Comrades! The question of concessions has given rise to quite unexpected disagreements among us—indeed, as late as last autumn, it seemed that this issue had been settled beyond dispute. When the Sovnarkom’s decree on concessions was issued on November 23 of last year, there were no protests within party circles, at least not among the leading cadres, and no signs whatsoever of emerging divisions. You are, of course, aware that the Party Congress was compelled to adopt a special resolution reaffirming the decree on concessions—and explicitly extending its application to the granting of concessions in Baku and Grozny.71 This decision had to be made at the Party Congress precisely because there could be no room for hesitation in the Central Committee’s policy, even though the division along this very issue turned out, to a considerable extent, to be entirely at odds with the old factional alignments, which had largely been shaped by Baku. Some comrades from Baku simply could not bring themselves to accept the idea that concessions were necessary—even perhaps especially so—for Baku itself; that in Baku, the majority of local industries ought to be placed under concessionary management. The arguments advanced were strikingly diverse: some claimed that we should “investigate” matters ourselves, asking why we needed to call in foreign investors; others insisted that the veteran workers, those who had long stood their ground in the struggle against capitalists, would never tolerate being forced back under the yoke of capital—and so on.

I do not presume to judge how much of these arguments stemmed from genuine principled concerns or, one might say, from a distinctly Baku-based “patriotism,” from local parochialism. As for myself, I must confess that I fought against this view with the utmost determination, believing that if we failed to implement a policy of concessions and to attract foreign capital into concessionary ventures, then there was little point in talking about any serious, practical measures to improve the economic situation. It is impossible to seriously address the urgent task of immediately improving the economic conditions unless we embrace the policy of concessions—and unless we cast aside our preconceptions, our narrow-minded local patriotism, and, to some extent, our self‑proclaimed “expertise” in “investigating” things ourselves. We must be prepared to make a whole host of sacrifices, endure hardship and inconvenience, break with long‑held habits, and even, perhaps, overcome deeply ingrained ailments—only then can we achieve a decisive shift and genuinely improve the economic position in the key branches of industry. We must succeed at all costs.
At the Party Congress, all attention was focused on the question of policy toward the peasantry and on the issue of the tax in kind—a matter that occupies first place in legislation as a whole and has captured the Party’s attention as the central political question. Regarding the tax in kind and our approach to the peasantry, we have come to realize that we are unable to raise the productivity of large-scale industry as quickly as is required to meet the needs of the peasantry without resorting to such makeshifts as the revival of free trade and free industrial activity. Now, however, we must, if only through these temporary measures, press forward—because it is plain to anyone who has not lost their sense of reality that without these crutches we will never be able to keep pace with the demands of life. The situation continues to grow more acute—partly because, for a variety of reasons, most notably natural ones, the spring harvest has been utterly ruined across a vast swath of the country. A fuel crisis looms on the horizon. Then, spring threatens another poor harvest—again, due to climatic conditions.

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The lack of fodder may further reduce fuel supplies. And if drought strikes once more, the crisis risks taking on an altogether extraordinary character. We must understand that under such conditions, all the provisions of our program—which, above all, call for increasing the output of foodstuffs at all costs—are not meant to be merely admired or to inspire sentimental attachment to various resolutions, something the Communists pursue with extraordinary zeal—but rather to ensure that increased food production is delivered, come what may. We cannot accomplish this on our own, without the aid of foreign capital. For anyone who looks at reality without illusions, this should be abundantly clear. That is why the question of concessions has taken on such importance that the Party Congress was compelled to devote itself to it.
After some heated debate, the Sovnarkom adopted the basic principles of the concession agreement.72 I will now read them aloud and highlight those principles that bear particular significance—or that have given rise to controversy. If the Party’s members, especially the leaders of the labor movement—that is, the organized ranks of the proletariat, the organized majority of the working class—fail to grasp the true nature of the current situation and draw the appropriate conclusions from it, then, of course, there can be no serious talk of economic reconstruction. I will now go through the basic principles of the concession agreement, point by point, as they were adopted by the Sovnarkom. I should add that, to date, we have not yet concluded a single concession agreement. We have certainly had our share of principled disagreements—after all, we are masters at voicing such differences—but we have not yet secured a single concession. Perhaps some will rejoice at this development. If so, that is a sad outcome, for if we fail to attract capital to concessionary projects, then it becomes evident that we possess no real economic initiative. Yet for the Communist, there remains ample room in the resolutions—enough space to fill countless pages with their words. Let us begin with the first principle:
“1. The concessionaire is obligated to improve the working conditions of workers employed in concessionary…

in enterprises (compared with other workers employed in similar enterprises within the same locality), up to the average international standard.”
