Date: 1922-04-25
Source: ru:ND; en:Pipes
Source: Unknown Documents

In code

Genoa. Chicherin for all members of the delegation

We consider Chicherin's maneuver in the form of his letter to Lloyd George1 correct, but we understand it precisely as a maneuver. The most important thing is to emphasize as clearly as possible that the rupture was caused exclusively by the question of the restoration of private property. In the matter of compensation for former foreign owners, our limit of concessions is as follows: first, according to the directive of April 17, preferential rights for concessions where they are recognized as possible by us. If an enterprise is generally leased out, and the old foreign owner does not take it, he loses the right to any compensation. Second. Owners of those enterprises which remain under state economic management are satisfied with the claims we recognize and in the amount established by us. These concessions must be strictly dependent on the size and conditions1* of the loan. The task of our financiers is to calculate the details. On this, insist, emphasizing as trumps for the resumption of trade in the future: 1st, the principled significance of the treaty with the Germans, 2nd, the principled refusal to restore private property2*.

Lenin. Kamenev. Stalin. Trotsky. Molotov.

Postscript. In the very extreme case, we allow for the following additional concession: instead of recognizing the claims and the amount of satisfaction being determined only by us, it can be proposed that both are determined by agreement between Sovpra3* and each individual owner. But we will make this concession only on two conditions: first, no arbitrator for such agreements; second, very favorable loan terms.

Lenin. Kamenev. Stalin. Trotsky. Molotov.

April 25, 1922

Fund 2, op. 1, file 23098, p. 3 - copy.

1* "and conditions" — inserted by V.I. Lenin in L.B. Kamenev's draft

2* "restoration... of property" — written by V.I. Lenin in L.B. Kamenev's draft instead of the crossed-out: "restitution."

3* Sovpra — Soviet government.

1Refers to the letter from G.V. Chicherin to Lloyd George on April 20, 1922, with the following proposal: on condition of the annulment of war debts and interest on all debts, the provision of sufficient financial assistance to Russia, and the de jure recognition of the Soviet government, it would be possible to return nationalized or expropriated property to its former owners, and where this proved impossible, to satisfy the claims of former owners either through direct agreement with them or through a corresponding agreement that could be discussed and adopted at the present conference (see: Documents of Soviet Foreign Policy. Vol. V, pp. 259-260). On April 22, Y. Rudzutak informed Moscow that the majority of the delegation did not agree with Chicherin's letter and considered it a violation of the directive of the Politburo of the CC RCP(b) of April 17. On April 24, Lenin wrote in a letter to I.V. Stalin for members of the Politburo that "Chicherin has either already made, or is quite capable of making, an undoubted mistake and violating the directive of the CC," and proposed the text of a telegram to Chicherin for all members of the delegation (Lenin V.I. Collected Works, vol. 45, pp. 164-165). Apparently, in the evening of April 24, during a meeting between Lenin, Stalin, and Kamenev, the draft of the published telegram was prepared. The draft was written by L.B. Kamenev, with corrections inserted by V.I. Lenin and I.V. Stalin; then Stalin wrote: "For Lenin, Kamenev, Stalin. For Trotsky with amendments." There is a note by V.M. Molotov: "For Molotov."

On April 27, after information from L. Karakhan about the Genoa Conference, the Politburo of the CC RCP(b) decided to send the following telegram to Chicherin: "Having received the latest information from Genoa this morning, the Politburo sees no possibility of going beyond the directive of April 25. Any further concessions could be made only with an absolutely precise guarantee of the preliminary receipt of the loan. Without a loan, we do not go for any concessions at all" (Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History, f. 17, op. 3, d. 290, l. 1).