Among the numerous most valuable qualities of comrade Bukharin belongs his theoretical capacity and his interest in seeking out theoretical roots in every question. This is a very valuable quality, because one cannot fully clarify any mistake for oneself, including a political one, if one does not seek out the theoretical roots of the mistake in the person making it, proceeding from certain, consciously adopted propositions by him.

In accordance with this striving of his to deepen the question theoretically, comrade Bukharin, beginning with the discussion of December 30, if not earlier, translates the dispute precisely into the indicated area.

"I consider it absolutely necessary," said comrade Bukharin on December 30, "in this consists the theoretical essence of what is here called the 'buffer faction' or its ideology – and it appears to me completely indisputable that one cannot reject either this political nor this economic moment…" (p. 47).

The theoretical essence of the error which comrade Bukharin makes here consists in the fact that he substitutes eclecticism for the dialectical relationship between politics and economics (which Marxism teaches us). "Both this and that," "on the one hand, on the other hand" – here is Bukharin's theoretical position. This is eclecticism. Dialectics requires an all-sided accounting of relationships in their concrete development, and not the plucking out of a piece of one thing, a piece of another. I have already demonstrated this on the example of politics and economics.

On the example of the "buffer," this is equally undeniable. A buffer is useful and necessary if the party train is going downhill toward a crash. Undoubtedly. Bukharin posed the "buffer" task eclectically, taking a piece from Zinoviev, a piece from Trotsky. Bukharin should have, as a "bufferist," independently determined where, when, and in what the one or the other, the ones or the others, makes a mistake – whether a theoretical mistake, or a mistake of political tactlessness, or a mistake of factionalism in coming forward, or a mistake of exaggeration, etc. – and strike with all his might against each such mistake. Bukharin did not understand this, his "buffer" task. One of the clearest proofs of this:

The Communist Fraction of the Petrograd Bureau of Tsektran (the Central Committee of the union of railwaymen and waterway workers) – an organization sympathizing with Trotsky and directly declaring that, in its opinion, "on the fundamental question of the productive role of trade unions, the positions of comrades Trotsky and Bukharin represent varieties of one and the same point of view" – published in Petrograd as a pamphlet a report by comrade Bukharin in Petrograd on January 3, 1921 (N. Bukharin: "On the Tasks of Trade Unions." Petrograd, 1921). In this report we read:

"Initially comrade Trotsky formulated it such that it was necessary to change the leading composition of the trade unions, it was necessary to select corresponding comrades, etc., and even earlier he stood on the point of view of 'shaking up,' which he has now renounced, and therefore it is completely absurd to put forward 'shaking up' as an argument against comrade Trotsky" (p. 5).

I will not dwell on the numerous factual inaccuracies of this exposition. (The little word "shaking up" was used by Trotsky at the Fifth All-Russian Conference of Trade Unions, November 2-6. About the "selection of leading personnel," Trotsky spoke in §5 of his theses, which he submitted to the Central Committee on November 8 and which were published, among other things, by someone from Trotsky's supporters, in the form of a printed sheet. The entire brochure of Trotsky: "The Role and Tasks of Trade Unions," December 25, is saturated throughout with the same way of thinking, the same spirit, that I have already pointed out before. Where and in what did the "renunciation" express itself is completely unknown.) My theme now is different. If the "buffer" is eclectic, it passes over some mistakes, mentions others; is silent about mistakes on December 30, 1920 in Moscow before thousands of workers of the RCP of all Russia; speaks about mistakes in Petersburg on January 3, 1921. If the "buffer" is dialectical, it attacks with all its force each mistake that it discerns on both sides or on all sides. This is precisely what Bukharin does not do. He does not even attempt to analyze Trotsky's brochure from the point of view of the policy of shaking up. He simply remains silent about it. It is not surprising that such performance of the buffer's role calls forth laughter from everyone.

Further. In that same Petrograd speech of Bukharin on page 7 we read:

"The error of comrade Trotsky consists in the fact that he insufficiently defends the moment of school of communism."

At the discussion on December 30, Bukharin reasons as follows:

"Comrade Zinoviev said that trade unions are a school of communism, while Trotsky said that this is an administrative-technical apparatus for managing production. I see no logical grounds which would prove that the first is correct and not the second: both these positions are correct and the conjunction of these two positions" (p. 48).