We insert this fundamental provision into the contract in order to place the communists—and the leaders of our economic institutions—right at the heart of the matter. What is most crucial for us in concession agreements? Of course, it is the increase in output. That goes without saying. But even more important—and perhaps even more so—is the fact that we can immediately improve the conditions of workers employed in concessionary industries. These provisions of the concession agreement were adopted after extensive deliberations on the issue, particularly following a series of discussions held abroad by certain representatives of the RSFSR, especially Comrade Krassin, with several of the financial magnates of contemporary imperialism. It must be said that, as you well know, the vast majority of our communists may have read books and even written pamphlets on capitalism and finance capital—but 99 out of every 100 communists are incapable of engaging in businesslike negotiations with representatives of financial capital, and they will never learn how.
In this regard, Comrade Krassin is uniquely prepared, having studied both the practical and organizational aspects of industrial conditions in Germany and in Russia. Comrade Krassin was briefed on these conditions and responded: “On the whole, it’s acceptable.” First and foremost, the concessionaire is obligated to improve the working conditions of the labor force. During Krassin’s preliminary talks with one of the oil barons, this very point was discussed—and it was clear to Western European capitalists that, given the current state of worker conditions, there was absolutely no prospect of achieving any significant increase in productivity. The obligation placed upon the concessionaire to improve workers’ conditions is not some humanitarian aspiration; rather, it is a purely pragmatic consideration. The second point:
“2. In this regard, account shall be taken of the lower labor productivity of the Russian worker, and it is stipulated that

MEETING OF THE COMMUNIST FRACTION OF THE VTsSPS the possibility of revising the labor productivity standard for the Russian worker, depending on whether he attains better living conditions.”

This proviso was necessary to prevent a one-sided interpretation of the clause. All of these provisions serve as rules and directives for all representatives of Soviet power who will deal with concessions, and they constitute guiding principles upon which contracts will be drafted. We have a draft oil contract, a contract for bearing factories, a draft forest concession, and a long-discussed agreement concerning Kamchatka—which, despite its many provisions, has yet to be fully implemented. The second clause was essential to ensure that the first was not interpreted in a rigid, literal sense. We must recognize that labor productivity will not increase until workers’ conditions improve. To disregard this consideration would immediately cast all questions regarding concessions onto a non‑businesslike footing, one that would deter capitalists from even entering into dialogue. The third clause:
“3. The concessionaire is obliged to import from abroad the essential goods required for the livelihood of workers employed in concessionary enterprises, selling them to the workers at no higher than cost plus a specified percentage for overhead expenses.”
Initially, we had considered setting this percentage at 10%, but during final deliberations, we ultimately dropped the percentage altogether. What matters here is that we are making it a fundamental principle to import from abroad the items necessary for workers’ daily lives. We know that, given the state of our peasant economy and the ongoing fuel crisis, we will not be able to fundamentally improve workers’ conditions—or, consequently, to significantly boost labor productivity—in the near future. Therefore, it is imperative that the concessionaire include in the contract the obligation to import all consumer goods from abroad—a task that remains entirely feasible for them. In this regard, we have already secured preliminary agreement from certain sharks of capitalism. Concessionaires will agree to these terms because obtaining raw materials—of immense value—is an absolute necessity for them. Securing raw materials is their top priority. Whether these key enterprises employ ten thousand, twenty thousand, or thirty thousand workers, it poses no real difficulty for concessionaires to procure all the goods workers need, thanks to the intricate networks maintained by modern syndicates and trusts. For today, few capitalists remain outside of syndicates and trusts; indeed, most major enterprises are built on monopolies rather than free markets. Consequently, these enterprises can effectively control access to raw materials and finished products for other capitalists—while simultaneously ensuring that they themselves have ample supplies, obtained through prearranged contractual agreements. These syndicates handle hundreds of millions. They will be able to manage vast reserves of foodstuffs—and thus secure sufficient food and other essential goods for tens of thousands of workers, transporting those supplies to Russia.
For them, this presents no real economic challenge. They will view these enterprises as high‑priority projects, capturing profits of 100%, if not 1,000%, while supplying these enterprises with food. I repeat: this does not pose any economic difficulty for them. Our concession policy must prioritize improving the conditions of workers in first‑class enterprises, and only then turn to the remaining sectors. The next, fourth clause:
“4. In this regard, should the government of the RSFSR so require, the concessionaire is obligated to import, in addition to the goods he already brings in for workers employed in concessionary enterprises, another 50–100% of that quantity—delivering these goods to the government of the RSFSR in exchange for payment equal in amount to the original cost plus a specified percentage for overhead expenses. The government of the RSFSR is authorized to offset this payment against the concessionaire’s share of the product he extracts (i.e., by deducting it from its own share-based allocation).”

