Date: 1922
Source: ru:PSS/v45

Continuation of Notes.

December 30, 1922
ON THE QUESTION OF NATIONALITIES OR “AUTONOMIZATION”
I believe I bear a grave responsibility toward the workers of Russia for failing to intervene with sufficient vigor and decisiveness in the infamous question of autonomization—officially, it seems, known as the question of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
In the summer, when this issue first arose, I was ill; then, in the autumn, I placed excessive hope in my own recovery and in the October and December Plenums, believing they would afford me an opportunity to weigh in on this matter. Yet neither at the October Plenum—on this very question—nor at the December Plenum did I manage to attend; thus, the issue passed me by almost entirely.
I did manage to exchange a few words with Comrade Dzerzhinsky, who had come from the Caucasus and briefed me on how the question stood in Georgia. I also had a brief conversation with Comrade Zinoviev, during which I expressed to him my concerns about this issue. From what Comrade Dzerzhinsky—head of the commission dispatched by the Central Committee to “investigate” the Georgian incident—had reported, I could only draw the gravest of apprehensions. If matters had reached the point where Ordzhonikidze had even contemplated resorting to physical violence—as Comrade Dzerzhinsky informed me—then one can scarcely imagine the depths into which we had plunged. Clearly, the entire enterprise of “autonomization” was fundamentally flawed and utterly untimely.

ON THE QUESTION OF NATIONALITIES OR “AUTONOMIZATION”
It is said that unity of the apparatus was required. But where did these assurances originate? Were they not, in fact, emanating from the very Russian apparatus itself—which, as I pointed out in a previous entry of my diary—was borrowed from Tsarist rule and merely given a slight polish by the Soviet era*?
Undoubtedly, we should have delayed this measure until such time as we could truly say that we regarded our apparatus as our own. But today, we must honestly admit the opposite: the apparatus we call our own remains, in essence, thoroughly alien to us—a hodgepodge of bourgeois and Tsarist elements. With no assistance from other nations, and with military engagements and the struggle against famine dominating our priorities, there was simply no way to transform such an apparatus within five years.
Under these conditions, it is only natural that the “freedom to withdraw from the Union”—which we invoke as justification—will prove to be nothing more than an empty promise, incapable of shielding Russia’s non-Russian peoples from the onslaught of that truly Russian man, the Great Russian chauvinist—essentially a scoundrel and a tyrant, such as the archetypal Russian bureaucrat so often is. There is no doubt that a paltry percentage of Soviet and Sovietized workers will drown in this sea of chauvinistic Great Russian rabble, just as a fly might sink in milk.
Those who defend this measure argue that we have established People’s Commissariats specifically devoted to matters of national psychology and national education. But the question arises: can these Commissariats truly be separated off in isolation? And a second question: have we taken sufficiently careful measures to safeguard non-Russians from the true Russian bully? I believe we have not taken those measures—though we could and should have done so.
I believe that Stalin’s haste and his administrative zeal, coupled with his growing animosity toward the notorious “social nationalism,” played a fateful role here. In politics, animosity generally plays the worst possible part.

* See this volume, pp. 349–353. Ed.

I also fear that Comrade Dzerzhinsky, who traveled to the Caucasus to investigate the “crimes” committed by these “social nationalists,” was distinguished there only by his deeply Russified outlook (as is well known, non-Russians who have become Russified tend to overcompensate in their displays of genuinely Russian sentiment). Moreover, the impartiality of his entire commission is vividly illustrated by Ordzhonikidze’s use of physical force. I believe that no provocation—and not even any insult—can justify this Russian recourse to violence, and that Comrade Dzerzhinsky bears an irreparable fault for having treated this act of violence with such cavalier disregard.
Ordzhonikidze held authority over all other citizens in the Caucasus. Ordzhonikidze had no right to the kind of irritability to which he and Dzerzhinsky both referred. On the contrary, Ordzhonikidze was obligated to conduct himself with a degree of restraint that no ordinary citizen—much less someone accused of a “political” crime—should ever be expected to display. After all, in essence, the social nationalists were citizens accused of political offenses, and the very circumstances surrounding their prosecution were precisely what qualified them as such.
Here arises an important, fundamental question: how are we to understand internationalism?*
Lenin
December 30, 1922

Recorded by M. V.
Continuation of Notes.

December 31, 1922
ON THE QUESTION OF NATIONALITIES OR “AUTONOMIZATION”
(Continued)
I have already argued in my writings on the national question that an abstract approach to the question of nationalism in general is wholly unsuitable. It is essential to distinguish

* The following text was subsequently crossed out in the stenographic record: “I believe our comrades have not yet fully grasped this important, fundamental question.” Ed.

ON THE QUESTION OF NATIONALITIES OR “AUTONOMIZATION”
between the nationalism of the oppressing nation and the nationalism of the oppressed nation; between the nationalism of the great nation and the nationalism of the small nation.
With regard to the latter form of nationalism, we—those of the great nation—have, in historical practice, almost always been guilty of countless acts of violence. What is more, we often commit acts of violence and inflict insults without even realizing it—for instance, recall my memories along the Volga, of how we treat non-Russians: the Pole is never called anything but “the Pole,” the Tatar is mocked only as “the Prince,” the Ukrainian is derided as “the Khokhol,” and the Georgian and other Caucasian non-Russians are referred to as “the Kavkazian.”
Therefore, internationalism on the part of the oppressing—or so‑called “great”—nation (a nation great only through its acts of violence, great only in the manner of a brute) must consist not only in the observance of formal equality among nations, but also in a kind of inequality that compensates, on the part of the oppressing, the great nation, for the actual inequalities that arise in life. Whoever fails to grasp this truth has not truly understood the proletarian approach to the national question; in essence, such a person remains stuck in a petty-bourgeois perspective—and cannot help but slip, minute by minute, back toward a bourgeois standpoint.
What matters most to the proletariat? For the proletariat, it is not only important but absolutely essential to secure the maximum degree of trust from non-Russians in the proletarian class struggle. What is needed for this? It requires more than mere formal equality—it demands that we somehow compensate, through our conduct or our concessions toward non-Russians, for the mistrust, the suspicion, the grievances that the government of the “great-power” nation has inflicted upon them throughout history.
I believe that for the Bolsheviks, for the Communists, there is little need to explain this further or in greater detail. And I believe that in this particular case, with regard to the Georgian nation, we have a typical example of where

