1) on closer ties between party organizations and non-party masses.
2) on broader and more systematic involvement of non-party workers in the work.
3) on the reorganization of the RCP in the direction of combating bureaucracy and red tape, improving the position of workers and peasants, and attracting non-party members to Soviet work.
But on all these issues, the conference must not only gather and study all the material of practical experience but also develop practical proposals for the CC.
Reports at the plenum (a)
2-3 reports on the current (actual) work of the CC and the party
(b) the same on the plan for its restructuring according to new tasks.

The draft plan of the RCP CC's work was prepared by V. M. Molotov and dated May 24, 1921. Lenin's remarks are dated the same day.
Lenin refers to the All-Russian conference of party workers from the largest local organizations, scheduled for May but which did not take place, to discuss the immediate tasks of organizational work of the party, particularly the promotion of new forces from the ranks of the party and the involvement of non-party members in Soviet, trade union, and other work. The convening of this conference was provided for in point VI of V. M. Molotov's plan.
Lenin's remark about the reports at the plenum of the CC is prompted by the seventh point of Comrade Molotov's plan, where Lenin specifically underlined in pencil the part about the issues to be raised at the next plenum of the RCP CC.
* This point is crossed out by Lenin with three vertical lines. Ed.
' From these words to the end, the entry was made later in pencil. Ed.

V.
INSTRUCTION OF THE SNK
ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NEW ECONOMIC POLICY
JULY 1921
The impending famine in the summer of 1921, the shutdown of industrial enterprises due to the fuel and metal crisis, and the difficulties associated with the implementation of commodity exchange, necessitated an urgent assessment of the current economic situation and the outlining of basic practical directives to overcome the difficulties and implement the decisions of the X Congress of the Party, which were further developed in Lenin's brochure "On the Food Tax."
Issues related to the New Economic Policy were the subject of repeated discussions between Lenin and economic and political workers.
An attempt to present in a coherent form the measures derived from the principles of the New Economic Policy was the resolution of the VSNKH on July 6 (the author of which was I. Smilga).
The theses of the VSNKH on the foundations of the New Economic Policy underwent editorial revision by Lenin on July 9 or 10. The corrected text of the draft theses of the VSNKH was sent by Lenin to several comrades (including G. Krzhizhanovsky, N. Bryukhanov, A. Lezhava, V. Avanesov, and V. Schmidt). On July 14, the Presidium of the VSNKH adopted, with minor amendments compared to Lenin's version, the document, which was then submitted for discussion to the Politburo of the CC on July 16, 1921.
During the meeting of the Politburo, Lenin made notes in the margins of the VSNKH resolution, reflecting the debate on the evaluation of the theses (see p. 444 of this collection). After discussing the VSNKH resolution, the Politburo decided to adopt the theses as a basis and instructed a commission consisting of P. Bogdanov, A. Rykov, L. Kamenev, and A. Andreev, taking into account all proposed amendments, to edit these theses, "giving them a form in which the CC could concretely review them point by point and clarify the attitude of the trade unions and workers, especially those of the best enterprises."
On July 24, L. Kamenev presented to Lenin a new draft of the theses on the implementation of the New Economic Policy, and on the same day, Lenin informed L. Kamenev in a special letter about his amendments. During this time, the theses were thoroughly discussed at a joint meeting of the Communist factions of the CCs of the trade unions, in all the CCs of the unions individually, and, finally, on July 23, they were unanimously adopted by the united meeting of the Communist factions of the unions, the Presidium of the Moscow Council of Trade Unions, and representatives of the Petrograd trade union movement. A commission was elected at this meeting, together with the CC commission, to finalize the text of the theses, which was then adopted at the plenum of the RCP CC on August 9 with minor amendments. On the same day, the theses passed through the SNK as "Instructions of the SNK on the Implementation of the Principles of the New Economic Policy."
Below are published all documents related to the SNK resolution on the New Economic Policy in chronological order.
AMENDMENTS TO THE VSNKH THESES.
[July 9 or 10, 1921]
Draft Resolution of the VSNKH Presidium of June 6, 1921.
I.
1. The acute crisis of our national economy, which we entered in May, is primarily [a food catastrophe] a serious food situation. At the same time, we face a series of phenomena without whose elimination the Soviet Republic will not be able to cope with the problem of developing productive forces or withstand the struggle against hunger. The essence of these phenomena lies in the lagging of our economic policy behind the new economic course proclaimed at the X Congress of the Party and the spring party conference. The emerging deterioration of our economic situation (decline in productivity of the Donbass, metallurgical industry, etc.) requires a decisive [revision of some of the fundamental positions of our] acceleration of the transition to this new economic policy; otherwise, we will be forced to do so in a few months under qualitatively worse conditions.
2. [The main shortcoming] One of the main shortcomings of the current economic policy is the absence of an economic subject and, as a consequence, rational management

One of the main shortcomings of the current economic policy is the absence of an economic subject, and as a consequence, rational management.

