V. I. Lenin

The International and Domestic Situation

Of The Soviet Republic

Speech Delivered To A Meeting
Of The Communist Group At The All-Russia Congress
Of Metalworkers, March 6, 1922 [1] (Stormy applause.) Comrades, permit me to depart
somewhat from your usual procedure and speak today not of the
subjects on the agenda of your meeting and Congress, but of my
conclusions and opinions on the principal political problems. It
has now become the custom to address those who, while not being
official representatives of state departments, actually perform
an enormous part of the work of the state. You all know that
really business-like work is being done in most of our state
departments by representatives of the working class, and this,
of course, includes the metalworkers, who are in the front
ranks.

That is why I think in this case it will not be out of place to
depart from the usual procedure and to speak not so much on
trade union and Party issues as on political issues, on our
international and domestic situation. In my opinion there is
something in our international and domestic situation that
resembles some change of policy to which every Party member,
and, of course, every class-conscious worker, should pay special
attention in order that he may fully understand the significance
of this change of policy, and be able properly to assimilate it
and apply it in his Soviet, Party, trade union or other
work.

Of course, comrades, you all know that Genoa remains in the
forefront of the problems of our international politics. I am
not very sure that it does so legitimately, for when we say
“Genoa” we mean the Conference that everybody long ago heard about, the Conference that was to have taken place in
Genoa, Italy. The preparations for it had been almost completed;
but now, unfortunately, the situation is so indefinite that
nobody knows (and I am afraid that even the initiators and
organisers themselves do not know) whether there is much chance
of its taking place or not. At all events, we must say to
ourselves, and to all those who have any interest in the destiny
of the workers’ and peasants’ republic, that our position on this question, that is, on the question of the Genoa
Conference, has been absolutely firm from the very beginning,
and remains so. It is not our fault if certain people lack not
only firmness but even the most elementary determination, the
most elementary ability to carry out their own plans. From the
very beginning we declared that we welcomed Genoa and would
attend it. We understood perfectly well and did not in the least
conceal the fact that we were going there as merchants, because
trade with capitalist countries (as long as they have not
entirely collapsed) is absolutely essential to us; we realised
that we were going to Genoa to bargain for the most proper and
most advantageous and politically suitable terms for this trade,
and nothing more. This is by no means a secret to those
capitalist countries whose governments drew up the first plan
for the Genoa Conference and got it going. Those countries know
perfectly well that the list of commercial agreements linking us
with different capitalist states is growing longer and longer,
that the number of practical transactions is increasing, and
that we are now discussing in the greatest detail a huge number
of joint Russian and foreign commercial projects between the
most diverse combinations of foreign countries and various
branches of our industry. Thus, the capitalist states are well
aware of the practical basis of what is mainly to be discussed
at Genoa. And this basis has a superstructure consisting of all
sorts of political talk, assumptions and projects, but we must
realise that it is only a little one, largely artificial,
designed and erected by those who are interested in it.

It goes without saying that during the more than four years’ existence of Soviet power we have acquired
sufficient practical experience (apart from the fact that we are
already quite familiar with it in theory) to enable us to
appraise correctly the diplomatic game the gentlemen who
represent the bourgeois countries are today playing according to
all the rules of the obsolete art of bourgeois diplomacy. We
know perfectly well what lies at the bottom of this game; we
know that it is trade. The bourgeois countries must trade with Russia; they know that unless they establish some form
of economic relations their disintegration will continue in the
way it has done up to now. Notwithstanding all their magnificent
victories, notwithstanding the endless boasting with which they
fill the newspapers and telegraph services of the whole world,
their economy is falling to pieces. And after more than three
years of effort, after their great victories, they cannot cope
with the very simple task of restoring the old, let alone
building anything new, and are still racking their brains over
the problem of how to get together and form some combination of
three, four, or five (the number is so large, you see, that it
is frightfully difficult to reach an agreement) so as to be able
to trade.

I can understand that Communists need time to learn to trade,
and I know that those who are learning will be making the
crudest of mistakes for several years; but history will forgive
them because they are entirely new to the business. For this
purpose we must make our thinking more flexible, and must
discard all communist, or rather Russian, Oblomovism, [2] and much more besides. But it is
strange for representatives of bourgeois countries to have to
learn the trading business all over again, after they have been
engaged in it for hundreds of years, and when the whole of their
social life is based upon it. Incidentally, it should not seem
so strange to us. For a long time we have been saying, and we
always knew, that their appraisal of the imperialist war was
less correct than ours. They appraised it from what they could
see directly in front of them, and three years after their
tremendous victories they still cannot find a way out of the
situation.

