V. I. Lenin

To Comrade Krzhizhanovsky, The Presidium Of The State Planning Commission

There is still hardly any evidence of the operation of an integrated state
economic plan. The predominating tendency is to “revive”
everything, all branches of the national economy indiscriminately, even
all the enterprises that we have inherited from capitalism.

The State Planning Commission should organise its work in such a way as to
have drawn up, at least by harvest time, the main principles of a state
economic plan for the next year or two.

It should start with food, for this is the taproot of all our
difficulties. An attempt must be made to draw up a national economic plan
for three contingencies: a state reserve of (1) 200; (2) 250 and (3) 300
million poods of grain for the year (September 1, 1921 to
September 1, 1922). Perhaps, if the difficulties of working out detailed
calculations for the three contingencies prove too great, it would be more
rational to confine ourselves to one detailed calculation based on the
assumption that we obtain 250 million poods , with a surplus (300
minus 250) provided against a rainy day, and only approximate the details
for the contingency of a complete shortage of grain (200 million
poods ) (so much to be bought from abroad, so much to be
“tightened up” in industry, transport, the army, etc.).

Assume that the state grain reserve amounts to so much; deduct a reserve
for the contingency of war, interruptions in railway communication, etc.

Then comes fuel. The prospects ranging from so much to so much. Minimum
and maximum amount of food required for this purpose. The possibility of
increasing fuel supplies to such-and-such dimensions if the grain reserve
is increased by so much.

Possibility of economising so much fuel by concentrating production in a
few of the best factories. These calculations are essential. In this
connection, estimate the possibilities of economising food by closing down
unnecessary factories, or those not absolutely essential, and by
transferring the workers (Where? Is such transfer feasible? If
not—consider the minimum task of putting such workers on shorter
rations).

Economising fuel by paying a bonus for saving it and by tighter
supervision of consumption. Approximate estimate of such economy—if
there are any data to base it on.

The army (as distinct from the navy, for which special calculations must
be made for maximum reduction, verging on abolition, and reduction of
expenditure). Basis of calculation—1.6 million by Sept. 1, 1921, and
a provisional estimate for half the amount.

Soviet office staffs. Present size. Possibility of reducing by 25 or 50
per cent. Bonus for one-fourth (of present number of employees, those
absolutely essential) for reducing the total number. This question of
giving a bonus to the remaining fourth (or third, or half) for reducing
the total number of mouths (and for reducing fuel consumption by, say,
introducing a three-shift system and closing two out of three offices)
must be examined with particular care in view of its exceptional
importance.

Industry, divided into several groups with the smallest possible number of
the main groups. Water and light. Minimum necessary to cover minimum
requirements: α productive consumption, β individual consumption. Estimates for a definite number of main groups (the task of
working out detailed calculations for the respective branches of industry,
districts and towns may, perhaps, be assigned to special subcommissions,
or special local agents, or to the gubernia statistical bureaus,
etc.)— calculate how many large factories all production can be
concentrated in, and how many should be closed. Obviously, this extremely
important question requires particularly careful study: firstly, purely
statistical (data for 1920, and, if possible, also for 1918 and 1919;
sometimes, in exceptional cases, pre-war statistics may be of auxiliary
use); secondly, economic, which must solve the following special problem:

Is it possible to find for the redundant urban and industrial workers whom
the state ought not to feed, and for whom other employment cannot be
provided in the towns, temporary employment—for a year or
two—in the grain districts on the understanding that they satisfy
the needs of the surrounding farming population?

After industry, from which the building industry must be singled out,
comes transport (perhaps this should be put before industry?), and
electrification as a distinct item.

And so forth.

The estimates must be first drawn up at least in rough outline, as a first
approximation; but they must be ready at an early date—within a
month, or two, at the outside. They must give an overall picture of the
total food and fuel expenditure for the year. This rough plan can
afterwards be filled in, corrected, amended; but at this early date we
must have the main plan for the year even if only in rough outline (or
perhaps separate plans for each of the quarters, or thirds, of the year:
Sept. 1, 1921 to Jan. 1, 1922; Jan. 1 to May 1, and May 1 to Sept. 1,
1922).

Nineteen-twenty must be taken as a basis for comparison
throughout. Perhaps a number of estimates can and must be made on the
basis of a comparative statistical and economic study of the data for 1920
and the “prospects” for 1921-22.

I request that the Presidium of the State Planning Commission inform me of
the opinions on this letter of the majority and of its individual members,
before submitting my proposal to the Plenum of the State Planning
Commission.

Chairman of the Council of Labour and Defence,

V. Ulyanov ( Lenin )

May 14, 1921

P.S. 1) Special attention must be paid to the industries producing
articles that can be exchanged for grain, in order to obtain grain within
the country. At all events these industries must be grouped separately so
as to provide a definite answer to the question: In the event of a general
shortage of grain, will it be possible, by setting aside a given quantity
of food and fuel for certain branches of industry, or certain factories,
to obtain a given quantity of goods which can be exchanged for a given
quantity of grain? This provisional estimate must be drawn up beforehand,
for application, in certain cases, after the harvest.

2) An attempt must be made to single out and count up: (a) the factories
(and number of workers) that are absolutely essential for the state and
(b) the factories—and number of workers—which are being kept
running by tradition, routine, and the unwillingness of the workers to
change their occupation and domicile, etc., and which should be closed
down to rationalise production and concentrate industry in a few of the
best factories operating in several shifts. Total number of factories and
workers in each category. Estimate reduction of ration for second category
as an incentive for closing these factories.