Date: 1905-02-01
Source: ru:LS/v5

Letter to Hermann Greulich on the Question of the Split within the R.S.D.L.P.
F. P.> whom Vladimir Ilyich mentions in his reply to Be
belu, was never published. It circulated in mimeographed form among overseas Social-Democratic groups sympathetic to the Bolsheviks. The Bern Group reprinted this letter, appending a brief introduction and titling it: “A Brief Outline of the Split within the R.S.D.L.P. R.P.” (Date: February 1–5, 1905). At present, the Lenin Institute archives hold a manuscript entitled “Letters to Greulich.” Here we reproduce the text of this letter directly from Lenin’s manuscript.
A BRIEF OUTLINE OF THE SPLIT WITHIN THE R.S.D.L.P. R.P.
The well-known leader of the Swiss Social Democrats,
Hermann
Greulich, in a letter dated February 1, 1905, addressed to the editorial board of the newspaper “Vpered” (Russian Social-Democratic Workers’ Party), expressed, among other things, his regret over the new split among Russian Social Democrats and remarked: “As for who bears greater responsibility for this division, I will not be the one to decide—and I have already urged the International Executive Committee of the German Social-Democratic Party to resolve this question through international means.” “Who is more to blame for this split—I shall not be the one to decide; rather, I have proposed that the Executive Committee of the German Social-Democratic Party settle this matter by international means.” In response to Greulich’s letter, the editorial board of “Vpered,” together with the foreign representative of the Russian “Bureau of Majority Committees,” Comrade Stepanov G.A.M., Essens], replied with the following letter:
In view of the fact that Comrade Greulich intends to seek an international resolution, we are forwarding our letter to Greulich to all our foreign friends of the newspaper “Vpered” and request that they translate this letter into the language of the country where they reside, so that as many foreign Social Democrats as possible may become acquainted with it. It would also be desirable to translate into foreign languages Lenin’s pamphlet “Declaration and Documents Concerning the Break Between the Central Organs and the Party,” as well as the resolutions of the Northern Conference, the Southern Conference, and the Caucasian Conference. We ask that you inform us whether this request will be fulfilled.

LETTER TO GREULICH.
February 3, 1905
Dear Comrade!
In your letter, you touch upon the question of which faction within our Party (R.S.D.L.P.) bears responsibility for the split. You state that you have sought the opinion of German Social Democrats and the International Bureau on this matter. In light of this, we feel obliged to set forth for you how the split came about. We will confine ourselves to presenting only those facts that have been conclusively established, avoiding, as far as possible, any evaluative judgments.
Up until the end of 1903, our Party consisted of a collection of locally organized, unconnected Social-Democratic bodies known as committees. There was no Central Committee nor Central Organ—neither had been elected at the Party’s First Congress (held in the spring of 1898). The police had dispersed these bodies, and they were never reconstituted. Abroad, a split had occurred between the “Union of Russian Social-Democrats” (whose organ was “Rabocheye Delo,” hence the term “Rabochedeltsy”) and Plekhanov. The latter was joined by the newspaper “Iskra,” founded in 1900. Over the three years from 1900 to 1903, “Iskra” acquired overwhelming influence over the Russian committees. “Iskra” championed the principles of revolutionary Social Democracy in opposition to “Economism” (also known as “Rabochedelstvo”—a Russian variant of opportunism). The lack of unity within the Party weighed heavily upon everyone. Finally, in August 1903, it became possible to convene the Party’s Second Congress abroad. All Russian committees took part, along with the Bund—a self‑governing organization of the Jewish proletariat—and both overseas factions: the “Iskra” faction and the “Rabochedeltsy” faction.
All participants at the Congress recognized the Congress as legitimate. The struggle at the Congress was waged between the Iskra adherents and their opponents—the Rabochedeltsy and the Bund—with the so‑called “Swamp” occupying the middle ground. The Iskra adherents emerged victorious. They adopted the Party Program (the draft approved by “Iskra”). “Iskra” was recognized as the Central Organ, its line as the Party’s line. A number of tactical resolutions were passed in keeping with this spirit; the organizational statute (the draft prepared by Lenin) was adopted by the Iskra faction, though the anti-Iskra elements made certain amendments to it—amendments that were accepted only in minor respects, with the support of a minority of Iskra adherents. The distribution of votes at the Congress was as follows: a total of 51 votes, of which 33 went to the Iskra faction (24 Iskra adherents forming the current majority, 9 Iskra adherents forming the current minority); 10 votes went to the “Swamp,” and 8 votes to the anti-Iskra faction (3 Rabochedeltsy and 5 Bundists).
By the end of the Congress, just before the elections, seven delegates—2 Rabochedeltsy and 5 Bundists—left the Congress (the Bund withdrew from the Party). At that point, the Iskra minority, bolstered by the mistakes it had made and supported by all the anti-Iskra elements and the “Swamp,” found itself in the minority at the Congress (24 Iskra adherents versus 9 Iskra adherents, plus 10 votes from the “Swamp,” and 8 votes from the anti-Iskra faction—totaling 24 Iskra adherents versus 20 votes overall). When it came time to elect the central organs, it was decided to choose three members for the Editorial Board of the Central Organ and three members for the Central Committee. Of the six members of the old “Iskra” Editorial Board—Plekhanov, Axelrod, Zasulich, Starover, Lenin, and Martov—Plekhanov, Lenin, and Martov were selected. For the Central Committee, the intention was to choose two members from the majority and one member from the minority. Martov refused to join the Editorial Board without the three “expelled” (unselected) comrades, and the entire minority ultimately withdrew from the election to the Central Committee. No one ever disputed—or still disputes—the legitimacy of the elections, but after the Congress, the minority refused to work under the leadership of the central bodies elected by the Congress. This boycott lasted for three months—from late August 1903 to late November 1903.
“Iskra” (6 M M 46–51) was edited jointly by Plekhanov and Lenin. The minority formed a secret organization within the Party (a fact now confirmed in print by the minority’s own supporters and not denied by anyone today)*. The Russian committees, by an overwhelming majority (12 out of 14 committees that had yet to express their views), spoke out against this disruptive boycott. But Plekhanov, following the tumultuous Congress of the Foreign League (the Party’s overseas organization), held at the very end of October 1903, decided to yield to the minority, declaring before the entire Party in his article “What Not to Do” (No. 52 of “Iskra,” November 1903) that, in order to avoid a split, one must sometimes yield—even to those who, in error, lean toward revisionism and act as anarchic individualists (the emphasized phrases are long passages from Plekhanov’s article “What Not to Do”). Lenin