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And this condition was recognized by the financial oligarchs as feasible during preliminary negotiations, since concessionary enterprises represented for them a powerful lever of influence.
If we consider commodities such as oil—oil that they can obtain from us—they will be able to sell it abroad as monopolists. Consequently, they will not only be able to supply foodstuffs to the workers employed at their enterprises, but also to allocate a certain percentage of these goods beyond that need. When you compare this point with the first, you will see the central tenet of concessionary policy: the improvement of workers’ conditions—first and foremost those working in concessionary enterprises—and, to a somewhat lesser extent, other workers, procuring for them certain consumer goods from abroad. At present, as buyers on the international market, we cannot secure these goods—even if we had the means to pay for them. When dealing in foreign currency, say gold, you must bear in mind that there is no free market; the entire market—or nearly the entire market—is dominated by syndicates, cartels, and trusts, all driven by their own imperialist profits. These entities will supply goods to workers only for their own enterprises, not for others, because the old form of capitalism—the free-market capitalism—no longer exists. Herein lies the essence of concessionary policy, as applied to the current conditions of finance capital and the immense struggle among trusts, a struggle waged by one against another. Concessionary policy is an alliance forged by one side against another; and while we are not yet strong enough to endure until the victory of the international revolution, we must exploit their mutual animosity. For them, improving workers’ conditions is feasible because providing for an additional twenty to thirty thousand workers poses little burden for even the largest modern enterprise. This would enable us to cover our raw-material costs—such as oil, for example. If we could supplement this with additional quantities of timber and ore—our principal assets—we would have the means to meet the needs of workers for essential supplies, and we could then focus, above all else, on improving the lot of those workers employed in concessionary enterprises, while directing any surplus toward enhancing the conditions of other workers—but to a lesser degree.  Point Five:
“5. The concessionaire is obligated to comply with the laws of the RSFSR, particularly regarding working conditions, payment deadlines, and related matters, and to enter into agreements with trade unions (should the concessionaire so request, we agree to add that, in such agreements, the standard rate applicable to the average American or Western European worker shall be binding upon both parties).”
This stipulation was adopted to allay the concerns of capital regarding our trade unions. When we state that agreements must be reached with the unions—because throughout the entire body of legislation, the involvement of trade unions runs like a red thread; because in every law of fundamental importance in this regard, the participation of trade unions has been enshrined, and the position of the unions, aligned with socialist principles, is guaranteed by law—if we were to say that capitalists must enter into agreements with trade unions, then a capitalist who is well informed, knowing that trade unions are guided by communist factions and, through them, by the Party, might well fear that these communists could bring about all manner of absurdities—and might then demand terms that are utterly unreasonable. From the capitalist’s perspective, such fears are entirely natural. Therefore, we must make clear that we stand on the ground of businesslike agreements—otherwise, there is nothing left to discuss. That is why we state that we agree to include this addition: we consent, on our own behalf and on behalf of our trade unions, to adopt a labor standard equivalent to the average American or Western European worker’s norm. Otherwise, I repeat, there can be no question of a contract tailored to capitalist relations.  Point Six:
“6. The concessionaire is obligated to strictly adhere to scientific and technical standards consistent with Russian and

SESSION OF THE COMMUNIST FRACTION OF THE VTsIK foreign legislation (details to be specified in each individual agreement).”
This clause in the contract will be developed with particular thoroughness. For example, an oil contract comprises ten articles, each meticulously setting forth and elaborating on specific scientific regulations. The fundamental characteristic of capitalist economic activity is its inability to ensure scientifically sound exploitation—not only of land, but also of labor itself. The means of combating this tendency are precisely scientific and technical standards. We know, for instance, that oilfields, when exploited in even slightly improper or insufficiently precise ways, are prone to waterlogging. It is clear that obtaining the necessary technical equipment is of paramount importance to us. Let me remind you here that an approximate estimate of the equipment we require was made in the booklet “The Plan for the Electrification of Russia.” I do not recall the figures with absolute precision, but in broad terms, the total cost of electrification was projected at 17 billion rubles in gold, with the first phase of work expected to be completed within roughly a decade. We plan to cover up to 11 billion of this sum through our own resources—both gold reserves and export earnings—and thus 6 billion will remain uncovered. In light of this, the authors of this study concluded that we would either have to issue debt obligations or grant concessions. We must bridge this deficit. The plan was formulated by the finest experts, taking into account the entire republic—from the standpoint of the systematic development of all industrial sectors. Above all, the focus is on fuel—and on the most economical, rational, and advanced utilization of that fuel across all major industries. We could not hope to solve this problem without the resources provided by concessions and debt financing. Of course, at some point—though highly desirable—these conditions may cease to exist. After a particularly large-scale strike, such as the one currently unfolding in England, or like the recent strike in Germany that ended in failure in 1973, a successful strike will inevitably follow a failed one.

