V. I. Lenin

Speech Delivered At

The Third All-Russia Food Conference

June 16, 1921 [1]

Comrades, first of all permit me to greet your conference on
behalf of the Council of People’s Commissars and of the
Central Committee of the R.C.P.

Comrades, we all understand, of course, why such special
attention should be paid to your conference-, not only by those
who are engaged in food supply work, but by all Soviet and Party
workers, by the whole Party, and by all those who are at all
seriously concerned about the fate of the Soviet Republic and
its tasks. Your conference has met at a moment of exceptional
importance, and for that reason it cannot possibly be regarded
as an ordinary, or regular food conference, like any you have
attended in the past, and will no doubt attend again in the
future.

The exceptional importance of your present conference is due to
two circumstances. The first is an unavoidable one-what we
feared-the fact that for the second year our country is
afflicted by a disaster that entails grave hardships. We do not
know whether we are in for a long cycle of drought, as has been
predicted these two years, but it is now clear that the grain
and hay crop will fail in a large area of the country for the
second year running, and the prospects are menacing. I will not
say just now how large is the area which, according to the grain
and hay crop reports, is affected by the drought; at all events,
it is considerable. Whatever it is, the prospect is that in many
gubernias there will he a large deficit in the tax in kind, and, moreover, the condition of the population in a number
of gubernias will be desperate; so that, instead of collecting a certain quantity of surplus produce from these
gubernias for the maintenance of the army, the working class and industry, the food supply workers will have to assist
the starving in these gubernias . The unanticipated tasks which thus devolve upon you, as food supply workers, will
make your work much more arduous. This is the first circumstance.

The second circumstance, which is not as unexpected, is the
moment of change, the turning point that has been reached, in
our whole food policy. This is the first food campaign to be
launched since the radical change in our food policy. This is
the first time we have met to sum up the experience of local
food supply workers and to prepare for our forthcoming tasks
since the Soviet government was obliged to change, not only its
food policy but, in many respects, the very principles of its
economic policy; since the extremely severe hardships the
peasants suffered last year, and the impossibility, as it turned
out, of rapidly restoring large-scale industry, compelled us to
switch all our state work to new lines.

Reckoning with the gravity of the situation in the country and
the impossibility of rapidly restoring large-scale industry,
means making preparations to help small-peasant farming, at all
costs, at any price, pull out of its critical position to a
bearable one, and for this purpose to revive small, local
industry, and adopt measures which, by at once placing small
production on a sound basis, would open up opportunities for
local trade, thereby enlarging the sphere for the investment of
capital, and also switching to new lines the whole Soviet
power-its very foundations, and its entire economic policy.

You are well aware of the effort it has cost us all, and you
particularly, during the past three years to build up something
like a stable food supply apparatus and to run it so that it
might fulfil at least the most urgent and essential tasks. Hence, there is no need to tell you, who have been in the
thick of all this, what it means quickly to reorganise all our
work and switch it over to new lines; what it means to organise
amidst so many unknowns, and, at the same time, to solve the
problem of obtaining a larger quantity of food. You know all
about it. Year after year, in spite of the terrible, unprecedented, sometimes super-human difficulties created by the
Civil War, our food policy has produced striking and tangible results, and the improvement has
been far more rapid than in any other sphere of Soviet work. But
you also know, of course, that although, as a result of the
strenuous efforts of the food supply workers, we have succeeded
in raising grain collections from 110 million peods in the first
year to over 280 million poods , you know very well that
this is net enough.

