Concluding Remarks
Заключительное слово
Date: 1917
Source: PSS vol 35
Translated by: AI (Claude)

Comrade Chudnovsky spoke here about how he "allowed himself" to subject the actions of commissars to sharp criticism. Here there cannot be talk of whether one can or cannot allow oneself sharp criticism, this criticism constitutes the duty of a revolutionary, and the people's commissars do not consider themselves infallible.

Comrade Chudnovsky said that an obscene peace is unacceptable to us, but he could not cite a single word, a single fact that could be interpreted in the sense of unacceptability of this peace for us. We said: peace can be signed only by the Council of People's Commissars. When we went to negotiations with Dukhonin, we knew that we were going to negotiations with an enemy, and when you deal with an enemy, you cannot postpone your actions. We did not know the results of negotiations. But we had determination. It was necessary to make a decision right there, at the direct wire. In relation to the disobedient general, measures had to be taken immediately. We could not convene the CEC by direct wire; there is no violation of the prerogatives of the CEC here. In war one does not await the outcome, and this was war against the counterrevolutionary generals, and we immediately turned against him to the soldiers. We removed Dukhonin, but we are not formalists and bureaucrats, and we know that removal alone is not enough. He goes against us, and we appeal against him to the soldier mass. We give it the right to enter into negotiations about an armistice. But we do not conclude an armistice. The soldiers received a warning: to guard the counterrevolutionary generals. I believe that any regiment is sufficiently organized to support the necessary revolutionary order. If the moment when soldiers go to negotiations about an armistice is used for treason, if during fraternization an attack is made, then the duty of soldiers is to shoot the traitors right there without formalities.

To say that we have now weakened our front, in case the Germans go on the offensive - is monstrous. While Dukhonin was not exposed and removed, the army had no confidence that it was conducting an international policy of peace. Now this confidence exists: to fight with Dukhonin one can only by appealing to the sense of organization and self-activity of the soldier mass. Peace cannot be concluded only from above. Peace must be achieved from below. We do not believe a drop in the German generals, but we believe in the German people. Without the active participation of soldiers, peace concluded by commanders-in-chief is unstable. I am against Kamenev's proposal not because I am in principle against it, but because what Kamenev proposes is insufficient, it is too weak. I have nothing against a commission, but I propose not to predetermine its functions; I am against weak measures and propose not to tie our hands in this regard.

"Pravda" No. 188, November 26 (13) 1917
Printed from the text of the book "Protocols of Sessions of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of Soviets of W., S., P. and C. Deputies of the Second Convocation," published by VTsIK, 1918