V. I. Lenin

Interview Given to Michael Farbman, Observer and Manchester Guardian Correspondent

1. Question. The anti-Russian press describes
Herriot’s recep-tion in Moscow and the Franco-Russian negotiations as
a definite change in Soviet Russia’s foreign policy.

Is that true? Is it true that Russia regards British policy in the Middle East as a challenge and is ready to conclude an agreement with France directed against Britain?

Answer. I consider it absolutely incorrect to describe Herriot’s reception in Moscow and the France-Russian
negotiations as a change, even a slight one, in Soviet Russia’s policy
in general, or as being anti-British in particular. [1] We certainly value very highly
both Herriot’s reception in Moscow and the step taken towards a
rapprochement with France or towards negotiations with her, which have now
become possible, probable and, I should like to believe, essential. Any
rapprochement with France is something we very much desire, especially in
view of the fact that Russia’s commercial interests imperatively
demand closer relations with this strong continental power. But we are
convinced that this rapprochement does not in the least imply that some
change must necessarily take place in our policy towards Britain. We believe
fully friendly relations with both powers to be quite possible, and that is
our aim. We believe that the development of commercial relations will
inevitably go a very long way towards achieving this aim. We
believe that the interests of Britain and France, rightly understood, will
likewise operate in that direction. We believe that the mutual interests of
both Britain and France. insofar as they have points of contact with Russia,
do not under any circumstances contain elements of inevitable hostility
between Britain and France. On the contrary, we even think that peaceful and
friendly relations between these powers and Russia are a guarantee (I am
almost prepared to say—the strongest guarantee) that peace and
friendship between Britain and France will last a long time, and that all
possible, and under present circumstances probable, differences between
France and Britain will most speedily and truly find a happy solution.

2. Question. Is not the virtual termination of the
Greco-Turkish War, a war supported by Britain, an opportune
nionieiit for the conclusion of an Anglo-Russian agreement?

Answer. Of course, the termination of the
Greco-Turkish War, which had Britain’s support, is a factor that, to a
certain extent, improves the chances of an Anglo-Russian agreement being
concluded. We looked for such an agreement even before that war ended and
shall now continue to seek it with the utmost energy. True, some of the
problems connected with the termination of that war are objects of our
disagreement with Britain. But, first of all, the peace which has followed
the Greco-Turkish War is in our opinion such an advantage to international
politics as a whole that we hope for an improvement in the general
conditions under which they are conducted, thanks to the Greco-Turkish
peace. Secondly, we do not consider the differences between Britain and
ourselves to be in any way insurmountable. On the contrary, we expect that,
with the Middle East problem entering various stages, the near future will
show us to what extent we are right in hoping that the end of the
Greco-Turkish War will also be the end of the conflicts and differences
which placed that war in the forefront of international politics. We are
doing everything in our power to make the end of that war also the end of
all friction and disagreement with Britain, and we hope that the interests
of the British Government will rise on this occasion, too, above any
promptings and the frequently insincere utterances of the anti-Russian
press.

3. Question. Do you consider Russia’s
participation in the eastern question a matter of prestige alone, or do you
proceed exclusively from Russia’s real interests? Does the Russian
’Government agree to the French proposal to permit Russia’s
participation in only that part of the Conference that will decide the
question of the Straits?

Answer. I consider Russia’s participation in the settlement of the Middle East question [2] to have nothing to do with
prestige. I hope that our international politics as a whole over a period of
five years have shown completely that we are quite indifferent to questions
of prestige and that we are incapable of putting forward any demand
whatsoever or of worsening the real chances of peace between states solely
on account of prestige. I am confident that in no other country are the
masses so indifferent to prestige and even so prepared to treat the question
of prestige as such with happy ridicule. We are of the opinion that modern
diplomacy will rapidly come to regard questions of prestige precisely in
this way.

Our Middle East policy is a matter of Russia’s most real, immediate and vital interest and of the interest of a number of states
federated with her. If all these states did not succeed in getting their
demand to participate in the Middle East Conference satisfied, there would
remain a huge mass of elements of hostility, conflict and discontent; their
non-participation would involve such difficulties in purely commercial
affairs between Eastern Europe on the one hand, and all other states on the
other, that either there would remain no grounds whatever for peaceful
coexistence or that such existence would be extraordinarily difficult.

The Russian Government, therefore, is not satisfied with the
proposal from Paris to allow Russia to participate only in that part of the
Conference which will settle the problem of the Straits. We are of the
opinion that such a limitation would inevitably lead to a number of very
practical, immediate inconveniences, in particular economic inconveniences,
from which France and Britain would themselves suffer, most probably in the
near future.

4. Question. What is the Russian programme for the
solution of the Straits problem?

Answer. Our Straits programme (still only approximate, of course) contains, among other things, the following:

First, the satisfaction of Turkey’s national aspirations.

We consider this essential, and not only in the interests of national
independence. Our five years’ experience in settling the national
question in a country. that contains a tremendous number of nationalities
such as could hardly be found in any other country, gives us the full
conviction that under such circumstances the only correct attitude to the
interests of nations is to meet those interests in full and provide
conditions that exclude any possibility of conflicts on that score. Our
experience has left us with the firm conviction that only exclusive
attention to the interests of various nations can remove grounds for
conflicts, can remove mutual mistrust, can remove the fear of any
intrigues and create that confidence, especially on the part of workers
and peasants speaking different languages, without which there absolutely
cannot be peaceful relations between peoples or anything like a successful
development of everything that is of value in present day
civilisation.

