V. I. Lenin

Fourth Congress of the Communist International [1]

November 5-December 5, 1922

1

To The Fourth Congress Of The Communist International And To The Petrograd
Soviet Of Workers’ And Red Army Deputies

I regret very much that I cannot be present at the first session of the
Congress and that I must confine myself to greetings in writing.

Notwithstanding the enormous obstacles confronting the Communist
Parties, the Communist International is growing and becoming strong. The
main goal is still to win over the majority of the workers. We shall attain
this goal in spite of everything.

The amalgamation of the Second and Two-and-a-Half Internationals will
benefit the proletarian revolutionary movement: less fiction and less fraud
is always to the benefit of the working class.

To the Petrograd workers and their newly-elected Soviet who are hosts to
the Fourth Congress of the Communist International, I send my best wishes
and cordial greetings.

The Petrograd workers must be in the foremost ranks on the economic
front, too. We rejoice to hear about the beginning of the economic revival
of Petrograd. I hope to be able to accept your invitation to visit Petrograd
in the near future.

Soviet rule in Russia is celebrating its fifth anniversary. It is now
sounder than ever. The Civil War is over. The first successes in the
economic field have been achieved. Soviet Russia considers it a matter of
the greatest pride to help the workers of the whole world in their difficult
struggle to overthrow capitalism. Victory will be ours.

Long live the Communist International!

V . Ulyanov ( Lenin )

Moscow, November 4, 1922

2

Five Years Of The Russian Revolution And The Prospects Of The World
Revolution

Report To The Fourth Congress Of The Communist Internatioinal, November
13, 1922 ( Comrade Lenin is met with stormy, prolonged applause and a general ovation. All rise and join in singing “The Internationale" .)
Comrades, I am down in the list as the main speaker, but you will understand
that after my lengthy illness I am not able to make a long report. I can
only make a few introductory remarks on the key questions. My subject will
be a very limited one. The subject, “Five Years of the Russian
Revolution and the Prospects of the World Revolution", is in general too
broad and too large for one speaker to exhaust in a single speech. That is
why I shall take only a small part of this subject, namely, the question of
the New Economic Policy. I have deliberately taken only this small part in
order to make you familiar with what is now the most important
question—at all events, it is the most important to me, because I am
now working on it.

And so, I shall tell you how we launched the New Economic Policy, and
what results we have achieved with the aid of this policy. If I confine
myself to this question, I shall, perhaps, succeed in giving you a general
survey and a general idea of it.

To begin with how we arrived at the New Economic Policy, I must quote
from an article I wrote in 1918. [2] At the beginning of 1918, in a brief polemic, I
touched on the question of the attitude we should adopt towards state
capitalism. I then wrote:

“State capitalism would be a step forward as compared with the
present state of affairs (i.e., the state of affairs at that time) in our
Soviet Republic. If in approximately six months’ time state capitalism
became established in our Republic, this would be a great success and a sure
guarantee that within a year socialism will have gained a permanently firm
hold and will have become invincible in our country.”

Of course, this was said at a time when we were more foolish than we are
now, but not so foolish as to be unable to deal with such matters.

Thus, in 1918, I was of the opinion that with regard to the economic
situation then obtaihing in the Soviet Republic, state capitalism would be a
step forward. This sounds very strange, and perhaps even absurd, for already
at that time our Republic was a socialist republic and we were every day
hastily—perhaps too hastily—adopting various new economic
measures which could not be described as anything but socialist
measures. Nevertheless, I then held the view that in relation to the
economic situation then obtaining in the Soviet Republic state capitalism
would be a step forward, and I explained my idea simply by enumerating the
elements of the economic system of Russia. In my opinion these elements were
the following: “(1) patriarchal, i.e., the most primitive form of
agriculture; (2) small commodity production (this includes the majority of
the peasants who trade in grain); (3) private capitalism; (4) state
capitalism, and (5) socialism.” All these economic elements were
present in Russia at that time. I set myself the task of explaining the
relationship of these elements to each other, and whether one of the
non-socialist elements, namely, state capitalism, should not be rated higher
than socialism. I repeat: it seems very strange to everyone that a
non-socialist element should be rated higher than, regarded as superior to,
socialism in a republic which declares itself a socialist republic But the
fact will become intelligible if you recall that we definitely did not
regard the economic system of Russia as something homogeneous and highly
developed; we were fully aware that in Russia we had patriarchal
agriculture, i.e., the most primitive form of agriculture, alongside the
socialist form. What role could state capitalism play in these
circumstances?