Both a successful revolution—and then we shall find ourselves in socialist relations, not capitalist ones.
The danger posed by interruptions in oil production is rapidly assuming catastrophic proportions. The level of output that capitalists had managed to achieve in Baku prior to 1905 has remained elusive. It turns out that in foreign oilfields—such as those in California and Romania—the same risk of water encroachment is recognized. Insufficient water extraction leads to ever-increasing water cut in the producing wells.
Detailed regulations governing this matter are enshrined in both foreign and Russian legislation. When we were working on this issue in Baku, we consulted our experts regarding Romanian and Californian law. To safeguard our sources of raw materials, we must ensure that scientific and technical standards are fully implemented and rigorously observed. For example, when it comes to forest management, we must ensure that forestry practices are carried out in accordance with sound principles. When dealing with oil production, we must adopt measures to combat water encroachment. In short, adherence to scientific and technical standards—and rational exploitation—are essential. But where do these principles originate? They are drawn from both Russian and foreign legal codes. By doing so, we dispel any fear that we have simply invented these rules ourselves; for if that were the case, no capitalist would be willing to engage in dialogue with us. We draw upon what already exists in Russian and foreign legislation. If we take the best elements from Russian law and from any foreign legal system, we can then establish a standard that matches—or even surpasses—the level achieved by the most advanced capitalists today. This is a well-established business norm, one that does not stem from communist fantasy—something capitalists fear above all else—but rather from capitalist practice itself. We guarantee that, in all contracts, we will never deviate from the standards set forth in capitalist legislation, under any circumstances, in every respect, and across every clause of the concession agreement. This fundamental principle must never be forgotten. We must build upon the foundations of capi-

MEETING OF THE COMMUNIST FRACTION OF THE VTsSPS
In capitalist relations, we must demonstrate to capitalists that these terms are acceptable, that they are advantageous for them—and at the same time, we must be able to extract benefits for ourselves as well. Otherwise, any discussion of concessions is nothing more than empty rhetoric. Thus, we are speaking of what is already recognized in capitalist legislation. Everyone knows that, in terms of technological advancement and the scientific organization of production, advanced capitalism far surpasses our current industry. Accordingly, we do not limit ourselves to Russian legislation alone. For instance, when it comes to oil, we began drawing on materials from Russian, Romanian, and Californian legal frameworks. We have the right to draw on any law whatsoever—and in doing so, we eliminate any suspicion that we are merely indulging in arbitrary invention. For the modern, advanced capitalist, for the financial magnates and for contemporary finance capital, this is perfectly clear. They align themselves with international standards and global norms. We present these standards, taking into account the practical demands of capitalism. Here, we do not operate on the basis of mere fantasies; rather, we set ourselves the practical goal of improving our industry to such an extent that it can truly compete with the most advanced, modern forms of capitalism. Anyone familiar with the state of our industry understands that this improvement represents a monumental leap forward. If we were to implement these measures across even a small portion of our industrial sector—say, just one-tenth of our total output—it would constitute a tremendous step forward: a step that would be highly beneficial for them, while also being deeply desirable for us. Seventh point:
“7. A rule analogous to Paragraph 4 shall apply to equipment imported by the concessionaire from abroad.”
Paragraph 4 stipulates that, in addition to bringing equipment necessary for his own operations, the concessionaire must, should we include this provision in the contract, also bring a certain quantity of surplus equipment for sale—at a special, premium price. If a capitalist imports advanced drilling tools and specialized instruments for his own use, we have the right to require that, beyond the number of drills he actually needs, let us say 25%, he also bring equipment for us—and we will compensate him in the same manner as under Paragraph 4: at cost plus a specified percentage for overhead expenses.
