthless only if they are false. Any attempt to prove that something
is false by saying that it is worthless is nonsense. The proponents of hedonism have
never been lacking in fine upstanding persons. Epicurus lived a pure and blameless life.
Bentham and Mill throughout their entire lives worked hard to realize their practical
observations.
What proof is there that pleasure is the highest good? As I see it, only by showing
that human nature actually values pleasure. The proponents of this view are ethicists,
whose function is not to be lawgivers, but strictly to explain the natural world. It
would be ab Hedonists believe that everything is a means to seek pleasure and avoid
pain.
surd to say that human nature seeks pleasure, but does not regard it as the highest
good, and then to add that it ought to regard pleasure as the highest good. The
arguments of all hedonists are generally of this sort. They all say that all human
beings, all living things seek pleasure, that to seek pleasure and avoid pain is mankind’s
greatest desire, and that all other things are simply the means by which human beings
seek pleasure and avoid pain. (pp. 51–52; Thilly 252–53)
This section directly attacks the fallacies in the hedonist view.
… Did Goethe (great German poet who believed in Mill’s theory, and said that
whenever a person does something, he inevitably measures it by the criterion of what
gives the greatest sense of pleasure), in his poetry, in his amours and travels, and
in his studies of natural science and history, think that they were all means to the
attainment of the greatest sense of pleasure? It is clear that this is absurd. There
were in Goethe’s constitution impulses and powers that demanded development and
exercise. These impulses and powers are like those contained within the sprouts of
young plants. When these are developed and fulfilled, a feeling of pleasure naturally

ensues, but this sense of pleasure is certainly not a pre-existing idea that is the end of
which all other things are but the means. These impulses, and the desire to carry them
out, precede the appearance of the idea of pleasure, and the idea of pleasure cannot
come before, or be independent of, the impulse that gives a sense of pleasure. Only
the indolent idlers of the world first experience a desire for pleasure and then seek a
means to procure pleasure. Healthy persons do not act in this way.
This is similar to the story of Taigong going fishing in the River Wei.
This says that the concept of a thing comes first, and that the desire for
it occurs afterward.
An idea is a concept.36
… There was an Englishman who was seated on the bank of a lake, fishing. A
German approached him and informed him that there were no fish in the lake, and
asked, “Why are you fishing?” The Englishman calmly replied that he was fishing
not for fish, but for pleasure. This Englishman had clearly transcended the common
conceptual association in which the pleasurable end is attained only by the means of
fishing for fish. Do other people have this feeling of seeking the pleasure and the fish? I
think that upon hearing the words of this Englishman, all persons would laugh, which
proves quite adequately that they have a different view. As I see it, the will and desires
never take pleasure as their end, but rather the end is in an event, such as an activity
or change of one’s condition. Thus, although the idea of a thing may indeed precede
the desire, the idea of pleasure is not in the consciousness, and does not appear as a
desire prior to the idea of the thing, (pp. 52–54; Thilly 254–55)
Objective facts are but pretexts to mislead the intellect. This is a very
strange theory.
Consequently, hedonism must modify somewhat its claim and say that pleasure is
not the conscious goal, but is the actual goal or end. Although the actual goal does not
appear in the consciousness, it is still the underlying goal or cause, like a mechanical
weight that though unseen by the observer is really what makes a machine move.
Although such things as food, riches, and honor appear in the consciousness as ends,
they are but pretexts to mislead the intellect, while the true end of the will is really
pleasure. A lover goes out on business and quite
This is not a common event.
unconsciously passes by the home of his love, much to his surprise, whereupon he
realizes that his reason for going out on business was a means, a deception by which
his impulses anticipated the objections of his reason. Is it true that pleasure is the
mistress of the will, and that the will then uses other pretexts to delude the reason?
36 Here, and in Cai Yuanpei’s text, on which Mao is commenting, the Chinese used for “idea”
in Thilly’s English version is xiexiang, which has a literal meaning closer to “image.” The same two
characters in Japanese, read shasho, stand quite definitely for image, as in “imagists.”

Certainly not
People cannot attain their fundamental desires, and it may be said that
people cannot attain their fundamental ideals. People can only achieve
those things that take the place of attaining ideals, and once achieved, the
ideal is again one level higher. Thus ideals can never be attained; only
things can be achieved.
Opponents of my view, wishing to prove that this theory is not false, must say that
whatever we do realizes not the pretended goal but rather the goal of the hidden desire,
as in the case of the lover whose pretext was going out on other business, but who
unconsciously was seeking his love. Can this be proven in fact? Hardly. The human
will always attains its ostensible goal, and seldom what it fundamentally desires. The
miser may accumulate great wealth, but the happiness he had expected escapes him.
The ambitious person may gain fame and honor, but his suffering from his worry about
losing it, is probably greater than his concern about getting it. Sexual desire leads to
the propagation of the species, but once satisfied, the happiness ends and feelings of
sadness abound. This is not made very clear in their exposition.
Knowledge or knowing.
… Several thousand years ago, Aristotle had already explained the relationship
between pleasure and the will. He said: Pleasure is not an end, but a manifestation
[in the consciousness].34 When the will is carried out, and it is accompanied by the
appropriate manifestation, this is pleasure. Thus pleasure
The term “a sign” is really like making a report to the will that the goal
has already been attained.
The statement of negative hedonism that what drives human beings to
action comes entirely from dissatisfaction would also seem to be founded
in part.
is simply a sign that the will has achieved its objective. Pleasure is that by which
we recognize that the will has been satisfied. But hedonism regards this recognition as
good, as if to say, value does not lie in things, but in being of value, that satisfaction
is not in the activity but in being satisfactory. Is this not tautologous?
Hedonism also appears in a negative form which says that what drives living things
to proper action is not our idea of pleasure, but our feeling of pain, or the sense of
dissatisfaction. Thus, the end that motivates us to action is getting rid of pain.
The motivation for such things is indeed not pain.
This has two interpretations: one says that it is determined by unfavorable conditions, and the other says that it is determined by favorable
conditions.
Pain arises when the impulses are not satisfied. To say that impulses
arise from pain is to turn cause and effect upside down.

But this form of the theory likewise suggests that hedonism does not explain the
facts. We know that the discomfort of pain may be a spur to action, as when ill we seek
a doctor, or as when one who is idle seeks diversion or work. But is this the motivation
for all activity? If we say that it is always discomfort that impels human beings to
action, did Goethe write his poetry or did Durer35 paint just out of unhappiness? Is
it pain that impels a child to play? I don’t think so. The impulses of the will have
nothing to do with pain; it is when the impulses are not satisfied that pain ensues.
Human activities arising from the impulses always occur before the onset of pain. The
farmer does not wait until he is hungry before he plants the fields. He sees the sun
rise and breathes the clear morning air, and without thinking about it picks up his
hoe and goes out into the field. What does this have to do with pain? When obstacles
come between the impulses and their fulfillment, this may give rise to a feeling of
This paragraph is the conclusion of this section.
This is the reason for our love of change, our sense of curiosity. Human
beings cannot be without change for long.
This is true.
pain. Otherwise, how is it painful? The impulse to fulfill one’s hopes can only fill
one with pleasure.
Thus, I do not believe that feelings, be they pleasure or pain, are the cause of
action. For action in the basic sense, impulse and the will are primary, and feelings are
secondary. The feeling of pleasure is a phenomenon that occurs when the will achieves
its goal, and pain is the phenomenon that occurs when the will is unable to achieve its
objective. This is what biology teaches, as I shall show presently, (pp. 54–57; Thilly
255–58)
1. On the function of pain as a goal of human impulses.
… If all the causes of pain, all danger, all resistance, all failures, were to be avoided,
then struggle, competition, the feeling of adventure, the longing for battle, the joy of
victory and the loathing of defeat would all be eliminated. This is a natural principle.
But we would then inevitably be terribly bored by satisfaction without obstacles, by
success without resistance, as we are with a game that we always win. If a chess
player knows that he will win every game, he takes no pleasure in the match. If the
hunter knew that every shot would hit its mark, he would take no pleasure in the hunt.
What makes the chess game or the hunt fun is the fact that the outcome cannot be
anticipated, that victory or defeat, winning or losing, cannot be predicted, otherwise
they would be of no interest. Human life, too, is like this… (p. 58; Thilly 260)
1. Using the laws of biology to confirm the hedonistic view…
… Biology says that pleasure at210

The will or impulses contain no elements of feeling or of intellect.
This is a summary; each point is discussed separately below.
Biology also suggests this.
The sense of pleasure is an indicator of the gradual attainment of the
tracts us, just as pain serves as a warning. Pain shows us what lessens life, while
pleasure shows us what furthers life. The one warns us to flee, while the other guides
us forward. The two may be said to be the primitive forms of the knowledge of good
and bad.
The will or impulses contain no elements of feeling or of intellect. The newly hatched
chick instinctively picks up kernels of grain not because it is hungry or likes to eat. Its
actions, just like the falling of a stone, or the formation of a crystal, or the growth
of a plant, are determined by natural forces. The same is true of the sexual impulse.
In lower forms of animals, there is no prior sense of pain or pleasure. The evolution
of life is accompanied by the development of the feelings. From the higher stages of
animal life to human beings, everything has its own special feeling. These feelings give
rise to the phenomena of pain and pleasure, according to whether its life functions are
obstructed or furthered…
With the gradual evolution of the life of the spirit, from the feelings intellect is bom.
The function of intellect is to manage the activities of the feelings and to perfect them,
to cause the will to know the difference between what is beautiful and what is ugly
and make it possible to choose between them…
It is for this reason that biologists do not regard pleasure to be the ultimate end
of human life, but regard it to be the complement of pain, both of which function as
guides to the will. The will, under the guidance of the sense of pleasure, exercises a
function
This paragraph is the conclusion of this section.
This is the reason for our love of change, our sense of curiosity. Human
beings cannot be without change for long.
This is true.
pain. Otherwise, how is it painful? The impulse to fulfill one’s hopes can only fill
one with pleasure.
Thus, I do not believe that feelings, be they pleasure or pain, are the cause of
action. For action in the basic sense, impulse and the will are primary, and feelings are
secondary. The feeling of pleasure is a phenomenon that occurs when the will achieves
its goal, and pain is the phenomenon that occurs when the will is unable to achieve its
objective. This is what biology teaches, as I shall show presently, (pp. 54–57; Thilly
255–58)
1. On the function of pain as a goal of human impulses.
… If all the causes of pain, all danger, all resistance, all failures, were to be avoided,
then struggle, competition, the feeling of adventure, the longing for battle, the joy of

victory and the loathing of defeat would all be eliminated. This is a natural principle.
But we would then inevitably be terribly bored by satisfaction without obstacles, by
success without resistance, as we are with a game that we always win. If a chess
player knows that he will win every game, he takes no pleasure in the match. If the
hunter knew that every shot would hit its mark, he would take no pleasure in the hunt.
What makes the chess game or the hunt fun is the fact that the outcome cannot be
anticipated, that victory or defeat, winning or losing, cannot be predicted, otherwise
they would be of no interest. Human life, too, is like this… (p. 58; Thilly 260)
1. Using the laws of biology to confirm the hedonistic view…
… Biology says that pleasure at The will or impulses contain no elements of feeling or of intellect.
highest good, and the hedonists take the indicator to be the ultimate
end.
that moves life forward. Thus, the sense of pleasure is an indicator, a sign, of the
gradual attainment of the highest good, and the hedonists take the indicators to be the

ultimate end. If it is then asked, What is the function of pain? it is as the complement.
Pleasure and pain are inseparably related. Since pain is very clearly a guide to avoiding
harm, is not pleasure a guide to moving forward?
For those who maintain the hedonist position, pleasure never ceases.
Furthermore, there is also one kind of fact that, from the biological perspective,
definitely cannot be explained in terms of hedonism, which is that once our impulses
are satisfied, the pleasure ceases. To continue eating after one is already full is painful,
not pleasurable. Only something that stimulates the palate can diminish this pain.
The desire of male and female is the same. Whenever the organs of reproduction are
used as instruments of pleasure, disturbances and disease ensue, and those who are not
enlightened will clearly lose their function, and their lives as well. (pp. 62–64; Thilly
264–68)
1. A positive definition of the highest good. Now that we have rejected the hedonistic
theory, let us give a positive definition of the highest good. It is my view that our
human end, expressed in the most general form, is to let our human life functions
operate within the laws of our natural constitution. Every animal desires to live
as is suited to its natural endowments, to let its impulses, which manifest its
nature, define its activity. The same is true of human beings. Human beings
desire to use fully their mental powers, to live an historical life according to their
These are all what is called the ob- original nature. It is for this reason that
jective content of life.
This section is very well done.
we desire to play, to study, to work, to acquire wealth, to possess and to enjoy, to
form and to create, and also to love and to admire, to obey and to rule, to fight and
to win, to make poetry and to dream, to think and to investigate. And he desires to
pursue all these things in their natural order of development. All human beings desire
the experience of human relations. Thus brothers desire to be brothers and friends
desire to be friends and companions desire to be companions and citizens desire to
be citizens, and even enemies desire to be enemies. To wife and children, he desires
to be a good husband and kind father. He desires all these experiences to maintain
the content of his life, and then he desires to rear and educate sons and daughters
to continue after him. If his experiences have indeed been exemplary, so as to prove
that he was indeed an upright and true human being, he has then achieved the goal
of human life and can die without remorse. However, what the content of his life is,
is obtained from the history of the life of the people. Thus, we may also say that the
human will is his personal form of expressing, and of maintaining and developing, the
life of his people, (pp. 65–66; Thilly 270–71)

… Human beings are different from other animals in that from the animal impulse of
self-preservation has grown a conceptual self-preservation impulse. For all subhuman
animals the will that determines their actions is an unconscious impulse, but human
beings can be conscious of it. We must think about how to express and carry
Liang Rengong’s37 article on the concept of the future and the belief in
the present [xianzai zhuyi\ contains this idea.
Their simplicity.
Their origins.
I would say that the human race has only a spiritual life, and not a bodily
life. It is clear that though the spirit has changed frequently, the body has
remained unchanged for thousands of years.
I would say that there are also differing degrees of depth in the ideals
themselves.
As the spirit develops, the ideals become diverse.
It is concepts that create civilization. Indeed, indeed.
out our aims in life which then become the forms of our life content that then make
up the ideals that appear in our minds. It is then the realization of these ideals that
forms the basis of our attempt to perfect our constitution, and the development of
our life activities and the definition of its value. Mankind indeed has a great many
such ideals. The Greeks and the Romans, the Spartans and the Athenians, each had
different ideals. There is a different ideal for men and women, for soldiers and scholars,
for peasants and fishermen. But they all come from one fundamental type, just as the
features of human beings are very diverse, but if we look at them in the context of
anatomical-physiological types they are all the same. With the gradual development
of the life of the spirit, ideals become more diverse, and with the diversity of ideals,
their realization becomes increasingly individualized. The direct perception of ideals
as displayed in the consciousness is seen in varying degrees of clarity with each person,
and the ability to resist corrupting influences and to pursue one’s ideals also varies
from individual to individual. However, all human beings have ideals, and furthermore
everyone uses his ideals as the basis of perfecting his basic constitution and developing
his life activities. It is indeed a fact that this is true for every human being.
… As nations evolved, they were then able to form ideals from their past history.
But in actuality, the historical life of world civilization is governed by concepts. Types
of behavior for perfecting the basic human qualities
New ideals.
Life ideals.
Historical life must be interpreted in this way for it to approach the
truth or have value.
See the introduction.
37 Liang Qichao.

and developing life appear that can overcome the old views and give rise to new
ideas, that are ultimately realized in human activity. Consider the fifteenth-century
movement inspired by the doctrine of universal brotherhood.36 Did it not arise from
the contemporary ideal of life? Did not the Reformation come from a newly constructed
ideal of life of the believers in Christianity? … Such facts, arising from the great
enterprise of real history, which have inspired the will of individuals and forced their
acceptance, have all been due to the power of new ideals of the human race.
Thus, it is plain to see that the goal of realizing our ideals is not just a concept
of assorted obsessions. When a people has an ideal of freedom or power or glory, and
engages in realizing it, this certainly is not just an arbitrary wish for pleasure or
happiness. Even when the ideal is realized, there is yet always a sense of satisfaction,
but no one cares whether or not this is the greatest pleasure of the entire human race.
A nation does not reckon the cost of its ideal. It strives for freedom, or power, or glory,
without calculating how much happiness is gained or lost. In striving to realize its ideal,
a nation will push straight forward, offering up the interests and lives of its individuals
in sacrifice, and the individual willingly sacrifices his interests and life, without regrets.
Even though they may dread the sacrifice as individuals, as members of the nation
they inevitably are willing to accept their own death. The historical judgment, like the
historical will, accepts this as its standard. A nation does not
Thirteen philosophers, nine groups.
judge its own past by the standard of pleasure, but rather it determines the value of
its historical persons and events according to the concept of its current basic character.
Thus our judgment of Frederick the Great and his wars is not based on a computation
of the pleasures and pains which they caused, but upon the honor and dignity they
achieved, upon whether or not the nation advanced closer to its objective goals. The
scientific historian does the same. He indeed knows that there is absolutely no hope of
applying the standard of pleasure. Only philosophers hold on to this hope. But, so far
as I know, not one of them has ever achieved this hope.
1.
Natural.
The historical arguments. The view here advanced of the ultimate end of the human
will and the ultimate standard of the behavior value is not new. The Greek moral
philosophers formulated it long ago, and additionally, all moral philosophies, with the
exception of hedonism, accept this view. In the words of Plato and Aristotle: The
highest good is natural character and life and action in harmony with the concept.
The happiness of the human race consists in upholding and practicing all the human
virtues. The Stoics taught the same, that living in accord with nature consisted of
regarding all real things as the end of the will; thus, our ultimate end is to live in
accord with reason. To live in accord with reason is the way that we find tranquility
… (pp. 66–69; Thilly 271— 73)

