Comrades, first and foremost, allow me to extend a warm greeting to your conference—on behalf of the Sovnarkom and on behalf of the Central Committee of the RCP.
Comrades, it is surely clear to all of us why such special attention must be given to your conference—not only by food workers, but by all Soviet and Party officials, by the Party as a whole, and by everyone who, however dimly, bears a conscious concern for the fate of the Soviet Republic and for the tasks that lie before it. Your conference is convened at a moment of utterly exceptional significance—and in this respect, it cannot in any way be equated with the ordinary, routine food conferences that you have held time and again, and that you will continue to hold in the future.
The utterly exceptional importance of your current conference stems from two circumstances. First and foremost, there is that unforeseen development which we had long feared—and which, for the second year running, is once again plunging the country into extremely perilous calamities: whether we have indeed entered a prolonged period of drought—as we have been warned for the past two years—we do not yet know; but what is already certain is that, for the second year in a row, large swathes of the country will experience severe crop failures, affecting both grain and fodder crops—and this has already become abundantly clear, painting before our eyes a picture of immense danger. I will not dwell now on just how vast the area is that, according to the latest reports on grain and forage yields, is now gripped by famine. In any case, this region is substantial. At the very least, we are already confronted with the prospect that a massive shortfall will occur across numerous gubernias in terms of the food tax—and that, in many gubernias, moreover, the population will find itself in a desperate, unprecedentedly dire situation. Instead of drawing from these gubernias the customary surplus needed to sustain the army, the working class, and industry, food workers will now be called upon to assist those very same gubernias, to aid the starving populations. The tasks that thus fall upon food workers, far beyond anything we had anticipated, only serve to magnify the burden of the work already weighing heavily upon you. That is the first circumstance.
The second circumstance, while not quite so unexpected, nonetheless marks a transitional, pivotal moment in our entire food policy. For the first time, we are entering into a food campaign; for the first time, we are gathering to take stock of the experiences of local food workers and to prepare for the tasks that lie ahead for food workers—yet all this takes place in conditions where food policy has undergone a radical transformation. The Soviet state has been compelled not only to overhaul its food policy, but in many respects to fundamentally reorient its entire economic policy. The extraordinarily difficult plight of the peasantry last year—and the subsequent realization that the rapid restoration of large-scale industry would prove impossible—have forced us to shift the entire course of state activity onto entirely new tracks.
To recognize the need to reckon with the country’s grave predicament, with the impossibility of swiftly restoring large-scale industry, means preparing ourselves to lift small peasant holdings, at all costs and whatever the price, from a critical state to one of relative viability—and to achieve this, we must bolster small-scale industry, local industry, and pursue measures that, while immediately strengthening smallholdings, will simultaneously open up avenues for local trade, thereby expanding the sphere of capital’s application. In doing so, we are placing the entire Soviet power—and its very foundations, its entire economic policy—upon entirely new rails.
You know full well how much effort it took over the course of three years—for you above all—to consolidate even a rudimentary food apparatus, to bring it into a position where it could fulfill at least the most minimal, the most essential tasks. And so it goes without saying, to those of you who have directly observed and personally endured this process, what it means to undertake the task of rapidly restructuring and reorganizing the entire system—and what it entails to organize oneself in an environment that is still very much subject to trial and error, while at the same time striving to secure a greater yield of food products. You know this all too well yourselves. Year after year, despite the terrible, unprecedented, at times almost inhuman hardships of the Civil War, year after year, our food policy yielded results that were plain to see, obvious to all—results that improved and advanced far more rapidly than could ever be demonstrated through the practical outcomes of any other field of Soviet endeavor. But you also know, of course, that although we managed, thanks to the strenuous efforts of food workers, to raise our food procurement from 110 million in the first year to 280 million and beyond—still, you all know perfectly well that this is far from sufficient.