The future looks exceedingly promising. Yet we must not, under any circumstances, confuse these two distinct endeavors: on the one hand, the agitational work that brings that future ever closer; and on the other, the ability to navigate the present-day capitalist environment with skill and finesse. If we fail to master this art, we risk falling prey to the bitter truth encapsulated in the proverb: “While the sun rises, the dew will eat away your eyes.” We must learn to leverage the peculiarities of the capitalist world—and to exploit the capitalists’ insatiable appetite for raw materials—to secure economic advantages that, strange as it may seem, enable us to strengthen our position within the capitalist system. The task may appear paradoxical: how can a socialist republic improve its standing by relying on capitalism? Yet we have seen this very dynamic in action during wartime. We did not win the war because we were stronger—but because, though weaker, we knew how to exploit the rivalries between capitalist states. Today, either we harness the divisions among corporate trusts, or we risk becoming ill-equipped to adapt to the unique characteristics of capitalism and ultimately finding ourselves unable to thrive within the capitalist order. Eighth point:
“8. The question of whether workers employed at concessionary enterprises shall be paid wages in foreign currency, in special bonds, in Soviet rubles, or in other forms—shall be determined by a separate agreement appended to each individual contract.”
As you can see, here we accept all forms of payment: foreign currency, bonds, Soviet rubles—and we agree in advance to consider favorably any proposals that business leaders may put forward. Among the concrete suggestions we have heard was one from Vanderlip, who stated: “I would like to pay workers an average wage—say, one and a half dollars per day. Then I would arrange…”

The meeting of the Communist Fraction of the All‑Union Central Council of Trade Unions
on its concessionary territory, in these shops; in these shops, I will stock all the goods necessary for the workers, and only those who possess designated vouchers will be able to obtain supplies from the shops—and I shall issue vouchers only to those workers who are employed in my concessionary enterprises.” Whether this arrangement ultimately comes to pass or not, we regard it, in principle, as entirely acceptable. Of course, a host of difficulties arise here. To successfully reconcile a concession that takes capitalist production into account with the perspective of Soviet power is by no means an easy task—and, as I have said, any such effort represents a continuation of the struggle between capitalism and socialism. This struggle has taken on new forms, yet it remains a struggle. Every concessionaire remains a capitalist, and he will naturally seek to undermine Soviet authority; but we, for our part, must strive to harness his greed to our own advantage. We say: “We will spare no expense—even up to 150%—if we can secure an improvement in the lot of our workers.” It is precisely for this reason that the struggle will continue. Here, of course, requires even greater skill than when negotiating any peace treaty. In every peace treaty, there is a struggle—a struggle in which bourgeois powers, standing behind the scenes, take part. When we concluded peace treaties with Latvia, Finland, and Poland, foreign powers stood behind each of those states, guiding their actions. And we had to negotiate these treaties in such a way as to allow the bourgeois republics to survive on the one hand, while, on the other, securing advantages for Soviet power from the standpoint of world diplomacy. Every peace treaty with bourgeois powers is, in essence, a document that codifies certain aspects of the war. Likewise, every clause in a concession agreement is, in a sense, a “warlike” provision—because, in each and every clause, there was a war at stake. And we must know how to position matters so that we can defend our own interests in this ongoing conflict. We can do this because the capitalist reaps substantial profits from the concessionary enterprise, while we, in turn, achieve a modest improvement in the conditions of our workers, gaining a small increment in output through proportional deductions. If payment is made in foreign currency, then a whole host of complex questions arise: How are we to exchange that currency for Soviet rubles? How are we to combat speculation? And so on. We are prepared in advance to face any form of payment head-on—we are not afraid of it. Go ahead, you capitalists, devise whatever schemes you wish—this is what this clause is meant to convey. Whether the goods you bring are sold using special vouchers, whether they are sold under special terms, or only against personal certificates issued to workers employed in the concession—that is of little concern to us. We can adapt to any condition, so that we may wage battle against you on these very terms and wrest from you a measurable improvement in the lot of our workers. This is the task we set ourselves. As for how this task will be resolved within the concession agreement, that remains to be seen. You cannot propose the same payment terms in remote Kamchatka as you would in our own region or in Baku. If the concession is located in the Donets Basin, then the forms of payment simply cannot be the same as those applied in the far North. We have placed no constraints on the capitalists regarding the methods of payment. Each and every clause of the agreement will inevitably involve the struggle between capitalists and socialists. We fear this struggle neither, and we are confident in advance that we will be able to extract the maximum possible benefits from the concessions. Clause Nine:
“9. The terms of employment, living standards, and remuneration for foreign skilled workers and employees shall be governed by the free agreement between the concessionaire and the aforementioned categories of employees and workers.
Trade unions have no right to demand that Russian tariff rates—or indeed, Russian hiring regulations—be applied to such workers.”