1. The positive meaning of the highest good, in detail. Someone might query: But
has this not commit Behavior that is good and kind.
All positive virtues are both means and ends.
Negative virtues are indirectly related to the perfection of life.
Negative virtues are not “good” in and of themselves.
ted the fallacy of circular argument? Did you not say earlier that the value of virtue
lay in the fact that it aided in the development of life? And now you say, being virtuous,
which is simply a kind of means, is also an end?
As I have already said, my reply is that this is true. The various parts of all organic
entities are means, and at the same time they are also ends. As parts of the whole,
they are like the bodily organs, all of which exist to support physical life, and at the
same time are parts of the body. The body cannot exist independent of the organs of
which it is composed. It is the whole of these organs that form the body. Thus, the
activities of these organs are in themselves means that maintain life, and at the same
time they take these activities as their life… The moral life of the spirit in itself is an
organism whose every power and every function are both means and ends. Thus each
part has its own inherent highest value, but if its relationship to the whole is severed
it becomes meaningless… Negative virtues, such as not stealing or not committing
adultery, have value only as means to such goods as truth, property, and marriage;
they have no value in and of themselves. Such positive virtues as respecting truth,
preserving justice, and upholding family relations are means of perfecting life, and at
the same time are part of the content of life. The exercise of all such virtues as the
search for knowledge, the acquisition of property, and maintaining the social order in
family life and raising children are means to life and at the same time are important
elements of life. (pp. 71–72; Thilly 27576)
Similarly, some persons are honored more than others according to their
different degrees of wisdom or stupidity.
This section gives a clear and thorough account of evolution.
I would further say that although all virtues and motives are both means and ends,
their value as means have differences of degree. The relationships of the different parts
of a living thing to the whole differ in importance. The various scenes of a play vary in
the respect to which they express the central theme of the play as a whole. Similarly,
some functions of moral life are more central to life’s ultimate end than others. Some
are secondary means, while others are means that are closely tied to the ultimate
ends… (p. 72; Thilly 277)
A similar conclusion discovered by evolutionists and historians is that later forms
of life are superior to earlier forms of life. The life activities of the lowest forms of

animal life are simply to get food and avoid harm. As they gradually evolved, the
reproductive organs gave birth to love for one’s own species. As the senses of the sensory
organs developed into a higher capacity for knowing, this laid the basis for social and
intellectual life. With the highest development of human social and intellectual life,
based on our ability to remember the past, this development could be known directly,
which is part of the content of the history of evolution, or what is called the history of
man. One important part of the historical life of the human race is the expanding and
deepening of our knowledge of reality, and another is the more comprehensive, more
integrated growth of social relations, both of which are derived from the development
of reason and social virtues. The
rational knowledge of things guides the will in the attainment of its goals. It is only
when the social virtues serve family, state, and society, that the human essence as
historical reality can be perfected.
This says that the sensory side cannot be denigrated. This differs from
the view of the Song Neo-Con- fucians.
It is for this reason that that human life which is able to develop these higher powers
and subordinate the lower powers to them is higher in human character. Otherwise,
that life in which the vegetative and animal functions and the sensory impulses and
blind passions are dominant is a lower form of life. The perfect human life is one
in which our spiritual abilities are developed to their highest, in which thought and
imagination and action are developed to the highest degree. Seen from the perspective
of human history, the social virtues are indeed an important part of life, for it is they
that make possible a peaceful environment for human life and its mutual support.
Thus, the common saying that truth and goodness are the two sides of the perfect life.
However, the reader should not for this reason think that my view is the same as that
of idealism, for I certainly do not denigrate the sensory side of man (i.e., the animal
functions). The childhood pleasures of perception and play are also part of life. And
eating and drinking and happiness have their place in the perfect life, as long as they
do not become the whole of life.
From this, we may further discuss the life of the individual in terms of its two sides
of ends and means. The perfect life is the ultimate end of life. But as a part of the
state or of civilized society, the individual is but a means.
Thus ends and means have no fixed position. Ends are everywhere, and
means are everywhere.
Benevolence [ren].
However, does perfecting the human way also include the way of all
things? If not, how do we explain that killing things is inhumane [buren]?
Plato said that the state is a human being on a larger scale. Thus, the functions of
the state are similar to the functions of the individual. The relationship between the
community and the individual is much like the relationship between ends and means,

except that as means the individual is part of the ends, since the whole is formed of the
totality of the individual parts. Thus, we obtain a new standard for defining human
character: The more a person fulfills his duty to his people, the more he contributes to
the spiritual and historical life of his people, to their scholarship or ethics or art, the
greater will be his historical value. Moral worth in the narrower sense does not depend
on this, but upon fulfilling his duty to his state. The reader, however, should not think
that this is idealism, (pp. 73–74; Thilly 278–79)
It is when we progress from the state to yet a higher stage, and become members of
the world, that we reach what is called the human way [rendao]. The human way, the
concept of benevolence expressed concretely, is the ultimate goal of the results of our
search for the highest good within the realm of experience. The perfect human way, or,
in Christian phraseology, the kingdom of God on earth, is the highest good, the final
end of human beings. And because of this, the morals of nations are related to it as a
means. But though they are its means, we must understand that they are also parts
of the end. The character of each nationality takes this end as its highest criterion
forjudging the degree to which its concept of humaneness has developed. Although no
nation or
We still do not know what humanity’s ultimate purpose really is.
To explain it.
This passage proves that mankind values surprise. Surprise is what the
life of mankind is all about.
stage of development is totally devoid of value, the quality of the character of a
people nevertheless inevitably differs according as the development of its political,
spiritual, moral, aesthetic, and religious life approaches the concept of humanity.
We cannot express concretely the concept of humaneness, but can only outline its
general concept in human spiritual, historical life. All anthropological and historical
studies furnish us with materials, but we cannot construct the idea… Although we
can see and compare fragments of the divine ideal in human histoiy, these assorted
fragments and their varying functions cannot provide us with an understanding of the
organization of the whole. We can never have a concept of the organization of the
whole… (pp. 75–76; Thilly 280–81)
But the human life is but one part of the life of all real things. We can only have
a formal concept of the totality of the life of all real things. We cannot perceive it
directly, and can only describe it by analogies, thus it is called the inconceivable. It is
called God… (p. 76; Thilly 282)
Chapter III: Pessimism
1. The theory of pessimism…
2. The realm of sense perception proves the view of pessimism… All those who have
strong desires receive only a small amount of pleasure when their desires are

realized. It is only those who quietly wait who experience the purest, the fullest
pleasure when they receive what they did not expect. We see this in children. It
is always
Not so. Mature people too sometimes want to be children again. In
their maturity, people undergo all kinds of changes, and since the period of
childhood does not have these changes, adults look back on their childhood
with longing.
Indeed, indeed. People really do take developing courage as their final
objective.
Such things really do happen. In 1918, when the troops were routed in
Changsha, this phenomenon did occur.38
clear that those with the strongest desires are the least satisfied, (p. 81; Thilly 292)
… Elderly people often have the wish to be young again. Mature people never want
to be young again, and the young do not have the desire to be children again, unlike the
elderly. Is it not because having enjoyed a period of rest they have already nourished
the courage to go out into the world again, (p. 84; Thilly 297)
1. The argument for pessimism in the moral domain… Just as wild beasts must be
kept behind iron cages, human beings must use the iron bars of fear to make
cages of criminal laws to prevent them from acting aggressively against each
other. Whenever they can escape the restraints of the criminal law, they will
immediately attack each other. Even what they call virtue, if exposed to the
light, is similar in nature. They are sociable from vanity. They are sympathetic
from self-love. They value their reputations out of fear. They remain peaceful
out of cowardice. They are benevolent out of superstition. Among them there
are a few whose malice preponderates over their ignorance, and since those who
have stronger wills invariably are more intelligent, the laws do not restrain them,
so they burst from the cage like wild animals and pounce on others stopping
at nothing. The many are like sheep, cowardly and stubborn and narrow; the
few like wolves and foxes, ferocious and deceitful. Only those with wisdom and
virtue stand outside these two categories. Nature hardly ever creates two or three
geniuses in one century. The same is true for saints, (p. 85; Thilly 298)
… The habit of sham and deception is strong today, but was there ever an age that
was free of this habit? And was there ever an age in which those who saw behind the
38 For an account by Mao and others of the depradations inflicted by warlord soldiers at this time,
see the “Appeal to the Central Government in Beijing by Hunanese Citizens in All Walks of Life Accusing
Zhang Jingyao of Ten Major Crimes,” dated January 19, 1920.

scenes did not have plans to reform it? It is doubtful, however, whether any age can
dispel our illusions. Today, condemning mankind and exposing the evil side of mankind
is a popular theme in the literary world. Showing the falsehood and coarseness of
mankind is the task of poetry. Is this a sign that people’s minds are turning toward
the truth? I’m afraid that I am not convinced of it. Besides the craving for truth, there
is an- Paulsen is a supporter of idealism, other impulse in us that takes pleasure
in
the dark side of life, that feeds upon gossip and scandal. I doubt that this new
school of art, which calls itself the realistic school is either healthy or worth welcoming.
Falsehood is indeed false, and we should not close our eyes to reality… (p. 91; Thilly
304)
Mutual distrust and deception. … It is indeed a fact that even if people could
dispel their sense of fear of each other, there are some who would not take pleasure
in helping others, but that there are also those who would delight in helping others
without being asked. Likewise, if you do not expect gratitude, when someone who has
sincerely received your assistance shows his thanks in his countenance you will have a
feeling of joy… (p. 92; Thilly 306)
We furthermore often feel that it is quieting and consoling to form a universal
conclusion about the baseness of life and mankind. For example,
A penetrating insight into human nature.
Such notions of praising the past and denying the present are held not
just in our nation but in the West as welt
when a man has been deceived by his wife, he often declares that women are good
for nothing. When a writer is ignored by the public he often says that ordinary people
can’t tell the difference between black and white. Another example is the fact that
if, upon meeting someone who has been disappointed, we tell him that what he has
suffered is an exception, his suffering is increased, while if we say that such a fate is
common to all, his pain is mitigated… (p.93; Thilly 307–8)
1. The argument for pessimism in the historical-philosophical domain… The poet
Hesiod once described the ages of the world as beginning with the golden age
and ending with the iron age, and bemoans the fact that he was unfortunately
bom into the iron age. Such a conception may be explained physiologically. The
temperament of old age is always optimistic about the past, and unable to keep
in touch with the present. Because he is powerless to do things in the present,
and finds the cause of this not in himself but in the times, he often longs for the
glowing age of his youth. The elderly are the bearers of history from whom the
young receive knowledge of the past. They are the light of history. The tendency
of youth in particular to admire, and the tendency to glorify one’s own forbears, is
also relevant. And the fact that the institutions of moral instruction tend to make

use of history serves the same function. All those who for their own particular
reasons are dissatisfied with the present love to humiliate it by praising the past.
(p. 95; Thilly 309)
A compromise position.
More good than evil.
To sum up: As civilization advances, both the varieties and the degree of suffering
increase. The same is true of pleasure. Thus the historical optimists say that the
advance of history brings an increase in happiness, while the pessimists say that it
brings an increase in suffering. I regard both positions as incapable of proof. Although
both may refine their arguments, in reality neither can be proved. Only one conclusion
seems certain to me, that the so-called advance of civilization brings with it greater
sensibility, and also an increasing intensity of both suffering and pleasure… (p. 99;
Thilly 313–14)
1. Morality and historical pessimism… It is only particular personalities that can
clearly distinguish between good and evil. On the one hand, we have reverent
love, self-sacrificing loyalty, and passionate devotion to the truth and to justice;
on the other, terrible depravity, even though, when the two are compared, there
is more good than evil, and the abnormality of evil is in obvious contrast to the
good as undoubtedly has always been the case…(p. 102; Thilly 317)
Chapter IV: Bad and Evil
1. Physical flaws. I distinguish between two kinds of human flaws: physical flaws and
moral flaws. Physical flaws also come in two varieties: external flaws deriving from
the world of nature, and internal flaws due to our bodily or spiritual weaknesses.
… All events in the world and civilization begin in obstacles and struggle. If the
fields automatically grew
Where the river emerges from the Tong Pass, because Mount Hua is an
obstacle to it, the force of the rushing water is much greater. When the
wind blows back through the Three Gorges, because it is blocked by Mount
Wu, the angry howling of the wind increases in intensity.
rice or the vegetable garden grew vegetables by itself, there would be no agricultural
or horticultural arts. If the climate were always suitable to the body there would be
no buildings. If all implements and articles were provided naturally by heaven and
earth there would be no handicrafts. If this were true this would be no different from
what the alchemists call paradise. This world that we live in is different from paradise
precisely because of the obstacles and all the activities relating to these obstacles. Thus

our present constitutions are more suited to living in this real world than to living in
paradise. As for extraordinary obstacles, their effect on human beings is no different
from that of ordinary obstacles. Floods teach us the art of building dikes. Fires are the
germ of the evolution of building. Although we cannot tell a particular individual that
a particular calamity from which he has suffered losses is good for him, it is possible
to turn bad fortune into good. As he looks back on what happened in the past he may
see that what was clearly an unfortunate occurrence might even have been a blessing.
An evil that has been overcome by one’s own efforts, and with help from others, is
no longer an evil but has been transformed into a blessing which, recalled later, gives
immeasurable pleasure. Is there anyone who has not experienced this?
From this we understand that it is the same with the effects of the flaws that are
inherent to ourselves, what we have called physical and spiritual weaknesses. If there
were people who were physically able to conquer the
This is not true. As mankind’s powers increase, external obstacles also
increase. Great power faces great obstacles, and great obstacles face great
powers, as inevitably as ordinary people face ordinary obstacles. For example, a great new continent to the West confronted Columbus, Yu39 was faced
with the great flood, and a host of European nations rose up to surround
Paris and defeat Napoleon.
A very true principle, very well expressed.
external world, who had the strength and endurance to resist harmful influences,
and if there were people whose intellect surpassed others in understanding so that they
never made an error, the result would be the same as living in the paradise mentioned
above. The increase of power would have the same effect as the decrease of obstacles,
to the point that would be the same as being in paradise. The value of the rice comes
from the effort put into tilling it. If it could be harvested with no labor, it would have
no value. The same is true of the human capacities. Our bodily organs are suited to life
in this world, and thus our various kinds of life activities are responses to our will and
feelings. Those living in a different world would have organs and functions different
from those of mankind. But our functions are appropriate to our tasks. Moreover,
the fact that our physical functions have illnesses, blindness, and handicaps that are
greater than our nature and our powers yields an effect similar to that of accidental
external evils… Although we cannot say that all illnesses are useful to us, if we can
make use of our inherent flaws, it is not impossible to tum weakness into strength, as
we have already seen. Looked at in this way, evils are not only real, but necessary.
“The light dove dividing the air in her flight and feeling its resistance might perhaps
imagine that she could suceed much better in a vacuum.” Thus Kant chides men,
39 The legendary emperor.

showing that the activity of our understanding must come from the facts of experience.
Similarly, human intent [yfrz] must
The fleshly desires concern the individual, and selfishness concerns social relations; fleshly desire is related to personal virtue, and selfishness is
related to public virtue.
Personal virtues.
Only afterward is it clear that the qualities of the sagely person, who “is
bom with the knowledge [of those duties],” “without an effort, hits what is
right, apprehends without the exercise of thought, and naturally and easily
embodies the right way”40 are not believable.
have obstacles to oppose it. Without resistance there is no motive force, without
resistance there is no happiness. Pure happiness, like pure truth, exists only for God.
For human beings, real happiness requires obstacles and loss, just as the knowledge of
truth requires ignorance and misunderstanding.
1. Moral flaws. Physical flaws are unavoidable in life, but what about moral flaws,
what we call evil?
I believe that evils, too, are inevitable ingredients of mankind’s historical life. Why
do I say this? There are two basic forms of evil: the desires of the flesh, and selfishness.
The desires of the flesh, or sensuality, are sensory impulses that the powers of reason
and morality cannot control, exposing their weakness, such as dissipation, indolence,
frivolousness, and cowardice, and all kinds of intemperance. Selfishness, hurting others
to benefit oneself, is the source of such evils as greed, injustice, and malice. If all sensual
desires and selfishness were eliminated, since the world would contain no evil, it would
also contain no good. The virtues of prudence, patience, and fortitude necessarily exist
only in opposition to their corresponding fleshly evils. If human beings had no fear
of suffering, there would be no fortitude, and without the stimulus of pleasure, there
would be no moderation. Thus if there were no potential of evil, there could be no virtue.
Perhaps good without evil is what is meant by divine virtue? But it is inconceivable
to us human beings. The human social virtues presuppose the natural selfishness of
the senses as their opposing counterparts. Without selfishness there could be no
Public virtues.
The sagely person is formed in the resistance to great evils.
The above talks of the types of evil, and this talks of actual evils.
All things in the world are realized from their differences and comparisons. The Buddhists say that we should extinguish differentiation. I wonder
how they would deal with the problem of moral good and evil?
40 From the Doctrine of the Mean, XX, 9 and 18 (Legge, Vol. I, pp. 407,413).