LETTER TO GREULICH

withdrew from the Editorial Board, unwilling to go against the decisions of the Congress.
Plekhanov then co-opted all four former editors. The Russian committees stated that they would wait to see what direction the new “Iskra” would take—and that, for the sake of peace, they would observe whether the Mensheviks had entered the Editorial Board.
As the Bolsheviks had predicted, it turned out that even the line of the old “Iskra” could not be sustained, and the new Menshevik-led Editorial Board did not bring peace to the Party. The line of “Iskra” had shifted back toward the old, rejected approach of the Second Congress—so much so that Trotsky himself, a prominent member of the minority who had published the programmatic pamphlet “Our Political Tasks,” a pamphlet issued under the banner of the new “Iskra,” declared quite bluntly: “Between the old ‘Iskra’ and the new ‘Iskra’ lies an abyss.” We limit ourselves to this judgment—this statement made by our opponent—in order to avoid lengthy explanations concerning the fundamental instability of “Iskra.” On the other hand, the “secret organization of the minority” did not disband; instead, it continued its boycott of the Central Committee. This secret split within the Party—between an open and a secret organization—imperceptibly but relentlessly hampered the Party’s work. The vast majority of Russian committees that spoke out about the crisis firmly condemned both the line of the new “Iskra” and the minority’s disruptive behavior. From every quarter arose the demand for the immediate convocation of a Third Congress, in order to break free from this intolerable situation.
According to our Party Statute, the declaration of organizations representing half of the total number of votes is required in order to call an emergency Congress (regular Congresses are convened every two years, whenever possible). Half of the votes had already been secured. But then the Central Committee, taking advantage of the arrest of several of its members who belonged to the majority, changed course. Under the pretext of “reconciliation,” the remaining members of the Central Committee, who had survived the arrests, entered into a deal with the secret organization of the minority and announced that this organization was being dissolved. Yet, secretly—without informing the Party and contrary to the Central Committee’s written declarations—five Mensheviks were co-opted into the Central Committee.* This co-optation took place in November or December 1901. Thus, from August 1903 to November 1904, the minority fought against the Party, tearing it apart over the co-optation of three members into the Central Organ and three members into the Central Committee. The centrally appointed organs, forged in this manner, responded to the Congress’s demand either with scorn or with silence.
At that point, the patience of the Russian committees finally snapped. They