We regarded Clause Nine as absolutely essential, for to expect capitalists to place their trust in communists would be sheer folly. This is clear—not only in principle, but especially from the standpoint of “pragmatic calculation.” And if we were to insist that professional trade unions must formally endorse these employment conditions, if we were to tell the capitalists that

The meeting of the Communist Fraction of the All‑Union Central Council of Trade Unions
we will accept any foreign technician or specialist—but please, first abide by the Labor Code of the RSFSR—then, quite obviously, no foreign technician would ever agree to comply with such requirements, nor would they wish to do so; thus, such a stipulation would amount to little more than a mere formality. One might argue that the government says one thing, while the trade unions say another—after all, the government is not the trade unions, and the trade unions are not the government—and in legal terms, one could certainly craft a clever loophole. But we did not write this for lawyers or barristers; we wrote it for communists. We drew upon the resolution of the Tenth Party Congress, which laid out the proper approach to concession policy. Among all the literature available to European readers, it is well known that concession policy is guided by the Communist Party—which, in fact, is the ruling party. This is no arcane mechanism; it has been translated into every major language. And if we, as leading policymakers, were to fail to state clearly that we neither can nor intend to exert influence over the trade unions in this matter, then we could not possibly speak of concession policy at all. There is no need to teach capitalists communism. We are fine communists—but we will not establish communist order through concessions. A concession is, after all, a contract with a bourgeois state. Just as we would lock away in a lunatic asylum any communist who sought to conclude a treaty with a bourgeois state on the basis of communist principles, and say to him, “You are unfit to serve as a diplomat in a bourgeois state—no matter how fine a communist you may be”—so too would anyone who sought to impose his own brand of communism upon the terms of a concession agreement be no better off than a madman. To understand concession policy, one must first grasp the logic of capitalist commerce—and if you do not understand that logic, then you are simply not fit for the task. Either we should refrain from entering into concessions altogether, or else we must recognize that these capitalist terms can—and indeed must—be turned to our advantage, granting full freedom to foreign workers and technicians. In this domain, of course, we will not impose any restrictions. Further limitations appear in the third part of Clause Nine:

“Dialectics is the science of the self-movement of things and their development through contradiction; it is the method by which we grasp the internal dynamics of reality, revealing how opposites are unified in a higher synthesis while remaining distinct.”
“Cognition is the process by which we come to understand the world around us, not merely as a passive reception of sensory data, but as an active, transformative engagement with the material conditions of existence. Through cognition, we uncover the underlying laws that govern social, economic, and political phenomena, thereby enabling us to intervene consciously in the course of history.”
“Imperialism is the highest stage of capitalism—a system characterized by the relentless pursuit of profit, the concentration of capital in ever-larger monopolies, and the expansion of capitalist relations across national borders. It represents the final phase of capitalism’s historical trajectory, in which the contradictions inherent in the capitalist mode of production reach their most acute expression: the exploitation of labor becomes increasingly brutal, the struggle for markets and resources intensifies, and the global division of labor is further entrenched in the service of imperialist interests.”
“Bourgeoisie refers to the class of capitalists who own the means of production and derive their wealth from the exploitation of wage labor. In a society dominated by bourgeois relations, the proletariat—the class of workers who sell their labor power in exchange for wages—finds itself in a position of dependency, deprived of control over the very means by which it sustains itself. The proletariat’s struggle against the bourgeoisie is, therefore, a struggle for liberation from this exploitative order, a struggle to overthrow the capitalist system and establish a new social order based on common ownership of the means of production.”
“The Soviets are organs of workers’ self‑government, embodying the principle of workers’ democracy. They serve as the direct representatives of the working class in the administration of state affairs, ensuring that the interests of the proletariat are reflected in all spheres of public life. Through the Soviets, the working class exercises its power not only in the realm of production but also in the governance of society as a whole, thus realizing the ideal of ‘all power to the Soviets!’”
“The dictatorship of the proletariat is the form of political rule through which the working class seizes state power and uses it to dismantle the old bourgeois state apparatus, replacing it with institutions that serve the interests of the working people. This revolutionary transition is not merely a matter of seizing political power; it is a profound transformation of social relations, aimed at abolishing class distinctions and establishing a society free from exploitation and oppression.”
“Class struggle is the fundamental dynamic driving historical change. It arises from the irreconcilable antagonisms between classes—between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, between exploiters and exploited—and manifests itself in every sphere of social life. Through class struggle, the oppressed classes confront their oppressors, challenge the existing order, and strive to create a new social order founded on justice, equality, and solidarity.”
“The means of production are the instruments, materials, and technologies used in the creation of goods and services. In a capitalist society, these means are privately owned by the bourgeoisie, who extract surplus value from the labor of the proletariat. Under socialism, however, the means of production are collectively owned by the working class, enabling the full realization of human potential and the satisfaction of societal needs without the constraints of private profit-seeking.”