But if this were true the inequality, the lack of freedom, and the great
wars that have existed in the world from time immemorial could never
be ended, so how could the world be one of pure equality, freedom, and
universal love? If it were, it would simply be a paradise. But is not the
theory that is touted as the Great Harmony41 a false ideal?
Since today we do not live in the age of Great Harmony we wish for
the Great Harmony, just as those who suffer strife wish for peace. But a
long period of peace, pure peace without any disorder of any kind, would
be unbearable to human life, and it would be inevitable that the peace
would give birth to waves. Could human life stand the Great Harmony? I
am sure that once we entered a reign of Great Harmony virtues of justice and
benevolence. All the virtues contain an ingredient of self-control.
Not only is this true, the actual evils outside us are also indispensable to the formation of virtue. Virtue grows strong in the battle against actual evils. Injustice arouses
in the spectator or victim an increasing idea of the right. Falsehood and deceit reveal
the value of truth and honesty. Cruelty and malice are the foil for kindness and broadmindedness. (pp. 105–8; Thilly 323–26)
Thus if we eliminate all evil from history, we at the same time eliminate all the
traces of the struggle of good against bad, and all of humanity’s greatest phenomena
of moral heroism are also lost.
But not this alone; the content of historical life is also lost. The forms of historical life
are nothing other than the forces of the struggle between good and evil that develop
with the times. If states had no schemes for aggression there would be no military
preparations. If no one acted improperly there would be no need for laws. Military
forces and laws are the means by which the state fights against foreign and domestic
disorder. If all
waves of competition and friction would inevitably break forth that
would disrupt the reign of Great Harmony. It is for this reason that the
conception of a society in which the sage is exterminated and the wise discarded, and the people of one state grow old and die without having had
any dealings with those of another, put forward by Laozi and Zhuangzi,42 remains but an ideal society and nothing more. The realm of Tao Yuanming’s
41 The chief promoter of the idea of Great Harmony (datong) at the time was Kang Youwei. Mao
had earlier expressed admiration for Kang, but see his two brief, barbed articles of July 14, 1919.
42 In fact, the language and ideas here are taken from Laozi. The passages evoked are to be found
in Chapters 19 and 80. The first of these begins: “Exterminate the sage, discard the wise, and the
people will benefit a hundredfold.” The relevant portion of the second reads: “Though adjoining states
are within sight of one another, and the sound of dogs barking and cocks crowing in one state can be
heard in another, yet the people of one state will grow old and die without having had any dealings
with those of another.” (D.C. Lau, Tao te ching, pp. 75 and 142.)

peach-blossom spring43 is also simply an ideal realm. This also shows that
human ideals are seldom realistic, that they are mostly false. This is the
reason for the natural alternation between order and disorder, and the cycle of peace and war. Since the earliest of times, when a period of order is
followed by a period of chaos, human beings always hate the chaos and hope
for order, not realizing that chaos too is part of the process of historical life,
that it too has value in real life. When we read history, we always praise the
era of the Warring States, the time of the rivalry between Liu [Bang] and
Xiang [Yu], the time of the struggle between Han Wudi and the Xiongnu,
the era of the struggles among the Three Kingdoms. It is the times when
things are constantly changing, and numerous men of talent are emerging,
that people like to read about When they come to periods of peace, they
are bored and put the book aside. It is not that we like chaos, but simply
that the reign of peace cannot last long, is unendurable to human beings,
and that human nature is delighted by sudden change.
disorder, both domestic and foreign, were eliminated, and all observed the way of
justice, peace, kindness and tolerance, then war and diplomacy, courts and police, and
all the aggressive features of government would disappear, and the perfect state would
also vanish. Religion, too, is nothing but a form of the struggle between good and evil.
If there were no evil acts, human beings would all be gods, and religion too would
vanish, (pp. 109–10; Thilly 327)
I once dreamed of everyone being equal in wisdom, and of the whole
human race being made up of sages, so that all laws and rules could be
discarded, but now I realize that such a realm cannot exist.44
Something that is evil is so because it is inferior to something that is
good. It is not evil by nature. Because it is inferior to the good, it cannot
be equal in value to the good. But it cannot be said to be without value.
At a particular time we may feel that it is totally without value, and not
only that it has no value, but that it is very harmful. This refers just to
that particular time, and in relationship to something else. This does not
mean that by nature it is valueless in itself.
Evil is inevitable, but is evil normal? Does it have equal value to good? I think it is
not. Evil has no value or right to exist in itself. It exists only for the sake of good, as a
means to the realization of good. Good is to bad as light is to darkness. If the painter
does not paint the shadows he cannot show the light, but his intention is to paint the
light, not the shadows, just as in the old saying, the clouds take their light from the
43 Tao Qian (365–427), original name Yuanming, zi Yuanliang, hao Wuliu Xiansheng, an outstanding poet, described an ideal kingdom, reached through a peachblossom spring. The metaphor has long
since passed into the common language in China to designate a utopia.
44 For a statement to this effect, see Mao’s letter of August 23, 1917, to Li Jinxi, above, p. 135.

moon. The same is true of the poet, who cannot portray the grand, the beautiful, or
the good without describing also the vulgar and ugly. But though his intention is to
portray what is beautiful and good, he can only do so by setting them off against the
vulgar and ugly. Both in life and in history, it is only the good that exists, while evil is
subservient to it and functions as a stimulus, an obstacle to it. Thus evil is negative and
has no value in itself. It is realized only as the opposite of good. This inherent quality
of contradiction is without constructive power. As Kant said, evil cannot escape its
own contradictory and self-destructive nature. Thus there is no positive antimorality.
That there is no principle of antimorality, or unvirtuousness, is like the case of
falsehood. All truth forms a unified system, but there is no system of falsehood or
error. As Epictetus (Epictetus, of the Stoic school, was
Because of such phenomena, my friend Zou Panqing45 has a pessimistic
view (referring to such things as those mentioned in these three sentences).
There is indeed a question here: Of what use to us is this historical
reputation, and what is wrong with an evil person gaining a bad reputation?
I do not think a theory should be based on this. We should emphasize
only whether or not the reality at the time was good or evil. If the actual
activity is good then it is good, if evil then it is evil. We should not think
about being good in order to leave behind a good historical reputation or
about evil leaving behind a bad reputation historically. When we judge
history and say that someone was good or that someone was bad, we are
referring to the good or bad actions of that person. There is no goodness
or evil apart from real actions. Thus it is stupid to think of leaving behind
a reputation for all time, and it is also stupid to envy the reputation that
others may leave behind them.
bom in the year 60 A.D. and died in 120) said, there is no mark for the misses.
In the present, a good person may be vilified and a bad person may be honored, but
history is just. Even when the lives of humane and upright people are full of suffering
and they are rejected everywhere, their virtue still stands, immortal and untarnished.
The evil persons of their age, though they may attain the highest position and honors,
will be unknown after they die. This is the admonition of history. Consider the case
of Jesus, whose truth was bright and clear. The record of history moves our highest
thoughts, and makes strong our will, though indeed no one has ever suffered as cruelly
as he.
When Pilate sat in judgment on Jesus and said, Do you not see that I have the
power to condemn you or to set you free? how great Pilate seemed to himself. At the
time, he saw before him only a madman who was called king of the Jews, whose life
or death would hardly affect the Roman Empire. But as we look back on it today,
45 Zou Panqing refers to Zou Yunzhen (1894–1985), zi Panqing, alternative ming Bangeng, a Hunanese who graduated from First Normal School in the eighth class. He became a member of the New
People’s Study Society.

not only are the roles changed, Pilate who would otherwise have been consigned to
oblivion long ago, along with all the other petty functionaries, is known to the world
centuries later, just because of the story of this madman who was nailed to the cross.
The tragic death of Jesus cannot be told without mentioning the name of Pilate, and so
the foul stench of Pilate must accompany the sweet fragrance of Jesus for a thousand
generations. His name will be known for generations, not for his honor or glory, but to
let later people
know that a judge and procurator of that time was not capable of passing the final
judgment, (pp. 109–11; Thilly 326–31)
I agree very much with this statement.
What we call evil is only the image, not the essence.
Augustine, using the words of Aristotle, once criticized the Persian religion, the
Manichaeans, saying, “Evil has no real essence, but the loss or the absence of the good
has received the name of evil.” Spinoza and Leibnitz also believe that only in God is
there perfection and reality. The difference between good and evil lies solely in the
fact that our ways of looking at things are incomplete. In the unity of all things, God,
everything is necessary and perfect. We cannot get away from ourselves to observe
things, but we understand that our conception of things is in images that are not their
essence. Also, we understand that evil does not have the same kind of value as good,
and that it does not possess any real power in relation to good. Thus, it is clear that
even though both evil and good appear in the world, we cannot conclude that the
world is worthless.
1. My view is not quietistic. Some may think that my view is quietistic because I
say that evil is by nature unavoidable, but this is not true. My view does not say
that because evil is unavoidable we should just sit down and accept it, but rather
that since evil is unavoidable we have the responsibility to attack and suppress
it whenever and wherever it occurs. The existence of evil in the world presents
us with the goal of attacking and suppressing it. It would be a great mistake to
say that because evil is inevitable we should accept or tolerate it. Disease that
fails
Here too, my view is different. If disease inspires the medical arts and
teaches a sense of patience and benevolence, if suffering is able to move
the heart and instill patience, if falsehood is conquered by truth, if evil
thoughts submit to one’s conscience, is this not precisely because they are
evil? Do not people everywhere say “we can’t …” and “don’t …” about
other evils besides these? When evil does occur, do not “we still cannot…”
or “still are not…” mean the same as “we can’t…” or “don’t …”? Those things
about which we say “we still cannot…” or “still are not…”, are similar in
nature to those about which we say “it’s already possible …” or “already

happened ..they are all bad. The reason we cannot do without evil is that
it is capable of assisting our resistance and struggle, and thus every kind
of evil is always under attack and being suppressed; it is not just that it
is inevitable. (A close reading of this passage shows that the words are
not clear, and this may not be what Paulsen meant.) to arouse the medical
arts or to teach a sense of patience and benevolence, poverty that is accepted without
moving the heart, falsehood that is not conquered by the truth, and evil thoughts that
do not submit to one’s conscience, these are real evils. We must exert eveiy effort to
attack and suppress them. How could we just sit down and be indifferent to them? (pp.
111–12; Thilly 332)
Some might question this saying, since evil is inevitable in this world, then there
is no way to eliminate evil as long as the world exists. Even though we work hard to
attack and suppress it, it is but wasted effort…
My answer is: Our impulse to combat evil does not come from the conception of
satisfaction after the battle, but from being oppressed by this evil. It is clearly understood that satisfying one need, or removing one obstacle, will inevitably be followed
by yet another new need, another new obstacle.
Do not worry about the harvest, just about the planting.
We want to do away with evil because it is enemy to the fulfillment of life.
Thus we eliminate evil in the process of fulfilling life, not just to eliminate
evil. In wishing to live a full life, how am I to know whether the evils are
many or few, or whether I shall totally eliminate them or not.
But this does not diminish the strength to press forward. No matter what the
circumstances, there is one inevitable result, which is the reality that right will conquer
wrong, that good will conquer evil. Our most important task is not to bring perfect
happiness to the human race, but to live our own lives properly. This purpose can be
achieved under all conditions, in all times. Goethe says, he who is capable does what is
right, without worrying about the results. Indeed! Those who are silently passive and
simply accept being oppressed by evil, will not only be unable to overcome it, they
will submit to it without courage and without spirit, which is the source of decline
and weakness. But those who constantly strengthen themselves, not only feel that
they can rely on their abilities, they often feel that evil is giving way before them. The
satisfaction they get from this is not diminished by the fact that another evil will follow
closely upon the defeat of the first evil. Future evils concern future human beings, and
I should not attempt to anticipate them. My task is to eliminate present evils, (pp.
112–13; Thilly 333–34)
Is this the inner peace of he who has the strongest, greatest powers?
The good persons of whom poets write are those who die content, without bitterness
for their opponents, even though they have suffered cruel wrongs. Such are Cordelia
and Desdemona. Thus in the end they are able to overcome evil with good, and evil

has no power to destroy their inner peace. It was a means of testing and perfecting
their character. Sooner or later, evil does not wait to be destroyed, but destroys itself,
(p. 113;
Only the rocks in the ground do not die, but what human being would
wish to live the life of a rock?
Cyclical
Contraction
Thilly 334)
4. On life and death. Some people regard death as a great evil. Neither the individual,
nor the nation, nor all humanity can avoid death.
But this is a false view. Death should not be viewed simply as an external necessity,
but as an inner teleological necessity. Goethe says that death is the plan of nature that
provides for the diversity of life. The plan that gives nature historical life is indeed
not good for those who are dying, but without the change of generations there would
be no history. The content of an unhistorical life, of the human race without death, is
inconceivable to us. Moreover, if there were no death, I fear there would also be no life
as we know it. If there were no family relationships, I fear there would likewise be none
of the deep moral feelings, such as the love of parents for their children or the love of
children for their parents. Thus, it is clear that if we wish to have human historical life
we cannot hate death. Furthermore, human life is not infinite in its nature. Its powers
and contents are limited. Biology and psychology tell us that every action tends to
be cyclical. Thus there are fixed forms of thought and action, for which there are also
corresponding principles. Cyclical actions invariably lead to contraction or involution,
and finally torpor. The will and understanding are in ever-changing motion, which
over time leads to a loss of the ability to respond flexibly to change. As people get
older, even though they continue to come into contact with external things, they are
no longer capable of receiving the new
To accept it and die, what is there to regret?
Human beings are part of nature, are supported by the laws of nature.
That the living must die is the law of ail natural things, that what comes
into being must perish. All natural laws have the quality of necessity. We
human beings also have the necessary, inevitable desire to achieve. What
more can we desire than to fulfill that which is fundamental and essential,
and discard that which is inessential. Furthermore, our death is not death,
but simply a dissolution \jiesari\. All natural things are not destroyed;
neither are we human beings destroyed. Not only is death not death, life
too is not life, but simply a uniting. Since a human being is formed of the
uniting of spirit and matter, what is there to dread when the decline of old
age leads to their dispersal? Moreover, dispersal is not a single dispersal
that is never united again. This dispersal is followed by that uniting. If the

world contained only dispersal without reuniting, how could we then see
every day with our own eyes phenomena that represent unitings (I do not
mean reincarnation)? The universe does not contain influences, nor can they
make use of them, and they gradually, imperceptibly, become strangers to the world.
The decline and death of human beings is not due to an invasion of some external
force but rather is inherent to our very essence. From the perspective of the living,
as part of the completion of life, death is not to be despised. From the perspective of
the dying person, the same is true. Thus both the living and the dying regard death
as a natural law. How can it be evil? What the dying person wished to be, he has
already experienced, and what he has lived for has already appeared in the world. His
descendants, his nation, the truth, the good, and the beauty that he has lived for
continue on after his death, so what regrets are there? (pp. 114–15; Thilly 335–36)
only the world of human life. There are many other kinds of worlds
in addition to that of human life. When we have already had all kinds
of experience in this world of human life, we should leave this world to
experience other kinds of worlds. If human life knew no dying, and if we
were to live forever on this venerable world, we cannot imagine what the
content of such an ahistorical life without the changing of the generations
might be like, but even if we could imagine it, what point would there
be in forever experiencing one kind of life? Would we then think that
dying was painful? Certainly not. Never having experienced death, what
makes us think it is painful? Furthermore, pursuing it logically, it would
seem that the event of death is not necessarily painful. Life and death
are two great worlds, and the passage between these two worlds, from life
to death, is naturally very gradual, and the distance is by nature barely
perceptible. Elderly people peacefully come to the end of their years and
enter a natural state, an event that is necessary and proper. Where is
the pain and suffering? I would guess that people fear death so much not
because it is painful, but because it is such a great change. From the realm
of life it is an enormous change for human beings suddenly to enter the
realm of death. But if we could have some idea of what it would be like
after the change, then it would not arouse so much fear. But we today still
cannot know at all what happens after death. Where is the vast universe
heading? This truly is enough to evoke a sense of sadness and pain in
life. However, I do not see it this way. Human beings are born with a sense
of curiosity. How can it be different in this case? Are we not delighted with
all kinds of rare things that we seldom encounter? Death too is a rare thing
that I have never experienced in my entire life. Why should it alone not
delight me? Whether it is painful or not, and even if it is, this pain will
indeed be a wonderland. Even though the future is dark and unknowable,
is not this dark and unknown world also a wonderland? Some may fear
the great change, but I think it is profoundly valuable. When can such a

marvelous great change be found in the world of human life? Will it not
be truly valuable to encounter in death what cannot be encountered in
the world of human life? When a storm rolls over the ocean, with waves
criss-crossing in all directions, those aboard ship are drawn to marvel at
its magnificence. Why should the great waves of life and death alone not
evoke a sense of their magnificence!
But the above cannot explain the case of an early death in the prime of life, before
one’s tasks have been completed, or perhaps in early age when one’s life has barely
begun. And even the wise and great cannot help being confused by the fact that in
an epidemic, the young and old, the wise and stupid may be brought to their deaths
one after the other. It is indeed not easy to find theoretical evidence for the purpose
of such particular cases.
In reference to a life fulfilled.
Here, I would explain it using natural phenomena, by the natural law of
the rise and demise of things. Everything in the natural world comes into
existence not without cause, and goes out of existence not without cause.
Human beings are born not without cause, and die not without cause. Since
there is a cause of death, one’s death is explained by its cause. The purpose
or reason why
one’s life was not fulfilled is also the cause. Since this cause is the reason
that a life was not fulfilled, what is there to regret?
At such times, we can only have a feeling of the frailty of man’s powers and the
inscrutability of the ways of heaven and be even more in awe of God’s meaning. For
those who have died prematurely, the grief of the living is double what it would be
ordinarily. The Greeks often felt that the early demise of a young man or woman
was not necessarily a misfortune, as the words of Solon indicate. Moreover, the fact
that death comes not just to old people alone, but may strike those who are young
and strong, enjoying life, and full of potential, may be looked at in another way. The
purpose of such cases in the common order of life may also, to a certain extent at least,
be proved logically. As the Greek wise man, Bias of Priene, said, You should live every
day to the fullest, so that if you die in the morning you will have no regrets, and the
same if you live to one hundred. This explains it somewhat. We cannot know whether
our lives will be long or short. If we die young, to have no regrets, and if we live long,
not to lose courage, this is our proper task. To not worry about whether one’s life will
be long or short, but to be prepared for it, then one may die without regrets. (This is
precisely what Confucius meant when he said, “If a man in the morning hear the right
way, he may die in the evening without regret.”)46
46 This is Cai Yuanpei’s note; the quotation is from the Confucian Analects, IV, VIII (Legge, Vol.
I, p. 168).

