V. I.

Lenin

April 11, 1921 [3]

1

Rejoinder During The Debate

We have just heard exceedingly diplomatic speeches on the
part of Comrade Shlyapnikov and Comrade Ryazanov’ who although they are now
protesting very loudly’ are nevertheless protesting so diplomatically that
they would make highly satisfactory negotiators with concessionaires and
with bourgeois states. We have come to a meeting at which I report on the
disagreements that arose in the Central Committee and the Council of
People’s Commissars. The same disagreements will emerge here during the
discussion .... These differences were resolved by the decision of the
Tenth Congress, which says: “The decree of the C.P.C. shall be approved
and a concession shall be granted in Baku and Grozny.” We want to discuss
this question here, that is why I asked that Shlyapnikov’s and Ryazanov’s
proposal should be rejected, and they should have their inquisitiveness,
not to say curiosity, gratified by the results of the ensuing debate.

| First published in 1932 in Lenin Miscellany XX | |
| --- | --- |
| Printed from the shorthand record | |

2

Reply To The Debate On The Report On Concessions

Comrades, the question was raised here from the very outset
whether our differences in regard to concessions were serious or not, and
the desire was expressed, incidentally’ by Comrade Shlyapnikov that more
systematic information be given on each agreement. I’m afraid this is
impracticable, if only for technical reasons. For instance, take the case of peace treaties with different countries. After the general directives,
which at first were drafted in great detail, it so fell out that a certain
type of treaty with bourgeois countries was adopted by tacit consent, the
mass of details being left to the representatives authorised to sign the
treaty. And most of these details are probably unknown to the majority of
the members of the Council of People’s Commissars and the Central
Committee. The same here: we were dealing with a question of principle and
we thought there was a danger of disagreements arising. Therefore the Party
congress had to step in, and therefore the present meeting, in which only
members of the Party are taking part, was a meeting called for the purpose
of mutual information. We have read out to you what the Council of People’s
Commissars has adopted. [4]

The C.P.C.’s decision was adopted in spite of the motion by two very
prominent trade unionists. What other method of information do the majority
of the communist group members have if not through such a meeting as this
one? It works out that there were less disagreements than we thought. This
is the most desirable thing for us. No minutes of this meeting are being
kept and we do not intend to have a press discussion on it. Our purpose has
been achieved.

In informing you of the decision of the Council of People’s Commissars,
we are letting you know how we have accepted the decision of. the Party
congress. The remaining differences of opinion do not exceed those which
arise from day to day on various questions and are decided by a simple
vote, without becoming a hindrance to the work. Submission to the majority
in that case is not only a matter of form, but an act that does not hinder
further work. I think we have achieved here a result in that no serious
differences have come to light, and partial differences will be ’ironed out
in the course of the work itself.

Comrade Ryazanov, characteristically, has tried to drag in
disagreements with the Workers’ Opposition. He specially chose a
formulation that was intended to be a teaser, but he failed in this, and
none of the speakers fell for it.

One comrade sent in a note saying that we here are concluding a second
Treaty of Brest. The first one had turned out well, as to the second one,
he has his doubts. This true, but the present agreement, in the field of
economy

is something between the Brest Treaty and an agreement with any bourgeois
state. We have already signed several such agreements, including a trade
agreement with Britain. The one on concessions will be something between
the Brest Treaty and such agreements with bourgeois states.

Comrade Ryazanov then passed a remark, quite correctly, which I should
like to underline at the very outset. He said that if we want to grant a
concession it was not meant to improve the position of the workers, but to
raise the productive forces. Quite right! As to improving the position of
the workers’ we always stand by this. I have here a draft agreement with a
Swedish corporation of ball-bearing plants written by the staff of the
Supreme Economic

Council [5] ( reads ).

