Ill CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL
SPEECHES DELIVERED AT THE MEETING OF MEMBERS OF THE GERMAN, POLISH, CZECHOSLOVAK, HUNGARIAN, AND ITALIAN DELEGATIONS

11 JULY
Yesterday, I read certain reports in Pravda that convinced me that the moment of the general offensive might be closer than we had assumed at the Congress—and that is precisely why the younger comrades have turned against us so fiercely. But I will return to those reports later; for now, I must emphasize that the nearer the general offensive draws, the more “opportunistic” our conduct must become. You are all going home today and will tell the workers that we have grown wiser than we were before the Third Congress. Do not be shy—tell them that we have made mistakes and now seek to act with greater caution; in doing so, we shall win over the masses from both the Social Democratic Party and the Independent Social Democratic Party—masses who, by the very course of events, are being drawn toward us yet remain wary of us. Through our own example, I wish to demonstrate that it is imperative to proceed with greater circumspection.
At the outset of the war, we Bolsheviks adhered to but a single slogan: civil war—and a merciless one at that. We branded as traitors anyone who did not champion civil war. Yet when we returned to Russia in March 1917, we completely reversed our stance. Upon our return and after speaking with the peasants and workers, we discovered that they all stood firmly in defense of the fatherland—but, of course, in a very different sense from the Mensheviks. We could not possibly call these simple workers and peasants scoundrels or traitors.

We characterized their position as “honorable defenseism.” I intend to devote an extensive article to this topic and to publish all relevant materials. On April 7, I issued a set of theses in which I called for caution and patience*. Our initial stance at the war’s onset had been correct: at that time, it was crucial to forge a firm, resolute core. Our subsequent position was likewise sound—it stemmed from the conviction that we must win over the masses. By then, we had already begun to oppose the idea of an immediate overthrow of the Provisional Government. I wrote: “We must overthrow the government, for it is an oligarchic government rather than a popular one; it can offer us neither bread nor peace. But it cannot be overthrown immediately, since it rests upon the Workers’ Soviets and still enjoys the trust of the working class. We are not Blanquists—we do not seek to govern with a minority of the working class against the majority.”* The Cadets, astute politicians though they were, quickly detected the contradiction between our old and new positions and accused us of hypocrisy. Yet since they simultaneously labeled us spies, traitors, scoundrels, and German agents, the former epithet failed to make much of an impression. On April 20, the first crisis erupted: Milyukov’s note on the Dardanelles exposed the government as imperialist. In its wake, armed soldiers surged toward the government building and deposed Milyukov. Leading the charge was a certain Lindé, a nonpartisan figure. This movement had not been organized by the Party. We described it at the time as something slightly more than an armed demonstration—and yet somewhat less than an armed insurrection. At our conference on April 22, the Left Wing demanded the immediate overthrow of the government. By contrast, the Central Committee opposed the slogan of civil war, and we instructed all agitators in the provinces to refute the shameless lie that the…

* See Collected Works, 5th ed., vol. 31, pp. 113–118. Ed.
** Ibid., p. 147. Ed.

III CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL
the Mensheviks desire civil war. On April 22, I wrote that the slogan “Down with the Provisional Government” was mistaken—because without the support of the majority of the people, such a slogan would either degenerate into empty rhetoric or devolve into mere adventurism*.
We did not hesitate, even in the face of our enemies, to call our Left Wing “adventurers.” The Mensheviks rejoiced at this and proclaimed our bankruptcy. But we insisted that any attempt to be even just a little bit—however slight—a shade further left than the Central Committee was sheer folly; whoever stands to the left of the Central Committee has already lost all common sense. We will not allow ourselves to be intimidated by the fact that our opponents rejoice in our missteps.
Our sole strategy now is to grow stronger—and therefore wiser, more prudent, more “opportunistic”—and this is what we must communicate to the masses. But once we have won over the masses through our prudence, we shall then adopt an offensive tactic—in the strictest sense of the word.
Now, regarding the three reports:
1) The strike of Berlin municipal workers. The municipal workers are, for the most part, conservative individuals—members of the Majority Social Democrats and the Independent Social Democratic Party, well-off in material terms—but they have been compelled to strike.34
2) The strike of textile workers in Lille.35
3) The third instance is the most significant. In Rome, a rally was held to organize resistance against the fascists, drawing 50,000 workers—representatives of every party: Communists, Socialists, and Republicans alike. Five thousand war veterans, clad in military uniform, attended the rally, and not a single fascist dared to venture onto the streets.36 This proves that there is far more combustible material in Europe than we had imagined. Lazzari praised our resolution on tactics. This is a major achievement of our Congress. If Lazzari recognizes its validity, then the thousands of workers who follow Lazzari will surely turn to us—and their leaders will no longer be able to dissuade them from joining us. “One must
retreat, in order to

* See Collected Works, 5th ed., vol. 31, p. 319. Ed.