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SPEECH IN DEFENSE OF THE TACTICS OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

1 JULY
Comrades! To my great regret, I must confine myself to self‑defense. (Laughter.) I say “to my great regret” because, after reviewing Comrade Terracini’s speech and the amendments proposed by the three delegations, I very much wish we could launch an offensive—after all, the views championed by Terracini and these three delegations actually call for precisely the kind of offensive action that was so urgently needed in 19. If this Congress fails to mount a resolute offensive against such errors, against such “leftist” absurdities, then the entire movement is doomed to perish. That is my firm conviction. But we are organized, disciplined Marxists; we cannot be satisfied with mere rhetoric directed against individual comrades. As Russians, we have grown sick to death of these left-wing platitudes. We are men of organization: when formulating our plans, we must proceed along organized lines and strive to discern the correct course. Of course, it is no secret that our theses represent a compromise—but why should they not? Among communists who have convened their third congress and developed certain fundamental principles, compromises are, under certain conditions, indispensable. The theses put forward by the Russian delegation were studied and prepared with the utmost care, the product of long deliberations and extensive consultations with various delegations. Their purpose is to establish the overarching line of the Communist International—and they are especially necessary now, after we have not only formally condemned the true centrists but also expelled them from the Party. These are the facts. I must take these theses under my own protection. And when Terracini now comes forward and declares that we must continue our struggle against the centrists, then goes on to outline how this struggle is to be waged, I say: if these amendments are meant to signal a particular orientation, then we must wage a merciless struggle against that very orientation—because otherwise, there is no communism, and there is no Communist International. It surprises me that the RCP(b) did not sign onto these amendments. (Laughter.) Just listen to what Terracini is defending—and to what these amendments actually say. They begin thus: “On page 1, in the first column, on the nineteenth line, the words ‘The majority…’ should be struck out.” The majority! This is extremely dangerous! (Laughter.) Then it continues: instead of the words “fundamental principles,” we should substitute “goals.” Fundamental principles and goals are two entirely different things: after all, even the anarchists would agree with us on the question of goals, since they too stand for the abolition of exploitation and class distinctions.
In my life, I have met and spoken with only a few anarchists—but I have seen enough of them nonetheless. On occasion, I have managed to reach a common understanding with them regarding goals, but never when it came to principles. Principles are not goals, nor are they programs, tactics, or theories. Tactics and theories are not principles. What distinguishes us from the anarchists in matters of principle? The principles of communism lie in the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat and in the application of state coercion during the transitional period. These are the principles of communism—but they are not its goal. And the comrades who put forward such a proposal have made a mistake.
Second, it is stated there: “The word ‘majority’ should be struck out.” Read the whole passage:
“The Third Congress of the Communist International undertakes to review questions of tactics at a time when, in a number of countries, the objective situation has become sharply revolutionary, and when a series of communist
…
Ill CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL mass parties have been formed—though nowhere have they yet seized actual leadership of the working class in its genuine revolutionary struggles.”
And now they want to strike out the word “majority.” If we cannot agree on such simple matters, then I simply do not understand how we can work together and lead the proletariat to victory. No wonder, then, that we cannot reach consensus even on matters of principle. Show me a party that has already won the support of the working-class majority. Terracini did not even think to offer a single example—not that such an example exists, in any case.
Thus: replace “principles” with “goals,” and strike out the word “majority.” Thank you very much—but we will not go along with that. Even the German Party—one of the finest—is still far from commanding the support of the working-class majority. That is a fact. We, who stand before the most arduous struggle of all, are not afraid to speak this truth—but here we have three delegations eager to begin with falsehoods, for if the Congress strikes out the word “majority,” it will thereby reveal that it seeks falsehoods. That is perfectly clear.
Then comes this amendment: “On page 4, in the first column, on the tenth line, the words ‘Open Letter,’ etc., ‘should be struck out.’” 21 I have already heard a speech today in which I encountered the same idea. But there, it was entirely natural. It was the speech of Comrade Hempel, a member of the RCP(b). He said: “The ‘Open Letter’ was an act of opportunism.” To my greatest regret—and deep shame—I had already heard similar views expressed in private. But when, after such lengthy debates, the Congress declares the “Open Letter” to be opportunistically motivated—what a disgrace, what a shame! And now Comrade Terracini, speaking on behalf of three delegations, wants to strike out the words “Open Letter.” What, then, is the point of struggling against the RCP(b)? The “Open Letter” is a model political step—as our theses explicitly state. And we must unconditionally defend it. It is exemplary, as the first concrete manifestation of a practical method for winning over the majority of the working class. That, Whoever fails to grasp that in Europe—where nearly all proletarians are organized—we must win over the majority of the working class has lost his way in the communist movement; he will never learn anything, if he has not yet learned this lesson after three years of the Great Revolution.
Terracini argues that we achieved victory in Russia even though our party was exceedingly small. He is dissatisfied with the fact that what is stated about Czechoslovakia corresponds precisely to the positions set forth in the theses. There are twenty-seven amendments here—and had I chosen to criticize them, I would have been obliged, like certain other speakers, to speak for no less than three hours… It has been asserted here that the Communist Party in Czechoslovakia numbers between 300,000 and 400,000 members, that it is imperative to win over the majority, to forge an invincible force, and to continue drawing ever more working masses into the ranks. Terracini is already poised to launch an attack. He says: “If our party already boasts 400,000 workers, then why do we need any more? Strike them out!” (Laughter.) He fears the word “masses” and seeks to eradicate it. Comrade Terracini has only partially understood the Russian Revolution.
We were but a small party in Russia—but alongside us stood, moreover, the majority of the Soviets of Workers’ and Peasants’ Deputies throughout the entire country. (A cry of “That’s right!”) Where is such a majority to be found among you? With us was nearly half of the army, which at that time numbered at least ten million men. Do you command the majority of the army? Show me such a country! If these views of Comrade Terracini are shared by three additional delegations, then all is not well within the International! Then we must say: “Stop! A decisive struggle is required—otherwise the Communist International is doomed.” (Movement in the hall.)
Based on my own experience, I must say—even while adopting a defensive stance (laughter)—that the goal of my speech, and the principle guiding it, is to defend the resolution and the theses proposed by our delegation. Of course, it would be pedantic to insist that not a single letter in those documents may be altered. I have read many resolutions, and I know full well that every line could be amended—