I then asked myself which of these elements predominated? Clearly, in a
petty-bourgeois environmcnt the petty-bourgeois element predominates. I
recognised then that the petty-bourgeois element predominated; it was
impossible to take a different view. The question I then put to
myself—this was in a specific controversy which had nothing to do with
the present question—was: what is our attitude towards state
capitalism? And I replied: although it is not a socialist form, state
capitalism would be for us, and for Russia, a more favourable form than the
existing one. What does that show? It shows that we did not overrate either
the rudiments or the principles of socialist economy, although we had
already accomplished the social revolution. On the contrary, at that time we
already realised to a certain extent that it would be better if we first
arrived at state capitalism and only after that at socialism.

I must lay special emphasis on this, because I assume that it is the
only point of departure we can take, firstly, to explain what the present
economic policy is; and, secondly, to draw very important practical
conclusions for the Communist International. I do not want to suggest that
we had then a ready-made plan of retreat. This was not the case. Those brief
lines set forth in a polemic were not by any means a plan of retreat. For
example, they made no mention whatever of that very important point, freedom
to trade, which is of fundamental significance to state capitalism. Yet they
did contain a general, even if indefinite, idea of retreat. I think that we
should take note of that not only from the viewpoint of a country whose
economic system was, and is to this day, very backward, but also from the
viewpoint of the Communist International and the advanced West-European
countries. For example, just now we are engaged in drawing up a programme. I
personally think that it would be best to hold simply a general discussion
on all the programmes, to make the first reading, so to speak, and to get
them printed, but not to take a final decision now, this year. Why? First of
all, of course, because I do not think we have considered all of them in
sufficient detail, and also because we have given scarcely any thought to
possible retreat, and to preparationg for it. Yet that is a question which,
in view of such fundamental changes in the world as the overthrow of
capitalism and the building of socialism with all its enormous difficulties,
absolutely requires our attention. We must not only know how to act when we
pass directly to the offensive and are victorious. In revolutionary times
this is not so difficult, nor so very important; at least, it is not the
most decisive thing. There are always times in a revolution when the
opponent loses his head; and if we attack him at such a time we may win an
easy victory. But that is nothing, because our enemy, if he has enough
endurance, can rally his forces beforehand, and so forth. He can easily
provoke us to attack him and then throw us back for many years. For this
reason, I think, the idea that we must prepare for ourselves the possibility
of retreat is very important, and not only from the theoretical point of
view. From the practical point of view, too, all the parties which are
preparing to take the direct offensive against capitalism in the near future
must now give thought to the problem of preparing for a possible retreat. I
think it will do us no harm to learn this lesson together with all the other
lessons which the experience of our revolution offers. On the contrary, it
may prove beneficial in many cases.