extreme caution, vigilance, and a willingness to compromise are truly required—through a genuinely proletarian approach to the matter. The Georgian who treats this aspect of the issue with disdain, who carelessly flings accusations of “social nationalism” around (even though he himself is not only a genuine “social nationalist,” but also a crude Great Russian bully)—such a Georgian, in essence, undermines the interests of proletarian class solidarity. For nothing delays the development and consolidation of proletarian class solidarity quite like national injustice; and none are more sensitive to the sense of equality—and to violations of that equality, whether through negligence, or even in jest—than the “wronged” nationalities themselves, especially when those violations are perpetrated by their own proletarian comrades. That is why, in this instance, it is better to err on the side of excessive compromise and leniency toward national minorities than to fall short. That is why, in this case, the fundamental interest of proletarian solidarity—and, by extension, of the proletarian class struggle—requires that we never treat the national question in a formalistic way, but always take into account the indispensable difference in the attitude of the proletariat toward the nation that is oppressed (or small) versus the nation that oppresses (or great).
Lenin
Recorded by M. V.

December 31, 1922
Continuation of Notes.

December 31, 1922
So what practical measures should we take in the current situation?
First, we must preserve and strengthen the Union of Socialist Republics; there can be no doubt about this measure. We need it—as does the worldwide communist proletariat—in order to combat world‑bourgeoisie and to protect ourselves from its intrigues.

ON THE QUESTION OF NATIONALITIES OR “AUTONOMIZATION”
Second, we must retain the Union of Socialist Republics with respect to its diplomatic apparatus. Incidentally, this apparatus is unique within our state apparatus. We admitted no single individual of any real influence from the old Tsarist apparatus into it. Every member of the apparatus who possessed even a modicum of authority was drawn from the ranks of the Communists. As a result, this apparatus has already earned—yes, we can say this boldly—the title of a tested, thoroughly purified Communist apparatus, cleansed far more completely, immeasurably more thoroughly, than the old Tsarist, bourgeois, and petty‑bourgeois apparatus that we are forced to rely upon in our other People’s Commissariats.
Third, we must mete out appropriate punishment to Comrade Ordzhonikidze (and I say this with great regret, since I personally count myself among his friends and worked alongside him abroad in exile), while also re-examining—or once again investigating—all the materials compiled by Dzerzhinsky’s commission, with a view to correcting the vast array of errors and biased judgments that undoubtedly exist therein. Politically responsible for this truly Great Russian–nationalist campaign, of course, must be Stalin and Dzerzhinsky.
Fourth, we must institute the strictest possible regulations regarding the use of national languages in the non-Russian republics that comprise our Union, and we must enforce these regulations with particular rigor. There is no doubt that under the guise of railway service uniformity, under the pretext of fiscal unity, and the like, our modern apparatus will inevitably give rise to a host of abuses of a distinctly Russian character. To combat these abuses, we require not only exceptional ingenuity—but above all, the utmost sincerity from those who undertake such a fight. Here, a detailed code is needed, one that can be successfully drafted only by nationals who live within the respective republic. Moreover, we must not preclude, in any way, the possibility that, as a result of all this work, we may return—at the next Congress of Soviets—to a position in which we maintain the Union of Soviet

Socialist Republics solely in military and diplomatic matters, while restoring full autonomy to each individual People’s Commissariat in all other respects.
We must bear in mind that the fragmentation of People’s Commissariats and the lack of coordination between their operations in relation to Moscow and other centers can be effectively counteracted by strong party authority—provided that authority is exercised with sufficient prudence and impartiality. The harm that may accrue to our state from the absence of unified national apparatuses alongside the Russian apparatus is immeasurably smaller, infinitely less than the damage that would be inflicted not only upon us, but upon the entire International—upon the hundreds of millions of peoples in Asia, who are poised to step onto the historical stage in the near future, following in our wake. It would be unforgivable opportunism if, on the eve of this Eastward advance and at the very beginning of its awakening, we were to undermine our own authority among those peoples—even by the slightest roughness or injustice toward our own non-Russians. One thing is the imperative to unite against the imperialists of the West, who seek to defend the capitalist world. There can be no doubt about that, and it is superfluous for me to emphasize that I wholeheartedly endorse these measures. Quite another matter is when we ourselves, even in the smallest details, fall into imperialist relations toward oppressed peoples—thereby completely undermining our own principled sincerity, our own steadfast commitment to the struggle against imperialism. For tomorrow, in the annals of world history, will be the day when the long‑dormant peoples oppressed by imperialism finally awaken—and when the decisive, protracted, and arduous struggle for their liberation will begin.
Lenin
December 31, 1922

Recorded by M. V.
First published in 1956

in the journal “Communist,” No. 9

Printed from the secretary’s transcript (typewritten copy)