Date: 1922-10-24
Source: ru:ND

Comrade Chicherin!

It seems to me that we’re heading toward a situation where we won’t pay a single penny to anyone—whether we grant Urkarta a concession remains to be seen; but we will not yield a single royal prerogative.

That’s my view. It’s quite possible that we may have to concede something—or perhaps even more than that. I’m not tying my own hands. When the moment arrives, we’ll discuss in detail what we can—and cannot—offer (a concession to Urkarta, or perhaps some bonds and the like).

My overarching thought is this: they are crumbling, while we grow ever stronger. If we can manage it, we must strive to come out on top. We must keep our options open and avoid locking ourselves into rigid commitments. I’m jotting this down hastily, as a personal note; if you’d prefer an official statement, you’re always free to request a formal resolution from the Politburo.

I’m not familiar with the Aralov affair—I don’t know what’s at stake.

Yours, Lenin.

P.S. If you’d like, we could meet and talk further.

I do not share Sokolnikov’s views. While credit may not be premature, we must not resort to drastic sacrifices.

I simply don’t see how one could issue bonds—with a 15‑year maturity—and then fail to make any payments on them! In my view, such a move would inevitably lead to being forced to repay through blockade.

Envelope Inscription

To Comrade Chicherin (from Lenin).

Fund 2, Inventory 1, File 23377, Pages 1 and 4—autograph.

1In the letter now being published, V.I. Lenin responds to G.V. Chicherin’s questions, which Chicherin had posed in his letter dated October 24, 1922: “I am taking this opportunity to write to you about the most pressing matters. Before Genoa, you wrote to me: ‘A rupture would be advantageous for us—but it must not originate with us.’ Why? I have sought in vain to obtain an answer. It is not enough to issue directives on individual details; I need to understand the government’s overarching strategy. All that remained was to pursue a policy of evasive maneuvering.

And now—every day I speak with ambassadors, journalists, and write to plenipotentiaries—I must grasp the government’s fundamental line of thinking.

Sokolnikov believes that credit is premature; we must first strengthen ourselves so that we can absorb it. But if that’s the case, why do we go to such lengths to pretend that we desire credit? A series of recent decisions seems to suggest precisely that line of reasoning. But is that really so? I cannot carry out my work without knowing the truth.

For propaganda purposes, we—and I included—are quick to claim that Genoa demanded the restoration of private property. Yet we all know that this is not the case: it would have sufficed to print bonds ostensibly payable after 15 years—bonds that would never actually be redeemed. Such a move would have paved the way for agreements with foreign governments. Credit does not come from the state treasury; it comes from the pockets of private individuals. Once agreements are reached with foreign governments, once “confidence” is established, the wallets of countless individuals may begin to open wide.

What, then, could possibly have been so disadvantageous about printing bonds that would never be paid—while still securing an agreement? (“The Slide Toward Krasin.”) To this day, I still do not fully grasp your true intentions… My ignorance of your core strategic vision has become a constant obstacle in every endeavor” (RGASPI, Fund 5, Inventory 1, File 2061, Pages 17–19).

Upon receiving Lenin’s reply, Chicherin noted on the envelope: “Received at 10:15 p.m. Georgy Chicherin,” and immediately penned a new letter to Lenin: “October 24, 1922, 11:00 p.m. Dear Vladimir Ilyich, of course I would be delighted to engage in a more detailed conversation with you. (Emphasized by V.I. Lenin—Ed.) If ‘they’ are indeed falling apart, then that only strengthens your position: in 15 years, we will be far more robust, while ‘they’ will have grown so weak that no one will even think of compelling us to honor our obligations. The bonds serve precisely this purpose: they shift the dispute forward by 15 years, when the balance of power will have shifted entirely. To be sure, I would not go so far as to say that ‘they’ are collapsing—only that their strength is waning. The crisis is abating. Indian swaraj is no more than Irish Home Rule. But in 15 years, we will have grown sufficiently strong; today, we need ‘them’ far more than we will in 15 years…

If we wait for the “decisive moment,” the costs will mount far higher. “Seize the moment!” What was possible in Genoa is no longer feasible in The Hague. Once we miss the window of opportunity, it may be a long time before another presents itself. And in the next moment, they will demand far more from us.

I wrote to Aralov in response to a question you put to me over the phone, on your behalf” (RGASPI, Fund 2, Inventory 1, File 23377, Page 3).