When a person dies leaving behind achievements that will benefit later generations,
we may say that his life continues on in his descendants and nation. But what if nations
in time perish and what if the world in time perishes? Does this not then destroy the
This is precisely the position of the Republic of China.
My interpretation here would be the same as above. The idea of the life
and death of the individual is based on the indestructibility of spirit and
the indestructibility of matter (spirit and matter are not two absolutely
separate things; actually, there is only one thing, in which both exist). All
phenomena in the world are simply a state of constant change for which
there is no birth and death, no formation and demise. Life and death are
both change. Since there is no birth and destruction, but only change, and
change is inevitable and necessary, the formation of this necessarily means
the destruction of that, and the destruction of that necessarily means the
formation of this. Formation is not birth and demise is not destruction.
The birth of this is necessarily the death of that, and the death of that
is necessarily the birth of this, so birth is not birth and death is not destruction. The demise of a state is a change in its manifestation. Its land
is not destroyed, nor are its people. Changes in a state are the germ of its
renewal that is necessary for the very foundation of all human life values? We
cannot escape the fact that the cyclical stages of the life of a nation are the same as
those of the individual, that the only difference is one of scale. This is not easy to
explain. History proves that all nations inevitably go through the stage of old age and
decline, of withering and contraction. As the fixed habits of thought and action, the
historical stock of ideas, of structure and authority, increase with time, tradition acts
as an obstacle to the forces of renewal, and the past oppresses the present, opposing
the powers of the new age, gradually grinding them down, until this historical organism inevitably collapses. At this time, do the individuals have the ability to give life
to the basic elements of the old civilization and create a new historical reality? The
same is true for the entire human race. Although history cannot prove it, it can be
deduced that humanity too will come to an end. Physics shows that the stars and the
solar system all go through stages of birth and growth, of decline and death. They
come into being by separation from other stellar systems, after which they develop
and mature, and after an immeasurable life, grow old and decline, wither and contract.
And the same is true for the earth and for humanity.
If the destruction of humanity is similarly inevitable, then is not human life also
worthless? I do not think so. The flower blooms for just a few days, the dance performance lasts just a couple of hours, but they have value. Any232

evolution of society. Today’s German Reich is the same as the former
German states.47 The land is the same, and so are the people. I used to
worry that our China would be destroyed, but now I know that this is not so.
Through the establishment of a new political system, and a change in the
national character, and a reforming of society, the German states became
the German Reich. There is no need to worry. The only question is how
the changes should be carried out. I believe that there must be a complete
transformation, like matter that takes form after destruction, or like the
infant born out of its mother’s womb. The state is like this, and so are
nationalities, and so too humanity. In every century, various nationalities
have launched various kinds of great revolutions, periodically cleansing the
old and infusing it with the new, all of which are great changes involving
life and death, formation and demise. The demise of the universe is similar.
The destruction of the universe is not an ultimate destruction. It is certain
that its demise here will necessarily be a formation there. I very much look
forward to its destruction, because from the demise of the old universe will
come a new universe, and will it not be better than the old universe!
Although it is not forever, yet it is forever. This finite reality can never
be destroyed.
The past and future of time are arbitrary divisions that human beings
make in the present, but in reality time is one indivisible span. And thus
our life within the single span of time is all real. How can it be said that
past life is not real?
In the realm of ethics, I advocate two principles. The first is individualism. Every act in life is for the purpose of fulfilling the individual, and
all morality serves to fulfill the individual. Expressing sympathy for others,
and seeking the happiness of others, are not for others, but for oneself. My
heart contains this love of others, so I need to fulfill it, for if it cannot be
fulfilled then there is something lacking in my life, I have not achieved my
ultimate end. This is how both Sakyamuni and Mo Di48 thing that is finite
cannot exist forever. This is also true for the life of an individual, of a nation, and
of the human race. Their essence is finite, so how could their development be infinite.
Everything finite is perishable; only the infinite reality is forever and unperishable. But
the fact that humanity must inevitably perish does not mean that all its values perish
with it. Otherwise, why has humanity labored, and suffered and battled? … Death is
simply the cessation of the continuation of life, and cannot influence past life. If the
past life is worthless, and the present alone is real, is it only myself and my life, as
they exist in my present consciousness, that alone have the quality of reality? But
Ri’erman, or German, to designate these two entities, but the distinction he wants to make is clearly
that between the situation before and after Bismarck’s unification.
48 Mozi.

the present is just a single point with no breadth. My life is formed of a process that
includes the past and the present. It cannot be formed of just that single point that
is the present. If this means that my past life is regarded as being unreal, then is not
what we call all of life devoid of the quality of reality? (pp. 115–17; Thilly 336–39)
achieved their ultimate ends. The second is realism. In terms of time, we
see only past and future; we do not even see that there is a present. Realization does not refer to this; it refers rather to the spiritual and physical
experiences that I bring together in the course of my life in the universe,
and which I must make every effort to actualize. For example, a particular
action is an objective proper real thing, which I should pursue with all my
energies, and a particular idea is a subjective proper real thing, which I
should apply my energies to realizing. I am responsible only for my own
subjective and objective reality; I am not responsible for whatever is not my
subjective and objective reality. The past that I have not known, and the
future that I do not know, are irrelevant to my individual present reality.
Nor do I believe the saying that historical human beings are responsible for
continuing the past and leading the way to the future. I develop only my
own self, so that internally my thoughts and externally my actions achieve
their ultimate ends. After I die, I place myself in history where later people
may see that I had indeed fulfilled myself. Because I have thus perfected
myself, later generations may speak well of me, but I derive no pleasure
from this, because it belongs to the future and not to my present reality.
The same is true of things that happened before in history. I take from
history whatever may be used as resources in the fulfillment of my life.
Nor do I believe that I have a responsibility to reproduce. If I myself desire to reproduce, this becomes one fragment of my entire life. To whom
am I responsible for carrying out my own desires? Only what is in accord
with these two ideas can be called true freedom, can be called true selfperfection. Paulsen says that though human beings die they leave behind
achievements that benefit later generations, that one lives on within the
sons and grandsons of one’s people, and that this may be called immortality. This may only be a description of the objective aspect of reality, but
it certainly cannot exist in the subjectivity of the person concerned. We
do not strive for achievements for the sake of leaving a legacy to future
generations. The capacity to benefit future generations is contained within
the inherent nature of these achievements themselves. Likewise, the fact
that I am not destroyed is simply because my body inherently contains
these properties that are not destroyed. Paulsen also has these two ideas,
but he just does not state them very clearly.
I.e., the conscience [liangxin].
I.e., sense of duty.

A kind of realm.
Chapter V: Duty and Conscience
1. The Origin of the Feeling of Duty…
How does the willing being come to have a feeling that something ought to be done?
Where does the conflict between the feeling of duty and natural inclination really come
from? Is it that something supernatural enters into the system of the willing being?
Religion says that conscience is the voice of God.
I.e., fundamental essence [benti].
See below.
A conclusion.
An example.
The sense of duty.
Natural impulse.
The manifestation of conscience.
Inborn nature.
Secondary nature.
The sense of duty acts as judge or arbiter between the two sides A and
B.
Although this is a good idea, it has no value as an explanation. Ethics cannot use
God as a reason any more than physics can. The foundation of both natural law and
moral law are indeed in the supernatural world.49 But we want to explain it in terms
of the facts of experience, and thus must not base it upon the transcendent world, but
must seek it within the realm of the world of experience, and furthermore, I believe
we can find it within the world of experience.
Darwin said this in the fourth chapter of his Descent of Man, where he proved that
the development of the feelings of animals is similar to that of human beings. He says
that a female dog lying down with her puppies sees her master going out to hunt and
wants to go with him, but out of love for her young does not go with him. When she
sees her master return, with her tail between her legs, she seems to beg his pardon, as
if she is very ashamed of not being faithful to her master. Domestic animals have two
kinds of impulses: (1) those that are natural, and (2) those that come from training or
habit, and they often vacillate between the two impulses. Darwin believes that this is
the sense of duty in its primitive form, in which a resolution that is based on a learned
habit comes into conflict with a natural impulse. At this point, there is a kind of inner
feeling that compels one to ignore the natural impulse and follow the resolution that
is based on learning or habit, which is the primitive sense of duty. Although we can
also oppose the resolution that is based on learning or habit, nevertheless, if we do
just blithely follow the
A noun.
49 Compare with Thilly (341) “Both the natural law and the moral law may point to something
beyond them, to something transcendent.”

This is like speaking of constantly striving to improve oneself.
I suspect that natural instincts are not necessarily false, and that the
sense of duty is not necessarily true. The sense of duty, which derives
from training or habit, is a posteriori, is acquired or artificial. Natural
instincts come from Nature, and are inborn or a priori, not acquired or
man-made. Whatever derives from Nature is a real thing that actually
exists in the natural world. That which is artificial or man-made is obtained
from experience, is created from conceptual thinking, in order to adapt to
one’s surroundings and better one’s life and development. Such things do
not necessarily exist in the world of Nature. If such things do not exist in
the world of Nature, they simply are not real. But why say that, though
the instincts are natural, they cannot better my life development, and that
it is the sense of duty, though not natural, that can actually contribute to
bettering the development of my life? I think that this view would cause
us to adapt poorly to our surroundings, and not to develop our lives well.
Even though the instincts are natural, it is not necessarily true that they
cannot contribute to the development of life. Whatever is natural natural
impulses, this arouses a sense of uneasiness or shame, which is the most basic form
of the troubled conscience. A troubled conscience may also be said to come from
social or artificial instincts that are always at work, and which therefore oppose and
suppress the very strong natural impulses of the moment. In human beings these kinds
of feelings are especially strongly developed. Human beings remember the past longer
and more accurately than other animals, and so the opposition of their wills to the
natural impulses of the moment are powerfully determined by education and habit,
(pp. 118–21; Thilly 340–42)
is both true and real. Can something that is both true and real fail to contribute to improving my life? Besides, my life and development ultimately
depend on just such things. The desire to eat contributes to my life, sexual
desire is good for my development, and both of these come from natural instincts. Since the will is based on instincts, how can the conscience, which
is part of the will, be an exception? Since the conscience too originates
from the instincts, it should in principle be consistent with the instincts.
The inconsistencies that we sometimes encounter come from our knowledge
and experience. Living in this world of continuous change and diversity is
indeed not easy. Under the demands of a particular time and place, when
we seem really to rely on our instincts, it is inevitable that we get ourselves
into situations that threaten our lives and their development. Progressively
subjected to the constraints of training and habit, the conscience, although
it is also based on the instincts, may also, in special conditions, get into
situations that conflict with instinct. This may be because we do not understand the laws governing the events we are experiencing, or it may be
that there is no fundamental conflict with our instincts and simply that we

cannot yet see how this may also contribute to our life and development.
In short, the two are originally one entity, and our many different activities both create and in turn are driven by many different instincts. The
conscience recognizes all of
The objection is raised: This cannot explain the special authoritative character of
the human sense of duty. The authority that compels us to do what one ought to do
does not derive from the life of the natural instincts, and the reactions of the conscience
come from a different source than the feelings aroused by the natural instincts. Thus
how can the authority that duty exercises over one’s own will come from the system
of natural instincts? (p. 120; Thilly 342)
Various other customs are, I suspect, also based on the instincts [benneng]. The
long-standing prohibitions against such things as murder and robbery belong to this
category. Such customs as these, I suspect, also
them. The conscience certainly al* ways sees our appetite for food and
for sex for what they are. It is only at a particular time and place that
the conscience will suggest restrain* ing the impulses, as when the desire
for food or sex becomes excessive. And then the conscience acts only to
restrain or moderate the excess, certainly not to oppose or deny these
desires. It is this restraint that perfects the job of the instincts. Thus, the
instincts and the conscience are consistent as a matter of course, in harmony,
rather than in conflict A posteriori training and habits that are rigid and
excessive will lead to incidents that deny nature and instinct, and will cause
the conscience, which derives from the same source as instinct, which is
likewise true and natural and real, to become warped and unnatural and
false. This is the tragedy of excessive rigidity.
A situation in which the conscience commands the will to do something.
It is explained below how duty has a special authority.
I have doubts about this passage.
My above argument is in complete accord with this idea.
This agrees with what I have said above.
derive from the animal herd instinct. The relation of authority and obedience, which
is the basis of the state, is also present, in germ, in the animal herd. From this perspective, it is clear that duty does not arise from the inner will of the individual but
is really formed by an external absolute authority… (p. 121; Thilly 345)
2. The relation between duty and inclination. We here return to the earlier problem,
to discuss the relationship between the good that is in harmony with duty, and the
good as that which agrees with inclination and contributes to human welfare and
happiness.
From our discussion above, we may conclude that the conceptions of habits and
customs act as the mediators between good as duty and good as inclinations. Those

human habits and customs which come from our animal instincts are modes of behavior
that promote various life activities and bring them into harmony with our ends. The
force of habit and custom acts to benefit the preservation of society and the normal
development of the individual. And duty is not seen as requiring human behavior that
is contrary to habits and customs… (p. 122; Thilly 346)
… All consciousness of one’s duty regarding property involves rules that limit it,
such as: Thou shalt not steal, cheat, be greedy, or stingy. Our consciousness of our
duty concerning speaking is the same, as in: Thou shalt not be garrulous or rash, and
thou shalt not lie. From this perspective, duty is the limitation of the impulses. Duty
presupposes the impulses, and without the impulses there would be no duty.
The origin of duty is essentially negative, as in the prescription, Thou shalt not do
something or other. So it is only when the impulses go too far that human beings are
conscious of the duty to limit them. The positive formula does not state that, You
should do such and such, but rather that, I want to do such and such. It is only when
the natural impulses are in some way deficient that duty changes from, I want to do
such and such, to You should do such and such. (pp. 124–25; Thilly 348^9)
This is why the theory exists that society is more important than the
individual.
… When we look at a people as a whole, the matter becomes perfectly clear. The
natural inclinations of a people as a whole are always consistent with duty, and the
common will of a people represents the moral law. The moral laws are not imposed from
without, but represent the will of the people themselves. It is only for the individual
that there may occasionally be a conflict between his inclinations and duty, as when
he should do something but does not want to do so, or when he wants to do something
that he should not do. It is at this point that he often feels that the moral law is
imposed from the outside and that it limits his will. But if we look at the will in
general, we will always find that the individual usually agrees with the commands of
the moral law, and also that the individual will not hesitate to act or speak or have
thoughts opposing any violation of the moral law by others, (p. 125; Thilly 349)
3. Critique of the Kantian view. According to the Kantian view, the foundation of
morality lies in the con Self versus self.
I would say that this kind of sense of duty can only be sought in the
world of the unconscious, or in the world of the dead.
Quite so!
Such cases do exist, but they have only a secondary relationship to morality.
flict between inclination and the feeling of duty. He thinks that in order for human
actions to have moral value, they must spring from the feeling of duty, in a situation

in which those actions are not motivated by inclination, or when they are contrary
to inclination. To act benevolently out of natural inclination cannot be called moral…
Kant says that an action is moral when the person involved receives no feeling of
pleasure from it, when he has no thought for the fact that it provides others with relief
from suffering or danger, but acts simply because he considers it his duty to help others.
The same is true of preserving one’s own life or augmenting one’s own happiness. To act
according to inclination cannot be considered moral. The act of an unfortunate person
who has fallen into great misfortune and who would rather die than live, who yet out
of a sense of duty preserves his life, is indeed truly moral. Thus in Kant’s opinion,
a human act has value only when the will contains a conflict of the inclinations or
impulses, but one acts purely from a feeling of duty. But a humanity that is good
solely for the sake of duty would be dry and insipid, like so many wooden manikins.
The unreasonableness of this position goes without saying. But there is also something
that can be taken from this view. Although conflict between duty and inclination is
not the general rule, and although the control of the feelings by duty is not necessarily
an absolute law of moral value, nevertheless, moral character is only expressed when
there is a conflict between duty and inclination. We cannot say of the rich man
I still have doubts about this passage.
Actually, there need not be a conflict, as even when inclination and duty
are basically one entity, there are still distinctions of gradation, degree,
time, and place. These distinctions are sufficient to evaluate a person’s
character.
The view of our Song Neo-Con- fucians was the same as Kant’s.
who picks up ten dollars from the street and returns it to its owner that he is
an upright person, because a mere ten dollars would in no way affect the rich man’s
finances. But if a poor man picked up ten dollars, and though it would be very useful
to him, he nevertheless out of a sense of duty returns it, we would think him an upright,
or perhaps good, person. Thus, when there is no conflict between the inclinations and
duty, there is no opportunity for a person’s actions to be determined by his will and
sense of duty, so we have no way to evaluate this person’s character. It is only when
there is a conflict between duty and inclinations that we can judge whether a person’s
character is moral or not. (pp. 125–26; Thilly 350–51)
Because these have all insisted on separating and setting natural will and
the sense of duty in opposition to each other, they have failed to recognize
that they are one, that the differences are only ones of degree, and of time
and place.
Kant over-emphasized the consciousness of duty, and Fichte was even worse. Our
actions are not all due to a consciousness of duty, and even where this is true, it
cannot be considered a fault. It is neither possible nor necessary that all natural impulses should be controlled by motives of a will determined solely by moral law. Moral

