Date: 1921-07-25
Source: ru:ND; en:Pipes

T. Chicherin!

We must carefully consider and submit to the C[entral] C[ommittee] a number of practical proposals.

Approximately 1*: 1) Assign the V[ery] R[ussian] E[xtraordinary] C[ommission] the task of intensifying intelligence-gathering; a written report is due in one week. — 2) The same applies to the R[evolutionary] W[ar] C[ouncil] of the R[epublic] (or perhaps to the Registry?). — 3) Draft (text) a stern interview with Lenin or Trotsky—featuring threats along the lines of: “If you dare to push further, we’ll crush you!” — 4) Tukhachevsky’s trip to Minsk should likewise be accompanied by threats—and delivered with great fanfare. — 5) Issue directives to the press (draft the directives yourselves).

With c[ommunist] greetings,

July 25.

Lenin.

Fund 2, Inventory 2, File 773 — autograph.

1* Possibly. — Latin

1The note was penned by V.I. Lenin in response to a letter from G.V. Chicherin dated July 24, 1921, in which Chicherin set forth his views on France’s policy toward Soviet Russia. Chicherin wrote: “...our enemies, convinced that the fall of Soviet power is supposedly imminent, seek to hasten what is already in decline… It is also possible that they hope to frighten us into diverting our energies from the struggle against famine by engaging in various preparations for military defense” (RGASPI, Fund 2, Inventory 2, File 773).

In reply to Lenin’s note, Chicherin wrote on July 26: “There is no doubt that we should neither issue threatening interviews nor stage ostentatious trips for Tukhachevsky to Minsk. One of the recurring themes among our adversaries is the claim that, in a fit of desperate self‑preservation, the Soviet government will suddenly turn upon its neighbors. Our enemies circulate rumors—now of a general mobilization within our borders, now of mysterious preparations orchestrated by Trotsky. Such threatening interviews and demonstrative journeys will do nothing to inspire confidence in our strength; rather, they will provide an invaluable resource for our enemies’ provocative campaigns. It was precisely through such tactics of intimidation that France has now managed to draw closer to Finland, to strengthen the military faction in Poland, to forge the Baltic League with Poland while excluding Lithuania, and so on. In our current situation, what is needed above all is great composure and calm. We must not display weakness, but we must also avoid falling into shrillness.

As for the press, we ought to issue directives instructing it to expose the provocative nature of the fabrications concerning our aggressive intentions and the exaggerated portrayals of the horrors of our famine. Our press should make clear that these fabrications are the product—and the instrument—of French interventionist policy, designed to enable France to construct hostile alliances against us and to push small states into the arms of Poland, which France, in turn, is thereby driven toward a path of militarism. Indeed, we even deem it advisable to address our closest neighbors with a peace‑loving appeal” (RGASPI, Fund 5, Inventory 1, File 2057, p. 36).

The proposal put forward by G.V. Chicherin ultimately prevailed. On August 2, 1921, V.I. Lenin issued an appeal to the international proletariat (see: Lenin, V.I., Complete Collected Works, vol. 44, pp. 75–76); on the same day, G.V. Chicherin addressed notes to the governments of all nations (see: Documents of Soviet Foreign Policy, vol. IV, Moscow, 1960, pp. 251–253), and on August 10 he sent similar notes to the governments of Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia (see: ibid., pp. 258–259), among others.