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red amendments. But that would be pedantry. And yet, when I now assert that not a single letter may be changed in a political sense, it is because, as I see it, these amendments bear a distinctly political character—because they lead down a path that is both harmful and perilous for the Communist International. Therefore, both I and all of us, including the Russian delegation, must insist that not a single letter be altered in the theses. We did not merely condemn our right-wing elements—we expelled them. But if one turns the struggle against the right wing into a mere sport, as Terracini does, then we must say: “Enough! Otherwise the danger will become far too grave!”
Terracini championed the theory of offensive struggle on the 22nd. The infamous amendments offer, on this very point, a formula spanning two or three pages. There is no need for us to read them; we know what is written there. Terracini made it perfectly clear what he was talking about. He defended the theory of offensives, pointing to “dynamic tendencies” and to the “transition from passivity to activity.” In Russia, we already possess ample political experience in the struggle against centrists. Fifteen years ago, we waged battle against our own opportunists and centrists—as well as against the Mensheviks—and we emerged victorious not only over the Mensheviks, but also over the semi-anarchists.
Had we not done so, we would have been unable to hold power in our hands—not just for three and a half years, but for even three and a half weeks—and we would not have been able to convene communist congresses here. “Dynamic tendencies,” “the transition from passivity to activity”—all these were phrases that the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries once hurled at us. Now they sit in prison, defending “the goals of communism” and pondering the “transition from passivity to activity.” (Laughter.) To argue in the manner laid out in the proposed amendments is impossible, for in them there is neither Marxism nor political experience, nor any sound argumentation. Did we, in our theses, develop a general theory of revolutionary offensives? Did Radek—or any of us—commit such folly? We spoke of the theory of offensives in relation to a very specific country and a very specific period.
From our struggles against the Mensheviks, we can cite instances showing that even before the First Revolution, there were individuals who doubted whether a revolutionary party ought to launch offensives. Whenever a social democrat—back then, we all called ourselves social democrats—began to harbor such doubts, we would enter into debate with him and declare that he was an opportunist, that he understood nothing of Marxism or of the dialectics of the revolutionary party. Can a party really dispute whether revolutionary offensives are permissible in the first place? To find such examples, we need only go back fifteen years. If a centrist—or a disguised centrist—dares to challenge the theory of offensives, then such people must be excluded without delay. This question should not give rise to controversy. Yet the fact that, even now—after three years of the Communist International—we are still arguing about “dynamic tendencies,” about “the transition from passivity to activity”—is a source of shame and disgrace.
We have no quarrel with Comrade Radek, who worked together with us to formulate these theses. Perhaps it was not entirely wise to begin discussions in Germany about the theory of revolutionary offensives before the actual offensive had been properly prepared. Still, the March Uprising represents a major step forward, despite the mistakes made by its leaders. 23 But that is of little consequence. Hundreds of thousands of workers fought heroically. No matter how courageously the KPD struggled against the bourgeoisie, we must say what Comrade Radek said in a Russian article concerning Heltz: If someone—be it even an anarchist—fights heroically against the bourgeoisie, that is certainly a great achievement; but when hundreds of thousands fight against the vile provocations of social traitors and the bourgeoisie, that truly marks a genuine advance.
It is vitally important to approach one’s own errors with a critical eye. That is where we began. If, after a struggle in which hundreds of thousands took part, someone speaks out against