CORRECTIONS TO THE THESIS OF VSNKH

This is felt first of all in the area of supply. Food supply is obtained: a) by ration cards and norms of the People's Commissariat for Food, b) through theft from factories and enterprises, c) as a result of natural incentives through cooperatives, d) as a result of the realization of the natural fund by the enterprise itself or by workers. Work and special clothing are distributed by trade unions; technical and material supply comes from the Main Committees. Enterprises are supplied with food and work and special clothing not according to productivity, but according to need. That is, the connection between supply and productivity is not direct, but indirect. (Production increases, decreases, supply remains approximately the same). This system was a consequence of the war period of our revolution, when the Republic was a "military camp." In a besieged fortress, it is quite understandable [such a broad development of consumer communism. At present, this system must be resolutely revised and brought into line, above all, with the interests of production,] there was a desire to supply everyone as equally as possible, to feed, to support, while it was impossible to take up the restoration of production. Now the task is different; it is necessary at all costs to restore production, to achieve the development of productive forces.
3. A direct consequence of this is the complete vagueness of our economic activity. We throw out a mass of food and other resources with a negligible production effect, unproductively, to the wind. This inevitably must lead us to defeat on the economic front if we do not quickly and decisively reorganize ourselves in accordance with new conditions.
4. It is necessary to immediately reorganize on the following principles. First, it is necessary to establish, as a principle, that in the field of the national economy, the state gives nothing to anyone for free. Second, that all the worker's supply is included in his wages, which, for the part that remains, should be significantly increased and should approach the pre-revolutionary standards. Third, all the received worker's supply is divided not by the number of workers, but per unit of output produced, except for those industries and branches of industry where, due to the nature of the work, this is not possible.

[To abandon egalitarianism as a "principle of supply."] Fourth, the matter of supplying workers is carried out by all supplying bodies through factory management, administration, which receives what is necessary only in case of obligations given to a higher body, for the non-fulfillment of which it is responsible in court. The basis of the entire economic policy should be economic calculation.
The above is implemented, starting with the largest and most threatened enterprises, by the Presidium of VSNKH as the necessary preliminary organizational work is carried out.
5. Given the revealed impossibility of supplying industry even at a starvation norm from state funds, allow state trusts to realize a larger, than now, part of their own products, both within the Republic through Centrosouz, and abroad, through the Narkomvneshtorg.
6. It is necessary to get off the ground the issue of unloading the state apparatus from small enterprises and factories. It is necessary to energetically and decisively implement the decree on leasing enterprises. Ambiguity and incompleteness in this matter must end. Otherwise, our industry will undoubtedly not utilize all the possibilities before it. As one example, the following can be cited. In connection with the crop failure, the peasantry begins to throw a colossal amount of leather onto the market. And in the Republic, more than three thousand tanneries stand idle.
[7. Gosplan, having done a huge job of attracting highly qualified technical forces of the Republic to Soviet work, is delaying the plan for the second half of 1921. In the current situation, this is completely unacceptable. The main task of the moment is to clearly, soberly outline the role and significance for the near future of the main branches of our national economy. It is necessary to immediately instruct Gosplan, based on an approximate calculation of food and fuel resources, to draw up a preliminary plan for the second half of 1921.
8. The basis of this plan should be: a) the principle of favoritism (priority) for the main branches of the national economy (fuel, metal, etc.). Priority should be realized through products of its own production and through the formation of combined enterprises, b) maximum concentration and production densification of enterprises.]* * 88 7 p 8 Lenin crossed out twice. Ed.