philosophers have always considered that perfection could be attained only when all
actions of the will were determined by the idea of duty. Spinoza’s sage is governed
wholly by the dictates of reason, and his impulses have no effect whatsoever on his
behavior, and the wise man of Bentham or Mill differs little from him. They
This is the idea that regulates me.
Excellent point!
I strongly support this view.
Beauty existed long before there was a field of aesthetics, and every
human being had virtue and attained his ultimate end long before there
was a study of ethics. All the many writings merely outline actual situations
and describe their natural principles. All books of all kinds merely describe;
they do not act or do. It is of the basic nature of our minds that they
operate within a limited realm and cannot create anything at all! If the
universe had always existed in this same state, it would not have had the
capacity to create. If spirit is not destroyed and matter is not destroyed,
spirit cannot be born and matter cannot be created, and if there is no
destruction how can there be any birth? There can only be change. Our
minds are limited to concepts, and concepts are limited to phenomena, and
phenomena are limited to reality. Our minds contain only changes; how can
they create anything whatsoever? are both modeled on the Stoic and Epicurean
sage. In reality, reason, or the idea of duty, is not necessarily this important. Reason,
or the idea of duty, regulates the impulses, but it cannot replace them. The impulses
are the hanging weights of the clockwork of life. Reason definitely cannot replace them.
Why? Reason has no motive force of its own.
… So, too, the most perfect morality is to live naturally by realizing one’s instincts,
rather than by being concerned with ethics. Both aesthetics and ethics possess no
creative power. It is their job to guard against going beyond the bounds of beauty
and morality. Thus they are restrictive, not creative. The realization of beauty and
of morality does not wait upon the rules of aesthetics or of ethics entering into the
consciousness, or upon their becoming the central focus of attention. Moreover, when
the rules of aesthetics or of ethics enter the consciousness, or become the focus of
attention, they invariably become obstacles to the realization of one’s art or morality.
It is well known that when writing, getting mired down in the rules of writing leads
to uncertainty and confusion. The best way to answer a question in orthography is to
take up your pen and write it properly. The best way to answer a moral question is by
performing the act rather than reflecting upon it.
The truly great person develops the original nature with which Nature
endowed him, and expands upon the best, the greatest of the capacities of
his original nature. This is what makes him great. Everything that comes
from outside his original nature, such as restraints and restrictions, is cast
aside by the great motive power that is contained within his original nature.

It is this motive power that is the strongest and truest reality, that is the
spring that fulfills his character, what this work calls natural impulses or
inclinations. He then judges whether or not it is right and proper to exercise
this motive power. If it is right and proper he upholds it; if not, he reforms
or changes it so that it is made right and proper. This comes solely from
his own judgment, not in obedience to an external moral law, or to what
is called here a sense of duty. The great actions of the hero are his own,
are the expression of his motive power, lofty and cleansing, relying on no
precedent. His force is like that of a powerful wind arising from a deep
gorge, like the irresistible sexual desire for one’s lover, a force that will
not stop, that cannot be stopped. All obstacles dissolve before him. I have
observed from ancient times the fierce power of courageous generals on the
battle line facing undaunted ten thousand enemies. It is said that one man
who scorns death will prevail over one hundred men. This is because he
fears nothing, because his motive force presses forward in a straight line.
Because he cannot be stopped or eliminated, he is the strongest, the most
powerful. This is true also of the spirit of the great man and of the spirit
of the sage. For Paulsen, the great man is not one who acts according to a
sense of duty that would temper and constrain the vitality of the impulses
of his feelings. How true, how true! (Note: I see this as quite similar to the
view that Mencius puts forward in the two chapters “Haoran zhi qi” and
“Da Zhangfu.”50)
An unbiased mind will say that the moral value of human beings certainly does
not depend on thinking a lot about duty or on a consciousness of the motivation for
one’s actions. One whose actions are forced is totally different from someone whose
actions are natural. I have no way of knowing whether the descriptions of Kant given
by his biographers are really true or not, or whether Kant the person really took duty
as the motivation for his actions. In any case, I must confess that these descriptions
have never pleased me. Although the sense of duty may serve to prevent evil, the truly
great person is certainly never one who acts from a sense of duty, but rather is one
who is primarily molded by the vitality of the impulses of his feelings, (pp. 128–29;
Thilly 355)
4. On the errors of the a-prioristic- intuitionalistic moral philosophy…
I think that in reality, anyone can immediately recognize the truth of the moral
laws without having sought their purpose or understanding. In content, they are no
50 Cai Yuanpei introduces the term buke siyi, rendered here as “inconceivable,” where Paulsen, in the
original and in Thilly’s English translation (as well as in Kanie Yoshimaru’s Japanese version), speaks
merely of commands and prohibitions which appear to the individual as “absolute.” More precisely, buke
siyi, originally a Buddhist concept, refers to that which cannot be grasped by thought or expressed
in words, and thus hardly seems in harmony with Paulsen’s view that the “categorical imperatives” of
moral philosophy are grounded in objective reality.

more than the positive and negative expressions of customs and habits, and these
customs and habits exist in the consciousness of every member of the entire society. A
person knows of customs and habits through the many particular judgments by which
others and he himself approve or disapprove of different kinds of actions. The fact that
whenever a particular event is encountered it is immediately
That such terms in their origins do indeed agree with objective facts
is due to the fact that they are derived from all kinds of experience. As
far as the individual is concerned, since they have been practiced since
childhood, they seem to be a priori truths. Historically speaking, however,
they are derived purely from experience, and are not intuitively known a
priori truths. judged with certainty is something that comes with practice. The same
is true of human knowledge of the general forms of morality, which are impressed on
us from childhood up. Schopenhauer says, not without reason, that truths that we do
not remember having learned are erroneously regarded as innate. Moreover, all words
that refer to actions contain within their meaning moral judgments of right and wrong,
such as the fact that the terms falsehood and greed imply disapproval, while fairness
and frugality imply approval… (pp. 129; Thilly 355–56)
Only to validate.
This refers to the ultimate great purpose of humanity.
Knowledge of it comes from experience.
… There is unquestionably an objective ground for the existence and validity of
the moral laws, which appear in the consciousness of the individual in the form of
what we call inconceivable51 commands and prohibitions; they are the condition of the
welfare of the individual and of society. The task of moral philosophy is to validate
their foundations, just as the task of legal philosophy is to validate the foundations of
the content and form of laws… (p. 130; Thilly 35657)
I believe that it is indeed difficult to know what will bring true and durable advantage, but to say that human beings know easily the imperatives of duty is not in accord
with the facts. There are some activities about which everyone knows what their duty
is, but this is not true for all actions. For anything that is somewhat complex it is
never easy to know where one’s duty lies… (p. 130; Thilly 357)
Even though his words may not be believed and his actions may not be
effective, he simply does what is right.
True statement.
Suppose that a politician disagrees with one of the positions of the party to which
he belongs, and his party drafts a platform that expresses the great achievements of
the party, and requires him to sign it. If he goes along and signs it, he is cheating
himself; if he refuses to sign it, he will lose his political influence, and this will be a
51 The maxim appears in Latin both in the German and in the English editions of Paulsen; the
sense of Cai Yuanpei’s Chinese exactly corresponds to it. The same applies to the ensuing quotation
from the Kantian school.

great obstacle to his future. Kant’s categorical imperative cannot help him decide how
to deal with this problem. In my view, he should first ask himself, How important is
this issue? If it is not of great importance, it is not impermissible for him to give in
and go along with the party’s position; otherwise, he cannot do it. If the issue is of
great importance, then rather than give in to the party’s position, it would be better
to leave the party and issue a statement of his own views.
The objection may be raised that, if morality is uncertain, all kinds of doubts will
appear to which there can be no resolution. I would reply that, it is not we human
beings that make them uncertain; they are uncertain in and of themselves, and will
always remain so. Morality is not a simple mechanical function that is based on some
innate power, called practical reason or the conscience, that can be appealed to in an
instant. Nor can every particular case be subsumed under a general rule. (pp. 132–33;
Thilly 359–60)
The central axis of Kant’s entire philosophy is the absolute universal and necessary
quality of the moral laws. Their absolute and logical quality is perfectly consistent with
their legal and moral quality. For teleological ethics, on the other hand, the moral laws
are derived from empirical rules, in the same way that hygiene is based on the laws
of physiology. Thus, there are always exceptions to the moral laws just as there are
to empirical laws. There is indeed a common rule for the way in which any particular
action works to promote or injure life. But since human affairs are extremely complex,
it is unavoidable that at times, the same action may
Respect for particularity, a good have the opposite effect. Thus, a for- proposal
by Paulsen. mal breach of the moral law may not
necessarily be immoral, and indeed may be the only way to be truly moral. We often
see that this is true in actual practice and in actual judgments. And that intuitionist
ethics cannot explain this is a further proof of the inadequacy of its views, (pp. 133–34;
Thilly 361)
Let us take an example. The first duty of a soldier is obedience, absolute obedience
in his work. That the soldier takes obedience as his duty is essential to the existence
of the modem state. Because this duty is so important, even a slight deviation from
it incurs severe punishment. However, there are times when the breach of this duty
brings neither remorse nor reproach. In the convention of Tauroggen, General York
(on December 30, 1812, the Prussian General York signed a treaty of neutrality with
the Russian General Diebitsch at the Russian Palace of Tauroggen which soon forced
Napoleon I to retreat from Russia), based on his own observations and understand
ing of the political situation, publicly disobeyed the king’s order, violating his duty
to observe military obedience, by signing a peace treaty with the enemy. Was this
action still in accord with duty, and was it permissible morally? According to the
Kantian formula, certainly not. It is bad for the country for a general knowingly to
act contrary to his king’s order. Moreover, if pursued to its limit, at another time it
might become impossible to use the universal formula to keep the Prussian soldiers
under control.

The same was true of the dissolution of Parliament by Cromwell.
This is necessarily true in the case of a revolution.
Only after much hesitant deliberation did the general decide to take this action.
What made the general hesitate was his thought, “To disobey my orders and ignore my
duty to obey, is a gross abuse, and might destroy my country.” But then he decided to do
it, saying, “If I do not act contrary to the orders of my king, my country will be quickly
destroyed.” In the end, the general’s action was accepted by popular opinion. After
having wanted to rebuke him, the Prussian king also admitted that he was right. And
today, there is no historian who does not think that this action benefited Prussia. And
even though this action was most disadvantageous for the French, French historians
do not question it. Thus, the example of an official being immoral and violating the
state’s commands in pursuing his own policy in order to save the state in an emergency
has been publicly accepted. All similar situations cannot be dealt with by using the
universal principle. If the universal principle were to be upheld no matter what, then
a soldier would have to obey no matter what the out
come might be. He absolutely could not violate his duty to obey and pursue an
independent policy. However, when the situation is an emergency that involves the life
and death of the state, and the state cannot be saved except by disobeying the chain of
command, then one has no choice but to break the universal rule. The highest among
all the laws, what is called the law of the universal welfare, is a condition that even
the wise sage cannot violate, and if a soldier mistakenly violates this condition, then
it is proper for the government to punish him with death.
Only when it is just [yi].
The moral laws are also subject to this condition, and so there will always be
exceptions. The moral laws are made for man, not man for the moral laws. The jurists
have an old maxim, Fiat justitia, pereat mundus.52 The Kantian moral philosophers
have also said, Fiat lex, pereat vita. This means that the laws are more important than
any particular purpose. But the law really exists for the sake of the people, to preserve
them, not to destroy them. The same is true of the relation between the moral laws
and human life. They exist to preserve life, not to destroy it. Thus if following the
moral law should result in destroying life, then the form must give way to the content,
the means to the end. (pp. 134–35; Thilly 362–63)
5. Conscience [liangxin}. We stated above that conscience comes from a consciousness of social custom, that it is the existence of social custom within the consciousness
of the individual. The so-called authority of the conscience exists within the entire
human race to restrain the will of those
This refers to the origins of the conscience and the origins of the authority
of the conscience.
52 The reference is to L. Schmidt, Die Ethik der alien Griechen, 2 vols., 1882.

The reason for the theory that conscience originates in a divine voice.
who would oppose the moral laws, and thus is the guarantor of the moral laws. It
exists within human beings first as the authority of parents and teachers who impress
the various objective virtues of the social customs upon the child. And then, as the
authority of society, which is wider in scope, it expresses its judgment of individual
behavior in terms of praise and blame. And further, it becomes the authority of the
judiciary… The content of conscience differs with each nation of people. Each nation
of people has its own different characteristics and its different conditions of life, from
which are formed its different social customs. Although the content of the conscience
may be different, its form is always the same: the consciousness of a higher will that
works internally within the individual to restrain the will from immoral intentions.
This higher will is always regarded as emanating from a superhuman divine power.
Those who say that conscience comes from a divine voice, not only think that
the historical and psychological explanation is incomplete, they further think that it is
dangerous, and say that it robs conscience of its sanctity and destroys its efficacy. Those
who explain the conscience in historical and psychological terms also frequently accept
this conclusion. P. R6e (whose work Origin of Conscience was published in 1885),
who studied the origins of the conscience and wrote about the results of historical
and psychological studies, says that, when the commands of the conscience lose their
sanctity, all those who know that the conscience is man-made will violate
Paulsen’s argument here is indeed quite true, but it is false to say that
knowledge has no influence whatsoever on the mind, for knowledge definitely has a great influence on the human mind. The human mind is moved
half by feeling impulses and the conscience, and half by newly obtained
knowledge. The progress of the human race, its revolutions, its spirit of
reform, depend entirely on being guided in its actions by new knowledge.
Beliefs must be preceded by knowledge which is known and then believed.
Although there are superstitious people, this is a pejorative term we have
applied to them, and they do not consider themselves superstitious. Rather
they say that they already have a very intimate knowledge of something and
therefore firmly believe it. We, on the other hand, point to their attitude of
firm belief and call it superstitious. Knowledge comes before belief, and a
particular kind of knowledge becomes the foundation for a particular kind
of belief, which is then expressed in a particular kind of action. Knowledge,
belief, and action are the three stages of our spiritual activity. All knowledge
that leads to its commands and act shamelessly.
However, I do not agree. Responsibility to obey the commands of the conscience
cannot be erased just because of the logical conclusions of anthropological theory or
because of its psychological definition. I indeed believe the logical conclusion which says
that the conscience is an expression of a people’s accumulated experience, and that
virtue maintains human life, while a lack of virtue destroys it, and that the true nature

of the conscience is not thereby diminished. Thus we would argue that the inherited
wisdom of the people is strong proof that the natural order of morality comes from an
objective self-examination, so how can this interpretation destroy the true nature of
the moral order? As for psychology, whatever its view of social customs is, it too will
not be opposed to them. The effect on the spirit of what is inherited or learned will not
cease just because we suddenly discover that it is false or irrational. There are some
scientists who are not free of superstitious habits, and there are some people who do
not believe in ghosts yet have hidden fears much like those of ordinary people. In any
case, we are dealing here not with the false or meaningless elements of concepts and
feelings, but with really important elements. All human beings know that if everyone
were without morals and conscience, and all behavior were determined by calculation
and apprehension, a nation could not exist for a single day. Even the great philosophers
have never been guided by moral philosophy in their everyday lives, but by impulses
and feelings,
This statement is very true. All things human are natural.
… Thus the starting point of the evolutionists’ study of history is the belief that all
things human develop strictly according to natural forces. A man like Voltaire swept
away superstition, but at the same time, because a basic premise of his philosophy
was the rejection of the conscience as blind and worthless, his theory failed, just as
did that of the theologians. The evolutionists firmly believe that a universally existing
organ must have an a priori basis, and that it must perform a function related to the
preservation of life. Thus it is the business of science to explain the significance of these
functions for the development of human life. (p. 139; Thilly 367)
6. The differentiation of conscience.
This section on the differentiation of the human spirit is excellent.
With the increasing development of the human spirit and historical life, this ideal
becomes increasingly specific and individual. All historical development is a function
of differentiation. It is the assumption of scholars that as the various different races
and nations of mankind became differentiated from primitive man, their different social customs came to express their mental individuality. And as evolution advanced
still further, the basic national mentalities became further differentiated as individual
mentalities. In a less civilized nationality, the people are basically the same, and all individuals have the same concepts, thoughts, judgments, habits, and behavior, the same
mental life. As they evolve further, the content of life becomes increasingly richer and
more complex. As the differences among individuals become greater, individuals look
at
things differently, and they become dissatisfied with the common view of life presented by their national religion and myths, which is the beginning of philosophy. All
philosophies originate in the conflict between the beliefs of individuals and the common

