ON TACTICS FOR THE THIRD CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL
LETTER TO G. E. ZINOVIEV 390

The crux of the matter is that Levi is politically correct in many respects. Unfortunately, he committed a series of actions that violated discipline, for which the party expelled him.

The theses of Thalheimer and Béla Kun are fundamentally politically incorrect. They are mere phrases and a play at leftism.

Radek wavers and has spoiled his initial draft with a number of concessions to the foolishness of the "lefts." His first "concession" is particularly characteristic: in § 1 of his theses "Umgrenzung der Fragen"* it originally read: "winning the majority of the working class (for the principles of communism)" (note this). It was amended (verballhornt**): "winning the socially decisive parts of the working class."

A gem! To weaken here, in such a context, the necessity of winning "for the principles of communism" precisely the majority of the working class is the height of absurdity.

To gain power, under certain conditions (including having already won the majority of the working class for the principles of communism), a blow must be struck by the majority of the socially decisive parts of the working class at a decisive point.

To rework, verballhornen this truth so that in § 1 of the general tasks of the Communist International on winning the working class for the principles of communism, the position on the necessity of winning the majority of the working class is weakened, is a classic example of the stupidity of Béla Kun and Thalheimer (they look, damn them, solid, but in reality, they deserve to be whipped) and... Radek's hasty compliance.

* - "Definition of the scope of issues." Ed.

** - worsened under the guise of correction. Ed.

Radek's theses were excessively long, boneless, and without a political central point. And Radek further diluted and spoiled them completely.

What to do? I don't know. Too much time and effort have been wasted.

If you do not want an open battle at the congress, then I propose:

1) Today (since Bukharin assures that you must decide the main issue today, no later: it would be better to postpone it) firmly reject, by a precise vote, the theses of Thalheimer and B. Kun as fundamentally incorrect. Record this. You will ruin everything if you do not do this and go for a compromise here.

2) Take as the basis Radek's first draft, not "improved" by amendments, one example of which I have provided.

3) Entrust 1-3 people to shorten this text and correct it so that it ceases (if possible!) to be boneless, and truly puts at the forefront, clearly, precisely, unambiguously, as central ideas, the following:

The majority (of the working class) has not yet been won by the communist parties: not only for organizational leadership, but also for the principles of communism. This is the foundation of everything. "Weakening" this foundation of the only sensible tactic is criminal frivolity.

From this: revolutionary explosions are possible very soon, given the abundance of flammable material in Europe; even an easy victory of the working class is possible in an exceptional case. But to build the tactics of the Communist International on this possibility now is absurd; it is absurd and harmful to write and think that the period of propaganda is over and the period of action has begun.

The Communist International must build its tactics on this: consistently and systematically win the majority of the working class, first and foremost within the old trade unions. Then we will surely win under any turn of events. A "victory" on a short-term basis under exceptionally favorable circumstances can be achieved even by a fool.

From this: the tactic of the "open letter" is obligatory everywhere. This must be stated directly, precisely, and clearly, because hesitation about the "open letter" is extremely harmful, extremely shameful, and extremely widespread. There is no need to hide the sin. All those who do not understand the necessity of the "open letter" tactic should be expelled from the Communist International no later than a month after the Third Congress of the Communist International. I clearly see my mistake in voting for the admission of KAPD 391, and it needs to be corrected more quickly and thoroughly.

Rather than letting the thought wander, as Radek does, it is better to translate the entire text (and in German: to present the entire text) of the "open letter" and explain its meaning and use it as an example.

I would limit the general resolution on tactics to this.

Only then will the tone be set. The central idea will be clear. There will be no vagueness. There will be no possibility for everyone to read into it what they want (as with Radek).

Then Radek's initial project would be reduced by four times, at least.

It is high time to stop writing and voting on brochures instead of theses. Even with the undisputed consensus among all of us, individual errors are inevitable with this system. And with the lack of substance and controversy, we risk making big mistakes and ruining everything.

And then, if you still have a strong itch, you can add an addition: based on such a tactic, in particular, as an example, not as a principle, but specifically as an example, add this and that.

Furthermore.

To lump Serrati and Levi together under one "opportunism" is foolish. Serrati is guilty; of what? We must say clearly and precisely on the Italian question, not on the question of general tactics. He split with the communists, did not exclude the reformists, Turati and Co. Until you fulfill this, Italian comrades, you are outside the Communist International. We exclude you 392.

And to the Italian communists, a most serious advice and demand: until you have managed to persistently, patiently, and skillfully convince and attract the majority of the Serrati workers, do not strut, do not play at being left. "Fall Levi"* is not in general tactics, but in the assessment of the Marzaktion**, on the German question. Brandler says: it was defensive. The government provoked.

Let's assume this is true, that the fact is such.

What conclusion follows?

1) That all the cries about the offensive were erroneous and absurd, and there were many of them;

2) that it was a mistake to call for a general strike, given that the government provoked, wanting to draw a small fortress of communism (the area of the center where the majority was already with the communists) into the struggle.

3) Such mistakes must be avoided in the future, especially in Germany, given the special situation after the killing of 20,000 workers in the civil war through the skillful maneuvers of the right.

4) To call the defense of hundreds of thousands of workers (Brandler says: a million. Is he lying? Is he exaggerating? Why are there no data by regions, by cities???) a "putsch," and even more so a "Bakuninist putsch," is worse than a mistake, it is a violation of revolutionary discipline. Since Levi added: such-and-such violations (precisely, very carefully list them), he deserved punishment and was rightly expelled.

A term of exclusion should be set, say, six months. After that, he can again apply to the party, and the Communist International advises accepting him if he behaves loyally during this period.

I have not read anything except Brandler's brochure, and I am writing this based only on the brochures of Levi and Brandler. Brandler proved—if he proved—only one thing: the Marzaktion was not a "Bakuninist putsch" [for such abuse, Levi should have been expelled], but a heroic defense of revolutionary workers, hundreds of thousands; but no matter how heroic—

* - "The Case of Levi." Ed.

** - the March Action. Ed.

TO G. M. KRZHIZHANOVSKY. JUNE 10, 1921

it was, in the future, such a battle, provoked by the government, which has already killed 20,000 workers through provocations since January 1919, should not be accepted, until the majority is with the communists throughout the country, not just in a small area.
((The July Days of 1917 were not a Bakuninist putsch. For such an assessment, we would have expelled from the party. The July Days were a heroic offensive. And the conclusion we drew: we will not prematurely undertake the next heroic offensive. Prematurely taking up a general battle—that is the essence of the Marzaktion. Not a putsch, but an error, mitigated by the heroism of the defense of hundreds of thousands.))
About Šmeral. Can't we get at least 2-3 documents?

It wouldn't be a sin to print at least 2 documents (2-4 pages) for the Comintern about each country.

What are the facts about Šmeral? About Straßer?

Don't forget one of the main points: absolutely everything must be removed from Radek's first theses related to the "party of expectation," to the condemnation of this. Get rid of it all 393.

On Bulgaria, Serbia (Yugoslavia?), and Czechoslovakia, raise the question concretely, separately, clearly, and precisely about these countries.

If there is no agreement on this, I propose to convene the Politburo.

10/VI. 1921. Lenin

Published for the first time, from the manuscript