CORRECTIONS TO THE THESIS OF VSNKH

[III] II.
[9. Extremely important] 7. The excessively slowly developing operation of commodity exchange already now provides some material for judging what it will give us in the near future. The limits of local turnover, as well as commodity expeditions of industrial centers or individual factories, saturating the markets of their areas with homogeneous goods (threads or textiles or metal), finally disrupt the markets and any possibility of commodity exchange. The equivalents practiced in free exchange: one hundred for one hundred at pre-war prices or free market prices for both city and rural goods dictate a transition to buying and selling. In all commodity exchange operations 1) we should not limit ourselves to the limits of local turnover, 2) along with natural commodity exchange, where it is profitable, we must resolutely move to the formula: commodity - money - commodity.
[10] 8. Given the revealed crop failure and direct famine in the southeast, it is clear that it will be hardest to extract grain. But this very crop failure devalues such items as livestock, meat. It is necessary to immediately give a directive to scientists and food suppliers to combine a ration of calories with a new ratio between bread and its substitutes and meat.
[11] 9. In order to establish greater stability of our ruble, it is necessary to carry out a series of measures for the reverse flow of money into the treasury of the state. It is necessary to introduce taxes in municipal management, village levies, payment for state services, etc. Open savings and loan offices and widely use credit cooperatives. [Allow the circulation of metallic currency in the country.]
[IV] III.
[12. In the current situation, we are powerless to fight against bureaucracy and red tape.] 10. The struggle against bureaucracy and red tape [a real struggle against this evil is not possible] will be fully successful only when the decisions of the All-Russian Party Conference will [decisively] be carried out much more energetically than now. [We must] It is necessary to break out more decisively and faster from the clutches of polyarchy, collegiality, coordination of all kinds of trifles, and preliminary control. [This whole system] All this is in glaring contradiction with the course taken in the spring.
[13] 11. To facilitate purchases abroad, it is necessary to [rebuild] build the Narkomvneshtorg in such a way that interested departments have the decisive word in purchases. Narkomvneshtorg, from being a monopolistic body, should gradually transform into a body regulating transactions of departments and institutions with foreign countries.
[14] 12. It is necessary for party organizations to widely explain to all party members that this turn is not a step back, but a step forward, and that it corresponds both to the objective situation of Russia and to the interests of the world revolution. Precisely, the conservatism and sluggishness in the implementation of the new policy are the worst enemies.
[15. Draft decrees on the points of VSNKH's conduct must be developed by the Presidium of VSNKH in the near future.]* The Presidium of VSNKH requests the Central Committee of the RCP to consider and approve this resolution as soon as possible.
NOTES ON THE THESIS OF VSNKH
10 — 11
JULY

NOTES ON THE TEXT OF THE VSNKH RESOLUTION

[To Comrade Krzhizhanovsky. 10th of July, 1921]

Dear Sir, Please read this as soon as possible. Compare this draft with my corrections (in pencil). Give me your feedback.

I have crossed out the part about Gosplan. Perhaps you could replace it with one paragraph: that it is necessary to accelerate, intensify, and focus in a specific direction. Perhaps then the theses could go under the signature of the Presidium of VSNKH or the Presidium of Gosplan? Return and reply as soon as possible.

With regards, Lenin.

* Crossed out by Lenin with an X. Ed.
" See the previous document with Lenin's corrections. Ed.

NOTES ON THE TEXT OF THE VSNKH RESOLUTION

[To N. P. Bryukhanov, A. M. Lezhava, and V. A. Avanesov] [11th of July]

I request that you do not show this draft to anyone for now, read it as soon as possible, and call me, or if you cannot reach me by phone, write me a brief note today: Is it acceptable to you? What amendments would you like to make? (very briefly).

I consider it extremely important to get this through quickly and unanimously. Lenin.

* In the Institute's archive, there is a letter from G. M. Krzhizhanovsky (arch. L3 26465) with a draft paragraph on Gosplan, which was later used as the basis for thesis 8 of the Presidium of VSNKH resolution on 11th July. The letter from G. Krzhizhanovsky was apparently sent to Lenin on the 10th, as on the 11th, Lenin had already forwarded it for review to Smilga.
* Bryukhanov P. P. - Deputy People's Commissar for Food.
* Lezhava A. M. - Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Trade.

NOTES ON THE TEXT OF THE VSNKH RESOLUTION FROM 11TH JULY

[16th of July]

Lenin's copy.

Resolution of the Presidium of VSNKH from 11/7-21.

1. The acute crisis in our national economy, which we entered in May, is primarily due to the severe food situation. At the same time, we are encountering a series of phenomena, without the elimination of which the Soviet Republic will not be able to cope with the problem of developing productive forces or withstand the struggle against famine; the essence of these phenomena lies in the lagging of our economic policy behind the new economic course, which was proclaimed at the Tenth Party Congress and the spring party conference. The emerging deterioration of our economic situation (the decline in productivity of the Donbass, metallurgy, etc.) requires a decisive acceleration of the transition to this new economic policy. Otherwise, we will be forced to do this several months later under qualitatively worse conditions.

2. One of the main shortcomings of the current economic policy is the absence of an economic subject, and as a consequence, rational management of industry. This is felt first of all in the area of supply. Food supply is obtained: a) by ration cards and norms from the People's Commissariat of Food, b) by theft from factories and enterprises, c) as a result of remuneration through cooperatives, d) as a result of the realization of the natural fund by the enterprise itself or by workers. Work and special clothing are distributed by trade unions; technical and material supplies come from the Chief Committees. Enterprises are supplied with food and work and special clothing not according to their productivity but according to their needs. That is, the connection between supply and productivity is not direct but indirect. (Production increases, decreases, supply remains approximately the same.) This system was a consequence of the war period of our revolution when the Republic was a military camp. In a besieged fortress, it was quite understandable to strive to supply everyone as evenly as possible, to feed and support them, while it was impossible to take up the restoration of production. Now the task is different; it is necessary at all costs to restore production, to achieve the development of productive forces.