We are now, for the first time, entering on a big food supply
campaign without any whiteguard troops or foreign armies on the
territory of the R.S.F.S.R. But to this must be added some
reservations: except for the intervention started by the
Japanese in the Far Eastern Republic. Which shows again that in
the very first year when we can say that, on the whole, we have
done with the Civil War, it becomes evident that we are
surrounded by the international bourgeoisie, whom the Red Army
taught a harsh lesson, but who has not by any means abandoned
the idea of resuming the attack, in open or undercover,
systematic or sporadic form, at the very first opportunity. So
even here we have no sure guarantee. But in addition to all this
you know that the very transition from war to economic development, the transition about which we talked so long, and
to which we devoted several Party conferences and congresses,
this transition in itself, is a transition, created fresh
difficulties of vast proportions because, with a dislocated
state apparatus and transport a shambles, enormous difficulties
arose from the very transition from the old, large army, ranged
on the frontier in battle formation, to a peacetime army. The
signs are that we have overcome most of these difficulties;
nevertheless, as anyone familiar with the situation will agree,
quite a number of difficulties still confront us.

That is why I say that this food conference is exceptionally
important, that it must settle other questions besides those
specifically connected with the food supply, that your attention
and efforts on behalf of the Republic are required not only in
your capacity of food supply workers, and men on whom the Soviet
government has placed the crucial task of supplying the
population with food. T say that this is not enough. You as
Party workers must exert all your efforts to fulfil a number of
tasks which so far exist only in the form of instructions and
decisions adopted by the supreme organs of the Soviet power and
by the Party. And you know perfectly well what a wide gap there
is between general decisions, general instructions, and their
practical application. You are aware that this entails enormous
effort, which must be exerted in order to put these principles
successfully into practice, to prevent then from remaining a
dead letter, as, unfortunately, often happens in Soviet
Russia.

I should like to remind you of the decision adopted by the last
Party Conference which dealt specifically with the question of
the New Economic Policy. [2] The Party conference was called urgently for the purpose of convincing all
comrades that this policy had been adopted, as was said at the
conference, in earnest and for a long time and to prevent any
wavering on that score in future, for there has been some
wavering and uncertainty. The Party conference, as the supreme
organ of the ruling, government Party, the leading authority of
the working class, emphasised the importance of collecting the
large food stock of 400 million poods . It laid emphasis
on the point that the whole meaning of our food policy,
permitting a large measure of unrestricted trade, boils down to
building up a big food fund, as a large state reserve. Without
it, neither the restoration of large-scale industry nor the
restoration of the currency will be possible, and every
socialist understands that unless large-scale industry-the only
real basis.-is restored, it is no use talking about socialist
construction.

No country has been so devastated as ours. It had been more
backward than other countries before the imperialist war, which
brought it more ruin than it did to any other country, and in
addition we had to endure the untold hardships of another three
years of war against the bourgeoisie and the landowners. The
vanquished countries with which Russia might be compared,
countries like Serbia and Austria—where industry has been
ruined to an extent equal to, and in some cases even greater
than, that of Russia—are in desperate straits. Counting on
the assistance of the bourgeoisie—for they did not rise
against it-they are crushed by a double burden: starvation, ruin and impoverishment (as in
our case), plus the realisation that their position is hopeless,
that they had put their stake on the bourgeoisie and are
perishing without any prospects of assistance. But, in spite of
all our incredible difficulties, we see and clearly realise, and
the mass of workers and peasants clearly realise—in spite
of our incredible difficulties fresh forces are arising. Every
difficulty brought to life fresh forces, created new sources of
energy and indicated new paths. The work these forces have
performed proves to us that, terribly slow though it is, we are
making progress, that frightfully hard though it may be to
overcome difficulties at times, we are nevertheless overcoming
them. There is a growing realisation that economic relationships
are being built upon entirely new lines, that great as its
sufferings may be, the working class is, step by step, day after
day, finding solutions for all problems without the aid of the
capitalists, and is fighting them, and dislodging them from one
position after another.

This, comrades, seems to me to be the sum and substance of the
decisions adopted by the Party conference. And with this I want
particularly to emphasise that the present conference is not
only a conference of specialists, but of Party and Soviet
workers upon whom will devolve the practical task of building,
under extremely difficult conditions, the new forms of economic
policy and the foundation of the whole Soviet edifice.