Now that I have emphasised the fact that as early as 1918 we regarded
state capitalism as a possible line of retreat, I shall deal with the
results of our New Economic Policy. I repeat: at that time it was still a
very vague idea, but in 1921, after we had passed through the most important
stage of the Civil War—and passed through it victoriously—we
felt the impact of a grave—I think it was the gravest—internal
political crisis in Soviet Russia. This internal crisis brought to light
discontent not only among a considerable section of the peasantry but also
among the workers. This was the first and, I hope, the last time in the
history of Soviet Russia that feeling ran against us among large masses of
peasants, not consciously but instinctively. What gave rise to this
peculiar, and for us, of course, very unpleasant, situation? The reason for
it was that in our economic offensive we had run too far ahead, that we had
not provided ourselves with adequate resources, that the masses sensed what
we ourselves were not then able to formulate consciously but what we
admitted soon after, a few weeks later, namely, that the direct transition
to purely socialist forms, to purely socialist distribution, was beyond our
available strength, and that if we were unable to effect a retreat so as to
confine ourselves to easier tasks, we would face disaster. The crisis began,
I think, in February 1921. In the spring of that year we decided
unanimously—I did not observe any considerable disagreement among us
on this question—to adopt the New Economic Policy. Now, after eighteen
months have elapsed, at the close of 1922, we are able to make certain
comparisons. What has happened? How have we fared during this period of over
eighteen months? What is the result? Has this retreat been of any benefit to
us? Has it really saved us, or is the result still indefinite? This is the
main question that I put to myself, and I think that this main question is
also of first-rate importance to all the Communist Parties; for if the reply
is in the negative, we are all doomed. I think that all of us can, with a
clear conscience, reply to this question in the affirmative, namely, that
the past eighteen months provide positive and absolute proof that we have
passed the test.

I shall now try to prove this. To do that I must briefly enumerate all
the constituent parts of our economy.

First of all I shall deal with our financial system and our famous
Russian ruble. I think we can say that Russian rubles are famous, if only
for the reason that their number now in circulation exceeds a
quadrillion. ( Laughter .) That is something! It is an astronomical
figure. I am sure that not everyone here knows what this figure
signifies. ( General laughter .) But we do not think that the figure
is so very important even from the point of view of economic science, for
the noughts can always be crossed out. ( Laughter .) We have achieved
a thing or two in this art, which is likewise of no importance from the
economic point of view, and I am sure that in the further course of events
we shall achieve much more. But what is really important is the problem of
stabilising the ruble. We are now grappling with this problem, our best
forces are working on it, and we attach decisive importance to it. If we
succeed in stabilising the ruble for a long period, and then for all time,
it will prove that we have won. In that case all these astronomical figures,
these trillions and quadrillions, will not have mattered in the least. We
shall then be able to place our economy on a firm basis, and develop it
further on a firm basis. On this question I think I can cite some fairly
important and decisive data. In 1921 the rate of exchange of the paper ruble
remained stable for a period of less than three months. This year, 1922,
which has not yet drawn to a close, the rate remained stable for a period of
over five months. I think that this proof is sufficient. Of course, if you
demand scientific proof that we shall definitely solve this problem, then it
is not sufficient; but in general, I do not think it is possible to prove
this entirely and conclusively. The data I have cited show that between last
year, when we started on the New Economic Policy, and the present day, we
have already learned to make progress. Since we have learned to do this, I
am sure we shall learn to achieve further successes along this road,
provided we avoid doing anything very foolish. The most important thing,
however, is trade, namely, the circulation of commodities, which is
essential for us. And since we have successfully coped with this problem for
two years, in spite of having been in a state of war (for, as you know,
Vladivostok was recaptured only a few weeks ago), and in spite of the fact
that only now we are able to proceed with our economic activities in a
really systematic way—since we have succeeded in keeping the rate of
the paper ruble stable for five months instead of only three months, I think
I can say that we have grounds to be pleased. After all, we stand alone. We
have not received any loans, and are not receiving any now. We have been
given no assistance by any of the powerful capitalist countries, which
organise their capitalist economy so “brilliantly” that they do
not know to this day which way they are going. By the Treaty of Versailles
they have created a financial system that they themselves cannot make head
or tail of. If these great capitalist countries are managing things in this
way, I think that we, backward and uneducated as we are, may be pleased with
the fact that we have grasped the most important thing—the conditions
for the stabilisation of the ruble. This is proved not by theoretical
analysis but by practical experience, which in my opinion is more important
than all the theoretical discussions in the world. Practice shows that we
have achieved decisive results in that field, namely, we are beginning to
push our economy towards the stabilisation of the ruble, which is of supreme
importance for trade, for the free circulation of commodities, for the
peasants, and for the vast masses of small producers.