We Communists said that our appraisal of the war was more
profound and correct; that its contradictions and its disasters
would have a far broader impact than the capitalist countries
imagined. And, looking at the bourgeois victor countries from
outside, we said: they will recall our forecast and our
appraisal of the war and its consequences more than once. The
fact that they do not understand the simplest things does not
surprise us. But we nevertheless say, “We must trade with
the capitalist countries as long as they exist.” We shall
negotiate with them as merchants; and the fact we can do so is
proved by the increasing number of trade agreements we are
signing and negotiating with them. But we cannot publish them
until they are signed. From the commercial point of view we, of
course, have to agree when a capitalist merchant comes to us and
says, “This deal must remain between ourselves until the
negotiations are completed.” We, however, know how many
agreements are in course of preparation—the list alone fills several pages, and it includes scores of practical
proposals that have been discussed in detail with important
financial groups. Of course, the gentlemen representing the
bourgeois countries gathering at Genoa are as well aware of this
as we are; whatever the position may be as regards other
matters, contacts between these governments and their capitalist
firms have, of course, been maintained. Even they are not so
terribly lax as not to know of this.

Since in foreign telegrams we are continually reading statements
which create the impression that they do not know exactly what
will take place at Genoa, that they have something new up their
sleeve, that they want to astonish the world by submitting new
terms to Russia, permit me to say to them (and I hope I shall
have the opportunity of saying it to Lloyd George personally, at
Genoa): “You will not surprise anyone by this, gentlemen. You are businessmen, and you know your job well. We
are only just learning to trade and are still clumsy at it. But
we have tens and hundreds of agreements and draft agreements,
which show how we trade and what transactions we conduct or
shall conduct, and on what terms.” And we smile quietly to
ourselves when we read in the newspapers all sorts of reports—published for the purpose of searing
someone—to the effect that they intend to put us to some
sort of test. We have been threatened often enough, and with
much more serious threats than those uttered by the merchant who
intends to slam the door after making his last offer. We have
been threatened with the guns of the Allied powers that rule
almost the whole world. We were not frightened by those
threats. Please, gentlemen, European diplomats, do not forget
that.

We are not in the least concerned about maintaining our
diplomatic prestige, the good name to which the bourgeois states
attach so much importance. Officially, we shall not even talk
about it. But we have not forgotten it. Not one of our workers,
not one of our peasants has forgotten, can forget, or ever will
forget that he fought in defence of the workers’ and peasants’ government against the alliance of all those
very powerful states that supported the intervention. We have a
whole collection of treaties which those countries concluded
with Koichak and Denikin over a number of years. They have been
published; we are familiar with them and the whole world is
familiar with them. What is the use of playing hide—and—seek and pretending that we have all become
Simple Simons? Every peasant and every worker knows that he
fought against those countries, and that they failed to vanquish
him. And if you gentlemen, who represent the bourgeois governments, care to amuse yourselves, to waste your paper (of
which you have ever so much more than you need) and your ink,
and to overload your cables and radio stations with messages
announcing to the whole world: “We shall put Russia to the
test", we shall see who comes off best. We have already been put
to the test, not the test of words, not the test of trade, not
the test of money, but the test of the bludgeon. And in view of
the severe, bleeding and painful wounds inflicted on us, we have
earned that it be said of us—not by ourselves, but by our
enemies— “A man who has been beaten is worth two who have not.”

We have earned this on the field of battle. As far as trade is
concerned, it is a pity that we Communists are not being
thrashed enough, but I trust that this defect will be made good
in the near future with equal success.

I said that I hope to discuss these subjects with Lloyd George
personally, in Genoa, and to tell him that it is no use
trying to frighten us with such trivialities because it
will only damage the prestige of those who try it. I hope that I
shall not be prevented from doing this by ill health, which
during the past few months has prevented me from taking a direct
part in political affairs, and which totally incapacitates me
for the Soviet duties which I have been appointed to perform. I
have reason to believe that I shall be able to return to my
duties within a few weeks. But will three or four of them succeed within the next few weeks in reaching an agreement on what they have informed the world they are already agreed upon? I am not sure about that. I even dare assert that nobody in
the world is sure about it, and what is more, that they
themselves are not sure, because when these victorious powers,
which rule the whole world, gathered at Cannes after numerous
preliminary conferences—the number of these conferences is
infinite, and even the European bourgeois press is jeering—they could not say definitely what they
wanted.