beliefs of their nationality. And as the judgments of the individuals become less tied to
social custom, the individual becomes increasingly particularized, and life activities or
livelihoods become particularized. The sphere of freedom of life-activity expands, and
the area of life that is controlled contracts. The relationship of the life of the individual
with the lives of others becomes one in which the particular character or personality
of the individual is not lost, as in the case of parents and children or husband and
wife, so that it becomes increasingly difficult to apply the old formulas or laws, and
particular rules are developed, (pp. 140–41; Thilly 369–70)
This truly brings out very well the mentality of all those great men of
the past and present who sacrifice themselves for benevolence.
… The religious morals of Jesus were much higher than the religious morals of
the nation at that time. His concept of God was much higher than the concept of
God of the people of his time. He thought that what his people called righteousness
was despicable and lamentable and unsatisfactoiy. Thus he and his disciples placed
themselves outside the laws of their people, violated the Sabbath, broke the eating
restrictions, and replaced them with the new commandment to love one another. The
conservatives were greatly frightened, and to preserve their old laws did battle with
Jesus and killed him. But although Jesus suffered greatly and gave his body in sacrifice,
his way [dao] ultimately triumphed and his believers founded the
theory of the heavenly mandate of the new kingdom of love. This then became the
prototype for later generations, for those who thirsted for the truth and righteousness
of the kingdom of God, for those who feel that there is not enough of divine love and
freedom in their lives, for those who are tortured and burned for ardently expressing
themselves and yet do not repent, (p. 142; Thilly 370–71)
Quite true, quite true.
Every great genius can become either a tyrant or a wise sage. Goethe’s Faust portrays the spiritual transformation from extreme evil to extreme good. In the first part,
Faust is described as a person who despises his people for believing in their customs,
and who abandons himself to his desires… The second part describes the transformation of this thoroughly evil person into one who knows self-control and respect for
what is right, although he is never able fully to realize this concept. The Faust of part
one could have been saved only by striving for some high end, by great suffering and
great battle, not by becoming in his later years just a great hydraulics engineer. That
so great a genius as Goethe left it at this was a consequence of the fact that in his own
life Goethe had never experienced great suffering or great struggle, and thus he dared
not write about something that was so far from his own subjective realm.
Yuan Shikai.
Although the two types of great evil and great good appear similar outwardly in their
disregard for the social customs, they are very different inwardly in their relationships

to social customs and the people. What makes a tyrant a tyrant is that he despises
social custom and vio This section is not very good.
I, however, think that we have a duty only to ourselves, and have no
duty toward others. We have the duty to do whatever we have thought
about, that is, we have the duty to do whatever we know. This duty arises
naturally within my spirit, such as repaying debts, keeping promises, not
stealing, not being false, and although they are things that involve other
people, it is also my wish that they be done. The meaning of duty to oneself
means no more than just developing fully one’s own physical and spiritual
powers. Helping those in need, perfecting those things that are humanly
beautiful, treading fearlessly in the face of danger and sacrificing oneself
to save others, are no more than duty, since I desire to do them, and only
then will my mind be at rest If I see someone in danger and do not try
to rescue him, even if not doing so would not be considered wrong, will I
really think in my own lates it in order to pursue his own desires; he seeks only
pleasure and power… (p. 143; Thilly 372–73)
8. The sphere of the meaning of duty. There are one or two questions concerning
the concept of duty. What do we mean by meritorious duty? Can human beings do
more than duty? What actions does duty allow? Are there actions that duty neither
enjoins nor prohibits, that can be said to be neither good nor bad? All such questions
deal little with reality and mostly with semantics. They can be explained clearly by
defining the terms more carefully.
The concept of duty, in its narrowest sense, means considering what is in the interest
of others, and determining that something should or should not be done, such as paying
your debts, keeping your contracts, not stealing, and not cheating. As for rescuing
someone who is in danger, or doing someone a favor, these are above and beyond duty,
for they are purely voluntary, and unlike the former which are obligations. In this sense
of the term, there can be no duties toward the self… (p. 146; Thilly 377)
mind that not helping him is right? The fact that I think it is not right
is what makes it my duty to try to rescue him. We rescue those who are in
danger to set our minds at rest, and to develop fully the capacities of our
spirits.
If doing something is considered meritorious, then it should be considered a duty. How can failing to do it not be a breach of the principle of
duty? If we think wise or great people do it, then we should think that
ordinary people do it. To call someone a wise or great person is to say that
his or her spiritual and physical capabilities have been developed to the
fullest. Everyone should seek to develop his or her spiritual and physical
abilities to the fullest. To say that only the wise or great people would risk
their lives to rescue someone and that common people do not need to do

so, is to imply that the wise and great people develop their mental and
physical abilities to the fullest, but that the common person need not do
so. How can this statement be regarded as compatible with ethics?
Duty in a wider sense means all life and actions that are in accordance with social
custom and the laws of morality. If someone should ask me what road to take, and I
refuse to tell him, this would be a violation of duty. The concept of duty contains the
commandment to love your fellow man. But to risk your own life to rescue someone is
beyond the call of duty; to do so is to perform a meritorious act, but to not do so is not
a breach of one’s duty. These are the actions of the wise or great man. In this wider
sense, I have a duty to myself to develop my own capacities. It is a violation of duty to
ruin one’s body out of negligence, or to damage one’s mental capacities by idleness or
dissipation. But in the responsibility to carry out this duty there is a degree beyond
which is meritorious conduct. At this point we can define the concept of actions that
duty allows. Although there is work that must be done, and we have the ability to do
it, duty does not prohibit us from taking a break temporarily. And although there are
other things we should use our money for, duty does not prohibit us from spending
some money on recreation. As long as we seek to stay within the boundaries of moral
behavior, duty tolerates minor differences.
In the widest sense of the term, there is no distinction between what is allowable
and what is meritorious. Christianity admonishes its disciples:
What here is called duty is really the laws. Laws are made only to forbid
people to do evil, and not to encourage people to be good. How can this be
the most important of the ethical duties? Duty is directed toward oneself.
Duty to oneself cannot be a matter of degree. Our duty should be to put
the highest good into practice, that is, to develop our mental and physical
capacities to their highest, and to experience life to the fullest If I have
a job to do and the ability to do that job fully, my sense of duty forbids
me to slack off or fail to do it Duty does forbid us to spend our money on
frivolous pleasures when there are other things we should buy. Why? To be
slack in doing our jobs or to be without the things we should have bought
would create a lack, a defect, in the full life. Duty means more than just
not doing something or other; it also means that there are some things that
ought to be done. Duty is not just negative; it also has a positive meaning.
Chapter VI: Egoism and Altruism
1. There is no absolute conflict between egoism and altruism…
… In fact, all our actions arise from and are determined by our own
“Be ye therefore perfect even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect.” No imperative
can go further than this. Thus, there can be no merit before God. Whoever has kept
the commandments, can only say, I have done my duty. But human beings can never

be totally pure and without blemish, so even the saint will also say, I am an unworthy
servant, (pp. 146–47; Thilly 378)
But of these two, it is egoism that pursues life, and altruism is simply one
of the methods it employs to attain one’s life objectives. It goes without
saying that there is absolutely no basis for pure altruism. Pure egoism is
also merely a theory that definitely cannot be realized in this world of
multiple individual entities and diverse activities. Although it cannot be
realized, although it is not a factual reality, it does still have meaning. The
basic meaning of human life still lies in fulfilling the individual. In order to
achieve this objective, what methods should we choose? Should we choose
the method of pure egoism? In the beginning, a people, and the individual
person when first born, do indeed select this method, but after a while run
into a great many obstacles, so they discard this pure egoism and choose
instead the method of combining egoism and altruism, and thus all people
pursue life. It is for this reason that we sometimes use altruistic methods
to attain our own egoistic objectives.
The members of a nation or people do in reality join together and will and
feelings; they are never first determined by the will and feelings of others. However, this
statement is not sufficient to reconcile the difference between egoistic and altruistic
feelings, because if this statement were true, then the egoistic will would still unavoidably contain differences between the directly egoistic and indirectly egoistic impulses,
and the latter would correspond to the altruistic impulses of the will. And then we
would have to say that without the altruistic impulses of the will, human life would
be just as impossible as it would be without the egoistic impulses of the will. For the
individual and for society as a whole, both together are necessary to make life possible.
Pure altruism and pure egoism are both erroneous as moral principles, and both are
based on a false anthropology. They both presuppose the old rationalistic individualism that treats each individual human being as an absolutely independent being, that
has only accidental relations with others. And the relationships between one person
and another are either egoistic or altruistic. Those who claim they are altruistic say
that altruistic behavior is moral and that other actions are either indifferent or bad.
The defenders of egoism counter by saying that the whole of a person’s relations with
others consists simply in the pursuit of one’s own interests, and nothing else. Both
theories are based on one concept that appears at the beginning of Jeremy Bentham’s
Principles of Morals and Legislation, where he says, “A community is a fictitious body,
composed of individual persons who are considered as consti- live together. But I
do not agree with the idea that the life of the individual derives from the
life of the nation in the same way that the four limbs derive from the body.
The life of a nation, including its politics and language, all began well after
the human race had evolved and did not exist in the beginning. Furthermore, these later activities were created by individuals joining together, for

the benefit of the individual. The individual came before the nation; the
individual did not come from the nation. The life of a nation is the total
life of its individuals, is formed of the combined lives of individuals. The
life of the individual does not derive from the life of the nation. Once a
nation or society is organized and comes into being, the individual cannot
help but live within it. If we look just at the situation as it exists today,
the inevitable effect is that the nation is great and the individual is small,
that the nation is important and the individual is unimportant. A closer
look would show that this is not really so. Paulsen’s view reflects the fact
that he lived in Germany, which is highly nationalistic.
tuting, as it were, its members.” This conception has been abandoned in Germany
since the end of the eighteenth century. In fact, a people is not a fictitious body, and the
individual is not a fictitious member. A people is a real unified being and its relationship
to the individual is like that of the body to its limbs. The limbs are brought into being
by the body; they have life because the body has life. The individual is produced by the
people, and has life and movement because the people has life. The individual acts as a
member of the people, he speaks its language, he upholds the philosophy of his people,
and his feelings and hopes are the feelings and hopes of the people. And the existence
of the people results from the propagation and education of the individual. These are
the relations between the individual and society in the objective realm. And in the
individual’s subjective realm, of the will and feelings, there is no distinction between
the self and others. We all experience this personally. Only the moral philosophers
deny it. All the inconsistencies between pure altruism and pure egoism are no more
than their erroneous opinions that turn their backs on the facts. In reality, no one ever
acts purely out of either altruism or egoism. And the motives and the effects of our
actions always vacillate between altruism and egoism until the boundaries between
them gradually disappear, (pp. 147, 150–51; Thilly 379,381–83)
1. A summary of the effects of actions.
So we may assert that human qualities and actions that are of benefit to
There is truth in this.
the health of the individual also benefit the progress of society, and that what is an
obstacle to the health of the individual is also harmful to society, or as Spinoza put
it, we should take what is of benefit to ourselves and apply it to the benefit of others.
But the converse is also true, that virtues that benefit society also necessarily promote
the welfare of those who exemplify them, and that those who tum their backs on these
virtues also hurt themselves, (pp. 151–52; Thilly 383–84)
The reason why stealing is not permitted concerns primarily human character, and secondarily happiness. Being a dark malevolent act, a despicable
method, stealing quickly destroys a person’s self-respect.

… Dishonestly acquired property loses its true commercial quality, so a life of cheating is always very precarious. The fruits of honest endeavors increase one’s well-being,
but this is not true if acquired by theft. If the argument were made that this is not true,
then even if something has been stolen only once and it has been preserved and not
wasted, why is it that everyone still looks upon it as dishonest property? What is true
and false, praised and blamed, by the society as a whole always has an effect on the
conduct of the individual. One may be lucky for a while, but sooner or later his day of
judgment will come. Secret actions have never, in the past or in the present, resulted in
happiness. Everyone knows that it is his duty to be considerate, fair, and kind toward
others, and that this is the way to achieve happiness for oneself. If a person is able
to extend his own feelings to others, and bring peace and prosperity to his kind and
to his friends, then their peace and prosperity will inevitably reflect back on himself.
And conduct that is haughty, deceitful, and malicious, that
brings suffering to others, will also bring suffering to oneself. Looked at in this way,
duties toward others and duties toward oneself are certainly not mutually exclusive.
The individual’s welfare is inter-connected with the welfare of his family, society, and
nation. Whoever is able to fulfill his own duty to self, thereby increases the welfare
of society, and by fulfilling his duty to society he increases his own welfare, (p. 153;
Thilly 385–86)
1. Summary of the motives of conduct
… Human inclinations, whether they come from his nature or from life, have many
diverse causes. And the situation at the moment also contains direct and indirect demands, in the form of entreaties and admonitions, praise and blame, that are especially
complex. When the peasant plows and harvests the fields, working all year long without resting, is he motivated by egoistic or by altruistic motives? This is an absurd
question. If we were to ask the peasant himself, Do you work so hard in the fields for
yourself, or for others? he would be puzzled by the question, or else he would reply, If
I don’t the fields will go to ruin. And if we were to ask, But why not let the fields go
to ruin? he would reply, For a peasant, that would be disgraceful. He would give the
same answer if we asked why he keeps his family and home in order. And if the same
moralist were to investigate further, he would find that this peasant was working hard
in the fields to benefit his village, that he was rearing his sons for his country, and that
he was doing these things because he really wanted to. His motivation for increasing
his income ultimately cannot
Reality itself does not make distinctions; the distinctions are only conceptual, in order to facilitate language and memory. Ethical qualities such
as public and personal, great and small, or good and bad, are distinguished
according to their usefulness to a person. This is true not just in ethics.
All distinctions in the universe are simply those different aspects of it that

appear to us when we observe and react to it. In its basic nature it is simply one single form. This is true of such things as the yin and the yang,
of top and bottom, big and small, high and low, this and that, others and
self, good and evil, positive and negative, clean and dirty, beautiful and
ugly, bright and dark, and victory and defeat Our various forms of human
mental activity are composed of these distinctions and comparisons, and
without these distinctions and comparisons historical life would not be possible. Evolution is the succession of differentiation. Only after there are
distinctions can there be language and thought, without distinctions they
would not be possible—
Not all the distinctions we human beings make about matters of fact
are correct, and even more of the conceptual distinctions we make are
incorrect. The reason for this is that we leap to conclusions based solely
on superficial judgments of the usefulness of something, as in the case of
public versus private virtue. We all know of such errors— be that he says that
so much of his work is for himself and so much is for others. All of his actions are both
for himself and for others. They are determined by the total weight of his conscious
and unconscious purposes taken together. Any listing of his actions that distinguishes
so much for himself, so much for his family, and so much for society is like tiying to
calculate pleasure; they are just the conceptual distinctions made by moralists who
mistakenly believe that they are real distinctions, (pp. 153–54; Thilly 38687)
Distinctions arise from the drawing of boundary lines. Since human beings live within boundaries, their thoughts are limited, their abilities are
limited, and their activities are limited. They divide up in many and various ways that part of the objective world that lies within the reach of their
mental capacities and activities. This is how the world of distinctions is
formed.
This section is argued very lucidly. The only goal of human beings is to
realize the self. Self-realization means to develop fully both our physical
and spiritual capabilities to the highest. Action is the means by which this
goal is achieved. Action relies on the various organizations of the nation
and society, the joining together of human beings. But to say that one
writes for others is really very superficial. Our various kinds of activities,
such as writing, use this as a means of displaying our own abilities. When
engaged in writing, the writer is oblivious to both the past and the future,
concentrating so intently on the writing that he is unaware of anything or
anyone else except himself and his writing. This is the way it must be if
the writing is to be true and honest, and not false and superficial. Other
activities are the same. The same is true of a craftsman, even if he is
working to make a living. Once he starts working, he must have no thought

that this is being done for someone else. Zhuangzi says: “A hunchback was
catching cicadas,…‘I know only the cicada’s wings.’ ”31 Everything in
And what is it like for the scholar, the artist, or the statesman? When a scholar
reaches his seventieth birthday, or on some other occasion, someone praising him will
inevitably say that this person exerted his efforts for the happiness of the nation and
humanity. And perhaps that person says this himself, as when Christian Wolff says in
his preface to one of his works, I love humanity, and all my works have been written for
others. Not that I question Wolffs word, but I wonder if when he started to write, he
first raised the question of human happiness and then made a plan as to how he could
benefit the human race, and if he picked up his pen to write only after discovering his
so-called rational thoughts? This is doubtful. I imagine that Wolff must have first run
into a problem that he wanted to clarify, and then, having a bright idea, he felt like
expressing it in writing. At this point, was he not sometimes pleased with the thought
of publishing his lucid thesis in a learned journal so that the readers could appreciate it,
and he could strike back at the attacks of his opponents? And sometimes he probably
thought that by striving to explore the truth and
the world that is accomplished and has value is done in this way (by being
oblivious to the distinction between the self and others, by concentrating
solely on the true nature of real things). This is why things in the world
fail and are worthless. This is the difference between true and false, and
the difference between excellent and inferior.
I have questions about this. I suspect that negative suicide is also a form
of self-preservation. He who cannot solve the problems confronting him, or
is ashamed of sins he has committed in the past, may conclude that death
is preferable to life, and thus he ends his life. This judgment that he would
rather be dead than
writing these several books he was making a contribution to human knowledge and
increasing its value. The worth of these books is not diminished by the fact that they
were written in response to these various hopes. Works that are written solely for
altruistic purposes are inevitably far inferior to those written by a writer who seeks
fame. Schopenhauer did not worry about the weal or woe of others. He wrote simply
to reveal the great secret he had glimpsed and to make it known to the world, with
no goal of benefiting others. His writings, like the verse of the poet or the canvas of
the artist, simply express the marvels of his spiritual world. If there were only the self
and no others in the world, there would be no writing at all. Without an audience,
the lecturer would not open his mouth. If there were no readers of poetry, then the
poet would not pick up a pen. But once the process starts, the writer does not need
to imagine that this is being done for others alone. Goethe once said to Eckenmann, I
never thought that it was the responsibility of a writer to pay any attention to what
will please others, or how I can benefit others. I simply always endeavored to enrich

my personality, and to say only what I had found to be good and true. (pp. 154–55;
Thilly 387–88)
… Those who sacrifice their lives also do so for self-preservation, to preserve their
conceptual, intellectual selves. They have no regrets in sacrificing their lives because
they wish to preserve the self that is greater than life, higher than life. Negative suicide
has nothing to do with self-preservation, and cannot be called self-sacrifice. All
alive is egoistical. Even if we think that a difficult problem might be
solved with some effort, that a shameful sin could be erased with effort,
that self-preservation is still possible, he does not see it this way. This being
the case, it is not impermissible for him to act according to his view of the
situation. As for suicide committed for a cause, its value as self-preservation
is self-evident
The statement that the difference between the superior man and the
petty man lies in what they consider happiness to be, and that human
character is higher or lower accordingly, is quite true. The superior man and
the petty man are one in their desire to manifest their egos; it is just that
their understanding and experience may be higher or lower. Where there
are higher or lower levels of understanding and experience, the methods
employed differ similarly as a result. Our judgments of human character
consequently also distinguish between higher and lower. Someone who does
not really know himself may think that he is among the highest in character,
and only when a great person comes forth does his own low character
become evident. He who betrays his friends and country does not think
that this is a sin. The fact that it is a sin becomes evident when we compare
it with someone who does not betray friends and country. Therefore we say
that there is no evil in the world, just lesser goodness, and that there are
no evil persons in the world, just people of lesser goodness.
self-sacrifice contains an element of egoism. Unselfish martyrdom is a contradiction
in terms. Self-sacrifice always seeks self-preservation. The reason that someone willingly
gives up property or life is that he has something greater than these to preserve. The
little man, on the contrary, will sell out his friends, or his good name, or his country, for
material profit, not because he hates his friends or his reputation or his country, but
just because he lusts after material things. Thus, the difference between the great man
and the little man lies in what they regard happiness to be, and human character varies
accordingly. Thus you can know the innermost disposition of a person by examining
the value of what he thinks happiness is. (p. 156; Thilly 388–89)
The comparison with physics is very good.
Judgment plays a really powerful role.
A question.

