Date: 1922-10-13
Source: ru:PSS/v45

LETTER TO I. V. STALIN FOR THE MEMBERS OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE RCP(b) ON THE MONOPOLY OF FOREIGN TRADE
To Comrade Stalin, Secretary of the Central Committee
13/X/1922.
The resolution adopted by the Plenum of the Central Committee on October 6 (Protocol No. 7, Item 3) ostensibly establishes a minor, piecemeal reform: “to enact a series of separate resolutions by the State Trade Organization authorizing, on a temporary basis, the import and export of certain categories of goods or the application of such measures to specific border regions.”
But in reality, this amounts to a dismantling of the monopoly over foreign trade. It is not surprising that Comrade Sokolnikov sought—and achieved—this outcome. He has always pursued this line of reasoning; he delights in paradoxes and has consistently argued that the very existence of the monopoly is detrimental to our interests. What is astonishing, however, is that those who voted in favor of this measure did so without thoroughly consulting any of the economic experts—despite the fact that they had, in principle, stood firmly behind the monopoly.
What, then, does the adopted resolution entail?
For import and export purposes, purchasing offices are being established. The owner of such an office is authorized to buy and sell only specifically designated commodities.
Where, then, is the oversight? Where are the means of control?
In Russia, flax costs 4 rubles and 50 kopeks; in England, it fetches 14 rubles. We have all read in “Capital” how capital undergoes profound internal transformations and grows ever bolder as interest rates and profit margins soar. Everyone remembers that capital is capable of recklessly plunging headlong into risk—and Marx recognized this long before the war, even before its “jumps” and surges.
So what now? What force will prevent peasants and merchants from seizing the most lucrative opportunity? To monitor the activities of the neighboring purchasing office and prove that its flax has been sold off for clandestine export?
Comrade Sokolnikov’s paradoxes are always cleverly crafted—but one must distinguish between paradoxes and hard-won truths.
In rural Russia, no “legality” whatsoever can be imposed in matters of this kind. Any comparison with smuggling—“after all,” some might say, “smuggling against the monopoly is rampant anyway”—is utterly misguided: one thing is a professional smuggler operating at the border; quite another is the entire peasantry, which will inevitably defend itself and clash with the authorities seeking to seize what it regards as its own, rightful gains.
Before we have even had time to fully experience the benefits of the monopoly regime—which is only just beginning to yield millions for us (and will soon bring in tens of millions and more)—we are plunging into utter chaos, undermining the very foundations we have barely begun to strengthen.
We have begun to build a system: both the Foreign Trade Monopoly and cooperative enterprises are in the process of being established. In a year or two, we will see some initial results. Profits from foreign trade are measured in hundreds of percent; we are already reaping millions, even tens of millions. We have started forming mixed enterprises, learning to capture half of their (prodigious) profits. We already glimpse the prospect of substantial state revenue. Yet we abandon this path in the hope of relying on tariffs—tariffs that cannot possibly generate anything close to such returns—we cast aside everything and chase after a phantom!
The issue was hastily brought before the Plenum. There was no serious debate whatsoever. There was no compelling reason to rush. Only now are economic experts beginning to take a closer look. To resolve the most crucial questions of trade policy from one day to the next, without first gathering the necessary data, without weighing the pros and cons with concrete documents and figures—where, in such a hasty approach, is there even the slightest semblance of a proper, reasoned attitude toward the matter? Tired minds cast their votes within minutes, and that’s the end of it. Even less complex political issues we have weighed repeatedly and often deliberated over for months.

I deeply regret that illness prevented me from attending the meeting that day—and that I am now compelled to petition for a temporary exemption from the usual rules.
But I believe we must carefully weigh and study this question; haste is always harmful.
I propose that we postpone decision on this matter for two months—that is, until the next Plenum—and, in the interim, gather together and thoroughly examine the documents detailing our experience with trade policy.
V. Ulyanov (Lenin)
P.S. During yesterday’s conversation with Comrade Stalin (I was not present at the Plenum but made every effort to learn from comrades who had attended), we touched upon, among other things, the proposed temporary opening of the ports of St. Petersburg and Novorossiysk. It seems to me that both examples illustrate the extreme danger inherent in such experiments—even when limited to just a small list of goods. The opening of the Port of St. Petersburg would escalate flax smuggling along the Finnish border to truly alarming proportions. Instead of combating professional smugglers, we would find ourselves locked in a struggle against the entire peasantry of the flax-growing region. We would almost certainly lose that battle—and suffer irreparable damage in the process. The opening of the Port of Novorossiysk would rapidly drain surplus grain supplies: is this prudent, when our reserves for war are already scant? When a number of systematic measures aimed at increasing those reserves have yet to bear fruit?
Next, we must consider the following: the Foreign Trade Monopoly has opened the door to a steady influx of gold into Russia. For the first time, we can begin to calculate: a merchant’s initial six-month trip to Russia might yield him, say, hundreds of percent in profit; he raises the price we pay for acquiring this right—from 25% to 50%, in favor of the Foreign Trade Monopoly. We have begun to gain the capacity—and the opportunity—to learn how to increase these profits. But all of this collapses in an instant; the entire endeavor comes to a halt, for if different ports are opened up piecemeal, on a temporary basis, then no merchant will offer even a single kopeck for such a “monopol—

LETTER TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE RCP(b) ON THE MONOPOLY OF FOREIGN TRADE y.” That much is clear. Before taking such a risk, we must think it through—and calculate it out—several times over. On top of that, there is the added political risk of inviting not just the specific foreign merchants we have vetted, but the entire petty bourgeoisie at large.
With the Foreign Trade Monopoly, we began to count on an inflow of gold. I see no other viable calculation—except perhaps in the case of the wine monopoly—but here too, we face grave moral concerns, as well as a host of practical objections raised by Sokolnikov.
Lenin
P.P.S. I am now informed (around 1:30 p.m.) that several economic experts are petitioning for a postponement. I have not yet reviewed this petition, but I wholeheartedly support it. After all, it is only a matter of two months.
Lenin
First published in 1950,
in the fourth edition of the Collected Works
of V. I. Lenin, Volume 33

Printed from the manuscript