3. A direct consequence of this is the complete vagueness of our economic activity. We throw out a mass of food and other resources with minimal production effect—wastefully, into the wind. This inevitably must lead us to defeat on the economic front if we do not quickly and decisively reorganize ourselves in accordance with the new conditions.

4. It is necessary to reorganize immediately on the following principles: first, it must be established as a principle that in the sphere of the national economy, the state gives nothing to anyone for free. Second, all the worker's supply should be included in his wages, which, for the part that remains, should be significantly reduced and brought closer to the average subsistence level of the worker. Third, all received worker's supplies are divided not by the number of workers but by the unit of produced product, except for those industries and branches of industry and the national economy where, by the very nature of the work, this is not possible. Fourth, the matter of supplying workers is carried out by all supplying organizations through the factory management, the administration, which receives what is necessary only in case of obligations given to a higher body, for the non-fulfillment of which it is responsible in court. The basis of the entire economic policy should be economic calculation.

The above is implemented starting with the largest and most threatened enterprises, by the Presidium of VSNKH as the necessary preliminary organizational work is carried out.

5. Given the impossibility of providing industry with all types of supplies even at a starvation norm from state funds, allow state industrial associations to realize a larger portion of their own products than now, both within the Republic through Centrosouz and abroad through the NKVT.

6. It is necessary to move the issue of unloading the state apparatus from small enterprises and factories off the ground. The decree on leasing enterprises must be energetically and decisively implemented. The ambiguity and half-heartedness in this matter must end. Otherwise, our industry will undoubtedly not utilize all the possibilities before it.

7. In the development and organization of small and artisanal industry, it is necessary to firmly and resolutely follow the path of cooperation of small producers, combining, where technologically appropriate, cooperatively organized artisanal industry with large industrial enterprises. Only such a policy will raise the productivity of small-scale production and contribute to the transition from small, scattered production to large-scale production on the basis of voluntary association. Therefore, it is necessary that all organs of Soviet power, based on this policy, promote it in every way.

Transition from small, scattered production to large-scale production on the basis of voluntary unification. Therefore, it is necessary that all organs of Soviet power, based on this policy, do everything possible to encourage the development of industrial cooperation and the voluntary unification of small industry.

II.
8. At the present moment, with changes in economic policy, Gosplan is assigned a particularly responsible task of urgently developing a general economic plan and coordinating the interests of industry with agriculture, transport, food supply, etc. For this purpose, Gosplan must, in particular, set itself the task of selecting, in the shortest possible time, the main, viable enterprises and individual sectors with maximum production concentration, commercial viability, and concentration, identifying specific priority directions for key productions and sectors of the economy. In doing this, the special needs of regions and the advantages of the principle of combined enterprises should be taken into account.
9. The excessively slow development of commodity exchange operations now provides some material for judging what they will give us in the near future. The limits of local turnover, as well as commodity expeditions of industrial centers or factory departments, by saturating the markets of their areas of operation with homogeneous goods (threads or textiles or metal), ultimately disrupt the markets and any possibility of commodity exchange. The equivalents practiced in free exchange: one hundred for one hundred at fixed prices for a certain period or free market prices for both urban and rural goods, dictate a transition to buying and selling. In all commodity exchange operations 1) we should not limit ourselves to the framework of local turnover, 2) alongside natural commodity exchange, where it is advantageous, we must resolutely move to monetary forms of exchange.
10. To establish greater stability of our ruble, a series of measures must be implemented to bring money back into the state treasury. It is necessary to introduce fees in municipal services, taxes, charges for state services, etc. Savings and loan offices should be opened, and credit cooperatives should be widely utilized.

NOTES ON THE TEXT OF THE DECISION OF VSNKH
11. To facilitate trade relations with abroad, Narkomvnut should be structured so that interested agencies have the right to independently conduct relations with foreign countries, conclude deals, and implement them. Narkomvnut, as a monopolistic body, should gradually transform into a regulatory and controlling body for transactions of state agencies and institutions, as well as private enterprises, with foreign countries.
III.
12. The struggle against bureaucracy and red tape will only be fully successful when the decisions of the All-Russian Party Conference are carried out much more energetically than they are now. It is necessary to decisively and quickly break free from the grip of multiple authorities, inter-departmental coordination, agreement on all sorts of trifles, and preliminary control, and to introduce strict personal business responsibility. All this is in glaring contradiction with the course taken in the spring.
MARGINAL NOTES ON THE DECISION.
[Railway] [tariff]
[Connection of collective] [supply]
[Support] (or [development]) [capitalism]
Trotsky: (against GOELRO)
Trotsky.
"No Gosplan exists for him" "Release from the idea of electrification"...
I. Trotsky
I. [Gold] ore (Bukharin)
sh.]
Trotsky:
"Krizhizhanovsky's plan has nothing in common with VSNKH.
The Chairman of Gosplan should be the Chairman of VSNKH."
Trotsky:
"Gosplan and VSNKH are not coordinated"...
details to be corrected
+ Krasin
+Narkomprod.
* In the original, there was a typo: "yavstvennost'", corrected by Lenin to "otvetstvennost'". Ed.