Physicists claim that there is no isolated point in the universe, that every bit of
matter in the physical universe has a reciprocal influence on all other matter. The
same is true in the moral world as well. The actions of each individual necessarily
have an influence on the entire moral world, and all phenomena of the moral world
necessarily affect the conduct of the individual… All phenomena are interrelated. No
one can be totally indifferent to the actions of others. Upon hearing of someone else’s
actions, he makes a judgment that it is good or bad. And the result of all judgments
is public opinion, which acts to further or retard all actions. Thus everyone feels that
the conduct of other people concerns himself directly, and thus promotes or opposes
it.
Is the difference between egoism and altruism therefore meaningless? Are there no
differences between motive and result that can be called egoistic or altruistic?
I do not agree. This is not what I mean to say. There are always those cases in
which there is a conflict, or apparent conflict, between my interests and the interests
of others. At such times, one either acts in one’s own interest at the expense of others,
or sacrifices one’s own interests to those of others, and there is no doubt that this is
very much related to moral values. However, conflict between one’s own interests and
the interests of others, conflict between egoistic and altruistic motives, is not the rule
but the exception. As a rule, egoistic and altruistic
The path that benefits both oneself and others is mutual aid.
motives are consistent with each other. The way of life is not as intensely antagonistic as most moralists claim, with no peace at all. Although no one can escape
the competitive struggle, most human beings do not depend on intense competitive
struggle in order to be able to live. It is the experience of those who live in healthy
families and an orderly society and that have regular occupations, that they generally
follow a path that is of benefit both to the self and to others, and that they are seldom
forced into a situation in which they cannot benefit others except by making some
self-sacrifice.
1.
This is in agreement with our Confucian theory of ethics.
It also agrees with Mozi’s universal love, because the mutual aid of Mozi’s
universal love does not ignore my own important interests for the minor
interests of others, but is altruistic self-sacrifice that results in benefiting
others.
Moral judgments… Any altruistic act of self-sacrifice that results in benefiting others
must be called good, righteous. However, what about an act that gives others a little
pleasure and ignores my own important interests? Should I sacrifice my property, my
health, and my life for the sake of the whims of a sick person or to lessen his illness a
little? Is that my duty, or if not my duty, yet a fully moral act? Or should I sacrifice the

interests of my own family to fulfill the wishes of others? The unprejudiced answer must
be, no. My family and kin are closer to me than others, and to sacrifice the welfare of
family and kin for the sake of others is not only not my duty, it would violate it. Thus,
it is not necessarily good just to sacrifice one’s own wishes and interests. In order to
be good such an act must promote the important interests of others. Sacrificing one’s
life to save the lives of others, or for the public interest of one’s nation, these are great
and good acts. Not to
This is the Confucian righteousness [yi].
Mutual aid.
Sociableness is a factor in selfpreservation, quite true.
be able to control one’s desires even when it endangers the well-being of others, this
is evil. (pp. 156–58; Thilly 389–92)
… The first of my duties are those imposed on me by my calling and position, and
next come those that involve my special relations with others, and then those that
arise from my occasional relations with others. If the interests of the latter are seen as
more important than those of the former two, I would have to make a special effort to
distance myself from the core of my ego. In the real world we easily make decisions on
such matters. The relation of human beings to others is like that of concentric circles
in which the centripetal force of the circles depends on their distance from myself at
the center and determines the rate of their motivating force… (p. 159; Thilly 393)
5. The effect of the theory of evolution on ethics and on altruism and egoism… The
reason that the human race is superior to other animals, and that poisonous snakes
and wild beasts cannot threaten it, is entirely due to the collective social capacities
to provide mutual support, including such capacities as language, intelligence, and the
discovery of tools. There is no power stronger than that of joining together to achieve a
common purpose. Hence, sociableness is a self-preserving factor, which is exhibited in
many different qualities, such as trust, friendship, and the sacrifice of personal interests
for the common good. And the deepest foundation for these various qualities
is in following the social love of companions, from which comes the ability to implement social morality, rather than being eliminated by nature, and also to attain
a superior position in the competition to exist among the various nationalities… (p.
160–61; Thilly 394—95)
True.
This is really true.
… If human beings did not have feelings of mutual love, but were driven solely by
egoistic feelings, there would still be order and common tasks. For example, there is
much more mutual suspicion and envy in today’s commercial and industrial society
than there was among the agricultural peasants of the past. In German agriculture of
the past, there was no such thing as competition or cheating between landlords and
tenants, no threats of public disturbances or disorder. There was veiy rarely contact

between one household and another. As systems of cooperation become increasingly
complex the points of collision multiply. In all societies today where are there the
most collisions? Among officials and teachers and clergymen, or among peasants and
soldiers? Everyone is able to answer this question. The reason for this is that the society
of commerce and industry is not nearly as simple as that of the peasants. On the one
hand there is an increase in friendship and trust, but on the other hand there is also
an increase in feelings of jealousy and envy.
Spencer appeals to the development of family relations as proof of his view. I believe
that family relations have also developed in two directions.
This is the reason for discord.
This is quite true.
This chapter is extremely well done.
In the world today, there are families that are in greater discord than the ancients
could ever have imagined. This is quite natural, for with the appearance of increasing
individuality, the mutual feelings of love and hatred also become increasingly intense.
Wild animals live together in the hills and forests in far greater harmony than do
human beings, (p. 163; Thilly 397–98)
… If the world of the future attains perfect happiness and morality, this would in
no way diminish the happiness and morality of past humanity. The kind of life they
lived was suitable to their kind, and moreover was an inevitable stage in the evolution
of the human race. And their condition does not lose its value, just as the age of youth,
of taking pleasure in playing, does not lose its value… (p. 164; Thilly 398–99)
Chapter VII: Virtue and Happiness
There is a similar saying in our country: “On the good-doer He sends
down all blessings, and on the evildoer He sends down all miseries.” 32
1. The effect of virtue on happiness. The first truth that all peoples rely upon as the
basis of examining all things in the moral world is that goodness brings happiness
and evil brings misfortune. This conviction that is the conclusion of all forms of
life experience has been expressed in proverbs. In the first chapter of his Ethics of
the Greeks, L. Schmidt53 includes an exhaustive collection of Greek proverbs and
passages on this idea. Moreover, his introduction states that the Greek people
were firmly convinced that the fate of the human race was perfectly just and
correct, that good is rewarded
and evil is punished. (Pp. 164—65; Thilly 401)
The unity of happiness and virtue.
53 The Chinese is guannian, “concept” or “idea.” Thilly has “idea”; the sentence referring to Plato
does not even appear in the German edition.

… The basic nature of all things contains a force that connects virtue and happiness.
But the conception of happiness tends to be focused within the internal nature of things,
and thus the so-called direct effect of virtuous conduct is not necessarily an external
happiness, but an internal happiness, or what is called internal peace. The humane
and great person does not necessarily attain external happiness, though his virtuous
conduct is certainly affected by external happiness. And even if he can never attain
external happiness, he is sure to find internal happiness within his own heart. This
truth is also in accord with the general position of modem ethics, (p. 166; Thilly 401)
Between optimism and pessimism, is the pessimist correct and the optimist wrong?
I do not think so.
Indeed, indeed.
All the pessimistic views of individuals and of nations may be reconciled within
optimism. We cannot of course say that good people will never have misfortunes, just
as he who is careful with his hygiene may even so fall ill, while those who are lax
and dissolute may remain healthy. The great man may fail while the little man may
succeed. The loyal and upright minister may incur the hatred of his prince, while the
flatterer may be given high position. Such things are unavoidable in the human world.
However, the fact that such things are always closely noted and regarded as injust
demonstrates that they are not the general rule but the exception. When frivolousness
or recklessness
lead to ruin, everyone says: Of course! But when someone who has been just and
righteous meets with misfortune and even death, all persons will sigh: How inscrutable
the ways of heaven! When the good person succeeds and the bad person fails, everyone
thinks it quite normal. When some illegitimate action leads occasionally to amassing a
fortune, people talk about it forever, precisely because it is not normal, (p. 167; Thilly
402–3)
Like the government of Yuan Shikai.
Excellent.
Whenever, wherever there is a society in which vice is upheld, those who are upright
and virtuous will not be respected or loved, but will be treated with contempt and
persecution. But those who follow vice will unavoidably be in conflict with each other,
and will be judged before the court of the entire society, with the result that they shall
crumble and fall. (p. 168; Thilly 404)
… He who acts virtuously takes only virtue as his goal, and if external happiness
eludes him, and his senses suffer hardship, nevertheless his virtuous conduct brings
him spiritual happiness. Spinoza said that the reward of virtue is not happiness, but
virtue. This is true. (p. 171; Thilly 406)

1. The effect of happiness on character.
… Happiness and success often and easily make people self-satisfied and can lead
to arrogance. The prosperous person is prone to criticizing others, and often lacks
self-knowledge, so that he boasts of his own achievements and looks upon the failure
of others as being due to their own lack of ability. Thus he belittles the efforts
of others, has no compassion for their difficulties, and becomes insolent so that he
is hated by both the gods and men. All those who become arrogant in victory are
contemptuous of their neighboring states, abuse the weak, and insult the vanquished.
Their own sense of careless security will one As in the case of Germany. day be
their downfall, (p. 171; Thilly 407–8)
What is true of individuals is also true of collective bodies, of nations, societies,
and parties. Their common prosperity is an omen of ruin. They will then lose their
capacity for selfcriticism and self-control, they will end up by being overrun by the
enemy they so despised. The world has always detested nothing more than those who
are self-satisfied and arrogantly extravagant.
This proves that prosperity is the agent of ruin. On the other hand, we can learn
from misfortune, be it failure
Cause the blind to see and the or adversity, the results of which deaf to hear,
as it is said. strengthen and purify. Misfortune can
teach and temper us in the strength to stand up under pressure, the patience to
be flexible. It also nurtures strength of will, the ability to be patient, and the virtue
of modesty. Prosperity feeds the divisive qualities of human beings, while misfortune
makes human beings draw upon the qualities of friendliness, patience, and justice that
bring them together. When a storm suddenly drenches travelers with rain on a summer
day, those who have mutually despised each other crowd together under the same roof,
talking and laughing without rancor. When a city or nation meets with misfortune,
those
In the past I was in this situation.
This chapter talks of philosophical problems; fairly good.
Even before its full flowering, religion was a force that restrained naked
violence and protected the young and weak.
who ordinarily hated and despised each other all work together to help each other.
These are all evidence for this view. The highest morality cannot be matured without
great pain and suffering. (p. 172; Thilly 410)
There are people who are dissatisfied with the present world and have visions of
another world of perfect pleasure. There is no basis for their imaginings, but even if
there were such another universe and they could go live there, I fear that when they
recalled this old world they had despised, they would regard it as the better of the
two. There are indeed those who hate their own country and move to live abroad. But
before long they begin to think of home, and want to maintain a close relation with
their homeland throughout their entire lives. The same is true of those who say they

hate the world. If they could leave the earth to live among the stars, they would soon
long for earth and regret the errors of their view. (pp. 174–75; Thilly 413)
Chapter VIII: The Relation of Morality to Religion
1. The historical relationship between morality and religion and its effects… (p. 175)
… The gods are the enemy of insolence, and so become the protectors of morality.
All those who are weak, without rights, strangers in another land, and helpless are
protected by the gods. Those who persecute strangers, the old, or young, will be
punished by the gods. This is its greatest significance.
This section discusses the evolution of the relationship between morality
and religion; fairly good.
An exploration of the relation between religion and morality brings us even closer
to this. All religions instruct us to have faith in a transcendent reality. All religions
presuppose a feeling of dissatisfaction with the empirical world of experience. Fetichism
and shamanism also assume a transcendent power or a reality that natural forces
cannot reach, that can only be reached with magic. As human life develops, the will is
gradually spiritualized. In the very beginnings of human civilization, the objectives of
the will were solely concerned with the animal needs. With the advance of civilization,
these objectives turned toward the beautiful and good life, or what is called the ideal
human way of life. With the change in the direction of the human will, the form of
the transcendent world that man imagined also changed, beginning with polytheism.
Polytheism moved away from the vague indefinite magic of fetichism, and toward
realization of the personal, historical. The gods of polytheism represent the human
ideals of the beautiful and good life objectified. The Greek world of the gods was an
objective representation of the national ideals of the human world. Thus each of the
various gods takes the form of some aspect of the Greek ideal of human life. And
this transcendent world could not but have an influence on the empirical world. These
various gods were always mindful of human life, guiding, protecting, admonishing,
leading human beings toward perfection. The magic character, though, had not been
totally eliminated; prayers for the health, prosperity, success, and
victory of their people were predominant. But the intellectual leaders gradually did
away with magic and led the common people to regard the gods as a representation
of the perfect human life, that is not necessarily to be expected, and treated reverence
and admiration alone as the function of religion. Monotheism, the highest development
of religion, contains even more elements of the ideal. Christianity does away with magic
entirely. Jesus and his disciples seek only that the will of God be realized. Christian
prayer presupposes that whatever comes from God’s will is good. And ultimately, he
who is sincerely submissive to God’s will believes that it is holy, just, and kind. When
I realize my will as an objectification of the will of God, as His revelation, this is truly
the purest, most profound goal of mankind.

