V. I.

Lenin

Only for circulation among members of the
Politbureau

Draft decision for the C.C.

1. The C.C. recognises as correct the appraisal of the situation and
the tasks (of our delegation at Genoa) as given in the theses of Comrade
Litvinov.

2. The C.C. fully empowers Vice Chairman Chicherin to act as chairman
of the delegation.

3. In the event of Comrade Chicherin’s illness or departure his powers
shall be vested in turn in one of the two trios:

a) Litvinov, Krasin, Rakovsky; b) Litvinov, Joffe, Vorovsky.

4. Our delegation should try to evade the question of acceptance of the
Cannes terms. Failing this, and in the event of our being presented with a
direct ultimatum, we should try to work Krasin’s formula:

“All countries recognise their state debts and undertake to compensate
damage and losses caused by the acts of their governments."

If this does not work either, we should make for a break, declaring
definitely that we are prepared to recognise private debts, but that, not
wishing to play hide-and-seek, we point out that we consider them covered,
together with the whole sum of our obligations, by our counter-claims. We
accept no chief umpire between us and all the bourgeois countries, since
the dispute is between two systems of property.

If we have to break, we should make it perfectly clear that the main
and sole reason for the break is the greed of a handful of private
capitalists, Urquhart, etc., whom the governments serve.

As a maximum concession these capitalists can be offered:

a preferential right to concessions (i.e., if we grant X a concession on
their former property wholly or in part on such-and-such terms, we
undertake to give it to its former owner on the same terms).

5. In view of the possibility of the bourgeois trying to prevent us
from developing our programme, we should make every effort in the very
first speech to set forth, if not develop, this programme, or at least
outline it (and immediately publish it in greater detail).

6. In our programme we should, without concealing our communist views,
confine ourselves to a brief and passing mention .of them (for instance, in
a subordinate clause), and to a forthright statement to the effect that we
do not consider this the right place to preach our views, since we have
come for trade agreements and for an attempt to reach an agreement with the
pacifist section of the other (bourgeois) camp.

By the pacifist section of that camp (or some other well-chosen polite
expression) we should make it clear that we mean the petty-bourgeois,
pacifist and semi-pacifist democrats of the II and II 1/2 International type, and the Keynes type,
etc.

One of our main, if not principal, political tasks at Genoa is to
single out this wing of the bourgeois camp from the rest of the camp, try
to flatter that wing, make it known that we consider possible and desirable
not only a trade, but a political agreement with them (as one of the few
chances of capitalism’s peaceful evolution towards the new order, which we,
Communists, do not greatly believe in, but which we agree and consider our
duty to help try out, as representatives of one power in face of a hostile
majority of other powers).

Everything possible and even impossible should be done to strengthen
the pacifist wing of the bourgeoisie and increase if only slightly its
chances of success at the elections. This first and foremost. Secondly, to
disunite the bourgeois countries that will be united against us at
Genoa—such is our dual political task at Genoa, and not at all the
development of communist views.

7. Every attempt should be made to develop at length and publicise as
widely as possible (in print, if not in speeches) the plan for the
rehabilitation of the national economy in Russia and in Europe—in the
spirit of the State Planning Commission’s researches and on the basis of
these researches.

8. If the bourgeois camp in Genoa presents an ultimatum to us not to
touch on questions of pacifism, but to speak only on narrow trade subjects,
we should express our regret, but comply with this ultimatum, saying that
we had two aims at this conference—a pacifist aim and a trade aim. This
will leave only one.

9. The C.C. leaves it to the delegation to elaborate the pacifist
programme, confining itself to the general directive that they should try
to develop it as broadly as possible in order to split the pacifist camp of
the international bourgeoisie away from the gross-bourgeois, aggressive
bourgeois, reactionary-bourgeois camp.

10. On the question of trade and concessions (including the question of
loans), the forests of the North, etc., should be put forward as the
principal guarantee. We agree to no derogation of the rights of our
state. No agreements are to be signed without the special consent, by telegraph, of the Central

Committee. [1]

Lenin

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Notes:
[1]
Lenin’s motion was adopted by the Politbureau on February 28, 1922,
with the following amendments moved by Stalin:

“1. The question regarding recognition of the Soviet government
should

be raised not at the beginning but at the close of the conference (after
attempts had been made to reach an economic agreement), and no ultimatum
should be made of it; 2. Centrosoyuz, the agricultural co-operatives , etc., should not be put forward at the conference in
the capacity of subjects (contracting parties) (as Krasin suggests), and
only a single subject—the Russian state should be taken into
consideration” (Central Party Archives, Institute of Marxism-Leninism of
the C.C., C.P.S.U.).