Now I come to our social objectives. The most important factor, of
course, is the peasantry. In 1921 discontent undoubtedly prevailed among a
vast section of the peasantry. Then there was the famine. This was the
severest trial for the peasants. Naturally, all our enemies abroad shouted:
“There, that’s the result of socialist economy!” Quite naturally, of course, they said nothing about the famine actually being the
terrible result of the Civil War. All the landowners and capitalists who had
begun their offensive against us in 1918 tried to make out that the famine
was the result of socialist economy. The famine was indeed a great and grave
disaster which threatened to nullify the results of all our organisational
and revolutionary efforts.

And so, I ask now, after this unprecedented and unexpected disaster,
what is the position today, after we have introduced the New Economic
Policy, after we have granted the peasants freedom to trade? The answer is
clear and obvious to everyone; in one year the peasants have not only got
over the famine, but have paid so much tax in kind that we have already
received hundreds of millions of poods of grain, and that almost without
employing any measures of coercion. Peasant uprisings, which previously,
before 1921, were, so to speak, a common occurrence in Russia, have almost
completely ceased. The peasants are satisfied with their present
position. We can confidently assert that. We think that this evidence is
more important than any amount of statistical proof. Nobody questions the
fact that the peasants are a decisive factor in our country. And the
position of the peasantry is now such that we have no reason to fear any
movement against us from that quarter. We say that quite consciously,
without exaggeration. This we have already achieved. The peasantry may be
dissatisfied with one aspect or another of the work of our authorites. They
may complain about this. That is possible, of course, and inevitable,
because our machinery of state and our state-operated economy are still too
inefficient to avert it; but any serious dissatisfaction with us on the part
of the peasantry as a whole is quite out of the question. This has been
achieved in the course of one year. I think that is already quite a
lot.

Now I come to our light industry. In industry we have to make a
distinction between heavy and light industry because the situation in them
is different. As regards light industry, I can safely say that there is a
general revival. I shall not go into details. I did not set out to quote a
lot of statistics. But this general impression is based on facts, and I can
assure you that it is not based on anything untrue or inaccurate. We can
speak of a general revival in light industry, and, as a result, of a
definite improvement in the conditions of the workers in Petrograd and
Moscow. In other districts this is observed to a lesser degree, because
heavy industry predominates in them. So this does not apply
generally. Nevertheless, I repeat, light industry is undoubtedly on the
upgrade, and the conditions of the workers in Petrograd and Moscow have
unquestionably improved. In the spring of 1921 there was discontent among
the workers in both these cities. That is definitely not the case now. We,
who watch the conditions and mood of the workers from day to day, make no
mistake on that score.

The third question is that of heavy industry. I must say that the
situation here is still grave. Some turn for the better occurred in 1921-22,
so that we may hope that the situation will improve in the near future. We
have already gathered some of the resources necessary for this. In a
capitalist country a loan of hundreds of millions would be required to
improve the situation in heavy industry. No improvement would be possible
without it. The economic history of the capitalist countries shows that
heavy industry in backward countries can only be developed with the aid of
long-term loans of hundreds of millions of dollars or gold rubles. We did
not get such loans, and so far have received nothing. All that is now being
written about concessions and so forth is not worth much more than the paper
it is written on. We have written a great deal about this lately and in
particular about the Urquhart concession. Yet I think our concessions policy
is a very good one. However, we have not concluded a single profitable
concession agreement so far. I ask you to bear that in mind. Thus, the
situation in heavy industry is really a very grave problem for our backward
country, because we cannot count on loans from the wealthy countries. In
spite of that, we see a tangible improvement, and we also see that our
trading has brought us some capital. True, it is only a very modest sum as
yet—a little over twenty million gold rubles. At any rate, a beginning
has been made; our trade is providing us with funds which we can employ for
improving the situation in heavy industry. At the present moment, however,
our heavy industry is still in great difficuities. But I think that the
decisive circumstance is that we are already in a position to save a
little. And we shall go on saving. We must economise now though it is often
at the expense of the population. We are trying to reduce the state budget,
to reduce staffs in our government offices. Later on, I shall have a few
words to say about our state apparatus. At all events, we must reduce it. We
must economise as much as possible. We are economising in all things, even
in schools. We must do this, because we know that unless we save heavy
industry, unless we restore it, we shall not be able to build up an industry
at all; and without an industry we shall go under as an independent,
country. We realise this very well.