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If one participates in this struggle and acts as Levi did, then such a person must be expelled—and that is precisely what was done. But we must draw a lesson from this: Did we truly prepare for an offensive? (Radek: “We didn’t even prepare for defense.”) Yes, the only talk of an offensive was confined to newspaper articles. This theory proved incorrect when applied to the March uprising in Germany in 1921—we must acknowledge that; but in general, the theory of revolutionary offensive is by no means false.
We won in Russia—and we won with such ease—because we had prepared our revolution during the imperialist war. That was the first prerequisite. Ten million workers and peasants were armed, and our slogan was: “Peace at any cost!” We triumphed because the broadest peasant masses were deeply revolutionary in their opposition to the large landowners. The Socialist-Revolutionaries, supporters of the Second and Second-and-a-Half Internationals, constituted the largest peasant party in November 1917. They called for revolutionary measures—but, like true heroes of the Second and Second-and-a-Half Internationals, they lacked the courage to act in a truly revolutionary manner. In August and September 1917, we declared: “Theoretically, we continue to fight against the SRs as before, but in practice we are ready to adopt their program, for only we can actually carry out that program.” And as we said, so we did. The peasantry, which had turned against us in November 1917, but after our victory sent the majority of Socialist-Revolutionaries to the Constituent Assembly, was won over by us—not, as I had mistakenly assumed and predicted, within just a few days, but in any case within a matter of weeks. The difference was slight. Point me to a country in Europe where you could win over the majority of the peasantry within a few weeks! Perhaps Italy? (Laughter.) When people claim that we won in Russia despite having only a small party, they merely prove that they have failed to understand the Russian Revolution—and that they still do not grasp how a revolution ought to be prepared.

Our first step was to establish a truly communist party, so that we would know whom we were dealing with and whom we could fully trust. The slogan of the First and Second Congresses was: “Down with the centrists!” If we fail, across the board and throughout the world, to break with the centrists and semi‑centrists—whom we in Russia call Mensheviks—then we cannot even begin to master the rudiments of communism. Our primary task is to build a genuinely revolutionary party and to sever all ties with the Mensheviks. But this is only a preparatory school. We are already convening the Third Congress, while Comrade Terracini still insists that the purpose of the preparatory school is to drive out, persecute, and expose the centrists and semi‑centrists. Thank you very much! We have already done enough of that. We stated at the Second Congress that the centrists are our enemies. But we must move forward. The second stage will consist in organizing ourselves into a party and learning how to prepare for revolution. In many countries, we have not even learned how to assume leadership. We won in Russia because we had not only the undisputed majority of the working class on our side (during the elections of 1917, the overwhelming majority of workers stood with us against the Mensheviks), but also because half of the army, immediately after we seized power, and nine-tenths of the peasant masses shifted to our side within a matter of weeks; we won because we did not adopt our own agrarian program, but rather the SR program—and we put it into practice. Our victory lay precisely in the fact that we implemented the SR program; that is why this victory was so easy. Do you in the West really harbor such illusions? How laughable! Just compare the concrete economic conditions, Comrade Terracini—and all of you who signed the proposal for amendments! Despite the fact that the majority quickly found itself on our side, the difficulties we faced after our victory were immense. Yet we prevailed, because we never forgot not only our goals but also our principles, and we would not tolerate in our party those who remained silent about the prin-