Now, for the first time, we are embarking on a major food campaign under the condition that no White Guard forces or enemy hordes remain within the territory of the RSFSR. Yet even this must be qualified: apart from the nascent Japanese intervention in the Far Eastern Republic—meaning that, once again, in the very first year when we can say that, on the whole, we have brought the Civil War to a close—it becomes immediately clear to everyone that we are surrounded by international bourgeois forces, which— Speech at the Third All‑Russian Food Conference
The Red Army had indeed delivered a most impressive lesson—but that did not in the least put an end to its persistent attempts to resume aggression, whether in overt or covert form, in a systematic or sporadic manner, whenever the slightest opportunity presented itself. Thus, we are far from having achieved complete security in this regard. But beyond that, as you know, the very transition from war to peacetime—this transition we have spoken of for so long, to which we have devoted several Party conferences and congresses—this transition, taken in and of itself, simply by virtue of being a transition, gave rise to new and immense difficulties. For with a shattered administrative apparatus and a severely disrupted transportation system, the shift from the old, large army stationed along the front in battle formation to a peacetime military force created enormous challenges—and while we have, by and large, managed to overcome these challenges, anyone who truly understands the situation will hardly doubt that a considerable number of difficulties still remain.
That is why I say that the significance of this Food Conference is utterly exceptional: it must address not only food-related issues per se. Your attention and your efforts are now required not merely as food administrators—those who have taken upon themselves from the Soviet authorities the momentous task of supplying the population with food—but that is far from sufficient. As Party workers, you are called upon to exert every ounce of your strength in order to carry out a whole host of tasks that have so far been outlined only in the form of directives and resolutions adopted by the highest organs of Soviet power and the Party organization. And you yourselves know how great the gap is between general policy decisions and broad directives on the one hand, and their practical implementation into something concrete on the other—that is where the immense burdens lie, burdens that workers must bear if they are to successfully execute these fundamental guidelines, to ensure that these directives do not remain mere ink on paper—a reality that, unfortunately, is all too common in Soviet Russia.
I would like to recall the resolution adopted at the last Party conference, which had been convened specifically to address the question of the New Economic Policy.119 The Party conference was called into emergency session in order to instill in all comrades a firm conviction that this policy, as was stated at the conference, had been adopted in earnest and for the long term—there would be no more hesitation on this score. Yet there had been ample hesitation, plenty of uncertainty. And so the Party conference, as the highest organ of the ruling, governing Party—the guiding force of the working class—underscored just how crucial it is to amass a substantial food reserve totaling 400 million poods. It emphasized that the entire significance of our food policy, of the shift toward permitting extensive free trade, hinges for us on the creation of a large food fund, of vast state reserves. Without such reserves, neither the restoration of heavy industry nor the revival of monetary circulation can ever be achieved—and any socialist knows full well that without the restoration of heavy industry—the sole real foundation—there can be no talk whatsoever of socialist construction.
The country has been laid waste in ways previously unimaginable. Even before the outbreak of the imperialist war, it was already relatively backward; after the war, it was devastated to a degree greater than that of other nations—and for three more years it bore the unprecedented burdens of war against the bourgeoisie and the landed gentry. The defeated nations that might be compared with Russia—such as Serbia and Austria, where industry was no less ruined, and in some cases even more so than in Russia—find themselves in a position of utter despair, of complete hopelessness. Relying on the aid of the bourgeoisie, since they had not waged war against it, these countries were crushed on two fronts: by famine, by ruin, by impoverishment—as we were—and by the stark realization that their situation was hopeless, that they had placed their bets on the bourgeoisie only to perish, with no prospect of support. We, however, despite all these unprecedented hardships, see clearly—and both the working class and the peasant masses see clearly—that, despite the staggering difficulties, new forces are emerging. Every difficulty has brought forth new strengths, has given birth to new…

Speech at the Third All-Russian Food Conference sources of energy, pointing toward new paths. The work of these forces demonstrated to us that, however devilishly slow our progress may be, we are nonetheless moving forward; that no matter how incredibly agonizing the overcoming of difficulties may sometimes prove, we do, in fact, surmount them. A growing awareness is dawning that economic relations are being built upon entirely different foundations—that the working class, despite all its suffering, is resolving every question without the aid of capitalists, advancing step by step, day by day, steadily pressing against them and wresting one position after another.
Here, comrades, is what, it seems to me, embodies the essence, the meaning, and the ultimate outcome of the Party Conference’s deliberations. And it is precisely this point I wish to emphasize: to what extent this gathering is not merely a conference for specialists, but rather a forum for Party and Soviet leaders who, in practice, are called upon to forge new forms of economic policy—building the very foundation of the entire Soviet edifice under conditions of extraordinary hardship.