I would therefore conclude that the religion of any people is the reflection of its will
in a transcendent world that expresses its deepest yearnings…
Form without content.
Thus, it is clear that in the relationship of morality and religion, the two come from
a single source, the fervent desire of the will to attain perfection. What in morality
is just a demand, in religion becomes a reality. Perfection is described by morality in
abstract terms, but in religion it is a concrete intuition… (pp. 176–78; Thilly 418— 19)
1. On their necessary internal relationship…
There are two views of the world that are diametrically opposed to each other. The
one regards it as most important that good exists in the world, that reality is itself
good and that it
These are two of the great cur- exists for the good. Taking Plato’s rents of
philosophy. conception of the world as based on
the idea54 of the good, we may call this view the idealist world view. The reason
human beings believe in God is because good is the foundation or goal of the world, or
as Fichte put it, that morality is the ultimate basis of the world order. Thus the idealist
world view is also called the theistic world view. Diametrically opposed to this view is
the materialist world view. The materialist view says that the principles of reality are
absolutely indifferent to distinctions of value; the whole of reality, which is composed
of atoms moving in conformity with laws, has nothing to do with good and evil, and
simply that all things are produced in the course of time. Living things are formed
entirely from the accidental conjunction of atoms, and the feelings of pain and pleasure
that living things have are no more than variations in the movements of atoms. What
we call pleasure and pain, good and bad, are no more than this. All atoms combine
accidentally and disperse accidentally, so all objects must die, and species must also
perish. This is also true of the conditions of the formation of living things. Thus what
we call pleasure and pain, good and bad, will also perish, leaving only the unfeeling
atoms and the natural laws.
We must choose between these two opposing world views. And the choice cannot
but be related to one’s inclinations and conduct. A person whose life contains ideals
must be inclined to the idealist view of the world, while the person whose life is purely
materialist
Words are the sounds of the heart, and the sounds of the heart are the
expression of the inherent capacity of the basic nature of the heart.
must be inclined toward the materialist world view. This is quite natural, for it is the
inclinations that come first, and then one’s world view. Thus, it is life that determines
54 Here Cai Yuanpei has kexue shi, “scientific style,” for what in both the German and the English
editions is “Rococo.” The reasons for this rather inappropriate emendation are obscure.

faith, not faith that determines life. As Fichte said, the philosophy a person chooses
depends on what kind of a person one is. Truly. If a person just follows his unconscious
impulses and momentary desires, how can he have a higher conception of the world?
A person judges the worth of the world according to the worth of human life, and his
evaluation of the worth of human life depends on his own experiences of life. If his own
life merely follows unconscious impulses and momentary desires, then he will view the
world as no more than the conjunction and dispersal of atoms. Likewise, if he has great
ideals with lasting purposes. As for life itself, he knows first his own life, then the life of
humanity, and then he knows how noble, how great, the world is. Such a person, then,
will know the meaning of historical life, and that the whole of reality moves forward
in the same direction as his own inclinations. And in this way, the value of his own life
is influenced by the value of the entire world, (p. 182; Thilly 423–24)
We can do without religion, but Thus life influences faith, and faith not without faith. in tum affects life. If a person believes
in the power of good, believes in God, this gives him courage and arouses hope. I
dare say that no one in this world has ever accomplished anything of greatness without
this kind of faith. All religions are founded on faith. Their teachers and disciples have
conquered the world by faith. The fact
that, in the past, as in the present, the faithful have devoted their whole lives to
their ideals, have resisted adversity, have overcome danger, and even willingly given
their lives, is indeed due to the faith that good will be victorious over evil… (p. 183;
Thilly 424–25)
1. The relationship between religion and science.
The feeling of awe.
Resides in occupational differences.
This feeling of awe is the source of religion. Awe contains two meanings, humility
and trust. Humility is thinking of the infinity of the universe and seeing oneself as
no more than a ephemeral mayfly. Trust is the feeling not only of the great power of
the universe, but that it really has the great capacity of giving birth and nourishment.
This is the beginning of religious feelings… (pp. 188–89; Thilly 431–32)
1. The reason for not believing. It may be said that there are also upright and great
human beings who do not believe in religion, and who advocate not believing
in religion. Why is this? I would reply that there are indeed such persons, and
the reason for it is that the capacity of religion is not equally present in all
persons. Where the intellect and will are excessively developed, they may inhibit
the higher, freer feelings. There was a great mathematician who, after listening

to the reading of a poem, was unmoved, and asked, But what does it prove?
Because his daily occupation had to do with proofs, and did not involve being
interested in anything else, over time he seemed to have forgotten that anything
existed outside of mathematics.
Paulsen emphasizes inner cultivation to correct the defects of materialist
civilization.
Not bad.
Darwin once related that his ability to be moved by poetry had disappeared over
the years. This is likely to be true of anyone who devotes his entire life totally to the
pursuit of science. And there are some who are so engrossed in practical problems that
they regard anything that is not relevant to them as dull and boring. Such persons
may be great and good human beings, but they are not normally developed. A most
important aspect of their inner lives has not been able to develop fully, that part
which is most beautiful, noble, and free. This is especially true of many people today.
The strong point of the present, the division of occupations and specialization, and
the use of mechanistic principles to prove the conditions of life, have contributed to
this one-sided development. Many scholars praise the uniqueness of the modem age.
The ancient Greek philosophers, the scholars of the middle ages, and the thinkers of
both the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had a much broader view of the world
than today’s scholars. The development of anyone who is addicted to one thing or
one occupation will inevitably be onesided. This indeed is not as good as in ancient
times, when life on the one hand was simple, yet varied, when human beings had more
diverse contacts with things, and for this reason had active imaginations and rich
feelings, and they developed equally. Modem specialization is most prone to killing off
religious feelings, and especially the scientific specializations. Salamanders living in the
stalactitic caves of Camiola have lost their sense of sight and even have no eyes. This
is
Quite true.
The question of life and death is a question of time.
I think that the question of life and death is a question of time, and that
the question of formation and dissolution [cheng-hui] is a question of space.
For the world, there is formation and dissolution, not life and death; there
is only space, not time. By extension, we may infer an entirely different
sort of world. I can imagine space without time, and feel that I am placed
in an infinite, unbounded, broad, and expansive great place that has no
present, no past, and no future. In this context, it is possible to maintain
the view that both body and spirit are immortal. Is this not an entirely
different world?
a rule of biology, that organs that are not used will disappear… (pp. 190- 91; Thilly
433–34)

1. The relationship between belief in the immortality of the soul and morality.
… Faith in the immortality of the soul is very relevant to life as a whole, but not
to moral philosophy. Whether or not there is life after death in no way changes the
principles of ethics. The moral laws are the natural laws of historical life, of human
beings living in this age, on this earth. Even if this present life is simply preparation
for a life after death, we must still do so by following the moral laws. And should there
be only this life, and no life after death, the moral laws should still be obeyed. Obeying
the moral laws for the sake of this life brings its own reward that does not depend
upon what happens after death, (p. 191; Thilly 439–40)
What is time? An inherent form of reality? If so, then to be in time would be a
condition of being real. We might further say that something has to be in the present
in order to fulfill the condition of being real. Why? What is not in the present must be
either past or future, and the past is no longer, while the future is not yet. Thus, it must
belong to the present. However, if we pursue this further, there is no so- called present,
because this momentary instant that we call the present is already past. Thus, present
is a point that does not occupy space. Being in the present cannot be a condition of
reality. If reality is not to dissolve it must be real both in the past and in the future.
Thus, being in time is not a conI would say that the discovery of the concept of time comes from a
kind of physical mechanical change that exists in the objective world. The
earth revolves around the sun and creates day and night. If there were
only daylight or only long night, there would be no concept of time, and
this proves that there is no such thing as time. The revolution of the earth
around the sun is merely motion in space.
dition of reality. As Kant said, Time is not a form of reality, but a form of our senseperception. Our consciousness is bound to this form of intuition which then appears as
the experience of time. Its essense or noumenon continues forever, quite untouched by
our thoughts of death or destruction. Life is definitely not destroyed by death. Since
this life is a part of eternal reality, it is neither destroyed nor changed. How can this
be affected by Karl Moor’s statement that one bullet makes the wise and foolish, the
courageous and the cowardly, the noble and the villain, entirely equal. Although death
may sever the connection of this life with the future, the content of life can be neither
changed nor destroyed, since it is of the nature of reality that it can be neither changed
nor destroyed, (pp. 192–93; Thilly 440–41)
I would say: I am reality, so reality is myself. I have consciousness, thus
reality has consciousness. I have life, so reality has life.
It cannot be proven.
Some might say that if reality is completely without consciousness, I too would be
without it. And furthermore, if I have no consciousness, then others also lack it, in
which case, what connection do I have with reality?

We dare not say it.
I would disagree. Can the questioner prove that reality does not have consciousness?
Otherwise, how does he know that reality cannot have absolute consciousness as its
inherent essence? Can the commonly recognized view of the great philosophers of the
past and present be mistaken? The divine consciousness is different from the temporal
consciousness of earthly human beings, which is the reason that human beings cannot
conceive, imagine, or describe it. But dare we say that there is nothing outside of what
we can conceive, imagine, or describe?
Temporal consciousness must be based in real consciousness before its
origin and existence can be explained.
And who would dare to claim that this earthly temporal consciousness is not part
of an eternal consciousness, or that all that exists in time cannot exist forever? And if
this were to be denied, how would the questioner explain the origin and the existence
of temporal consciousness? (pp. 193–94; Thilly 442)
The same is true of the faith of Christianity when expressed in philosophical terms.
The eternal life of Christianity is not a sensory temporal life; it transcends the senses
and time. It does not consist of clothing and food, but of a solemn blessing. With the
end of this earthly life, the essence does not revert to a state of change. The temporal
life cannot but undergo changes, so after death there can be no temporal life. The
faith of Christianity is not just an abstract and negative function that just expresses
the fact that the eternal life transcends the senses and time. It also presents an idea
of the life that transcends the senses and time, and imagines it using the forms of
sensory temporal life. Its kingdom of heaven has streets lined with gold, with gates
of pearls, and angels clad in white robes, God the Father, and God the Son. And the
hell it speaks of is composed of things that are repulsive and horrible to human beings.
These are mental images, but not just mental images. It is a peculiar quality of faith
that it steps outside the sensory world, yet cannot help but hold on to it. What faith
throws away with the right hand it snatches up with the left hand. All religious faith
vacillates between the sensory and super-sensory, alternating between imagination
I say: the concept is reality, the finite is the infinite, the temporal senses
are the super-temporal senses, imagination is thought, form is substance, I
am the universe, life is death and death is life, the present is the past and
the future, the past and the future are the present, small is big, the yang
is they in, up is down, dirty is clean, male is female, and thick is thin. In
essence, the many are one, and change is permanence.
I am the most exalted person, and also the most pnworthy person.
and thought. What it calls God, on the one hand transcends the temporal senses,
is infinite and unchangeable, while on the other hand it is finite, changing, thinking,
feeling, and willing, and so is described as being moved to joy and sadness. Polytheism

attributes to the gods human sensory qualities, and gives them freedom. This gives
them that aesthetic perfection that we so admire in the Greek gods. The spread of
Christianity, from the beginning, had a special relationship with the inner sensory
world, at a time when thought and imagination had long been divorced from each
other… (pp. 194–95; Thilly 444)
Chapter IX: The Freedom of the Will
1. The history of the question of free will…
I agree with this view.
Since ancient times, the metaphysical freedom of the will has been the most difficult
and greatest problem for philosophy, but I do not regard it as such…
Greek philosophy did not address this as a distinct problem, but only touched on
it occasionally. The Greek philosophers for the most part clearly believed that human
beings are part of the natural universe, and thus that they are subject to the universal
rules that govern the natural world, (p. 197; Thilly 454)
1. The question of using the facts to evaluate the freedom of the will.
… Human beings are bom of their parents, just as are other animals. In body and
spirit, they resemble their parents. And their temperament, their
That human beings are subject to natural law is compatible with my
view.
In short, each and every structure of the self depends entirely on external
materials, and we can in no way escape this world outside the self.
desires, their feelings, and their intellect are all inherited from their parents. At the
same time, they are imbued with the physical and spiritual habits of the nation to
which they belong; these are not determined by themselves. And their sex, as male or
female, for whatever unknown reason, is not chosen by the individual, so it is clear
that human beings cannot escape the jurisdiction of natural law. (p. 200; Thilly 457)
… Society constantly uses words and deeds to show us the difference between what
is right and what is wrong, what is proper and improper, what is attractive and
repulsive, and always commands or requests that we perform certain specified tasks. Is
there anyone who does not receive instructions from his times? The builder does not
build as he chooses, but as the age chooses, as in the fourteenth century in the Gothic
style; in the sixteenth century in the Renaissance style; in the eighteenth century in

the scientific style.55 The same is true for the scholar who does not choose his own
scientific questions, but has them chosen for him by his age… (p. 201; Thilly 458)
… The difference between an organic and inorganic structure is that the former is
determined by external mechanical effects, while the structure of the latter comes from
the force of internal causes.56 For example, a sculpture can be fashioned with a chisel,
but though mechanical effects can destroy an organism, they cannot create one. Thus
the human race is created not by external mechanical effects but by internal effects.
This is what
I still suspect that human beings are powerless from beginning to end.
Even after the development of the human spirit, are we not still defined by
the natural world?
After writing the above, I got another idea, as follows: Although we are
defined by Nature, we are also part of Nature. Thus Nature has the power
to define us, and we have the power to define Nature. Although our power
is very small, it cannot be said to have no effect. Nature without us would
be incomplete. Our relationship to Nature is like that of the individual to
his people. The individual is influenced by the people in many kinds of
ways, but he is also a part of the people. A people without its individuals
loses its power. From this derives the significance of both our responsibility
and our freedom. All our various kinds of knowledge and social relations
are molded by the external influence of parents, friends, etc. Indeed, but
since it is essential that we ourselves have this basic nature [benxing] that
can be molded in order for this to happen, what is there for completely
external our consciousness tells us. This is not to say that all particular processes arise
without cause. Nor does it mean that the various momentary experiences of life are
unrelated to the past. Nor does it mean that the inner principles, what is called the ego,
are all uncaused. Nor does it mean that the ego enters this world as an independent
entity. The human body is formed of matter, and becomes an organism only after it
is matured. Although during the early stages of its development, it is greatly affected
by material influences, as it evolves to a higher degree it is gradually able to resist
material forces, and through the will, it becomes capable of changing its close ties to
the external world, and indirectly its own form. Is what our will tells us in conflict
with the above view? (pp. 202–3; Thilly 459–60)
shaping to rely on? This basic nature that is capable of being molded, I
call our potential nature, and it is to this nature that I have responsibility.
55 Cai Yuanpei’s version here inverts the meaning of Paulsen’s text. The relevant sentence in Thilly’s
translation (p. 459) reads: “The organic differs from the inorganic in that the former is not determined
by external, mechanical effects, but by the action of an inner principle.” The sense of the Japanese
translation, and of the German original, is the same. Since the Chinese sentence also contradicts the
thrust of the ensuing paragraph, Cai’s formulation must result from an accidental confusion of “former”
and “latter.”
56 I.e., the Cultural Book Society.

The definition.
This is free will explained through evolution.
Secondary nature.
Humanity is both animal and human.
4. The definition of human freedom.
… The conceptual ability that determines all particular acts is what we call the free
will. Thus we say that a person’s acts are free when they are determined by purposes
and ideals, by duty and conscience, not by the stimuli and desires of the moment.
The animal part of man is the track of natural experiepce. That part which is in
Nature is still moved by external stimuli. With the evolution of the human race, it
became possible partially to escape from the forces of Nature, to stand above it, and
thus to determine and use it, rather than being determined by Nature. This is what
is called personality. And it is this that makes it possible for human beings to become
masters of all their own actions, and with this comes responsibility for one’s actions.
At this point, it becomes quite clear that it is in this sense that we recognize that
freedom of the will is not an original endowment of human nature but is acquired
through training… Human beings develop this ability in differing degrees. Those who
are wholly controlled by the animal impulses and cannot attain mastery over them are
vulgar barbaric people. Those in whom such impulses are wholly absent are dry and
insipid people. Neither of these is normal. Thus, humanity stands between the animal
and the rational. (pp. 209–10; Thilly 467–69)
The method of self-denial and self-cultivation.
This is the origin of the theory of the omnipotence of education.
The power of the will.
The power of the mind.
This being the case, can human beings determine themselves by their wills? To this
question, it is possible to say both yes and no. Yes, for every human being has the
capacity of educating and aiding himself, and thus one’s own life, both external and
internal, through the function of consciousness, is formed by the ideals one embraces,
and the natural impulses can always be suppressed or controlled. He cannot do this just
by purely wishing or resolving it, but must examine himself and practice it constantly
over time for it to become possible, just as in athletic training… Demosthenes, the
famous Greek orator, is said to have originally had a bad speech defect, but having
resolved to become a public speaker, he worked at it arduously and with determination
and finally achieved his purpose, becoming world famous. This is the only way for us
to train our inner natures. He who has a quick temper, if he recognizes that it is wrong
and wishes to control it. cannot accomplish this overnight, but must take appropriate
measures to guard against and get rid of it gradually. By avoiding the occasions that
arouse anger he may over time get rid of his quick temper, which is the principle that
human organs decay with lack of use. Or if when such occasions cannot be avoided, he
always reminds himself of many examples of the injurious effects of blind rage, and of

the virtue of controlling oneself, and repeats them over and over to himself so that he
cannot forget them, then a quick temper may also be gradually overcome. Looked at
in this way, there is no doubt that human beings are capable of changing their basic
natures by using their wills… (p. 210; Thilly 469–70)
[27] See the Mencius, II, I, II, 11: “I venture to ask wherein you, Master, surpass
[Gao].” Mencius told him, “I understand words. I am skillful in nourishing my vast,
flowing passion-nature [haoran zhi qi]” (Legge, Vol. II, p. 189). Also III, II, II, 3: “To
dwell in the wide house of the world, to stand in the correct seat of the world, and to
walk in the great path of the world; when he obtains his desire for office, to practise his
principles for the good of the people; and when that desire is disappointed, to practise
them alone; to be above the power of riches and honours to make dissipated, of poverty
and mean conditions to make swerve from principle, and of power and force to make
bend—these characteristics constitute the great man [da zhangfu]” (Legge, Vol. II, p.
265).
[28] The Chinese is henti, meaning noumenon, Ding-an-sich, or ultimate reality.
(Bentilun is the term for ontology.)
[29] Benti huo mingzhi yue shen.
[30] Mao’s handwritten text actually has “Is there any God other than God?” As
the Chinese editors point out, the second “God” must represent a lapse on his part,
and should read “self.”
[31] The reference is to a story in Chapter 19 of the Zhuangzi. Confucius encountered
a hunchback catching cicadas on a sticky rod with the greatest of ease. Asked about
his Way, the hunchback replied: “… out of all the vastness of heaven and earth, the
multitude of the myriad things, it is only of the wings of a cicada that I am aware. I
don’t let my gaze wander or waver, I would not take all the myriad things in exchange
for the wings of a cicada. How could I help but succeed?” (Angus Graham, Chuang
Tzu, p. 138.)

--- Notes

30 Chongdong is used here where Thilly has “strivings”; throughout the work, Cai Yuanpei employs
it variously for “impulses,” “instincts,” or even “inclinations.”


[32] From the Book of Historical Documents, IV, iv; Legge, Vol. Ill, p. 198.
[33] Boaijia, literally “persons [animated by] universal love.”
[34] This reference to an accompanying manifestation in the consciousness, which
appears both in Thilly, p. 257, and in the German original, p. 258, has disappeared in
Cai Yuanpei’s text.
[35] The footnote to this name in the Beijing edition of Mao’s notes wrongly identifies the painter in question as James Turner, instead of Albrecht DUrer.
[36] The old Chinese concept of boai (“universal love,” “love without distinction”)
serves more than one purpose in Cai Yuanpei’s translation. Earlier in this text, he
used it as an equivalent for Paulsen’s word “unselfishness” (see note 33). Here he has
employed the same term to render Paulsen’s “Humanist movement,” which becomes
boaizhuyi yundong. We, in tum, have freely translated this back into English as “movement inspired by the doctrine of universal brotherhood.”