The same thought in the 6th thesis of Bukharin and his "group" or "fraction": "…on the one hand, they (trade unions) are a school of communism, on the other hand, they are – and moreover in increasing degree – a component part of the economic apparatus and the apparatus of state power in general…" ("Pravda," January 16).

Here is where the fundamental theoretical error of comrade Bukharin lies – the substitution of Marxist dialectics for eclecticism (especially widespread among the authors of various "fashionable" and reactionary philosophical systems).

Comrade Bukharin speaks of "logical" grounds. All his reasoning shows that he – perhaps unconsciously – stands here on the point of view of formal or scholastic logic, and not of dialectical or Marxist logic. To clarify this, I will begin with the simplest example, taken by comrade Bukharin himself. At the discussion on December 30 he said:

"Comrades, on many of you the disputes which are occurring here produce an impression, roughly, of the following character: two people come and ask each other what such a glass is, which stands on the lectern. One says: 'this is a glass cylinder, and let anyone be accursed who says it is not so.' The second says: 'a glass is an instrument for drinking, and let anyone be accursed who says it is not so'" (p. 46).

With this example Bukharin wanted, as the reader sees, to explain to me popularly the harm of one-sidedness. I accept this clarification with gratitude and, to prove by deed my gratitude, I respond with a popular explanation of what eclecticism is in distinction from dialectics.

A glass is, undoubtedly, both a glass cylinder and an instrument for drinking. But a glass has not only these two properties or qualities or aspects, but an infinite quantity of other properties, qualities, aspects, interrelations and "mediations" with everything else in the world. A glass is a heavy object which can serve as an instrument for throwing. A glass can serve as a paperweight, as a container for a captured butterfly, a glass can have value as an object with artistic carving or design, completely independently of whether it is suitable for drinking, whether it is made of glass, whether its form is cylindrical or not quite, and so on and so forth.

Further. If I need a glass now as an instrument for drinking, then it is completely unimportant for me to know whether its form is fully cylindrical and whether it is really made of glass, but it is important that there be no crack in the bottom, that I not be able to cut my lips using this glass, etc. But if I need a glass not for drinking, but for such a use for which any glass cylinder is suitable, then for me a glass with a crack in the bottom will do, or even one without a bottom at all, etc.

Formal logic, with which schools limit themselves (and ought to limit themselves – with corrections – for the lower classes of school), takes formal definitions, guided by what is most usual or what most often strikes the eye, and limits itself to this. If in the process two or more different definitions are taken and joined together completely by chance (and a glass cylinder and an instrument for drinking), then we obtain an eclectic definition, indicating different aspects of the object and only that.

Dialectical logic requires that we go further. To truly know an object, one must embrace, study all its aspects, all connections and "mediations." We will never achieve this completely, but the requirement of all-sidedness will warn us against errors and against petrification. This is first. Second, dialectical logic requires that we take the object in its development, in its "self-movement" (as Hegel sometimes says), in its change. With respect to a glass this is not immediately clear, but even a glass does not remain unchanged, and particularly the purpose of the glass changes, its use, its connection with the surrounding world. Third, all human practice must enter into the complete "definition" of the object both as the criterion of truth and as the practical determinant of the connection of the object with what man needs. Fourth, dialectical logic teaches that "there is no abstract truth, truth is always concrete," as the late Plekhanov loved to say, following Hegel. (It is fitting, it seems to me, to remark in parentheses for young members of the party, that one cannot become a conscious, genuine communist without studying – precisely studying – everything written by Plekhanov on philosophy, for this is the best in all the international literature of Marxism.[25])

I have, of course, not exhausted the concept of dialectical logic. But for now this is enough. One can pass from the glass to trade unions and to Trotsky's platform.

"On the one hand, school; on the other hand, apparatus," says Bukharin and writes in his theses. In Trotsky's case the error is that he "insufficiently defends the moment of school"… in Zinoviev's case – the deficiency concerning the "moment" of apparatus.

Why is this reasoning of Bukharin dead and hollow eclecticism? Because in Bukharin there is not the slightest trace of an attempt to analyze independently, from his own point of view, either the entire history of the given dispute (Marxism, that is, dialectical logic, requires this unconditionally), or the entire approach to the question, the entire posing – or, if you will, the entire direction of the posing – of the question at this time, under these concrete circumstances. Not the slightest trace of an attempt by Bukharin to do this! He approaches without the least concrete study, with bare abstractions, and takes a piece from Zinoviev, a piece from Trotsky. This is eclecticism.