This agreement does not stipulate any improvement in the condition of
the workers. True’ it is so worded that the Russian Government undertakes
to supply the workers with everything they need, and if it fails to do
this, the capitalists have the right to bring in workers from abroad. As to
the ability of the Russian Government to fulfil everything the plan calls
for as far as the workers are concerned, I think that neither we, nor the
Supreme Economic Council, nor the Swedes can have any illusions on this
score. At any rate, in this Comrade Ryazanov is quite right’ for the main
thing in concessions is not improvement of the workers’ condition, but the
raising of the productive forces and such a transaction under which we are
making great sacrifices in order to increase output. But what are these
sacrifices? I have been told that I gloss over these sacrifices, play them
down. Comrade Ryazanov even tried to crack a joke on this score. I did not
play down the sacrifices, I only said that we may have to give the
capitalists not only hundreds, but thousands of per cent in profits. That’s
the whole gist of it!

If, as I assumed, on the basis of calculations by our specialists, we
take 30-40 per cent of the oil, for instance, for ourselves, if the
capitalist, out of every 100 million ponds of oil which he produces, takes
50-60 million ponds for himself, and possessing the transport, sells them
at a profit of perhaps 1000 per cent, or maybe more, then the position is
clear. And when I tried to find out from Krasin the terms of his agreement
on the basis of his preliminary talks with the businessmen and tycoons, I asked: “Can one conceive of a type of
agreement under which we stipulate a definite percentage of profit for the
capitalist, say up to 80 per cent.” He said: “It is not a question of
the size of the profits, because these robbers now make as much as 1000 per
cent, not 80.”

To my mind’ the sacrifices will be very heavy. We shall probably have
to make great sacrifices if we are going to give concessions on ores or
timber’ if we are going to give away raw materials which they are so
desperately in need of abroad, such as manganese ore’ for example. Georgia
has now become Soviet. The thing is to unite the Caucasian Republics into a
single economic centre: the Georgian, Azerbaijan and Armenian
Republics. Azerbaijan produces oil; it has to be transported via Batum
through Georgian territory, so there will be a single economic centre.

According to one report, the Georgian Menshevik government had
concluded a concession agreement, which, on the whole’ is acceptable to
us. Preliminarily, I could only get in touch with Georgian comrades and
ascertain from a talk with Comrade Yenukidze, the Secretary of the
All-Russia Central Executive Committee, who is himself a Georgian, that he
had been there and concluded an agreement—true, not a concession
agreement—with the Menshevik Georgian government granting us without
resistance one-sixth of Georgia while retaining a guarantee of inviolability. [6]

After this agreement, to the signing of which Comrade Yenukidze was a
party, they preferred nevertheless, despite the guarantee of inviolability’
to quit Batum for Constantinople, so that we have gained by this in two
ways, positively and negatively—in that we have acquired territory, not
for Russia’ but for Soviet Georgia—Batum and its environs—and in that we
have lost a good many Mensheviks, who have left for Constantinople.

It appears that the Georgian Revolutionary Committee is inclined to
confirm the concession on unworked coal-mines, which it considers a very
important one. Two representatives of foreign powers were in Georgia and
did not leave at the time of the Soviet coup—the Italian and the
German—most important circumstance, as it is desirable to develop
relations with these countries, by means, among others, of
concessions. Italy even had a concession agreement with

Georgia, while in Germany the situation is that some German capitalists own
a tremendous per cent of the Chiatura manganese mines. The thing is to
transfer the right of ownership to a lease or a concession, that is, to
grant on lease to the German capitalists the very mines which they owned as
property. Owing to the change in the political situation in the Caucasus,
the circumstances are favourable for concession relations. The important
thing for us is to force windows open one after another. The agreement with

Britain [7] was that of a Socialist Republic with a bourgeois state, an
agreement that imposed upon us a certain burden.

To the first state with whom we concluded an agreement we gave a much
greater part of our gold fund than we have given to others. But the
consequences have shown that thanks to this agreement we have forced open a
window of sorts. It is from this point of view that we should judge every
concession.

Germany and Italy, owing to their economic position, are obliged to
seek an alliance with Russia. For Russia,,an alliance with Germany opens up
vast economic prospects, irrespective of whether or not the German
revolution will soon win a victory there. We can come to terms even with a
bourgeois government in Germany, because the Versailles Treaty has made
Germany’s position impossible, whereas an alliance with Russia opens up
entirely different possibilities. Since Italy has no fuel resources of her
own, they have taken a coal-mining concession in the Caucasus at
coal-fields that have never been worked before. I should not be surprised
to see the Germans hankering after oil concessions, as Germany has no fuel
at all.