LENIN'S COMPILATION
AMENDMENTS TO THE THESIS OF THE CC COMMISSION ON IMPLEMENTING ECONOMIC POLICY.
[July 21, 1921]
Draft.
1. The Tenth Party Congress and the All-Russian Party Conference established the basic principles of our new economic policy. However, it must be noted that the implementation of the outlined directives in the area of direct economic activity of the Soviet organs, the enactment of corresponding decrees, and the assimilation of the new principles of economic policy by the broad masses of party and Soviet workers—proceeds too slowly and does not keep up with the pace required by [catastrophic] the severe situation of the national economy. * This severe situation has become especially acute in connection with the food crisis, which has led to a sharp deterioration in many sectors of the economy even compared to the end of 1920. Party and Soviet organs must take the most decisive measures to overcome the existing situation, which is only possible on the basis of energetic and practical implementation of the established party directives.
2. Our economic policy up to the present time has been characterized primarily by the following features:
a) The Soviet state had to directly manage a vast number of enterprises of the most diverse types, the servicing of which did not correspond to the raw material and food resources at the disposal of the state. The immediate result of this was the impossibility of rational economic use of the resources provided by the state and, as a consequence, their dispersion. The supply of enterprises was fragmented among various institutions and not directly linked to the productivity of the enterprise. As a result, there was a multiplicity of authorities and irresponsibility. Under these methods of supply and * existing conditions of labor remuneration, the participants in production were not and could not be interested in the results of their labor and the improvement of production methods. Due to the three-year war situation and extreme devastation of the country, it was impossible to formulate and implement a single economic plan that would encompass and coordinate the various sectors of the national economy. To prevent further decline of the national economy, it is necessary to reorganize on the following principles:
The state, through VSNKH and local organs, concentrates in its direct management a certain number of large or, for some reason, important from the state's point of view, as well as auxiliary enterprises, with the principle of combining enterprises that complement each other being widely applied.
b) These enterprises are run on the principle of precise economic calculation, i.e., all production costs are fully covered by the output obtained.
c) The launch and operation of enterprises by VSNKH and its local organs are only permissible within the limits in which, according to the overall state plan, the said enterprises will be provided with material, food, and financial resources, both from state organs and from other sources (self-procurement, free market, etc.).
d) To supplement the insufficient resources provided by the state, enterprises (or their governing bodies) are given the right to sell part of their own products to acquire the missing items of supply, both domestically and abroad, with raw materials and fuel being procured by their own apparatus, and food through Centrosouz.
e) All types of worker supply are included in wages, with the workers of the specified group of enterprises being provided in such a way as to interest them in production and stimulate initiative to increase productivity, but in any case, not below the average subsistence level. Supply is distributed both among individual workers and groups of them (working on piecework, contract, etc.) in accordance with the production results achieved.

as
both between individual workers, and groups of them (working
on a piece-rate, contract, and so on.
according to the production results achieved by them.
Collection
XX
N

(*)
Both products and clothing and other (6)
c) The supply of workers is carried out by all supply organs through the factory management, administration, which receives the necessary only in case of obligations given to the higher organ. For factory administrations, the norms established by trade unions and the People's Commissariat for Food according to their affiliation are mandatory in distribution. At the direct disposal of factory administrations, for unforeseen cases and for those exceeding the norm of incentives, natural and monetary FUNDS are allocated, for which factory administrations report in the order of subsequent control (Voting on this point resulted in 2 for and 2 against).
4. All other enterprises not included in the above-mentioned groups should, on the basis provided for by the decree on leasing and the instructions of the Supreme Council of National Economy, be leased to cooperatives, partnerships, and other associations, as well as to private individuals. Soviet bodies should without hesitation and energetically implement this decree on leasing with regard to those enterprises that cannot be launched and maintained by Soviet economic organizations, thereby relieving the state apparatus of small enterprises and factories.
5. Enterprises that remain unsold on lease and whose operation the state does not take upon itself shall be closed, and the workers and employees shall be distributed among the operating enterprises, while those remaining without work shall be transferred to [existing state-wide supply] other jobs.
6. 1. For cottage and small industries, conditions must be created under which artisans and craftsmen could [peacefully] properly develop their production and freely dispose of the products of their labor.
2. In the development and organization of small and cottage industry, it is necessary to firmly and decisively follow the path of cooperation of small producers, combining where economically and technically expedient, the cooperatively organized cottage industry with large industrial enterprises.
3. It is necessary to create the most favorable conditions primarily for those branches of small and cottage industry that serve the needs of large industry and peasant farming, or work on state orders for consumer cooperation.