Secondly, our programme includes the closing of the Straits
to all warships in times of peace and of war. This is in the direct
commercial interests of all powers, not only of those whose territory is in
the immediate vicinity of the Straits, but of all others, too. It must be
remembered that all over the world there has been an inordinate amount of
pacifist talk, an unusual number of pacifist phrases and assurances, and
even vows against war and against peace, [The Versailles Peace Treaty] although there is usually little preparedness on the
part of the majority of states, especially on the part of the modern
civilised states, to take any realistic steps, even the most simple, to
ensure peace. On this, and on similar questions, we should like to see a
minimum of general assurances, solemn promises and grandiloquent formulas,
and the greatest possible number of the simplest and most obvious decisions
and measures that would certainly lead to peace, if not to the complete
elimination of the war danger.

Thirdly, our programme on the Straits includes complete
freedom of commerce by sea. After what I have said above I do not think it
at all necessary to explain this point or make it more concrete.

5. Question. Would the Russian Government agree to the League
of Nations controlling the Straits if the League were to include in its composition Russia, Turkey, Germany and the United States?

Or would Russia insist on the establishment of a special
commission to control the Straits?

Answer. We are, of course, opposed to the League of
Nations, and I do not think that it is only our economic and political
system with its specific features that accounts for our negative attitude
towards the League; the interests of peace, regarded from the point of view
of the concrete conditions of modern international politics in. general,
also fully justify that negative attitude. The League of Nations hears so
many marks of its world war origin, it is so intimately hound up with the
Versailles Treaty and is so marked by the absence of anything resembling the
establishment of the, real equality of rights between nations, anything
resembling a real chance of their peaceful coexistence, that I think our
negative attitude to the League can he appreciated and does not stand
in need of further comment.

6. Question. Does the refusal to ratify the agreement with
Urquhart mean a victory of the “Left Communists” ? What are the
objective conditions which would make possible a resumption of negotiations
and the ratification of the agreement with Urquhart?

Answer. The question of concluding an agreement with
Urquhart124 was raised by our government when I was ill and was unable to
take part in affairs of state. Therefore I am not yet fully informed of all
the details of this matter. Nevertheless I can assert quite definitely that
there is not, nor can there now he, any question of a victory for the Left
Communists. I know this from my direct observation of the course of
government affairs.

The fact of the matter is that Britain’s act of injustice, expressed in her unwillingness to admit us to the Conference, was
so unexpected, aroused such indignation in Russia and so firmly united not
only the Right with the Left Communists but also united the huge mass of the
non-Party population of Russia, the workers and peasants, that things did
not and could not reach the point of disagreement between the Left and Right
Communists.

The reason given for our rejection of the Urquhart agreement was a direct expression, one may say, not only of the general Party
sentiment but of that of the entire people, i.e., the sentiment of the
entire mass of the workers and peasants.

The resumption of negotiations and the subsequent ratification of an agreement with Urquhart depend primarily on the
elimination of the flagrant injustices committed against Russia by Britain
in curtailing her right to participate in the Middle East Conference. As far
as the concrete terms submitted to us by Urquhart are concerned, I have not
yet had time to look into this matter in sufficient detail, and can only say
that the government has decided to let the supporters and opponents of this
agreement have their say in our press as soon as possible, in order to
obtain, from the most objective and motivated discussion, material for the
overall verification of all the pros and cons and for a decision on the
issue in a manner that best accords with Russia’s interests.

7. Question. To what extent are the accusations of the anti
Russian press in Britain justified when they assert that the recent arrests
of industrialists in Moscow signify the end of the New Economic Policy and a
reversion to the policy of nationalisation and confiscation?

Answer. As to your question concerning the accusations made against us in the British anti-Russian press that
“Moscow industrialists” were being arrested, I must say that I
have today just read in our newspaper (Izvestia) an item headed
“Arrests of Black Marketeers” . None other than Comrade
Z. B. Katsnelson, chief of the Economic Division of the State Political
Administration, tells us in this article that there was no question of
arrests of industrialists, and that “rumours circulated by enemies of
Soviet power, both within the R.S.F.S.R. and abroad, that the arrests are
infringements on the freedom to trade are actually nothing but
nonsensical inventions that have the definite counter-revolutionary
intent of disrupting the economic relations that are being established with
Western Europe” .

Indeed, those arrested were exclusively profiteers on the
so-called black market and our authorities are in possession of evidence
establishing connection between these black-market currency profiteers and,
certain employees of foreign missions in Moscow. This evidence shows not
only the sale of platinum and of gold bars but also the organisation the contraband shipments of these valuables abroad.

From this you can see how absolutely unfounded are the rumours that we are putting an end to the New Economic Policy and how
utterly false are the accusations made by the anti-Russian press in Britain,
which is trying by the most unheard of distortion and deception to present
our policy in a false light. Actually, there has never been any mention in
any government circles whatsoever of discontinuing the New Economic Policy
and returning to the old. Incidentally, the whole work of the government
during the session of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee now in
progress is aimed at obtaining the widest possible legislative sanction for
what is known as the New Economic Policy, so as to eliminate all possibility
of any deviation from it.

October 27, 1922

Endnotes

[1] Edouard
Herriot, leader of the Radical Socialist Party, member of Parliament and
Mayor of Lyons, visited Russia unofficially on September 20-October 10,
1922. He toured the country with the aim of elucidating economic and
political possibilities for estab-lishing relations between France and the
R.S.F.S.R.

[2] The
Lausanne Conference, which took place on November 20, 1922-July 24,
1923.