To illustrate this more vividly, I will take an example. I know absolutely nothing about the insurgents and revolutionaries of Southern China (except 2-3 articles by Sun Yat-sen and several books and newspaper articles which I read many years ago). Since uprisings are occurring there, probably there are also disputes between Chinese No. 1, who says that the uprising is a product of the sharpest class struggle that has seized the entire nation, and Chinese No. 2, who says that the uprising is an art. Theses similar to Bukharin's theses I could write, knowing nothing more: "on the one hand… on the other hand." One insufficiently took into account the "moment" of art, the other – the "moment of sharpening," etc. This would be dead and hollow eclecticism, because there is no concrete study of the given dispute, the given question, the given approach to it, etc.

Trade unions, on the one hand, are a school; on the other – an apparatus; on the third – an organization of workers; on the fourth – an organization of almost only industrial workers; on the fifth – an organization by branches of production,[26] etc. and so on. There is not the slightest foundation, not the slightest trace of independent analysis in Bukharin to prove why one must take the first two "aspects" of the question or object, and not the third, fourth, fifth, etc. Therefore the theses of the Bukharin group are nothing but eclectic emptiness. Bukharin fundamentally, eclectically, poses the entire question of the relationship between "school" and "apparatus."

To pose this question correctly, one must pass from empty abstractions to the concrete, i.e., the given, dispute. Take this dispute however you wish – either as it arose at the Fifth All-Russian Conference of Trade Unions, or as Trotsky himself posed and directed it with his pamphlet-platform of December 25 – you will see that Trotsky's entire approach, his entire direction is incorrect. He did not understand that one must and can approach trade unions as a school both when posing the theme of "Soviet trade-unionism," and when speaking of productive propaganda in general, and when – as Trotsky does – posing the question of "merger," of the participation of trade unions in managing production. And in this last question, as it is posed throughout Trotsky's pamphlet-platform, the incorrectness consists in the failure to understand that trade unions are a school of administrative-technical management of production. Not "on the one hand, school, on the other – something else," but from all sides, in this given dispute, given this posing of the question by Trotsky, trade unions are a school – a school of unification, a school of solidarity, a school of defending one's interests, a school of economic management, a school of administration. Instead of understanding and correcting this fundamental error of comrade Trotsky, comrade Bukharin gave a ridiculous correction: "on the one hand, on the other hand."

Let us approach the question still more concretely. Let us look at what present-day trade unions are as an "apparatus" for managing production. We saw: according to incomplete data, approximately 900 workers, members and delegates of trade unions, manage production. Increase this number if you wish, even by ten times, even by a hundred times; even assume, for the sake of yielding to you and clarifying your fundamental error, such an incredible rate of "movement forward" in the nearest future – all the same we obtain an insignificant portion of those directly managing compared with the 6-million total mass of trade union members. And from this it becomes even clearer that to direct all attention to the "leading layer," as Trotsky does, to speak of the productive role of trade unions and of managing production, without taking into account that 98½% are learning (6,000,000 – 90,000 = 5,910,000 = 98½% of the total) and must learn for a long time, means making a fundamental error. Not school and management, but school of management.

In disputing against Zinoviev on December 30 and accusing him, completely without foundation and incorrectly, of denying "appointiveness," i.e., the right and obligation of the Central Committee to appoint, comrade Trotsky inadvertently let slip an extremely characteristic counterposition:

"…Zinoviev," he said, "takes too propagandistic an approach to every practical business matter, forgetting that here is not only material for agitation, but also a question that must be resolved administratively" (p. 27).

I will now explain in detail what an administrative approach to this given question could be. But therein precisely consists the fundamental error of comrade Trotsky – that he approached (or rather, flew at), like an administrator, those questions which he himself posed in his pamphlet-platform, whereas toward these questions he could and should have approached exclusively as a propagandist.

Indeed. What is good in Trotsky? Not in his theses, but in his speeches – especially when he forgets his unsuccessful polemic with the allegedly "conservative" wing of trade unionists – undoubtedly good and useful is productive propaganda. In the practical "economic" work in trade union commissions, in appearances, oratorical and literary, as a participant and worker in the All-Russian Bureau of Productive Propaganda, comrade Trotsky would undoubtedly bring (and undoubtedly will bring) no small benefit to the cause. The error is in the "theses-platform." Running through them like a red thread is an administrator's approach to the "crisis" in trade union organization, to the "two tendencies" in trade unions, to the interpretation of the program of the RCP, to "Soviet trade-unionism," to "productive education," to "merger." I have just gone through all the main themes of Trotsky's "platform," and precisely toward such themes the correct approach at this time, with the material that Trotsky has, can be exclusively propagandistic.