The salvation of Russia lies not only in a good harvest on the peasant
farms—that is not enough; and not only in the good condition of light
industry, which provides the peasantry with consumer goods—this, too,
is not enough; we also need heavy industry. And to put it in a good
condition will require several years of work.

Heavy industry needs state subsidies. If we are not able to provide
them, we shall be doomed as a civilised state, let alone as a socialist
state. In this respect, we have taken a determined step. We have begun to
accumulate the funds that we need to put heavy industry on its feet. True,
the sum we have obtained so far barely exceeds twenty million gold rubles;
but at any rate this sum is available, and it is earmarked exclusively for
the purpose of reviving our heavy industry.

I think that, on the whole, I have, as I have promised, briefly outlined
the principal elements of our economy, and feel that we may draw the
conclusion from all this that the New Economic Policy has already yielded
dividends. We already have proof that, as a state, we are able to trade, to
maintain our strong positions in agriculture and industry, and to make
progress. Practical activity has proved it. I think this is sufficient for
us for the time being. We shall have to learn much, and we have realised
that we still have much to learn. We have been in power for five years, and
during these five years we have been in a state of war. Hence, we have been
successful.

This is understandable, because the peasantry were on our side. Probably
no one could have supported us more than they did. They were aware that the
whiteguards had the landowners behind them, and they hate the landowners
more than anything in the world. That is why the peasantry supported us with
all their enthusiasm and loyalty. It was not difficult to get the peasantry
to defend us against the whiteguards. The peasants, who had always hated
war, did all they possibly could in the war against the whiteguards, in the
Civil War against the landowners. But this was not all, because in substance
it was only a matter of whether power would remain in the hands of the
landowners or of the peasants. This was not enough for us. The peasants know
that we have seized power for the workers and that our aim is to use this
power to establish the socialist system. Therefore, the most important thing
for us was to lay the economic foundation for socialist economy. We could
not do it directly. We had to do it in a roundabout way. The state
capitalism that we have introduced in our country is of a special kind. It
does not agree with the usual conception of state capitalism. We hold all
the key positions. We hold the land; it belongs to the state. This is very
important, although our opponents try to make out that it is of no
importance at all. That is untrue. The fact that the land belongs to the
state is extremely important, and economically it is also of great practical
purport. This we have achieved, and I must say that all our future
activities should develop only within that framework. We have already
succeeded in making the peasantry content and in reviving both industry and
trade. I have already said that our state capitalism differs from state
capitalism in the literal sense of the term in that our proletarian state
not only owns the land, but also all the vital branches of industry. To
begin with, we have leased only a certain number of the small and medium
plants, but all the rest remain in our hands. As regards trade, I want to
re-emphasise that we are trying to found mixed companies, that we are
already forming them, i.e., companies in which part of the capital belongs
to private capitalists—and foreign capitalists at that—and the
other part belongs to the state. Firstly, in this way we are learning how to
trade, and that is what we need. Secondly, we are always in a position to
dissolve these companies if we deem it necessary, and do not, therefore, run
any risks, so to speak. We are learning from the private capitalist and
looking round to see how we can progress, and what mistakes we make. It
seems to me that I need say no more.

