POLITICAL BUREAU DIRECTIVE FOR THE PRESS
May 15, 1921
1) The population of the capital cities and the central industrial region is once again poised to endure a prolonged period of deteriorating food supplies. This time, the supply crisis will last for roughly a month—from May 15 to June 10–15—and will manifest itself in a reduction of the ration under Work Card “A” to two-thirds of a pound, while the daily ration for the remainder of the population will be reduced to three-quarters of a pound.
2) The immediate causes of the worsening food situation in the capital cities and the central industrial region are as follows: first, the organized plundering of grain by bandit gangs at state grain collection centers and along railway lines; second, the temporary disruption of transport and food distribution networks in Siberian provinces and certain other regions—areas from which the bulk of grain has recently been arriving; third, the overuse of seed grain in several provinces, exceeding the planned allocation in order to expand sowing efforts; and fourth, the underloading of grain shipments destined for consumer regions—a consequence of the urgent need to increase supplies to the working population in producing provinces.
3) Taken on their own, the latter two causes could not have had such a severe impact on food supplies for the populations of the capital cities and the central industrial region. However, the overuse of seed grain—which, in this particular case, was fully justified by the economic considerations that formed its basis—was especially significant. This applies particularly to the excess use of seed grain, amounting to approximately four million poods, which were urgently required to meet the farmers’ growing desire to expand sowing following the transition from the requisition system to the tax-based grain levy.
4) The deterioration in food supplies must be attributed entirely to the activities of bandit gangs that had been operating until recently in Tambov Province, certain areas along the Volga River, and Siberia. These bands—organized and led by Socialist-Revolutionaries—acted according to a prearranged plan: they looted state grain collection centers and grain-carrying trains, sabotaged railway lines of critical importance for food distribution, and systematically eliminated food distribution agents. According to incomplete reports, Socialist-Revolutionary bands had plundered around six million poods of grain; in reality, the actual amount of grain stolen by these gangs was far greater. All of this occurred in regions from which the capital cities and the central industrial region had, in recent times, received the majority of their grain supplies—and naturally, it could not fail to lead to a reduction in the volume of goods in transit just as the bandits were being neutralized, thereby contributing to the overall worsening of the food situation.
5) As of May 1, food authorities had 30 million poods of grain in stock, sufficient to provide two months’ worth of supplies to the population (the summer monthly consumption, prior to the new harvest, was projected at 15 million poods). Yet by May 7, only 768 railcars were in transit on railways and waterways—compared with 1,596 railcars on April 7 and 4,500 railcars on March 7. It was precisely these reductions in grain deliveries from producing regions—despite existing stocks that could cover the two-month needs of workers in the capital cities and the central industrial region—that the Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks, and Cadets, who sought to undermine Soviet power from within, were responsible for.
6) Just as they failed to overthrow Soviet power through Kronstadt, so too are they unable to achieve their goal by disrupting the nation’s food supply system. At present, now that the bandits have been neutralized, vigorous measures are being taken to deliver grain to railway stations from individual grain collection centers. Furthermore, without waiting for the measures already implemented to yield positive results, the People’s Commissariat for Food Supplies has established firm ration standards for the populations of producing regions—primarily Siberia and the North Caucasus—with the aim of ensuring that, throughout May, 100 railcars of grain are loaded and dispatched daily from Siberia, and 70 railcars from the North Caucasus. The Council of People’s Commissars has instructed the Siberian Revolutionary Committee and the North Caucasian Regional Authority to ensure that local food supplies are distributed only after fulfilling delivery orders for the capital cities and the central industrial region—and at the same time, to report daily via telegraph on the progress of grain loading and dispatch according to the Commissariat’s delivery schedules. Finally, the Council of People’s Commissars has reached an agreement with the Ukrainian government to send no fewer than 40 grain-carrying trains from Ukraine to the RSFSR each day throughout May.
7) The aforementioned measures will enable the populations of the capital cities and the central industrial region to receive reduced rations from May 15 to June 10–15, after which gradual increases in rations can begin. But it goes without saying that the measures adopted are insufficient. To emerge from the current crisis as quickly as possible and to prevent its recurrence before the new harvest—when the grain reserves stored at collection centers are exhausted and used up—reserves that, as previously noted, should last for two months—it is necessary, at the same time, to make extensive use of barter trade.
