(July 18,1916)
Esteemed elder brother Sheng:
I sent a letter from Xiangtan on the twelfth; I do not know if it has arrived or not?
It has been seven days and I have had some new thoughts, so I respectfully recount
them for you as previously agreed. Regarding the Hunan question, I still maintain
that Military Governor Tang7 should not have been sent away. Driving him out was an
injustice, and the situation now is growing more and more chaotic. Why do I say it was
an injustice? Tang was here for three years, and he ruled by the severe enforcement of
strict laws. He swept away the oppressive and tyrannical atmosphere of earlier days,
creating a tranquil and amicable environment. Order was restored, and the peaceful
times of the past were practically regained. He controlled the army strictly, and with
discipline. Even though Yuan8 threatened him, he was able to plan expansion secretly
and to attain independence. With just over fifteen thousand troops he was able to
secure the provincial capital, defend Hubei, and look after the surrounding xian, but
the officials in the towns around did not approve. If he was not extremely capable,
could he have done all that? He appointed Zhang Shuxun9 head of the police, and
the city of Changsha became so honest that lost belongings were left on the street
for their owners. Even chickens and dogs were unafraid. The city administration was
the best among all the provinces! Anyone coming from Wuhan said that it could not
compare to [the capital of] Hunan. When the armies of the north and south arose,
6 Literally, Ze bai — Ze who is without official rank, or by extension, “Humbly, Ze.”
7 The previous governor, Tang Xiangming (1886–1975), zi Zhuxin, from Hubei Province, was a
French-trained naval officer appointed by Yuan Shikai as successor to Tan Yankai on October 21, 1913.
He was notorious for his harsh treatment of political opponents and pro-Guomindang elements, to such
an extent that he was often called “Tang the Butcher.” (Mao himself, who is relatively indulgent toward
Tang here, applied this epithet to him in a letter of June 23, 1920.) Under pressure from his brother,
Tang Hualong (see the note to Mao’s letter of winter 1915 to Xiao Zisheng), Tang Xiangming declared
Hunan independent on May 29,1916, and fled the province on July 4, 1916.
8 Yuan Shikai.
9 Zhang Shuxun, zi Zhuqiao, a Hunanese, was head of the police in Hunan from October 1914 to
July 1916. He later became head of the police in Hebei Province.

Hunan became their battleground. Wave after wave hit the provincial capital, and in
the period between spring and summer, the danger increased ten thousand fold. Yet
he was able to maintain stability. When the
mine guards mobilized,10 many of the students fled. He sent out a notice that they
were not to miss classes, and when funds were required he issued them. Are these
the accomplishments of a weak and cowardly person? He was especially painstaking
in planning independence. He first raised the idea with Wang Yunting,11 and had
Wang declare independence. Afterward, he found a way to ward off the northern army
while he brought back his own units. He contacted Guizhou and Guangxi, and they
responded immediately. When Yuan unfortunately died early, the war was prolonged,
and thus the contributions of Sichuan and Hunan in declaring independence were not
less than those of Yunnan and Guizhou. Did they not have some districts that must
be taken and cities which must be attacked, and are these two provinces not the key
to the outcome of the struggle between north and south? Some partisans despise him
for ingratiating himself with Yuan, but when did Tang really ingratiate himself with
Yuan? Yuan had been suspicious of Tang for some time. First, he did not allow him
to expand his army; then, he sent Cao Kun12 to watch him; and then, he sent Shen
Jinjian13 to move in on his authority. The fact that he killed well over ten thousand
people was the inescapable outcome of policy. Did he kill any more than Feng14 in
Jiangning? In the attack on Wujiang and the ransacking of Jiangyin, men were cut
down like weeds. One can say that he manufactured public opinion, pandered to Yuan,
and slandered good men. But did not this type of behavior also occur in Yunnan,
Guizhou, and Guangxi? Those who plan far ahead will always have things for which
to wait, and those whose accomplishments are great will always have things to endure.
Without such behavior, the goal of national protection would be unattainable. Those
who consider these things to be crimes do not comprehend the overall plan. (Under a
strict interpretation of ethics, a different view should be taken of murder and slander.)