I should still like to deal with several minor points. Undoubtedly, we
have done, and will still do, a host of foolish things. No one can judge and
see this better than I. ( Laughter .) Why do we do these foolish
things? The reason is clear: firstly, because we are a backward country;
secondly, because education in our country is at a low level and thirdly,
because we are getting no outside assistance. Not a single civilised country
is helping us. On the contrary, they are all working against us. Fourthly,
our machinery of state is to blame. We took over the old machinery of state,
and that was our misfortune. Very often this machinery operates against
us. In 1917, after we seized power, the government officials sabotaged
us. This frightened us very much and we pleaded: “Please come
back.” They all came back, but that was our misfortune. We now have a
vast army of government employees, but lack sufficiently educated forces to
exercise real control over them. In practice it often happens that here at
the top, where we exercise political power, the machine functions somehow;
but down below government employees have arbitrary control and they often
exercise it in such a way as to counteract our measures. At the top, we
have, I don’t know how many, but at all events, I think, no more than
a few thousand, at the outside several tens of thousands of our own
people. Down below, however, there are hundreds of thousands of old
officials whom we got from the tsar and from bourgeois society and who,
partly deliberately and partly unwittingly, work against us. It is clear
that nothing can be done in that respect overnight. It will take many years
of hard work to improve the machinery, to remodel it, and to enlist new
forces. We are doing this fairly quickly, perhaps too quickly. Soviet
schools and Workers’ Faculties have been formed; a few hundred
thousand young people are studying; they are studying too fast perhaps, but
at all events, a start has been made, and I think this work will bear
fruit. If we do not work too hurriedly we shall, in a few years’ time,
have a large body of young people capable of thoroughly overhauling our
state apparatus.

I have said that we have done a host of foolish things, but I must also
say a word or two in this respect about our enemies. If our enemies blame us
and say that Lenin himself admits that the Bolsheviks have done a host of
foolish things, I want to reply to this: yes, but you know, the foolish
things we have done are nonetheless very different from yours. We have only
just begun to learn, but are learning so methodically that we are certain to
achieve good results. But since our enemies, i.e., the capitalists and the
heroes of the Second International, lay stress on the foolish things we have
done, I take the liberty, for the sake of comparison, to cite the words of a
celebrated Russian author, which I shall amend to read as follows: if the
Bolsheviks do foolish things the Bolshevik says, “Twice two are five",
but when their enemies, i.e., the capitalists and the heroes of the Second
International, do foolish things, they get, “Twice two make a tallow
candle”. [3] That is easily proved. Take, for example, the
agreement concluded by the U.S.A., Great Britain, France and Japan with
Kolchak. I ask you, are there any more enlightened and more powerful
countries in the world? But what has happened? They promised to help Kolchak
without calculation, without reflection, and without circumspection. It
ended in a fiasco, which, it seems to me, is difficult for the human
intellect to grasp.

Or take another example, a closer and more important one: the Treaty of
Versailles. I ask you, what have the “great” powers which have
“covered themselves with glory” done? How will they find a way
out of this chaos and confusion? I don’t think it will be an
exaggeration to repeat that the foolish things we have done are nothing
compared with those done in concert by the capitalist countries, the
capitalist world and the Second International. That is why I think that the
outlook for the world revolution—a subject which I must touch on
briefly—is favourable. And given a certain definite condition, I think
it will be even better. I should like to say a few words about this.

At the Third Congress, in 1921, we adopted a resolution on the
organisational structure of the Communist Parties and on the methods and
content of their activities. The resolution is an excellent one, but it is
almost entirely Russian, that is to say, everything in it is based on
Russian conditions. This is its good point, but it is also its failing. It
is its failing because I am sure that no foreigner can read it. I have read
it again before saying this. In the first place, it is too long, containing
fifty or more points. Foreigners are not usually able to read such
things. Secondly, even if they read it, they will not understand it because
it is too Russian. Not because it is written in Russian—it has been
excellently translated into all languages—but because it is thoroughly
imbued with the Russian spirit. And thirdly, if by way of exception some
foreigner does understand it, he cannot carry it out. This is its third
defect. I have talked with a few of the foreign delegates and hope to
discuss matters in detail with a large number of delegates from different
countries during the Congress, although I shall not take part in its
proceedings, for unfortunately it is impossible for me to do that. I have
the impression that we made a big mistake with this resolution, namely, that
we blocked our own road to further success. As I have said already, the
resolution is excellently drafted; I am prepared to subscribe to every one
of its fifty or more points. But we have not learnt how to present our
Russian experience to foreigners. All that was said in the resolution has
remained a dead letter. If we do not realise this, we shall be unable to
move ahead. I think that after five years of the Russian revolution the
most important thing for all of us, Russian and foreign comrades alike, is
to sit down and study. We have only now obtained the opportunity to do so. I
do not know how long this opportunity will last. I do not know for how long
the capitalist powers will give us the opportunity to study in peace. But we
must take advantage of every moment of respite from fighting, from war, to
study, and to study from scratch.

