Date: 1919
Source: ru:PSS/v52
Source: CW vol 52

OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL
LETTER TO G. E. ZINOVIEV 390

The crux of the matter is that Levi is politically right in many respects. Unfortunately, he committed a series of actions that violated discipline, for which the party expelled him.

The theses of Thalheimer and Béla Kun are fundamentally politically incorrect. It's just phrase-mongering and playing at leftism.

Radek wavers and has spoiled his initial draft with a number of concessions to the foolishness of the "lefts." His first "concession" is most characteristic: in § 1 of his theses
"Umgrenzung der Fragen"* it originally read: "winning the majority of the working class (for the principles of communism)" (note this). It was amended (verballhornt**): "winning the socially decisive sections of the working class."

A gem! To weaken here, in such a context, the necessity of winning "for the principles of communism" precisely the majority of the working class is the height of absurdity.

To win power, under certain conditions (including having already won the majority of the working class for the principles of communism), a blow must be struck by the majority of the socially decisive sections of the working class.

To rewrite, verballhornen this truth so that in § 1 of the general tasks of the Communist International on winning the working class for the principles of communism, the position on the necessity of winning the majority of the working class is weakened, is a classic example of the foolishness of Béla Kun and Thalheimer (it looks, damn them, solid, but in reality, it's so bad that they should be whipped) and... Radek's hasty compliance.

* - "Definition of the scope of issues." Ed.

** - Verballhornt - worsened under the guise of correction. Ed.

Radek's theses were excessively long, boneless, and without a political central point. And Radek further diluted them, ruining them completely.

What to do? I don't know. Too much time and effort have been wasted.

If you do not want an open battle at the congress, then I propose:

1) today (since Bukharin assures that you must decide the main thing today, no later: it would be better to postpone) to reject the theses of Thalheimer and B. Kun by a precise vote as fundamentally incorrect. Record this. You will spoil everything if you do not do this and go easy on them here.

2) take Radek's first draft as the basis, not the "improved" one with amendments, an example of which I have provided.

3) entrust 1-3 people to shorten this text and correct it so that it ceases (if possible!) to be boneless, and indeed puts at the forefront, clearly, precisely, unambiguously, as central ideas, the following:

The majority (of the working class) has not yet been won by the communist parties: not only for organizational leadership, but also for the principles of communism. This is the foundation of everything. "Weakening" this foundation of the only sensible tactic is criminal frivolity.

From this: revolutionary explosions are very likely soon, given the abundance of combustible material in Europe; even an easy victory of the working class is possible - in an exceptional case. But to build the tactics of the Communist International on this possibility now is absurd; it is absurd and harmful to write and think that the period of propaganda is over and the period of action has begun.

The tactics of the Communist International must be built on this: consistently and systematically win the majority of the working class, primarily within the old trade unions. Then we will surely win under any turn of events. And to "win" for a short term under exceptionally favorable circumstances, even a fool can manage.

From this: the tactic of the "open letter" is obligatory everywhere. This must be stated directly, precisely, and clearly, because hesitations about the "open letter" are extremely harmful, extremely shameful, and extremely widespread. There is no need to hide the sin. All those who did not understand the necessity of the "open letter" tactic should be expelled from the Communist International no later than a month after the Third Congress of the Communist International. I clearly see my mistake in voting for the admission of KAPD 391, and it needs to be corrected more quickly and fully.

Rather than rambling, as Radek does, it would be better to translate the entire text (and in German: to present the entire text) of the "open letter" and explain its significance and use it as an example.

I would limit the general resolution on tactics to this.

Only then will the tone be set. The central idea will be clear. There will be no vagueness. There will be no possibility for everyone to read into it what they want (as with Radek).

Then Radek's initial project would be shortened by at least four times.

It's time to stop writing and voting on brochures instead of theses. Even with undisputed agreement among all of us, individual errors are inevitable with this system. And with the lack of substance and controversy, we will run into major errors and ruin the whole business.

And then, if you really have a strong itch, you can add an addition: based on such tactics, in particular, as an example, not as a principle, but precisely as an example, add this and that.

Furthermore.

To lump Serrati and Levi together under one "opportunism" is foolish. Serrati is guilty; of what? It must be stated precisely and clearly, on the Italian question, not on the question of general tactics. In splitting from the communists, not excluding the reformists, Turati and Co. Until you fulfill this, Italian comrades, you are outside the Communist International. We exclude you 392.

And to the Italian communists - a serious advice and requirement: until you have managed to persistently, patiently, and skillfully convince and attract the majority of Serrati's workers, do not strut, do not play at leftism. "Fall Levi"* is not in general tactics, but in the assessment of Marzaktion**, on the German question. Brandler says: it was defensive. The government provoked.

Let's assume this is true, that the fact is so.

What conclusion follows from this?

1) That all cries of offensive were erroneous and absurd, and there were many of them;

2) that the tactic of calling for a general strike was a mistake, since the government was provoking, wanting to draw a small fortress of communism (that area of the center where the majority was already with the communists) into the struggle.

3) Such mistakes must be avoided in the future, because in Germany, the situation is special, after the killing of 20,000 workers in the civil war through the skillful maneuvers of the right.

4) To call the defense of hundreds of thousands of workers (Brandler says: a million. Is he lying? Is he carried away? Why are there no data by regions, by cities???) a "putsch" and even more so a "Bakuninist putsch" is worse than a mistake, it is a violation of revolutionary discipline. Since Levi added: other such violations (precisely, very cautiously list them), he deserved punishment and was rightly expelled.

A term of expulsion must be set, say, six months. After that, he is allowed to reapply to the party, and the Communist International advises accepting him if he behaves loyally during this period.

I have not read anything except Brandler's brochure, and I write this only based on the brochures of Levi and Brandler. Brandler proved - if he proved - one thing: Marzaktion was not a "Bakuninist putsch" [for such abuse, Levi should have been expelled], but a heroic defense of revolutionary workers, hundreds of thousands; but no matter how heroic it was, it is not advisable to accept such a battle, provoked by the government, which, since January 1919, has already killed 20,000 workers through provocations, until the majority is with the communists throughout the country, not just in a small area.
* - "Case of Levi." Ed.

** - March Action. Ed.

TO G. M. KRZHIZHANOVSKY. JUNE 10, 1921

The July Days of 1917 were not a Bakuninist putsch. For such an assessment, we would have expelled from the party. The July Days were a heroic offensive. And the conclusion we drew: we will not prematurely undertake the next heroic offensive. Prematurely taking up a general battle - that is the essence of Marzaktion. Not a putsch, but an error, mitigated by the heroism of the defense of hundreds of thousands.
About Šmeral. Can't we get at least 2-3 documents?

It wouldn't hurt to print at least 2 documents (2-4 pages) for the Comintern about each country.

What are the facts about Šmeral? About Strasser?

Do not forget one of the main points: it is absolutely necessary to remove everything from Radek's first theses related to the "party of expectation," to the condemnation of this. Remove it all 393.

For Bulgaria, Serbia (Yugoslavia?), and Czechoslovakia, raise the question concretely, separately, clearly, and precisely about these countries.

On Radek's thesis, relating to the "party of waiting," to condemn this. All of it must go 393.

Regarding Bulgaria, Serbia (Yugoslavia?), and Czechoslovakia, to raise the question concretely, separately, clearly, and precisely about these countries.

If we do not have agreement on this, I propose to convene the Politburo.

10/VI. 1921. Lenin

Published for the first time, from the manuscript