Note that corrections were later appended to this document,
written in the margins of the stenographer's notes.

I have lately been glancing through Sukhanov's notes on the
revolution. What strikes one most is the pedantry of all our
petty-bourgeois Democrats and of all heroes of the Second
International. Apart from the fact that they are all extremely
fainthearted, that when it comes to the minutest deviation from
the German model [of Socialism] even the best of them fortified themselves with reservations —
apart from this characteristic, which is common to all petty-bourgeois Democrats and has been abundantly manifested by
them throughout the revolution, what strikes one is their
slavish imitation of the past.

They all call themselves Marxists, but their conception of
Marxism is impossibly pedantic. They have completely failed to
understand what is decisive in Marxism, namely, its revolutionary dialectics. They have even absolutely failed to
understand Marx's plain statements that in times of revolution
the utmost flexibility is demanded, [A] and have even failed to
notice, for instance, the statements Marx made in his letters
— I think it was in 1856 — expressing the hope of combining the peasant war in Germany, which might create a
revolutionary situation, with the working-class movement [B] — they
avoid even this plain statement and walk around and about it
like a cat around a bowl of hot porridge.

Their conduct betrays them as cowardly reformists who are afraid to deviate from the bourgeoisie, let alone break
with it, at the same time they disguised their cowardice with
the wildest rhetoric and braggartry. But what strikes one in
all of them even from the purely theoretical point of view is
their utter inability to grasp the following Marxist considerations: up to now they have seen capitalism and
bourgeois democracy in Western Europe follow a definite path of
development, and cannot conceive that this path can be taken as
a model only mutatis mutandis , only with certain amendments (quite insignificant from the standpoint of the
general development of world history).

First — the revolution connected with the first imperialist world war. Such revolution was bound to reveal new
features, or variations, resulting from the war itself, the
world has never seen such a war in such a situation. We find
that since the war the bourgeoisie of the wealthiest countries
have to this day been unable to restore "normal" bourgeois
relations. Yet our reformists — petty-bourgeois who make a
show of being revolutionaries — believed, and still believe, that normal bourgeois relations are the limit (thus far
shalt thou go and no farther). And even their conception of
"normal" is extremely stereotyped and narrow.

Secondly, they are complete strangers to the idea that while the development of world history as a whole follows
general laws it is by no means precluded, but, on the contrary,
presumed, that certain periods of development may display
peculiarities in either the form or the sequence of this
development. For instance, it has not even occurred to them
that because Russia stands on the borderline between civilized
countries and the countries which this war has for the first
time definitely brought into the orbit of civilization —
all the Oriental, non-European countries — she could and
was, indeed, bound to reveal certain distinguishing features;
although these, of course, are in keeping with the general line
of world development, they distinguish her revolution from those
which took place in the West European countries and introduce
certain partial innovations as the revolution moves on to the
countries of the East.

Infinitely stereotyped, for instance, is the argument they
learned by rote during the development of West-European
Social-Democracy, namely, that we are not yet ripe for socialism, but as certain "learned" gentleman among them put it,
the objective economic premises for socialism do not exist in
our country. Does it not occur to any of them to ask: what
about the people that found itself in a revolutionary situation
such as that created during the first imperialist war? Might it
not, influenced by the hopelessness of its situation, fling
itself into a struggle that would offer it at least some chance
of securing conditions for the further development of civilization that were somewhat unusual?

"The development of the productive forces of Russia has not yet
attained the level that makes socialism possible." All the
heroes of the Second International, including, of course,
Sukhanov, beat the drums about this proposition. They keep
harping on this incontrovertible proposition in a thousand
different keys, and think that it is decisive criterion of our
revolution.

But what if the situation, which drew Russia into the imperialist world war that involved every more or less
influential West European country and made her a witness of the
eve of the revolutions maturing or partly already begun in the
East, gave rise to circumstances that put Russia and her
development in a position which enabled us to achieve precisely
that combination of a "peasant war" with the working-class
movement suggested in 1856 by no less a Marxist than Marx
himself as a possible prospect for Prussia ?

What if the complete hopelessness of the situation, by stimulating the efforts of the workers and peasants tenfold,
offered us the opportunity to create the fundamental requisites
of civilization in a different way from that of the West
European countries? Has that altered the general line of
development of world history? Has that altered the basic
relations between the basic classes of all the countries that
are being, or have been, drawn into the general course of world
history?

If a definite level of culture is required for the building of
socialism (although nobody can say just what that definite
"level of culture" is, for it differs in every Western European
country), why cannot we began by first achieving the prerequisites for that definite level of culture in a
revolutionary way, and then , with the aid of the workers' and peasants' government and Soviet system, proceed to
overtake the other nations?

January 16, 1923

II

You say that civilization is necessary for the building of
socialism. Very good. But why could we not first create such
prerequisites of civilization in our country by the expulsion of
the landowners and the Russian capitalists, and then start
moving toward socialism? Where, in what books, have you read
that such variations of the customary historical sequence of
events are impermissible or impossible?

Napoleon, I think, wrote: "On s'engage et puis ... on voit." rendered freely this means: "First engage in a
serious battle and then see what happens." Well, we did first
engage in a serious battle in October 1917, and then saw such
details of development (from the standpoint of world history
they were certainly details) as the Brest peace, the New
Economic Policy, and so forth. And now there can be no doubt
that in the main we have been victorious.

Our Sukhanovs, not to mention Social-Democrats still farther to
the right, never even dream that revolutions cannot be made any
other way. Our European philistines never even dream that the
subsequent revolutions in Oriental countries, which possess much
vaster populations in a much vaster diversity of social
conditions, will undoubtedly display even greater distinctions
than the Russian Revolution.

It need hardly be said that a textbook written on Kautskian
lines was a very useful thing in its day. But it is time, given
that, to abandon the idea that it foresaw all the forms of
development of subsequent world history. It would be timely to
say that those who think so are simply fools.

January 17, 1923

Endnotes

[A] A reference to Marx's work The Civil War in France and his letter to Kugelmann dated April 12, 1871 .

[B]
See the letter of Marx and Engels of April 16, 1856.