From the point of view of practical tasks and not that of a game
of diplomatic leap-frog, therefore, Comrade Trotsky has defined
the position more correctly than anybody else. The day after the
news was received that all the arrangements for Genoa had been
made, that everything had been settled, that complete agreement
had been reached about Genoa and that it was only the instability of one of the bourgeois governments (they seem to
have become suspiciously unstable these days) that necessitated
the temporary postponement of the Conference, he issued the
following order: “Let every man of the Red Army get a clear understanding of the international situation. We know
definitely that there is a permanent group over there who want
to try their hand at intervention. We shall be on the alert. Let
every man of the Red Army know all about the diplomatic game and
what is meant by force of arms, which, up to now, has decided
all class conflicts.”

Let every man of the Red Army know all about this game and what is meant by force of arms, and then we shall see what happens. No matter how shaky capitalism may have become in
all capitalist countries, many quite influential parties may
still try their hand at this game. Arid if the governments are
so unstable that they cannot convene a conference at the date
set for it, who knows whose hands they will fall into? We know
that in those countries there are influential parties and
influential persons and business magnates who want war. We are
perfectly well aware of this, and we are well informed of what
really lies at the bottom of economic treaties. We have endured
exceptional hardship, and we know what misfortune and suffering
a fresh attempt at war must entail for us. But we say we
shall be able to stand it again—just try and do it! When Comrade Trotsky issued his definite order instead
of publishing opinions about the game of diplomatic leap-frog,
he had drawn the conclusion that we must again explain the
international situation to every man of the Red Army, and tell
him that the postponement of, the Genoa Conference, owing to the
instability of the Italian Cabinet, is a danger signal of
war. We shall see to it that every man of the Red Army under stands this. It. will be easy for us to do this
because there is hardly a family, hardly a man of the Red Army
in Russia who does not know this, not only from newspapers,
circulars and orders, but from his own village, where he has
seen cripples, and knows families that have gone through this
war, where he sees crop failures, appalling hunger and ruin,
hellish poverty, and knows what causes them—even though he
does not read the Paris publications of the Mensheviks and
Socialist-Revolutionaries which attribute all this to the
malignant nature of the Bolsheviks. There can scarcely be a
desire so deeply ingrained in him as the desire to repel (to say
the least) those who forced upon us the war waged by Koichak and
Denikin and supported it. There is no need for us to appoint new
agitation and propaganda commissions for this purpose.

In respect of the Genoa Conference we must distinguish exactk between its real nature and the newspaper canards circulasd by the bourgeoisie. They think that these canards
are frightful bombs, but they do not frighten us, because we
have seen so many of them; and sometimes they do not deserve
answering even with a smile. Every attempt to impose terms upon
us as if we were vanquished is so very foolish that it is not
worthy of a reply. We are establishing relations as merchants; we know what you owe us and what we owe you; and we know what your legitimate profit and even your super-profit may be. We get many proposals, and the number of agreements we
are concluding is growing and will continue to grow, no matter
how three or four of the victor powers combine. You will lose by
this postponement of the Conference, because you will show your
own people that you do not know what you want, and that the
disease you are suffering from is lack of will power, and a
failure to understand economics and politics, which we have
appraised more profoundly than you. It will soon be ten years
since we made this appraisal, and all the ruin and disorder that
has occurred since then is still not understood by the bourgeois
countries.

We already see clearly the position that has taken shape in our
country, and we can say with full conviction that we can now
stop the retreat we began, we are already stopping it. Enough! We clearly realise that the New Economic
Policy is a retreat, and we do not conceal it. We grasped more
than we could hold, but such is the logic of the struggle. Those
of you who remember what the position was in October 1917, or
those of you who were politically immature at the time and have
learned since what the position was in 1917, know what a large
number of compromise proposals we Bolsheviks made to the
bourgeoisie at that time. “Gentlemen, your affairs are in
a bad way,” we said, “we shall be in power, however, and will remain in power. Wouldn’t you like to consider
how you could settle things without a rumpus, as the muzhik
would say?” We know that there was not only a rumpus, but
attempts at rebellion, which the Mensheviks and
Socialist-Revolutionaries instigated and supported. Formerly
they said: “We are prepared to surrender power to the. Soviets right now.” A few days ago I read an article
by Kerensky, who opposed Chernov in a Paris journal (there’s lots of that stuff there). ’Did we cling to
power?” asked Kerensky. “Even at the time of the
Democratic. Conference [3] I said that if anyone could be found
to form a homogeneous government, power would be transferred to
the new government without the slightest upheaval.”