The state is the realm of coercion. It would be madness to renounce coercion, especially in the epoch of the dictatorship of the proletariat. "Administration" and the administrative approach to matters are obligatory here. The party is the directly ruling vanguard of the proletariat, it is the leader. Expulsion from the party, not coercion – that is the specific means of influence, the means of purifying and tempering the vanguard. Trade unions are a reservoir of state power, a school of communism, a school of economic management. In this area the specific and principal thing is not management, but the "link" "between the central" (and the local, of course, as well) "state administration, the national economy, and the broad masses of working people" (as our party program says, § 5 of the economic section devoted to trade unions).

Running through the entire pamphlet-platform of Trotsky like a red thread is the incorrectness of the entire posing of this question, the failure to understand such a relationship.

Imagine that this very notorious "merger," in connection with the rest of the themes of his platform, Trotsky had worked out, approaching the entire question differently. Imagine that his brochure were devoted entirely to the task of investigating in detail, say, 90 of the 900 cases of "merger," cases of combining positions in the Supreme Economic Council for managing industry and positions elected from the trade unions, the combining of positions by trade union members and permanent workers of the trade union movement. Imagine that these 90 cases were analyzed alongside data from a sample statistical investigation, alongside reports and investigations by inspectors and instructors of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection and the corresponding people's commissariats, i.e., analyzed according to data from administering institutions, analyzed from the point of view of the results and outcomes of work, successes of production, etc. Such an approach would be a correct administrative approach, and it would completely justify the line of "shaking up," i.e., the direction of attention to whom to remove, to whom to shift, to whom to appoint, what demands to make on the "leading layer" right now. If Bukharin said in his speech published by the tsektranists in Petersburg on January 3 that Trotsky earlier stood on the point of view of "shaking up," but now has renounced it, then Bukharin here too falls into an eclectic position that is laughable practically and completely impermissible theoretically for a Marxist. Bukharin takes the question abstractly, unable (or unwilling) to approach it concretely. As long as we, the Central Committee of the party and the entire party, administer, i.e., govern the state, we will never renounce and cannot renounce "shaking up," i.e., removal, displacement, appointment, dismissal, etc. But in Trotsky's pamphlet-platform completely different material is taken, completely different "practical business matter" is posed. They did not dispute about a "practical business matter," Zinoviev and Trotsky did not, we do not dispute with Bukharin, the entire party does not dispute, but about the question of "tendencies in the sphere of the trade union movement" (thesis 4, end, in Trotsky).

This question is, in its essence, political. Correcting the error of Trotsky with eclectic corrections and additions, as Bukharin wishes to do, full of the most humane, of course, feelings and intentions, in the very essence of the matter – of the given, concrete "matter" – is impossible.

Here the solution can be only one and only one.

First: correctly resolve the political question about "tendencies in the sphere of the trade union movement," about the relationship of classes, about the relationship of politics and economics, about the specific roles of the state, the party, trade unions, – "school" and apparatus, etc. This is one.

Second: on the basis of the correct political resolution, carry out – or rather: carry on – a lengthy, systematic, persistent, patient, many-sided, repeated productive propaganda, carry it out on a state scale, in the name of and under the leadership of a state institution.

Third: not confuse "practical business matters" with those disputes about tendencies, which (disputes) constitute the legitimate domain of "general party talk" and broad discussions, but pose them in a business-like way, in business commissions, with the interrogation of witnesses, with the study of reports, accounts, statistics, and on the basis of all this – only on the basis of all this, only under such conditions – only by the decision of the corresponding Soviet or party organ or both such organs – to "shake up."

But with Trotsky and Bukharin what came out was a mess of political errors in approach, a rupture of the transmission link, the breakdown of the transmission belts in the middle, a flying at or charging at "administration" in vain, at idle speed. The "theoretical" source of the error – since Bukharin posed his "glass" question about the theoretical source – is clear. The theoretical – in this case epistemological – error of Bukharin consists in the substitution of eclecticism for dialectics. Posing the question eclectically, Bukharin became completely confused and went so far as syndicalism. In Trotsky's case the error is: one-sidedness, enthusiasm, exaggeration, obstinacy. In Trotsky's platform what we have is that a glass is an instrument for drinking, whereas it turned out that this given glass has no bottom.