The whole Party and all strata of the population of Russia prove this by
their thirst for knowledge. This striving to learn shows that our most
important task today is to study and to study hard. Our foreign comrades,
too, must study. I do not mean that they have to learn to read and write and
to understand what they read, as we still have to do. There is a dispute as
to whether this concerns proletarian or bourgeois culture. I shall leave
that question open. But one thing is certain: we have to begin by learning
to read and write and to understand what we read. Foreigners do not need
that. They need something more advanced: first of all, among other things
they must learn to understand what we have written about the organisational
structure of the Communist Parties, and what the foreign comrades have
signed without reading and understanding. This must be their first
task. That resolution must be carried out. It cannot be carried out
overnight; that is absolutely impossible. The resolution is too Russian, it
reflects Russian experience. That is why it is quite unintelligible to
foreigners, and they cannot be content with hanging it in a corner like an
icon and praying to it. Nothing will be achieved that way. They must
assimilate part of the Russian experience. Just how that will be done, I do
not know. The fascists in Italy may, for example, render us a great service
by showing the Italians that they are not yet sufficiently enlightened and
that their country is not yet ensured against the Black Hundreds. [4] Perhaps
this will be very useful. We Russians must also find ways and means of
explaining the principles of this resolution to the foreigners. Unless we do
that, it will be absolutely impossible for them to carry it out. I am sure
that in this connection we must tell not only the Russians, but the foreign
comrades as well, that the most important thing in the period we are now
entering is to study. We are study ing in the general sense. They, however,
must study in the special sense, in order that they may really understand
the organisation, structure, method and content of revolutionary work. If
they do that, I am sure the prospects of the world revolution will be not
only good, but excellent. ( Stormy , prolonged applause. Shouts of “Long live our Comrade Lenin!” evoke a fresh stormy ovation .)

Endnotes

[1] The
Fourth Congress of the Communist International took place on
November 5-December 5, 1922. It opened in Petrograd and then, from November
9 onwards, the sittings were held in Moscow. It was attended by 408
delegates, 343 of whom had a casting vote, representing 58 Communist
organisations in various countries. Also present were representatives of the
Italian Socialist Party, the Iceland Workers’ Party, the Mongolian
People’s Revolutionaary Party, the Workers Party of the U.S.; the
Young Communist International, the Profintern, the International
Women’s Secretariat, the International Workers’ Aid and
U.S. Negro Organisation. The Congress endorsed the theses on a united
workers’ front, drawn up by the R.C.P.(B.), approved the theses on the
tactics of the Communist International, on the tasks of Communists in the
trade union movement, and on the Eastern question, and adopted a resolution
on the socialist revolution in Russia, on the Young Communist International
and other questions.

Lenin read his report “Five Years of the Russian
Revolution and the Prospects of the World Revolution” in German at the
morning sitting on November 13.

[2] Lenin refers
to the article Left-Wing Childishness and the Petty Bourgeois Mentality

[3] This
expression was used in Ivan Turgenev’s Rudin by Pigasov, who
was a woman-hater. Refusing to credit women with the ability to think
logically, Pigasov maintained: A man may, for example, say that twice two
make not four but five or three and a half; but a woman will say that twice
two make a tallow candle.”

[4] Black Hundreds were monarchist gangs that were formed by the tsarist police
to combat the revolutionary movement. They murdered revolutionaries,
attacked progressive intellectuals and organised Jewish pogroms.