One of the comrades here said that the Kamchatka concession would not
improve the condition of the workers. That is absolutely wrong. And Comrade
Ryazanov was quite wrong when he tried to crack a joke about our dealings
with Vanderlip turning out to be a Vander-slip. True, we made one
mistake—our telegram to Harding. But since we have had no agreements or
relations with ’America till now’ there was no mistake on our part, and we
only found out that Vanderlip had been boasting of his connections with
the American Administration. Now it is quite possible that in sending our
representatives to Canada, where we are to buy locomotives, that through this side door we may gain, some access to the
American market.

Negotiations for Kamchatka concessions are beginning to stir now, and
it is quite wrong to say that these concessions will not improve the
condition of the workers. If these concessions materialise, there will be
an undoubted improvement in the condition of the workers, because we shall
be receiving a certain deduction share, 2 per cent I believe, and when we
have nothing at all, even 2 per cent is something. If we get 20,000 out of
one million and use it for an exchange with the peasants, this will give us
some of the products the workers need.

Further I wanted to point out that some of the remarks you have made
here show that there are disagreements among the trade unionists, or rather
perplexities, which are the only real danger and which we’ among
ourselves’ perhaps by further discussions among the Party members, have to
eliminate. For example, Comrade Marshev spoke about payment having to be
made in cash, and not by coupons. As to the

Amsterdamists [8] and whether they will attack us, we must come to an
arrangement about this.

I recently re-read my pamphlet written in May

1918. [1]

I quoted in it the Menshevik newspaper

Vperyod [9] which the Menshevik Isuv accused the Soviet
government of agreeing to concessions’ of having deals with bourgeois
states. It is an old trick of the Mensheviks to blame us for granting
concessions. Quite a few groups have already taken shape in this connection
in Western Europe. The Communists understand that concessions are a treaty
of Brest, which we are obliged to put up with because of the ruined state
of a country with a predominantly peasant population. Everyone understands
that regeneration of the country without a big industry is
unthinkable.

The Communists of Germany understand why we have to give ground, but
the Scheidemanns and the II/2 International say that these concessions are
proof of our complete failure, and I remember at a meeting last year I
mentioned the American chauvinist

Spargo, [2] who specialised in writing a heap of books about the Bolsheviks in the vein of our Alexinsky,
and in connection with the concessions he all but performed a dance of
triumph. I mentioned at the time that this was an utter
distortion. Yesterday international capital was out to strangle us, and
today we have a number of agreements with this international capital.

We are making sacrifices in giving away to foreign capital millions’
worth of valuable materials from which they can make profits running into
hundreds of per cent. These are sacrifices which we are making deliberately
and consciously. But at the same time we should note that while allowing
them to make any profit they like, we are receiving the advantages we need
ourselves, i.e., increased output, and as far as possible an improvement in
the condition of our workers, both those employed at the concession
enterprises and those not so employed.

Comrade Shlyapnikov said here that it would be a good .thing to grant a
concession to Russian workers. The idea is absurd. We would then have to
guarantee fuel, etc., a thing which we can’t guarantee even to our most
essential enterprises. We are bad off for fuel. The idea of a concession
agreement with Russian workers’ generally speaking, is permissible in
principle, but such a solution of the problem for our big industry is not
serious, since we cannot guarantee them anything, whereas foreign
concessionaires can bring in supplies from abroad. That is what
distinguishes the agreement with foreign capitalists. They have the world
market, we have no secure economic base and would have to spend ten years
creating it. This is what we must soberly take into account. All our people
engaged in this problem have proved this situation.

We know that the electrification plan is the most economical one. We
cannot lease our big factories to the Russian workers. We must stake here
on small industry’ develop it and not rail at our tax-in-kind measures the
way Comrade Ryazanov does, or the author of that pamphlet which says that
we are putting through anarcho-syndicalist laws.