We have never refused to take power alone. We said that as early
as June 1917, [4] and took power at the Congress of
Soviets in October 1917. We Bolsheviks obtained a majority at
that Congress of Soviets. Then Kerensky appealed to the officer
cadets, [5] rushed off to Krasnov and wanted to muster an army to march on Petrograd. We knocked them about a
bit, and now they say in an offended tone, “You are insolent, you are usurpers, butchers!” And we say in
reply, “You have only yourselves to blame, friends! Do not
imagine that the Russian peasants and workers have forgotten
what you did. In October you challenged us to the most desperate
fight, and we retaliated with terror and redoubled terror;
and we shall adopt terror again if necessary,if you try it again.” Not a single worker, not a single peasant
doubts the need for it. No one doubts it but whimpering
intellectuals.

Under conditions of unheard-of economic hardship we were
compelled to wage war against an enemy whose forces were a
hundred times superior to ours. It goes without saying that
under these circumstances we were obliged to go to greater
lengths in our urgent communist measures than would otherwise
have been the case; we were forced to do it. Our enemies thought
they could finish us off; they thought they could bring us to
our knees, not in words, but in deeds. They said they would not
make any concessions. We replied that if they thought we dared
not resort to the most extreme communist measures they were
mistaken. And we did dare; we did it, and we won. Now we say we
cannot hold these positions, we are retreating, because we have
won enough to be able to hold essential positions. All the
whiteguards, headed by the Mensheviks and
Socialist-Revolutionaries, wax jubilant and say, “Aha, you
are retreating!” We say, ’Rejoice, since it puts you in good humour.” We stand to gain if our enemy pats
himself on the back instead of engaging in practical work. Rejoice, you are only putting us in a more favourable
position by deceiving yourselves with illusions. We have
captured vast positions, and had we not captured them in the
period from 1917 to 1921 we would have had no room to retreat,
geographically, economically or politically. We are maintaining
power in alliance with the peasantry, and if you reject terms
offered you before a war, you get worse terms after the
war. This is definitely recorded in the diplomatic, economic and
political history of the period 1917-21, so that we are not
boasting at all. It is a plain statement of fact, a simple
reminder. Had the capitalist gentlemen accepted the proposals we
made to them in October 1917, they would have had five times as
much as they have now. You fought for three years. What have you
gained 1y it? Do you want to fight again? We know perfectly well
that by no means all of you want to fight. On the other hand, we
know that in view of the desperate famine and the present state
of industry, we cannot hold all the positions we won in the
period 1917-21. We have surrendered a number of them. But we can
now say that, so far as making concessions to the capitalists is
concerned, the retreat is at an end. We have weighed up our own
forces and those of the capitalists. We have done some reconnoitring by way of concluding agreements with Russian and
foreign capitalists, and we say—and I hope, I am sure, that the Party Congress will say the same, officially, on behalf
of the ruling party of Russia— “We can now stop our economic retreat. Enough! We shall not retreat any further; we shall set about deploying and regrouping our
forces properly.”