10 This refers to the attempted coup by the commander of the mine guards, Guo Renzhang, who led
his guards into the city on May 14, 1916, with the aim of overthrowing Tang Xiangming and installing
himself as governor. Tang’s troops defeated the guards.
11 Wang Yunting, a Hunanese, was head of the Lingling garrison. Formerly a supporter of Yuan
Shikai, in May 1916 he broke with the Beijing government and proclaimed the independence of surrounding xian.
12 Cao Kun (1862–1938), zi Zhongshan, was a native of Tianjin and a graduate of the Tianjin Military Academy. A longtime close associate of Yuan Shikai, he was sent to Hunan in 1913 as commander
of the upper Yangzi military region. After Yuan Shikai’s death, Cao moved his 3rd Division back to its
permanent headquarters at Baoding. In September 1916, he became military governor of Zhili Province
and was thereafter a leading figure in the Zhili clique, which stood in opposition to the Anhui clique of
Duan Qirui.
13 Shen Jinjian, zi Shuzhan, from Zhejiang Province, was chief inspector general of Hunan from
September 1915 to June 1916.
14 Feng Guozhang (1857–1919), zi Huafu, led his troops in attacking and occupying Nanjing in 1913.
He was then appointed governor of Jiangsu Province by Yuan Shikai. Jiangning is the present-day city
of Nanjing.

When he fled, I wrote that he was stupid. But it is precisely because he was stupid
that one cannot say he is deceitful. Most of what was written in his Hankou cable
was the truth: he did not fight, although he had over ten thousand troops, because he
feared the destruction; he did not take the money that he could have, because he feared
leaving disaster behind him. (When people in Hunan published a list of his crimes, they
said he had embezzled several million, but I do not think this is likely.) Essentially,
Tang can proclaim his innocence before the whole world, and before the people of
Hunan. His departure from Hunan is a great misfortune for this province. Why do
I say the situation is growing more and more chaotic? Tang called in the Guangxi
army with good intentions, but the Guangxi army rebelled against him. This was not
necessarily the idea of Lu Rongting. Chasing Tang to Xiangyin, seizing his provisions
and weapons, adding them to all that was plundered from within the province, and
carrying them home: this is what was called in the newspapers “the civilized army
returning in triumph.” At our school, even the grass was removed. There were some
broken weapons belonging to the Xiang Army15 in the junior school, with eight people
guarding them. They took them all, and bound the eight men with the intention of
executing them. Everyone felt that ridding themselves of the Guangxi army was like
ridding themselves of tigers. Cheng Qian,16 drunk with power, led his army to the
capital with airs of extraordinary grandeur. He made enemies not only of Zeng Jiwu,17
but also of Tao Zhongxun.18 The likes of Tang Mang and Long Zhang19 took advantage
of the situation to rise up. They all wanted a taste of the governor’s seat, and all had
called up their own armies in order to expand their power. Cheng and Tao led their
divisions to a place outside of the city and battled for two days and nights. If it
15 Here the term refers not to Zeng Guofan’s Xiang army, but to contemporary military forces from
Hunan (particularly those loyal to Tan Yankai), as opposed to the various invading armies.
16 Cheng Qian (1882–1968), zi Songyun, from Liling, Hunan, was a graduate of the Japanese Officers’
Academy, and an early member of the Tongmenghui. In 1916, having gone to Yunnan to join the antiYuan campaign, he was appointed Hunan pacification commissioner. On entering the province, he called
himself, like many others at this time, commander of the National Protection Army for Hunan; though
he finally arrived before Changsha in early July, his forces were defeated and he was obliged to retreat.
17 Zeng Jiwu (1873–1943), a Hunanese, was an early member of the Tongmenghui and a graduate of
the Baoding and Japanese Officers’ Academy. In June 1916, he became commander in chief of the first
army of the Hunan National Protection Army. After the Hunanese forces had driven Tang Xiangming
from Changsha, Zeng’s army entered the city on July 5,1916, and he served as acting governor of Hunan
Province until Liu Renxi’s appointment a fortnight later.
