On the Purging of the Party
The purging of the Party has, it seems, evolved into a serious and immensely important undertaking.
In some places, party cleansing is carried out primarily by drawing on experience, by heeding the guidance of non‑party workers, by acting in accordance with their recommendations, and by taking due account of representatives of the non‑party proletarian masses. This is the most valuable, the most crucial approach. If we could truly succeed in purging the Party from top to bottom—“without regard to personal connections”—the gains of the revolution would indeed be momentous.
For the achievements of the revolution can no longer be the same as before. Their character is inevitably shifting, as the struggle shifts from the military front to the economic front; as we move toward a new economic policy; as conditions increasingly demand that we focus first and foremost on boosting labor productivity and strengthening labor discipline. In such times, the principal achievement of the revolution becomes an internal improvement—not flashy, not immediately conspicuous, not readily apparent—a betterment of labor itself, of its organization, of its outcomes; an improvement in the sense of combating the corrosive influences—those tendencies rooted in petty-bourgeois and petty-bourgeois-anarchist elements—that undermine both the proletariat and the Party. To bring about such an improvement, we must cleanse the Party of those elements that have grown estranged from the masses (not to mention, of course, those elements that bring shame upon the Party in the eyes of the masses). Of course, we will not submit to every single directive emanating from the masses, for the masses

On the Purging of the Party are themselves sometimes susceptible—especially in years of extreme exhaustion, of overwork brought on by excessive burdens and hardships—to moods that are anything but progressive. Yet when it comes to assessing individuals, to taking a negative stance toward those who “have attached themselves,” who “have become too cozy,” who “have bureaucratized themselves,” the guidance offered by the non‑party proletarian masses—and in many cases, even the guidance provided by the non‑party peasant masses—is of supreme value. The working masses possess an extraordinary sensitivity, keenly perceiving the distinction between honest, devoted communists and those who inspire nothing but revulsion in a person who earns his daily bread through the sweat of his brow, in a person who enjoys no privileges, who has no “shortcuts to power.”
To purge the Party while taking heed of the directives issued by non‑party workers is a great endeavor. It will yield profound results. It will make the Party a far more powerful vanguard of the class than before—making it a vanguard that is more closely bound to the class, more capable of leading it to victory amid countless difficulties and dangers.
As a specific task within the purging of the Party, I would also emphasize the need to cleanse it of former Mensheviks. In my view, of those Mensheviks who joined the Party after the beginning of 1918, we should retain in the Party roughly no more than one hundredth of their number—though even then, each individual we choose to keep must be scrutinized three or four times over. Why? Because, as a current, the Mensheviks demonstrated two distinct characteristics during the period from 1918 to 1921: first, their remarkable ability to adapt, to “attach themselves” to the dominant trend among the workers; and second, their even more remarkable capacity to serve the White Guard faithfully and wholeheartedly, to put their principles into practice while outwardly professing loyalty to the cause. Both of these traits stem from the entire history of Menshevism: one need only recall Axelrod’s “Workers’ Congress,” the Mensheviks’ attitude toward the Cadets—and toward the monarchy—both in word and in deed, and so forth, ad infinitum. The Mensheviks “attach themselves” to the RCP not only, or even primarily, out of Machiavellian calculation (although in matters of bourgeois diplomatic tactics, the Mensheviks had already proven themselves, as early as 1903, to be first‑class masters in this field), but rather because of their inherent “adaptability.” Every opportunist is distinguished by his adaptability (though not every instance of adaptability constitutes opportunism), and the Mensheviks, as opportunists, adapt—so to speak—“by principle” to the prevailing currents among the workers, cloaking themselves in a protective hue, much as a hare turns white in winter. We must understand this characteristic of the Mensheviks and take it into account. And to take it into account means purging the Party of roughly ninety-nine out of every hundred Mensheviks who joined the RCP after 1918—namely, at the very moment when the Bolsheviks’ victory began first to seem probable, then to become unmistakably certain.
We must cleanse the Party of sycophants, of bureaucrats gone soft, of dishonest men, of wavering communists, and of Mensheviks who may have repainted their “facade” but remained Mensheviks at heart.
September 20, 1921 “Pravda,” No. 210, September 21

Signed: N. Lenin

Printed according to the text of the newspaper “Pravda.”