When I say that we are halting our economic retreat I do not
want to suggest that I have for a moment forgotten the hellishly
difficult conditions in which we find ourselves; nor do I want
to soothe or console you on that score. The question of the
limits of the retreat, and of whether we are stopping the
retreat or not, is not one of the difficulties that confront
us. We are aware of these difficulties. We know what famine in a
peasant country like Russia means. We know that we have not yet
succeeded in alleviating the sufferings caused by the famine. We
know what a financial crisis means in a country which is
compelled to trade and where paper currency has been issued on a
scale such as the world has never seen before. We are well aware
of these difficulties and fully appreciate their immensity. I am
not afraid to say that they are tremendous. This does not
frighten us in the least. On the contrary, we gain strength from
saying openly to the workers and peasants that these are the
difficulties that confront us; this is the danger with which the
Western powers threaten us. Let us work and weigh up our tasks
soberly. The fact that we are stopping our retreat does not mean
that we are not aware of the dangers. We look them straight in
the face. “This,” we say, “is where the main danger lies; we must alleviate the sufferings caused by the
famine. We have not done so yet. We have not yet overcome the
financial crisis.” Hence, you must not interpret what I
say about halting the retreat to mean that we think that we have
already laid the foundation (of our new economy) and that we can
now calmly advance. No, the foundation has not yet been laid. We
still cannot look calmly to the future. We are surrounded by
threats of war, about which I have said enough, and by still
greater internal dangers, economic dangers within the country;
these are the frightful state of ruin of the peasantry, the
famine, and our disrupted finances. These dangers are very
great. They call for tremendous effort on our part. But if we
are forced to go to war, we shall be able to fight. It will not
be easy for them to fight, either. It was easy for them to start
war in 1918 and as easy to continue it in 1919. But much water,
and blood, and many other things have flowed under the bridge
since then. The Western workers and peasants have changed since
1919. And it is impossible to fool them by saying, “We are
fighting the Germans; the Bolsheviks are nothing more than
German agents.” We do not become panic-stricken over our
economic situation. Today we have scores of agreements concluded
with Russian and foreign capitalists. We know what difficulties
lay and still lie before its. We know why the Russian capitalists consented to conclude these agreements. We know on
what terms these agreements were concluded. The majority of the
capitalists concluded the agreements as practical men, as
merchants. We, too, are acting as merchants. But every merchant
takes some account of politics. If he is a merchant from a not
altogether barbarous country, he will not enter into transactions with a government unless it shows considerable
signs of stability, unless it is very reliable. The merchant who
did such a thing would not be a merchant, but a fool. Most
merchants are not fools, for the logic of the commercial
struggle eliminates the fools. If, formerly, the test was,
“Denikin has beaten you, now show that you can beat
Denikin", today the test is, “If the merchant has beaten
you, prove that you can compel him to do business". We have
proved it. We have already concluded a number of agreements with
very big capitalist firms, both Russian and West-European. We
know what they are after, they know what we are after.

Today the object of our activities has changed somewhat. That is
exactly what I want to say a few words about, to supplement my
already somewhat lengthy report.

In view of the fact that the Genoa situation is precarious and
the end of the wavering is not in sight, and because we have
made so many concessions in our domestic policy, we must now
say: “ Enough! No more concessions!” The capitalist gentlemen think that they can daily, and the longer
they daily the more concessions they will get, but we must
say,

’Enough! Tomorrow you will get nothing.” If they have not learned anything from the history of Soviet power
and its victories, they can do as they please. For our part we
have done all we could and have informed the whole world about
it. I hope the Congress will confirm the fact that we shall not
retreat any further. The retreat has come to an end, and, in consequence of that, the nature of our work is
changing.

It must be stated that considerable nervousness, almost
morbidness, is still observed in our ranks when this question is
discussed. All sorts of plans are drawn up, and all sorts of
decisions are adopted. In this connection I want to mention the
following. Yesterday I happened to read in Izvestia a political poem by Mayakovsky. [6] I am not an admirer
of his poetical talent, although I admit that I am not a
competent judge. But I have not for a long time read anything on
politics and administration with so much pleasure as I read
this. In his poem he derides this meeting habit, and taunts the
Communists with incessantly sitting at meetings. I am not sure
about the poetry; but as for the politics, I vouch for their
absolute correctness. We are indeed in the position, and it must
be said that it is a very absurd position, of people sitting
endlessly at meetings, setting up commissions and drawing up
plans without end. There was a character who typified Russian
life—Oblomov. He was always lolling on his bed and mentally drawing up schemes. That was a long time ago. Russia
has experienced three revolutions, but the Oblomovs have
survived, for there were Oblomovs not only among the landowners
but also among the peasants; not only among the peasants, but
among the intellectuals too; and not only among the intellectuals, but also among the workers and Communists. It is
enough to watch us at our meetings, at our work on commissions,
to be able to say that old Oblonovstill lives; and it will be necessary to give him a good washing and cleaning, a good rubbing and scouring to make a man of him. In this respect
we must have no illusions about our position. We have not
imitated any of those who write the word “revolution” with a capital R, as the
Socialist-Revolutionaries do. But we can quote the words of Marx
that many foolish things are done during a revolution, perhaps
more than at any other time. [7] We revolutionaries must learn to regard these foolish acts dispassionately and
fearlessly.