As regards the development of small industry, we must take several
steps, as we can get something out of it right now without state
guarantees, and since we cannot guarantee even our most essential factories, we must do everything we can to develop
small industry, which will give us a certain amount of produce which the
peasants need.

On the question of cash or coupons I would say this: it would be
something to fear if the capitalists had the power, but we have nothing to
fear, since all the factories and enterprises are in our hands, and we
haven’t leased a tenth part of them to the capitalists. I repeat’ we have
nothing to fear from coupons’ as the capitalists will be obliged to stock
the goods we tell them to’ not just salted fish, as was mentioned here, but
such-and-such products. Since we are taking the norm of a foreign worker,
we know that under this norm he gets even more and better products than the
Russian worker does.

Comrade Shlyapnikov here said: “We have seen concessions.” Both
Comrade Shlyapnikov and many practical workers make this mistake. I have
heard people say: “Your idea of concessions is schematic. The capitalist
has always tricked the most experienced Russian lawyers.” To be sure he
did’ when state power was in the capitalist’s hands and he was
all-powerful. What was that state power? A committee for the affairs of the
propertied master class—that’s what it was. A committee for the affairs
of the landowners and capitalists—that was what the capitalist government
was. But if we, having in our hands most of the factories, mills and
railways, with our Party standing at the head—with communist cells below
and Communists on top—if we do not hold our own in such conditions, then
we might as well commit suicide. And that is panic!

We are not that bad though 1 think, to allow ourselves to be tricked,
and if we have already concluded several agreements in which the
governments in France and Britain had the services of first-class bourgeois
diplomats, and if even under these conditions we have not once been
tricked, then why should we panic at the idea of being tricked by coupons?
Let me remind you of the treaty of Brest. In what way was this treaty
difficult? What were the difficulties of defence? When I was asked whether
I had any hopes of our being able to fool the Germans, I was obliged, in my
official capacity, to say that I did not. But now the treaty of Brest is
past history.

I don’t know whether the pamphlet Comrade Kamenev was preparing has
come out (it deals there with Ludendorf), but I do know that Ludendorf has
written a brilliant volume of memoirs in which ten pages are devoted to the
Brest negotiations. When Kamenev and I read that chapter we said: “This is
the best justification of the Brest Treaty.” He tells how Trotsky and the
others had driven them into a corner during the talks, how they were
outwitted, and so on. We decided there and then that these pages had to be
translated and published with a short preface by Comrade Kamenev, and the
fact that this hasn’t been done yet is a specimen of Soviet ineptitude. Or
take a fact like this. We know that Comrade Joffe, our Ambassador to the
German Government, was expelled from Germany on the eve of the revolution
there. After this, don’t try to guess who is going to trick whom. Don’t let
us lay down how many days will pass between the conclusion of the first
concession agreement and the first big European revolution. That is why’ on
the question of agreements, I maintain that the comrades are absolutely
wrong. There’s nothing to worry about.

The agreements will say what goods they are to have and at what
price. We can agree to any coupons or ration books. If they break the
agreement we have the right to cancel it immediately. The agreement is a
civil contract. I haven’t gone into the question of what arbitration there
is to be and who is to settle disputes, but I shall run through the initial
draft of the agreement with the Swedish corporation. It says here:
“Differences are settled....”

People here have brought academicians into play, and these will try to
bring the lawyers into play. I remember Bebel saying that lawyers were the
most reactionary and at the same time bourgeois’ people. Of course’ we can
mend this somehow’ but there is nothing at all to worry about. If the
concessionaires were to lay down this condition we could accept it. Once
the agreement stipulates precisely that there are to be such-and-such goods
and payment on the ration book is to be made in such-and-such a way, we can
agree to this, and the Socialist Republic has nothing to fear from coupons
or ration books. It was further stated that Point 9 was bad because we
would be drawing away from the international

T.U.C. [10] Lozovsky threatened that the

Amsterdam people would slam us, but they will slam us all the same on all
other points, and end up’ as always, with slamming themselves.

