# On the Reduction of the Ship Repair and Construction Program for Naval Vessels
Date: 1922
Source: ru:PSS/v45

On the Reduction of the Naval Ship Repair and Construction Program

(LETTERS TO I. V. STALIN)
To Comrade Stalin (For now, only a private consultation is underway, with a request to seek advice from other members of the Central Committee—180)
I am sending you a consolidated report on the ship-repair program. We need to make a decision as soon as possible—indeed, I believe we should address this matter today. Yesterday, I held an extensive discussion with Sklyansky and found myself somewhat hesitant; however, the projected expenditure of 10 million is so outrageously high that I cannot help but propose the following:
We should approve the completion of the cruiser “Nakhimov,” then reduce the remaining large vessels—destroyers, battleships, and the like—by one-third, and instruct the relevant authorities to correspondingly cut all other expenditures. I believe that, in total, we can achieve savings of 7 million, while it would be far more prudent to redirect the remaining funds toward increased spending on schools. I am attaching a strictly confidential consolidated report, along with the findings of the Pyatakov Commission—181—which, according to Comrade Sklyansky, has already reduced expenditures by nearly 16 million.
I maintain that, while our current naval strength may indeed be modest—though, as Comrade Sklyansky rightly points out, it still represents an extravagant luxury for us. The cruiser “Nakhimov” must be completed, since we will be able to sell it at a profit; as for the rest, I am firmly convinced that our naval experts are, all too often, carried away by excessive ambitions. We do not need a large navy—and increasing expenditures on schools is absolutely essential. 182
Lenin
Dictated over the telephone on November 25, 1922, at 11:00 a.m.
First published in 1959.

In Lenin’s Collected Works, Volume XXXVI

Printed from the secretary’s transcript (a typewritten copy)

To Comrade Stalin
Regarding the accusation that I am reducing the ship-repair program “at random”—183—I must explain the following:
The overall scale of the ship-repair program must be aligned—with the expertise of specialists, of course—to the size of the naval fleet that we have decided, for political and economic reasons, to maintain. I have been fully persuaded that the cruiser “Nakhimov” ought to remain part of our fleet, since, at the very least, we must retain the option of selling it at a profit. Furthermore, our ship-repair program encompasses a host of destroyers, several battleships, a number of submarines, and much more. In my view, the total number of these vessels is excessive—not justified by the overall requirements of our naval forces and far beyond the capacity of our budget. As for precisely how much we can reduce this portion of our fleet, I do not know—and I suspect that the Pyatakov–Sokolnikov Commission likewise lacked the means to determine this based on rational, economic, and, above all, political considerations.
One thing is certain for me: the total sum of 10 million is simply beyond our means. Therefore, I propose setting the target at 7 million, while tasking military experts with calculating what the overall number of destroyers, battleships, submarines, and other naval units would amount to under such a budget—

On the Reduction of the Military Shipbuilding Program
If we take into account additional figures relative to the actual number of ships in our fleet. I believe that without this adjustment, we will be unable to reduce the size of our navy at all—after all, naval specialists, naturally inclined to pursue their craft with great enthusiasm, will invariably inflate the figures. Yet, given the enormous expenditures we have allocated to aviation, we must exercise fourfold, even tenfold, greater caution when it comes to naval spending—especially since further costs, likely quite substantial, will arise from the impending annexation of Vladivostok.
As for Kamenev’s suggestion that we should fulfill the promised orders placed with the metalworks and Glavelectro, it must be said that these orders should be directed toward meeting the needs of the peasantry—not toward something like the navy, 184—for from both economic and political perspectives, maintaining a fleet of any significant size is simply not feasible for us.
I therefore propose that, after reducing total expenditures by three million, we calculate how this sum should be allocated among the various objectives within the ship-repair program—and then determine how we might immediately begin retooling a portion of our ship-repair facilities to produce the metal goods urgently needed by the peasantry.
Lenin
Dictated over the telephone on November 29, 1922, at 7:00 p.m.
First published in 1959.

In Lenin’s Collected Works, Volume XXXVI

Printed from the secretary’s transcript (a typewritten copy)