In this revolution we have done so much that is ineradicable,
that we have finally won; the whole world knows about it and we
have no reason whatever to be embarrassed or nervous. On the
basis of our reconnaissance we are now checking up on what we
have done. This check is very important and should serve as the
starting point for our further progress. And since we have to
hold out in the struggle against the capitalists, we must pursue
our new line with determination. We must build up our whole
organisation in such a way that our commercial enterprises are
not headed by people who lack experience in that field.
Very often we find a Communist at the head of a government
office who is admittedly a conscientious comrade, tried and
tested in the struggle for communism, who suffered imprisonment
for the cause, and for that reason has been put at the head of a
state trust. But he does not know how to trade. He has all the
undoubted qualities of a Communist, but the merchant cheats him,
and is quite right in doing so; it is a mistake to put a very
worthy, excellent Communist, whose loyalty no one but a madman
would doubt, in a place that should be occupied by a shrewd,
conscientious salesman who could cope with his work ever so much
better than the most devoted Communist. This is just where our
Oblomovism makes itself felt.

We have given Communists, with all their splendid qualities,
practical executive jobs for which they are totally unfitted. How many Communists are there in government offices?
We have huge quantities of material, bulky works, that would
cause the heart of the most methodical German scientist to
rejoice; we have mountains of paper, and it would take Istpart [8] fifty times fifty years to go
through it all; but if you tried to find anything practical in a
state trust, you would fail; and you would never know who was
responsible for what. The practical fulfilment of decrees—of which we have more than enough, and which we
bake as fast as Mayakovsky describes—is never checked. Are
the orders of the responsible Communist officials carried out?
Can they get this done? No. They cannot; and that is why we are
changing our domestic policy to the very core. Of what value are
our meetings and commissions? Very often they are just make
believe. After we began to purge our Party and said to ourselves: “Out with the self-seekers who have crept into
the Party, out with the thieves!” things improved. We have
expelled about a hundred thousand; that is splendid, but it is
only a beginning. We shall discuss this question thoroughly at
the Party Congress. And then, I think, the tens of thousands who
now only organise commissions, and do not, and cannot, carry on
practical work, will meet with the same fate. And after we have
completed the purge in this way, our Party will get down to real work and learn to understand it as it learnt to
understand war work. This, of course, is not a matter of several
months, or even a year. We must display rock-like firmness in
this question. We are not afraid to say that the nature of our
work has changed. Our worst internal enemy is the bureaucrat—the Communist who occupies a responsible (or
not responsible) Soviet post and enjoys universal respect as a
conscientious man. As the Russian saying goes, “Although
he never touches a drop, he sings false". He is very conscientious, but he has not learnt to combat red tape, he is
unable to combat it, he condones it. We must rid ourselves of
this enemy, and with the aid of all class-conscious workers and
peasants we shall get at him. The whole mass of non-Party
workers and peasants will follow the lead of the vanguard of the Communist Party in the fight against this enemy and this inefficiency and Oblomovisni. There must be no hesitation whatever in this matter.

In conclusion, I will sum up briefly. The Genoa game, the game
of leap-frog that is going on around it, will not compel us to waver in the least. They cannot catch us now. We
shall go to the merchants and agree to do business, continuing
our policy of concessions; but the limits of these concessions are already defined. What we have given the
merchants in our agreements up to now has been a step backward
in our legislation; but we shall not retreat any further.

In connection with this, our main tasks in our internal and,
particularly, our economic policy are undergoing a change. We do
not need new decrees, new institutions or new methods of
struggle, What we need is the testing of the fitness of our officials; we need executive control. The next purge will affect the Communists who imagine that they are administrators. All those who run all these commissions and conferences and
talk but do no practical work would do better to go into the
field of propaganda, agitation and other useful work of that
kind. All sorts of extraordinary and intricate things are
invented on the plea that the New Economic Policy requires
something new; but they do not do the work they are instructed
to do. They make no effort to look after the kopeks entrusted to
them; they make no effort to make one kopek grow into two; but
they draw up plans affecting billions and even trillions of
Soviet rubles. It is this evil that we shall combat. To test men and verify what has actually been. done— this,
this again this alone is now the main feature of all our
activities, of our whole policy. This is not, a matter of a few
months or of a year, but of several years. We must say officially, on behalf of the Party, what the main feature of our
activities is at the present time, and reorganise our ranks
accordingly. If we do that we shall be as victorious in this new
field as we have been up to now in all the fields of activity
engaged in by Bolshevik, proletarian power, supported by the
peasant masses. (Applause.)