You remember how the Mensheviks intended slamming us for having made
the slightest concessions to the capitalists. When we wanted to overthrow
capitalism’ they said we would overthrow it only for a few days’ but when
we have overthrown it for a few years, they are trying to set another trap
for us. They are trying to lure the enemy into a spot where he is sure to
be beaten.

First they called us utopians, then invited us to jump from the fifth
floor. We know that we have many small businesses. Petty proprietors are
our opponents. The petty-bourgeois element is our most dangerous
enemy. Brokers and leaseholders are the lesser enemy. Bureaucracy’ too, and
bureaucratic abuses are our enemy.

In regard to the point Comrade Lozovsky spoke about’ I will say
this—listen to it carefully. It says: “The trade unions shall not have
the right to demand application of Russian pay rates or of Russian rules of
employment to that category of workers.” It speaks here of the Russian
trade unions, and I am told about the international unions. Naturally, when
the capitalists see the Russian terms’ they say they are communist terms,
ridiculous terms, and that the Russian trade unions have no right to demand
Russian terms of employment, which are likely to be pretty stiff and
far-fetched’ but they do have a full right to apply international trade
union agreements. This is good enough. Nothing is mentioned here about
strikes’ about their being banned. The thing is to be able not to mention
everything before its time.

As to improving the condition of the Russian worker, Comrade Marshev
and Tartakovsky have made an attack here, saying you won’t be able to cope
with the workers’ you won’t be able to make them work, because if you
provide for one-fifth of them, the other four-fifths won’t want to work
under worse conditions. Do you mean to say we are dealing with workers who
are so foolish, uncultivated and undisciplined? If so, then the only thing
is to panic and commit suicide. If a hundred workers are underfed and we
tell them that we can feed twenty, and no more, do you mean to say they will refuse it? So far we have not come up against anything like it. We
have managed somehow to feed workers in certain branches of industry, but
not all of them, yet the workers didn’t all run away from these
enterprises, whereas they all did from other enterprises. Can the Russian
worker be so spoilt by the mistakes of Soviet power that he cannot figure
out that it were better to feed at least 20 people than to make the whole
hundred go hungry? There is a good deal here that ought not to be spoken
about before its time. Why can’t it be arranged for people to take turns in
working for the capitalists? The workers would work six months, get working
clothes, then give others a chance to feed up. Of course’ we shall have to
break down prejudices here.

When concessionaires come here, we must restrain our trade unions from
making excessive demands. You know that the usual term of an agreement is a
short one. In Europe there are no long-term agreements. The usual term is
six months. In this way the workers will be able to feed up, get boots and
clothes, then quit and make way for others.

Is it so impossible to arrange things so that a man works six months,
feeds up’ gets American boots and clothes, and makes room for the next man?
It will be difficult, of course. It will demand a higher degree of
organisation and discipline than we have’ but it is not impossible. If we
have contrived to keep a hold on the workers agai st an invasion of foreign
capital during three years of terrible famine, do you mean to say we won’t
manage it this time? I realise only too well what difficulties confront us
here. And therefore I say that concessions do not signify the advent of
peace among the classes. Concessions are a continuation of the war among
the classes.

If previously the war could be expressed in—111 get you through
starvation and you’ll get nothing’ now I say that I want to give the
workers a pair of boots each, but I want them to work six months. And we’ll
fight for all the workers getting boots. We do not reject strikes, all this
remains in our hands, if only we are reasonable and try to put the accent
now on what we can do to attract the capitalists.

People here have talked about what a great danger this is, saying that
the capitalist will come and trick us, but I assert that there is no
danger, and that in the interests of raising productivity it is desirable that he should come, because he has a
splendidly organised base and splendidly equipped factories’ where we can
order the necessary parts without having to buy them on the open market’
where there is only junk. The first-class factories have their orders
booked up for several years ahead. Even if we paid in gold we would not
receive anything’ whereas a member of the syndicate would get everything he
wanted. We wouldn’t mind paying him extra if it meant improving the
condition of at least a small section of the workers and peasants, because
each extra product will go to the peasants in exchange for grain’ and that
will create stable relations between the working class and the
peasantry.