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principles and spoke of goals, “dynamic tendencies,” and the “transition from passivity to activity.” Some may accuse us of preferring to keep such gentlemen in prison. But without this, dictatorship is impossible. We must prepare for dictatorship—and that means combating such phrases and such amendments. (Laughter.) Throughout our theses, we speak of the “masses.” But, comrades, we must first understand what we mean by “the masses.” The RCP(b), comrades on the left, too often abuse this term. Yet even Comrade Terracini and all those who signed onto these amendments do not truly grasp what lies behind the word “masses.”
I have already spoken at length; therefore, I would like only to say a few words about the concept of “the masses.” The notion of “the masses” is fluid, adapting to the changing nature of struggle. At the outset of a struggle, just a few thousand genuinely revolutionary workers were enough to constitute the masses. When a party succeeds in drawing not only its own members into the fight, but also in rousing the non‑party masses, that marks the beginning of mass mobilization. During our revolutions, there were times when a mere few thousand workers represented the masses. In the history of our movement, in the history of our struggle against the Mensheviks, you will find numerous examples where, in a single city, a few thousand workers alone were sufficient to bring the mass character of the movement into clear view. When several thousand non‑party workers—usually living ordinary, unremarkable lives, eking out a meager existence, having never heard a word of politics—begin to act in a revolutionary manner, then before you stand the masses. As the movement spreads and gains momentum, it gradually transforms into a full‑fledged revolution. We witnessed this in 1905 and 1917, during the three great revolutions—and you, too, will yet come to see it for yourselves. Once a revolution has reached a sufficiently advanced stage, the meaning of “the masses” shifts: a few thousand workers no longer constitute the masses. The term begins to signify something else entirely. The concept of “the masses” evolves in the sense that it comes to denote not merely the majority—but not simply the majority of workers, rather the majority of all those who are exploited; any other understanding is unacceptable for a revolutionary, and every other interpretation of the term becomes incomprehensible. It is quite possible that even a small party—such as the British or American parties—having thoroughly studied the course of political development and become familiar with the lives and habits of the non‑party masses, might, at an opportune moment, spark a revolutionary movement. (Comrade Radek, as a prime example, pointed to the miners’ strike of 24th.) If such a party steps forward at that moment with its slogans and manages to rally millions of workers behind it, then before you stands a mass movement. I do not categorically deny that a revolution can be launched by a very small party and carried through to victory. But one must know how to win over the masses. To do so requires thorough preparation for revolution. Yet here we have comrades who advocate: abandon immediately the demand for “large” masses. We must confront such comrades with their own contradictions. Without solid preparation, you will achieve victory in no country. A tiny party can, in fact, lead the masses. At certain critical junctures, there is no need for large organizations.
But to win, one must secure the sympathy of the masses. An absolute majority is not always necessary; yet for victory, for holding onto power, it is not enough merely to secure the majority of the working class—I use the term “working class” here in the West European sense, that is, in the sense of industrial proletariat—but one must also secure the majority of the exploited and toiling rural population. Have you given this thought? Do we find even the slightest hint of such a consideration in Terracini’s speech? All that is said there is of “dynamic tendencies,” of “the transition from passivity to activity.” Does he so much as mention the question of food supplies—even in a single word? And yet workers are demanding sustenance—though they can endure much and even go hungry, as we saw, to a certain extent, in Russia. We must therefore win over to our side

Ill CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL not only the majority of the working class, but also the majority of the toiling and exploited rural population. Have you prepared for this? Almost nowhere.
So I repeat: I must, without reservation, defend our theses—and I consider this defense a duty incumbent upon me. We did not merely condemn the centrists; we expelled them from the party. Now we must turn against another faction, which we likewise regard as dangerous. We must tell our comrades the truth in the most courteous manner—and our theses express this truth with kindness and politeness—so that no one feels offended: for before us now lie other, more pressing questions than the persecution of the centrists. We have had enough of that issue; it has grown somewhat tiresome. Instead, our comrades should learn to wage a truly revolutionary struggle. German workers have already begun to do so. Hundreds of thousands of proletarians have fought heroically in that country. Anyone who opposes this struggle must be expelled without delay. But after that, we must not indulge in empty rhetoric; instead, we must immediately begin to learn—from our very own mistakes—how best to organize the struggle. We must not hide our errors from our enemies. Whoever fears to do so is not a revolutionary. On the contrary, if we openly declare to the workers: “Yes, we have made mistakes,” then that means those mistakes will not be repeated—and that we will be better able to choose the right moment. For if, during the very struggle itself, the majority of those who labor on our side—no longer just the majority of workers, but the majority of all the exploited and oppressed—then indeed we shall prevail. (Long, thunderous applause.)
The newspaper report was published on July 5, 1921, in Pravda, No. 144,
and in Izvestia of the VTsIK, No. 144.
It was printed in full on July 8, 1921, in the Bulletin
of the Third Congress of the Communist
International, No. 11

Printed according to the text of the book “The Third World Congress of the Communist International.
Stenographic Report.”
Petrograd, 1922