18 Tao Zhongxun commanded a unit of the northern armies which remained stationed just outside
Changsha after Tang Xiangming’s departure. His troops clashed with those of Cheng Qian, who had
also approached the city, and defeated them.
19 Tang Mang (1887–1954) was a Hunanese graduate of the Japanese Officers’ Academy. Long
Zhang (1854–1918), zi Yanxian, a Hunanese, was a well-known merchant and cofounder of Mingde
Middle School in Changsha in 1903. He was also active in the Society for China’s Revival, and a
member of the Tongmenghui. In July 1916 he was elected head of the Hunan civil government by the
Hunan United Association of All Circles, but never took up the post.

had not been for Mr. Liu,20 who went out to restore order, the situation would have
been beyond saving. The Civil Affairs Agency and the Department of Civil Affairs were
established simultaneously, and each issues its own orders and obeys its own orders. You
have never heard of anything stranger. On July 7, rebel elements attacked the police
station. The police scattered and fled, and their weapons were taken. In one single
day, the success of ten years of diligent management was wiped out in violence, and
after ten days of preparation since then, they are still unable to go back to their posts.
Gamblers are emerging, and the atmosphere is white hot with debauchery. Both the
merchant trade and police authority have been taken over by outsiders. The disorder
is extreme. When Tang left, the gangsters tipped their hats and celebrated among
themselves, resenting their previous oppression. They are everywhere, investigating
and arresting people, and executing those they arrest. On the seventeenth was the
memorial for Yang Deling,21 and they caught six people and wanted to kill them as
a sacrifice to his memory, but were stopped from doing so. Alas, it is like the Reign
of Terror in France. In times like these, intellectuals must be cautious of how they
situate themselves. I was in Xiangtan and too timid to venture to the capital, so I
waited for the reports of friends before making the trip. I was truly frightened. There
is talk from every sector of government officials robbed and xian magistrates defied.
The magistrate of Ningxiang, Ding Xiangyi, is from Hubei and an appointee of Tang.
Yi Kongshao had previously been appointed by the head bandit, Xie Wenlin. When
Xie died, Yi was put in jail. Now Yi has secured the appointment of Long Zhang and
incited other factions to send telegrams calling for the removal of Ding and for his own
reinstatement. The governorship has already changed hands several times, and now
there is talk of another replacement. When the province declared independence, Tang
was accepted as governor. After chasing him out, Lu Rongting was welcomed. Before
Lu got there, Zeng took his place. When Cheng Qian arrived, he had no choice but
to step down. Then, when they were going to hold elections, Liuyang military officials,
local legislators, provincial legislators, citizens’ groups, and various local gentry and
merchants, thousands in all, cabled in their candidacies and were all of a sudden
suspicious of one another. When Chen Huan22 arrived, tens of thousands of northern
20 Mr. Liu, here referred to respectfully as Liu Gong, was Liu Renxi (18441919), zi Gensheng, from
Liuyang, Hunan. He was a former Qing magistrate and a leading member of the Changsha gentry. In
1915 he was active in anti-Yuan activities, and later he joined in the movement to oust Zhang Jingyao.
He was also involved in education, and had been principal of the First Central Circuit School, the
predecessor of First Normal School. On July 6, 1916, he was elected provisional governor of Hunan by
a “Joint Meeting of All Circles,” and on July 19 this decision was endorsed by the Beijing government.
He was eased out by Tan Yankai when the latter became governor in August 1916.
21 Yang Deling (1870–1913), zi Xingxun, a Hunanese, was head of the Department of Finance when
Tan Yankai first became governor. He stood in opposition to Yuan Shikai’s monarchical movement and
was executed by the Hunan chief prosecutor in October 1913.
22 Chen Huan (1876–1939), zi Er’an, from Hubei Province, a Japanese-educated militarist, was a
trusted subordinate of Yuan Shikai in the early days of the Republic. In 1915 he led the northern army
into Sichuan Province, where he became military governor. In May 1916, in the context of the struggle