Winding up, I would ask the trade unionists to waive questions of
principle and disputes. All these are idle disputes’ sheer
scholasticism. They should be dropped. Attention should be wholly directed
to those practical terms of concession agreements from which we, if we are
sensible, may derive benefit for ourselves. The trade unionists and Party
leaders should display here their inventiveness and practical knowledge of
conditions, of which we cannot and shall not speak about in the press,
because the Russian press is being followed by the capitalists, just as
during the Brest talks we did not speak about the instructions that had
been given to Comrade Joffe. We shall give practical attention to the
practical methods by which we can derive benefit in the way of improving
the condition of the workers and peasants. Every such improvement is of
tremendous importance to us. This is where the trade unionists should give
their attention. All trace of friction and prejudice should be
eliminated. It is a difficult business. So far no one has been willing to
conclude a concession agreement with us. They are all expecting us to
present impracticable demands.

We, therefore, on our part must use every effort to conclude several
such agreements. Of course, we shall make a number of mistakes. It is a new
business. So far no socialist republic has ever granted concessions to
capitalists. But we want the trade unionists to help us. There is vast
scope here for interpretations and pressure, including strikes, which
remain in our hands.

| First published in 1932 in Lenin Miscellany XX | |
| --- | --- |
| Printed from the shorthand record | |

---
Notes:
[1]
See Volume 27 of this edition, pages 323-54 .— Ed .

[2]
See Volume 31 of this edition, pages 414 and 430 .— Ed .

[3]
The meeting of the Communist group of the A.C.C.T.U. discussed the
question of concessions and the condition of the workers at the concession
enterprises. The meeting was called because some trade union functionaries
vacillated on this subject, while A. G. Shlyapnikov and D. B, Ryazanov
carried on demagogic propaganda against the idea of concessions.

Lenin made a report on this issue (see present edition, Vol. 32,
pp. 300-15), argued against Shiyapnikov’s and Ryazanov’s statements in the
debate, and made notes of the debate, which he used in his reply to the
debate.

[4]
This refers to the decision on “The Basic Principles of Concessions
Agreements” passed by the C.P.C. on March 29, 1.921, on the basis of
Lenin’s draft. This decision was read out by Lenin in his report on
concessions made at a meeting of the Communist group of the A.C.C.T.U. (see
present edition, Vol. 32, pp. 302-13). In saying that the C.P.C. passed its
decision "in spite of the motion by two very prominent trade unionists",
Lenin apparently had in view M. P. ’l’omsky and A. Z. Holtzmann.

[5]
Lenin is referring to the draft of a concession agreement with the AB
Svenska Kullager Fabriken in Goteborg (AB SKF). The agreement was signed in
April 1923.

[6]
This refers to the agreement signed at Kutaisi between the Georgian
Revolutionary Committee and representatives of the Georgian Menshevik
Government following negotiations held on March 17 and 18, 1921.

[7]
Lenin is referring to the trade agreement between Soviet Russia and
Britain signed on March 16, 1921.

[8]
This refers to the leaders of the Amsterdam International of Trade
Unions-the centre of the international association of reformist trade
unions (founded at the congress in Amsterdam called in July 1919; existed
up to December 1945).

[9]
Vperyod (Forward)-a Menshevik daily, launched in March 1917
in Moscow as the organ of the Moscow organiation of the Mensheviks, and
subsequently as the organ of the R.S.D.L.P. (Menshevik) committees of the
Moscow organisation and the Central Region. On April 2, 1918, it became the
organ also of the Mensheviks’ Central Committee. On May 10, 1918, by an
order of the Vecheka the newspaper was closed down owing to its
counter-revolutionary activities, and the men in charge were
prosecuted. The newspaper resumed publication on May 14 under the name
Vsegda Vperyod! (Ever’Forward!) The paper was closed down for
good in February 1919 by decision of the All-Russia Central Executive
Committee.

[10]
Lenin is referring to the International Council of Trade Unions
organised in July 1920 on the initiative of the Executive Committee of the
Communist International and the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions
to serve as the centre of the world revolutionary trade union movement. At
the first international congress of trade unions held in July 1921 it was
renamed the Red International of Trade Unions (the Profintern).