We shall have to build in two ways: by collecting the tax and by
reviving commodity exchange. The tax has been fixed, on the
assumption of an average harvest, at 240 million poods ,
which is inadequate even for a short ration for the army which
we need, and for the absolutely essential industrial enterprises. It will be difficult to collect this amount in
full, not only in view of the threatening crop failure, but
under any circumstances.

I have not got the exact figures before me showing the changes
in the percentages of fulfilment of our food supply plans and
assignments according to districts during the three years that
we have been carrying on food supply operations. But everyone
knows that the machinery we have created by our joint efforts is
running far more smoothly than that of a number of other
People’s Commissariats, and that our efficiency is steadily increasing. I also take it as an irrefutable fact that
this year, when so much attention is being devoted to this work,
we shall cope more fully with the tasks the Republic has set
us. We must achieve, if not 100 per cent, then as near to that
figure as possible; and we can achieve it, even amidst the
difficulties created by the threatening failure of the harvest. The tax deficit may run to tens of millions of
poods , but this may be balanced by the extra amount that is likely to be collected in areas where the harvest has
been particularly good.

Comrades, the harvest absolutely refuses to reckon with the
state of the food supply apparatus, and it has not given us the
satisfaction of being particularly good where the food supply
apparatus is particularly good. If we look at the chart
indicating the harvest prospects we shall find that the areas of
the R.S.F.S.H. and of neighbouring and fraternal republics where
the harvest outlook is particularly good, or is above the
average, are the very regions where the food supply apparatus is
certainly not above the average, but even below it. Vigorous
measures must be taken to transfer extra food supply workers to
these areas, but we know too few people who are sufficiently
trained and experienced to adapt themselves to the new areas
quickly and get things moving at once. This is a matter that
requires very close attention.

The main thing is commodity exchange, and it is this the Party
conference put into the forefront and the last Party Congress
decided. It is the question that is engaging most of the concern
and attention of all those who are at the head of Soviet and
Party work in Moscow. How well are we prepared for it? What has
been actually done? What part of these plans has been carried
out? You will be the first to have to answer these questions
from first-hand experience. Your experience in this matter and
its summing up will be of particular and vital importance.

This is a new field, and additional forces must be sent in. It
demands that the food supply apparatus should be something more
than it has been up to now-nothing but a more or less uniform
and smoothly running machine for collecting a quantity of food
products. No, here you will have to take account of the
difference in the localities, in the goods demanded and the
equivalents offered. You will not have to adjust yourselves to
what the Soviet government wants, and to what the Soviet
apparatus can carry out. No, you will have to adjust yourselves
to the economic conditions of the small farmers, and will have
to reckon with their satisfied and outstanding needs. You have
fought the profiteers and have combated trade conducted in
contravention of government orders. You will have to go on
fighting them. But in order to engage in the exchange of
commodities and avoid being beaten in the free market which
means being beaten by unrestricted trade-you must know it
thoroughly, compete with it, fight it with its own weapons and
beat it at its own game, but to be able to do that you must have
a thorough knowledge of it.

The old bureaucratic methods are of no use; we need precise
knowledge of commercial conditions and the ability to react
quickly to every change. For this purpose, food products and
articles for exchange must he rapidly transported from place to
place over the vast territory of the II.S.F.S.H. The difficulties ahead of us are enormous. But this will be the
basis of the whole of our New Economic Policy for the period
until we fully restore large-scale industry. This may take at
least ten years, during which time we must create such relations
between the working class and the peasantry-the only classes
that can serve as a base on which to build up our economy-and
such an alliance between them as will economically satisfy both
sides. It must be an alliance in which the small peasant will he
reckoned with as a small peasant, until we are able to provide
him with all the products of large-scale industry.

We must reckon with the small proprietor who sells his surplus
products. We must also reckon with the need to improve the
condition of the urban population-the workers. Unless we do
this, we shall fail in our further work of construction that
will so consolidate the transition to socialism that there will
be no turning hack. That is why commodity exchange is now the
most important part of our economic policy. This is the task
you, food supply workers, business managers and co-operators,
will have to tackle.