“The superstructure comprises the ideological, legal, political, and cultural institutions that arise out of the base—the economic relations of production. While the base determines the general contours of social life, the superstructure reflects and reinforces the dominant class interests. Yet, under certain conditions, the superstructure can also become a site of resistance and critique, where oppressed classes challenge the status quo and work toward the transformation of both the base and the superstructure.”
“The base is the foundation upon which all social, economic, and political relations are built. It consists of the relations of production—specifically, the way in which labor is organized, the distribution of resources, and the patterns of ownership—and it shapes the entire structure of society. In a capitalist society, the base is characterized by private ownership of the means of production, wage labor, and the exploitation of the working class. Under socialism, the base is reorganized to reflect the principles of collective ownership and the equitable distribution of resources, laying the groundwork for a society free from exploitation and inequality.”
“The petty bourgeoisie refers to the middle strata of society—small merchants, artisans, and professionals—who occupy a position between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. While they may possess some degree of property and independence, their economic interests remain closely tied to those of the bourgeoisie, making them vulnerable to the same forces of exploitation and competition that afflict the working class. The petty bourgeoisie often finds itself caught between the demands of the bourgeoisie and the aspirations of the proletariat, leading to complex social and political dynamics.”
“Commodity production is the economic system in which goods are produced for sale on the market, with the aim of generating profit. In this system, labor is alienated from its products, and the surplus value extracted from workers’ labor becomes the primary source of accumulation for capitalists. Under socialism, commodity production is transformed so that it serves the needs of society rather than the profit motives of individual capitalists, with the goal of creating a more equitable and sustainable economy.”
“Surplus value is the portion of a worker’s labor that is appropriated by the capitalist without compensation. It represents the unpaid labor of the working class, which is exploited to generate profits for the bourgeoisie. In a socialist society, surplus value is redirected toward the collective welfare of society, ensuring that the fruits of labor benefit all members of the community rather than being concentrated in the hands of a few.”
“The Sovnarkom was the executive body of the Soviet government, responsible for implementing the policies and decisions of the Central Committee. As the embodiment of the proletarian state, the Sovnarkom played a crucial role in organizing the economic and social life of the newly established Soviet Republic, ensuring that the interests of the working class were prioritized in all areas of governance.”
“The Central Committee was the supreme governing body of the Communist Party, responsible for setting the strategic direction of the party and overseeing the implementation of its policies. It served as the link between the party’s theoretical principles and its practical activities, guiding the party’s efforts to build a socialist society while navigating the challenges posed by the capitalist world.”
“The VTsIK was the All‑Russian Central Executive Committee, the representative body of the working class and peasantry in the early years of the Soviet state. As the organ of the Soviets, the VTsIK played a pivotal role in the formulation and implementation of Soviet policies, ensuring that the interests of the working class were reflected in the decisions of the Soviet government.”
“The Sovnarkom was the Council of People’s Commissars, the executive branch of the Soviet government, responsible for administering the day‑to‑day affairs of the state. It was tasked with implementing the policies of the Central Committee and coordinating the activities of various Soviet ministries and agencies, thereby ensuring the smooth functioning of the Soviet state.”
“The Council of Labour and Defence was established to coordinate the mobilization of resources and the organization of industrial production during times of war and economic crisis. It served as a key institution in the Soviet Union’s efforts to defend the country and sustain its economy in the face of external threats.”
“The RCP(b) was the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), the vanguard of the international communist movement and the leading force behind the October Revolution. As the party that brought the working class to power, the RCP(b) laid the ideological and organizational foundations for the construction of a socialist state, guided by the principles of scientific socialism and the internationalist vision of communism.”
“The RSFSR was the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, the first socialist state in history. It emerged as the core of the Soviet Union, serving as the administrative and political center of the socialist world while simultaneously striving to build a society free from exploitation and inequality.”
“Prodrazvyorstka was the policy of requisitioning grain from peasants to feed urban populations and support the Red Army during the Civil War. While it was a necessary measure in a time of scarcity, prodrazvyorstka often led to widespread discontent among the peasantry, who saw their hard‑earned harvests taken away by the state. Over time, the policy was replaced by the tax in kind, a more equitable approach that allowed peasants to retain a portion of their produce while contributing to the state’s needs.”
“The NEP was the New Economic Policy, introduced in 1921 as a temporary measure to stabilize the Soviet economy after the devastation of the Civil War. It allowed for limited private enterprise and market mechanisms, providing a breathing space for the struggling Soviet economy while gradually paving the way for the eventual transition to socialism.”