Barter trade must be utilized both by the state and by the working people themselves.
8) In order to facilitate barter trade during the summer months, prior to the onset of tax-based grain procurement, the People’s Commissariat for Food Supplies has already taken the following steps. A plan has been developed and is being implemented to procure grain, meat, potatoes, hay, and other agricultural products through barter, totaling 65 million rubles in gold; it is planned to procure 30 million poods of grain—of which 12 million poods are to be sourced from Siberia and 15 million poods from the North Caucasus—precisely the amount needed to sustain the population until autumn.
To fulfill the entire planned procurement program, the People’s Commissariat for Food Supplies requires goods worth approximately 20 million rubles in gold. Of this total, 3 million rubles’ worth of goods from previous shipments remain in stock at local warehouses; 12 million rubles’ worth of goods have been earmarked for shipment; another 5 million rubles’ worth still needs to be allocated; and in fact, goods totaling 7 million rubles’ worth have already been shipped from the allocated quantity—exceeding the 12 million ruble mark. Currently, grain supplies in Siberia are secured at 92%, while in the North Caucasus they stand at 75%. In the North Caucasus, where spring fieldwork has already concluded, barter operations began in early May. All goods have been dispatched and are being sent to the addresses of provincial food commissions, which are instructed to promptly enter into contractual agreements with local consumer cooperatives; should the latter refuse to fulfill the entire barter plan, then measures must be taken to organize barter transactions through private individuals on a commission basis, resorting to the establishment of their own exchange centers only in extreme cases. To avoid delays in securing essential goods, steps have been taken to purchase goods from abroad.
At the same time, the People’s Commissariat for Food Supplies has entrusted Comrade Malyshev—formerly a worker in Petrograd and a veteran of barter trade—with the task of organizing up to 20 barges for barter expeditions along the Volga and Kama rivers. These barges will soon begin operations.
9) Alongside the state, represented by the People’s Commissariat for Food Supplies, the working people themselves must also take part in organizing proper exchanges with the countryside—aiming to increase the state-provided food ration that they may receive. To this end, workers must immediately begin establishing workers’ cooperatives at factories, mills, and enterprises, based on the new decree on free cooperation. To help workers’ cooperatives begin exchanging goods as soon as possible, the Council of People’s Commissars has allocated a special commodity fund specifically for providing advance financing to cooperative organizations. This fund ensures the procurement of 15 million poods of grain and can be put to immediate use until the establishment of dedicated commodity funds, as envisioned in the decree on in-kind bonuses. All grain procured in this manner will fall under the full control of the workers’ cooperative that has acquired it and will not be counted toward the state-provided food ration. It is only necessary to get to work quickly and manage affairs as systematically as possible—so as not to create favorable conditions for the rampant growth of speculation.
10) Such are the measures adopted by the Council of People’s Commissars in order to overcome the difficult days that have arisen as swiftly as possible. There have been difficult weeks—and even entire months—in the past when food supplies were scarce. And each time, the measures taken by the Council of People’s Commissars, supported by the working people and benefiting from that support, yielded positive results.
With the support of the working people—and with the measures now adopted—the Republic will be able to surmount new challenges in food supply.
The difference between what was undertaken in the past and what is being done today lies in the following:

In the past, during times of famine, the Soviet state called upon workers to form food detachments and to fight for bread; now, it calls upon them to help the state organize exchanges with the countryside for the common pot—and at the same time, to organize themselves to exchange goods for agricultural products, supplying their own factory or mill’s needs.
This endeavor is new; it will take some time before noticeable results are achieved. But in the measures now adopted to strengthen the delivery of grain previously procured to the capital cities and the central industrial region, workers will find the support they need to weather this period with as little hardship as possible. Socialist-Revolutionary gangs stole grain from the workers and triggered a temporary crisis in food supplies—but they did not rob them of their capacity to organize themselves to overcome emerging difficulties and to establish new relationships with the peasantry, based on principles that would ensure a successful struggle against hunger.
Do not publish; approve as a directive for the press.
Members of the Political Bureau
Lenin. Molotov. Kalinin
Printed from a typewritten copy.
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