We must build in two ways: first, through taxation; second, through commodity exchange. The tax was set, on the assumption of an average harvest, at 240 million poods—a sum that is insufficient even to provide meager sustenance for the necessary army and for the industrially essential enterprises, a figure which, not only in light of the looming famine but even under normal circumstances, presents an enormous challenge to collect in full, at 100%.
I do not have precise data at hand regarding how the fulfillment rate of our plans and tasks in the realm of food supply has changed across different regions over the three years of our food-supply experience. But it is common knowledge that the apparatus we have built through joint effort has proven superior to many of our other People’s Commissariats—and that here, we have seen a steady increase in operational efficiency. I consider it beyond dispute that this year, when such work is receiving heightened attention, we will raise the percentage of fulfillment for those tasks that the Republic has entrusted to us. If not to 100%, then we should come close to that mark—and we can achieve it, even in the face of the difficulties posed by the looming famine.
Perhaps the shortfall will amount to tens of millions of poods; yet perhaps this deficit will be offset by the additional tax in kind that localities where the harvest has been especially bountiful are expected to yield.
Comrades, the harvest is in no way correlated with the state of the food-supply apparatus—and we have found little pleasure in seeing particularly good results in areas where the food-supply apparatus itself is far from exceptional. If we look at a map showing projected harvests, we find that in those regions of the RSFSR and of other neighboring, fraternal republics where the harvest is expected to be especially abundant—or even above average—it is precisely there that the food-supply apparatus falls far short of average, or even below it. We must therefore address the task of redeploying food-supply resources with particular vigor; yet for this redeployment, we have few individuals who are sufficiently trained, sufficiently experienced, and who would readily take up their new posts, quickly adapt, and swiftly set the machinery in motion. This is a task that demands ever more fresh attention.
What is most important—and what the Party Conference has brought to the forefront, and what the latest Party Congress has resolved—is the task of commodity exchange. Among all those who stand at the center of Soviet and Party-wide work in Moscow, this issue commands the greatest attention, the deepest concern. How well we have prepared for it, what has actually been accomplished in practice, and which of these plans have been realized—these are questions you will be the first to answer, based on your firsthand familiarity with the actual situation. Here, the exchange of your practical experience, the drawing of conclusions from that experience, takes on particularly vital, indeed crucial significance.
This is a novel undertaking, one that calls for an even greater reallocation of resources. It does not demand what was previously required of the food-supply apparatus: a more or less uniform machine, perhaps functioning correctly, tasked with collecting a specific quantity of food—and nothing more. No, here we must take into account the differences

Speech at the Third All-Russian Food Conference between localities, the varying demands for goods, the differing equivalents. We must adapt not to what the Soviet power requires or what the Soviet apparatus is capable of accomplishing—but rather, we must adapt to the economic conditions of small farmers’ lives, taking into account what they lack and what their needs already are being met. You have fought against petty trade, against commerce that circumvents state directives. You must continue to wage that struggle today as well. Yet to carry out commodity exchange without being crushed by the free market—not to be defeated by this very free trade—we must know it well, compete with it, and ultimately overcome it using its own weapons, its own tools—and to do so, we must first know those tools.
We do not need old, bureaucratic methods; what we need is a keen understanding of trading conditions, a precise grasp of those conditions, and the ability to respond swiftly to any change. To that end, we require rapid redistribution—not only of food supplies, but also of commodities for exchange across the vast expanse of the RSFSR. The difficulties before us are immense. Yet this is the foundation of all new economic policy—for as long as we have not fully restored large-scale industry—which may take no fewer than a decade to accomplish. And during this period, we must establish such forms of relationship between the working class and the peasantry, between these two sole classes upon which we must build our economy; we must forge between these classes a union that satisfies both sides economically—a union that treats the small peasant as the small peasant he is, until we are able to provide him with all the products of large-scale industry.
We must take into account the smallholder who sells his surplus; we must also recognize that the urban population—and the workers—must improve their own lot. Without this, we will not succeed in our further construction work, which will consolidate the transition to socialism to such an extent that there will be no turning back. That is why the task of commodity exchange…

Now, there is the most crucial question of our entire economic policy. You will all need to devote your efforts to this task—whether you are food administrators, economic managers, or cooperative officials. This is what the Soviet state expects of you; this is what the Party and the entire Republic expect of you, for the success—or failure—of your approach to this work, and of your ultimate achievements in this endeavor, hinges on the single, paramount stake of the entire Soviet Republic, of socialist construction as it stands today.