This is what the Soviet government, the Party, and the whole
Republic expect of you, for your attitude to this work and your
successes will determine the success of what the Soviet Republic
is now staking everything on in the work of socialist construction.

Comrades, I must say ill conclusion that your conference has a
special task before it: to consider a matter that was raised in
the Political Bureau of the Party’s Central Committee in
May, and settled, after discussion on the Central Committee, at
the All-Russia Congress of Trade Unions. It is to set to work,
with due circumspection and very gradually, but immediately, to
try out the system of collective supplies. The present system of
food distribution has proved to be defective, and this cannot go
on. The system of distributing food on the egalitarian principle
has led to equalisation, which sometimes proves to be an
obstacle to increasing output. The Republic must utilise the
food surpluses it collects to maintain only what is needed for
industry. We cannot maintain all our factories, nor is it
necessary to do so: that would be wasteful management. We cannot
restore the whole of large-scale industry, and so we must select
and maintain only those factories which have the best equipment
and promise a greater output.

Food supply workers cannot just go on thinking that their
business boils down to collecting so many millions of poods and distributing them in certain fixed rations,
on the present ration cards, say, and that there is the end of
it. The immediate thing is to integrate the activity of all the
economic People’s Commissariats. The conscientious food
supply worker must not only be interested in food supply work,
but in all economic activity. More is expected of him now.

He cannot go on being only a food supply worker, lie must be an
economist appraising every step in the light of the work of all
the economic People’s Commissariats, and of all the results achieved by that work.

It is wrong to think that food distribution is only a matter of
fairness. We must bear ill mind that it is a method, an
instrument, and a means of increasing output. State food
supplies must be given only to those employees who are really
needed, on the condition that productivity of labour is increased to the utmost. And if the distribution of food is
to he used as a political instrument, then it must be used to
reduce the number of those who are not absolutely needed and to
encourage those who actually are. If the distribution of food is
a political instrument for restoring our industry, then we must
maintain the industrial enterprises which are really needed now,
and certainly stop maintaining those we do not need now, and
thus economise fuel and food. For a number of years we have been
managing these things very badly. This must now be rectified.

Thus, you see that the closer you look into the matter the wider
you find the tasks confronting your food conference. I hope,
however, that none of you will be intimidated by the complexity
of these tasks, and that, on the contrary, the unusual nature of
your tasks as Soviet and Party workers will stimulate you to
fresh efforts to fulfil them. Our past experience of the work of
other People’s Commissariats clearly proves the necessity
of combining Soviet and Party work. Food supply workers have
carried out a number of urgent tasks under extremely difficult
conditions; and they did it successfully because in these cases
the Soviet and Party bodies resorted to unconventional methods,
urgent measures and shock-work campaign operations. I repeat
that it is the fundamental basis of our economic policy that is
the main subject of your food conference. It must engage all
your attention.

In conclusion, permit me to express the conviction that our
united efforts in the direction we have taken will lay a firm
foundation for a successful economic policy that will create an
alliance between the working class and the peasantry, the two
main classes on which the Soviet power rests, the economic
alliance which alone can guarantee the success of all our work
of socialist construction. (Stormy applause.)

Endnotes

[1]
The Conference was held in Moscow from June 16 to 24, 1921, and
was attended by 499 delegates: gubernia food commissars, members
of gubernia food committee collegiums, and representatives of
various food agencies and githernia executive committees,
ca-operatives and trade unions.

The questions on the agenda were: 1) tax in kind; 2) commodity
exchange; 3) relationship between the food agencies and
cooperatives; 4) principles of the state supply, etc.

Lenin was elected an honorary member of the Presidium and spoke
at the first sitting.

The Conference helped to improve the food situation in the
country.

[2] The reference is
to the resolution of the Tenth all-Russian Conference of the
R.C.P.(B.) “On Economic Policy”. See K.P.S.S. v rezolutsiakh . . . (The C.P.S.U. in the Resolutions and
Decisions of Congrresses, Conferences and C.C. Plenary Meetings,
Part 1, 1954, pp. 574-76