AMENDMENTS TO THE THESIS OF THE CC COMMISSION 

4. All organs of Soviet power should encourage in every way the development of industrial cooperation and voluntary association *
7. Local economic organs (Supreme Council of National Economy) should, regarding the enterprises under their management, immediately apply the same division into enterprises remaining under their management and those being leased, applying accordingly to specific groups all the above-mentioned provisions.
8. In connection with the shortage, it has become clear that the expected collection of the food tax will not cover the state's need for bread in several regions, the deficit of which can be made up on the internal market through the development of commodity exchange; on the other hand, the interests [of our monetary circulation. ] of the restoration of the national economy in general and monetary circulation in particular require the development of commodity exchange between the city and the countryside. In view of all this, measures must be taken to develop state and cooperative commodity exchange, and we should not limit ourselves to the framework of local turnover, moving, where possible and advantageous, to monetary forms of exchange.
9. For the same purposes of raising and stabilizing our ruble, it is necessary to carry out a series of measures for the return flow of money into the state treasury, proceeding from the principle that in the field of the national economy, the state, given the state of its state resources and until at least the main branches of it are raised, cannot provide any economic services to anyone free of charge. Among the measures to be taken, attention should be paid to the opening of savings and loan offices, encouragement of credit cooperation, transition and operation of municipal enterprises on the basis of payment, etc.
10. To develop trade relations with abroad, economic organs should be granted the right to participate in the conclusion and implementation of such transactions, as well as to have their own representations with foreign bodies of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade.
11. At the present moment, with the change in economic policy, the State Planning Committee is assigned a particularly responsible task of urgently developing a general economic plan and coordinating the interests of industry with agriculture, transport, food, etc., for which the State Planning Committee, in particular, must make it its task to conduct in the shortest possible time a correct selection of the main, viable enterprises and individual branches of industry with maximum production intensification, commercial viability, concentration, with the identification of specific priority directions for key productions and branches of the economy. In doing this, the special needs of regions and the advantage of the principle of combined enterprises should be taken into account.
12. In implementing the entire above-mentioned economic policy, it is necessary to clearly delineate the functions and competencies of various Soviet economic institutions. The Council of Labor and Defense should be the general leader of economic policy, establishing through the "State Planning Committee" a unified economic and coordinating plan for the People's Commissariats, as well as overseeing the implementation of the economic plan, both in general and in all parts.
The Supreme Council of National Economy is an organ (with the status of a Commissariat) that implements in a businesslike manner the plans and general economic directives approved by the Council of Labor and Defense in the field of industry.
In carrying out the productive tasks of the Council of Labor and Defense, all organs of industrial management bear strict personal responsibility in court for the rational management of the enterprises entrusted to them on the above-mentioned economic foundations; under these conditions, the preliminary control of the Russian Communist Party is lifted.
SL8
NOTE ON THE THESIS \
To Comrade Kamenev.
July 21 [1921]
I propose the following amendments to your rough draft of the theses on the implementation of economic policy:
1.— In paragraph 1, the word "catastrophic" (state of the national economy) should be replaced with the word "severe".
* The note to L. B. Kamenev was transmitted by telephone and survived in a typewritten form. At the end of the note, after the clerk's notation: "Received by telephone on July 21, 1921," there is an addendum: "Send to Kamenev immediately with a request to write a few words to V. P. and send it to him today by the first opportunity." Ed.

TELEGRAM TO THE SAMARKAND COMMUNISTS 

2. — In the same
paragraph the word "catastrophic" (in the next sentence) should be replaced with the phrase "severe situation".
3. — In paragraph 2, subpoint "A", after the word "thanks to the three-year war situation" insert the words "and extreme impoverishment of the country".
4. — In the same paragraph, in subpoint "E", add in parentheses after the word "supply" the phrase, both in terms of food and special clothing.
5. — In paragraph 5, at the end, instead of the words "are transferred to the existing state-wide supply" insert the words "are transferred to other jobs".
6. — In paragraph 6, the word "peacefully" should be replaced with the word "properly" in the first subpoint.
7. — In paragraph 8, after the words "require the interests" say "of the restoration of the national economy in general and monetary circulation in particular".
Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars V. Ulyanov (Lenin).
TELEGRAM TO THE SAMARKAND COMMUNISTS.
( K

After the words "require the interests" say "restoration of the national economy in general and monetary circulation in particular."
Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars V. Ulyanov (Lenin).
TELEGRAM TO THE SAMARKAND COMMUNISTS.
( K

27 VI [1921]
Urgent. Send them a telegram of gratitude and approval. Give a draft."
Lenin.
Samarkand. Gubpartkom. Shafiransky \
[27 June 1921]
I thank the group of friends for the greeting. The main thing now is to
immediately improve the condition of the workers and peasants. Everything now depends on the energy
and skill of the local workers: the food tax, the development of trade between agriculture and industry, the development of small
industry. Capitalism is not to be feared as long as the proletariat firmly holds power, transport, and
large-scale industry and can direct it into the channel of state capitalism. Under these conditions,
capitalism will help in the struggle against bureaucracy and the dispersion of small producers. We know what we want, therefore
we will win. [6971
Signed Lenin.
1 This refers to a welcoming telegram dated 15 July 1921, addressed to the "First Soldier of the Communist Revolutionary Army" Lenin by a group of party members from the Samarkand organization. The telegram was a response to the brochure "On the Food Tax."
8 The draft of the reply telegram was prepared by the secretariat of the SNK, undoubtedly based on Lenin's instructions.