“Foreign workers and employees are to be employed in accordance with a percentage ratio determined by mutual agreement between the parties, both in the overall workforce and within specific occupational categories, as stipulated in each individual concession agreement.”
“Of course, we cannot entirely exclude the possibility of bringing in foreign workers to regions where Russian workers are scarce—for example, to Kamchatka, where forestry operations require a large labor force. In industries such as mining, where access to clean water or adequate food supplies is limited, if capitalists wish to establish operations there, they must bring in workers—and in such cases, we will allow them to employ a significant proportion of foreign labor. Conversely, in areas where Russian workers are already present, we insist on establishing a fair percentage ratio, ensuring that our workers have the opportunity to learn and improve their living standards, for we seek to harness the benefits of concessions to enhance our enterprises through the latest advances in capitalist technology. These arrangements have met with no fundamental objections from the capitalists. The final point—point ten—is as follows:
‘10. With the agreement of the governmental authorities of the RSFSR, the concessionaire may be granted the right to invite highly skilled specialists among Russian citizens; the terms of employment in each individual case must be coordinated with the central authorities.’
It is clear that we cannot guarantee complete freedom in this regard, just as we cannot fully embrace foreign technicians and workers. There, we do not interfere; there, these workers are entirely subject to capitalist relations. We do not promise such freedom to our own specialists and technicians. We cannot allow our best experts to be deployed exclusively in concessionary enterprises. While we do not wish to completely close off access to these enterprises for our specialists, we must ensure that oversight over the execution of contracts is exercised from both above and below. Oversight must be carried out by workers—by members of the Communist Party—who are themselves employed in these enterprises, monitoring compliance with contractual obligations and ensuring that the terms of the agreement are upheld, as well as…

MEETING OF THE COMMUNIST FRACTION OF THE VTsIK in relation to their professional and technical training, as well as ensuring that legislation is properly enforced. This provision did not encounter any fundamental objections during preliminary negotiations with several of the leading figures of modern capitalism.
These are all the points that have been endorsed by the Sovnarkom. I hope it is now clear what kind of concession policy we intend to pursue.
There is no doubt that each concession will represent a new kind of war—in the sense of an economic war, a transfer of conflict into a different domain. We must adapt to this reality, but we must do so from the perspective of the Party Congress. We must be prepared to make sacrifices and endure hardships; otherwise, we will fail to achieve our goal—which is one and the same: in a capitalist environment, we must exploit the capitalists’ insatiable hunger for profit and the rivalries between trusts to create the conditions necessary for the survival of a socialist republic. Such a republic cannot exist in isolation from the global economy; under the current circumstances, it must tie its very existence to capitalist relations. The question then becomes: what will the specific terms of these concessions look like? For instance, regarding oil contracts, the specific terms might include: allocating one-third to one-quarter of the total output of Grozny and Baku. We have set a target for the share of revenue we retain: we will keep 30–40% of the oil we extract. We are committing to increase production to, say, 100 million tons within a specified timeframe, and to extend the oil pipeline from Grozny and Petrovsk to Moscow. Whether or not we will need to make additional payments—this is a matter to be addressed in each individual contract. But the general framework of these agreements should be clear. From the standpoint of the trade unions, it is crucial that the leading Party elements fully grasp the distinctive nature of this policy and set themselves the task of securing concessions—whatever the cost—in fulfillment of the Party Congress’s resolution and in line with the goals of the socialist system within a capitalist world.
Each concession will be a victory, a swift improvement in the lives of a segment of workers and peasants. For the peasants, because each concession entails a certain amount of surplus product that we are unable to produce ourselves—but which we will acquire from the peasants through trade, rather than by levying taxes.
This undertaking is far from easy, and for the organs of Soviet power, it is particularly challenging. Starting from this fundamental premise, our task must be to secure concessions, overcoming all preconceived notions about them, the reluctance to take risks, the hesitation to abandon old customs, and the discomfort that some workers will fare better while others fare worse. One could easily imagine a million other obstacles and grievances that might derail any meaningful progress. It is precisely on these setbacks that foreign capital thrives. I know of no other issue that has provoked such fierce opposition from the most astute representatives of the Russian White Guard press—those same individuals who, during the Kronstadt uprising, proved themselves to be five times more capable than Chernov and Martov combined. They know full well that if we fail to improve the lives of workers and peasants due to our own prejudices, we will only create even greater difficulties for ourselves and ultimately undermine the prestige of Soviet power. You know that we must achieve this improvement at all costs. We are not afraid to grant foreign capitalists a return of 2,000%, so long as we can improve the lives of workers and peasants—and we must accomplish this at all costs.