Comrades, I must conclude by emphasizing that your conference bears a special responsibility: to address the issue that was brought before the Politburo of the Party’s Central Committee in May and subsequently resolved after thorough deliberation within the Central Committee at the All‑Russian Congress of Trade Unions. That issue concerns the need to proceed with due caution and gradualism—but nonetheless to immediately embark upon the path of testing collective supply mechanisms. Our current system of food distribution has revealed significant shortcomings, and we simply cannot afford to continue along this course. The very model of food distribution we have long relied upon, founded on principles of egalitarianism, fostered a kind of equality that, at times, proved counterproductive to the goal of boosting production. The Republic must sustain itself—not through the lavish consumption of grain surpluses it has accumulated, but only by allocating those resources to what is truly essential for production. We cannot—and indeed, we do not need to—support every single enterprise in our industrial sector; to do so would amount to reckless, wasteful management. We cannot hope to fully restore large-scale industry; therefore, we must identify those enterprises that are best equipped, those that promise higher productivity, and focus our resources exclusively on sustaining these.
Food administrators cannot afford to limit themselves to the narrow mindset that “we’ll secure so many millions of poods, distribute them according to such-and-such quotas—perhaps even using the same ration cards—and then be done with it.” Beyond that, they claim, “it’s no longer my concern.” What lies ahead is the consolidation of all economic People’s Commissariats’ activities. It is not merely matters directly related to food administration that should occupy the attention of every conscientious food administrator; rather, it is the totality of economic activity—the whole spectrum of economic endeavors—that ought to be of primary interest to each of you. The demands placed upon you are steadily increasing.

SPEECH AT THE THIRD ALL-RUSSIAN FOOD CONFERENCE
To be a mere food administrator is not enough; one must also be an economist, capable of assessing every step of our work in light of the broader functions of all economic People’s Commissariats and the cumulative outcomes of their collective efforts.
When it comes to food distribution, we must move beyond the simplistic notion that our sole aim is to distribute food fairly. Instead, we must recognize that food distribution is itself a method—a tool, a means—designed to enhance production. We must provide state support in the form of food only to those workers who are genuinely indispensable under conditions of maximum labor productivity. And if we are to treat food distribution as a strategic instrument of policy, then we must reduce the number of those who are not absolutely essential while simultaneously incentivizing those who are truly needed. If food distribution is to serve as a tool in the policy of restoring our industry, then we must prioritize the maintenance of those industrial enterprises that are currently vital—and categorically refrain from supporting those enterprises that are no longer necessary for us—thereby achieving savings in fuel and in food supplies. For years, we have managed our affairs in this regard with profound shortcomings; now, it is time to rectify those errors.
As you can see, the deeper one delves into this work, the more expansive—and increasingly complex—the web of tasks confronting your food conference grows. Yet I am confident that none of you will feel daunted by the sheer magnitude of these challenges; on the contrary, the extraordinary tasks that lie before you—as Soviet workers and as Party members—should instead awaken within you a renewed sense of energy, empowering you to meet these challenges head-on. The experience gained in other People’s Commissariats over the past several years vividly demonstrates the imperative need to integrate the work of the Soviet apparatus with the work of the Party. A host of urgent, critical tasks faced by food administrators could only be accomplished under extraordinarily difficult circumstances because we were compelled to employ methods that were far from conventional—methods of emergency response, methods that harnessed the power of shock tactics and combat readiness, methods that called for unconventional approaches and innovative collaboration between Soviet institutions and Party organs. Let me reiterate: it is precisely the fundamental pillars of our economic policy that constitute the central mission of your food conference. All your attention must be directed toward this overarching objective.
In closing, let me express my firm conviction that, by pooling our strengths along the path we have chosen, we will succeed in strengthening the foundations of a sound economic policy—one that fosters the alliance between the working class and the peasantry, the two principal classes upon which Soviet power rests, and that builds the very economic union capable of securing the success of our entire socialist endeavor. (Loud applause.)
Brief newspaper report
Published on June 18, 1921, in Petrogradskaya Pravda, No. 129
Fully published on June 22 and 23, 1921, in Pravda, Nos. 133

Printed according to the text of Pravda.