FEBRUARY — 17
JULY

G.

First, the imperialist, and then the civil war caused extreme devastation
to the Soviet Republic. A severe economic crisis led to
a
political crisis in the spring of
1924.
The transition from war to peace required the party to review
the methods of struggle and construction used during the
period of war communism and to change them according to
the new tasks of socialist construction. In that, widely
conceived, plan for the restoration of large-scale socialist
industry and peasant farming, which
Lenin began to develop in the second half of
1920 (this plan was completed in March 1924, in the form of the New Economic
Policy) — concessions were given a major role. Concessions, i.e., the leasing by the Soviet state
to foreign capitalists under certain conditions of some mines,
oil fields, forest areas, etc., partly represented a tactical step
on the part of the Soviet government, a known political move to make it difficult for the imperialists to create a united front against us (Collected Works, Vol. XXV,
p.
45). Of course, concessions also had a purely economic significance:
they were intended, according to Lenin's plan, to serve the cause of restoring
large-scale socialist industry and improving the condition
of
workers and peasants.
By
the spring of
1924, the decline in the productive forces of the republic
was so great, the economic crisis had become so acute, that
there was a fear about the possibility of quickly restoring
the destroyed economy with the own strengths of the workers
and peasants of our country.
Therefore, Lenin raised the question of concessions especially
sharply.
In
essence, Lenin considered concessions only one of the possible
ways to raise the economy
—
the most favorable way under the given conditions.
Only by our own strengths or also "with the help" of foreign
capital?
—
Lenin posed the question, outlining ways out of the severe
economic crisis, and answered it by demanding that all measures
be
taken to attract foreign capital to the task of rebuilding
our socialist industry (in the form of granting capitalists
concessions), since this path of building large-scale industry
on
the basis of state capitalism, which concessions were, opened
up
prospects for the working class of relatively quick exit
from the severe economic crisis.
Lenin viewed concessions as an auxiliary means, which, in
the conditions of extreme destitution of the country, would
allow us to overcome the economic ruin faster, catch up
with
Western
European countries more quickly, and build socialism earlier
than if there were no concessions and capitalists did not
give us machines, technical equipment, products in exchange.
Let us cite some statements by
Lenin on this issue.
In
the theses for the
III
Congress of the
Comintern, Lenin clearly states that the practical task
of
concessions, with the help of which we expect to receive
"additional equipment and machines" from foreign capitalists,
is
to
"accelerate the restoration of
Soviet large-scale industry" (Vol.
XXV,
p.
453), which is the only basis of socialism.
Granting concessions to capitalists is linked to the payment
of
"tribute" in the form of oil or other products that the
concessionaires will receive from the leased enterprises;
Lenin considered it possible to go for the payment of that
"tribute" with the same goal "only to accelerate the restoration
of
our large-scale industry and serious improvement of the
condition of workers and peasants" (ibid.).
Elsewhere, Lenin, speaking about the necessity of improving
peasant farming and restoring large-scale socialist industry,
says that "with the help of concessions, we will do all
this sooner than without concessions" (Vol.
XXVI,
p.
308).
We
need, said
Lenin, "to bring our technology up to modern standards"
(Vol.
XXVI,
p.
243); we need "to catch up (and then overtake)
modern advanced capitalism" (this collection, p.
458); without concessions, we "will be in a very difficult
position and without colossal efforts of all our strengths,
we
will not catch up with them
[European capitalists.
Ed.]" (Vol.
XXVI,
p.
243).
Lenin fought for the creation of the most favorable conditions
for our further economic development, conditions that would
ensure the fastest possible rates of restoration of socialist
industry.
Attracting foreign capital in the form of concessions would
undoubtedly have helped the
Soviet government to emerge faster from the economic decline
experienced by the republic.
Here is what
Comrade
Stalin says about concessions:
"In
1924, knowing that our industry was poorly developed, and
the peasantry needed goods, and knowing that industry could
not be revived immediately, and that workers, due to the
situation, were engaged not so much in industry as in making
lighters, — in this situation, Lenin believed that the best
opportunity among all possibilities was to attract foreign
capital, to set up industry with its help, thus introducing
state capitalism and through it establishing a link between
the
Soviet power and the countryside.
This path was absolutely correct at the time, since we had
no
other possibilities to satisfy the peasantry, and our industry
was lame, transport was standing still, or almost standing
still, there was no fuel, or not enough of it" (On
Opposition.
1928, p.

possibilities to satisfy the peasantry were not available to us at that time, for our industry was limping, transport was at a standstill, or almost at a standstill, there was no, or insufficient, fuel" (On the Opposition. 1928, p.

While fighting for concessions, thoroughly developing this problem in a series of reports and articles, dispelling prejudices and fears that existed in the party circles regarding concessions, Lenin at the same time did not in any way close his eyes to the possibility of failure of our, generally speaking, extremely advantageous proposals to European and American capitalists concerning concessions. Did this mean, in such a case, that we would not be able to "get out" of the economic difficulties with our own forces, without concessions? No, it did not mean that at all. If the capitalists are not tempted by the exceptionally high profit which the concessions promise them, do not wish to render "aid" to the Soviet republic (of course, this "aid" must be understood very relatively; Lenin repeatedly emphasized that concessions represent merely a new form of fierce class struggle), then in such a case we will resolve all the tasks set before us ourselves, "single-handedly" (XXVII, 363), with our own forces—but, of course, with great difficulties, with "colossal strain on all our forces." Such was Lenin's point of view on the prospects of our development. As is known, the capitalists did not go for concessions on any significant scale. In the bourgeoisie's refusal of concessions, undoubtedly, the desire to retard, complicate, and delay the economic development of Soviet Russia played a significant role, the conviction that without the "help" of foreign capital, the Soviet republic would perish under the weight of its economic difficulties. The calculations of the enemies did not come true. The working class of our country, led by the Bolshevik Party, managed to restore the ruined economy and is now "entering a period of gigantic expansion of socialist construction" (resolution of the XVI Congress). Already a year after the introduction of the New Economic Policy, it became evident that the working class, with immense effort and real strain on all its forces, was nevertheless pulling the country out of a most severe economic situation. Another six months pass, and the Soviet power, as a result of the successful implementation of the New Economic Policy, recognizes the economic position of the republic to be so stable and secure that, on Lenin's proposal, in October 1922, it rejects a major concession from the well-known Urquhart, a rabid interventionist. Those times when the party, for the sake of reviving our industry, considered it possible to make rather significant concessions to foreign capital, have irretrievably passed. Concessions did not receive wide development and did not yield significant practical results. But Lenin's work on the problem of concessions, his articles, speeches, and notes on this subject, retain all their enormous theoretical and political significance, insofar as they substantiate the principled admissibility for a proletarian state, building socialism, of concessions as one of the forms of state capitalism, regulated and controlled by the proletarian dictatorship. On the other hand, Lenin's documents vividly show how V.I. worked on specific material related to certain concession objects and what practical instructions he gave in this area.

A. WORK ON THE STUDY OF THE OIL INDUSTRY
February 3, 1922

Between February 4, when the Council of People's Commissars adopted a decision on granting oil concessions in Baku and Grozny, and March 29, when the "Basic Principles of Concession Agreements" were approved, Lenin carried out extensive work both in familiarizing himself with materials illuminating the situation of the oil fields in Baku and Grozny, and in studying special issues related to the oil industry. Between February 8 and 26, Lenin acquainted himself with L.B. Krasin's report "On the Danger of Losing Oil-Bearing Areas and on Concessions in Baku and Grozny," addressed to the Central Committee of the RCP; on February 29, with the second report by L.B. Krasin "Concessions for the Development of Oil in Baku and Grozny," written after L. Krasin had familiarized himself with the opinions of specialists from the Main Oil Committee (Glavkonfte) on the issue of concessions. The reports of the specialists were presented by the Chairman of Glavkonfte, Z.N. Dosser, to the Chairman of the Supreme Council of National Economy, A.I. Rykov, along with a brief note from Z. Dosser. These reports were forwarded by A.I. Rykov to Lenin, and on February 23, Lenin had the opportunity to acquaint himself with the following documents: 1) Dosser's memorandum "On the Threat of Flooding of Oil Field Regions and on Granting Some Developed Areas in Concession to Combat Flooding," 2) Memorandum by I.Z. Gubkin, a member of the Glavkonfte Collegium, "On the State of Affairs in the Oil-Bearing Regions of the Republic," 3) Memorandum by A.I. Tsevchinsky, Head of the Commercial-Operational Section of Glavkonfte, "On the Issue of Water Encroachment in the Baku Region Oil Deposits," 4) Note by I.I. Strizhov, Head of the Technical Section of Glavkonfte, "On the Issue of Flooding of Oil Deposits," and 5) Report by N.N. Smirnov, Head of the Production Department. All documents, except the last one, are preserved in the Institute's archive and are published below with Lenin's markings and underlines. Besides these, Lenin also had at his disposal a report